Catherine Dill Articles

Celebrating Women in Nonproliferation

Women colleagues lead initiatives, publish innovative nonproliferation research, serve as mentors, and speak at conferences (or webinars, in the era of COVID-19).

Legal article (src: Pixabay)

A Model Law Prohibiting Luxury Goods Transfers to North Korea

CNS has developed a model embargo law easily adaptable by UN Member States.

Punggye-ri nuclear test site, North Korea (credit: NTI.org and CNS)

Why North Korea is Destroying its Nuclear Test Site

But what would it take for the country to truly “denuclearise”?

OP#36: The Shadow Sector: North Korea’s Information Technology Networks

OP#36: The Shadow Sector: North Korea’s Information Technology Networks

North Korea’s global IT network undermines sanctions and poses grave cyber-security threats.

Left to right: Dave Schmerler, Jeffrey Lewis, and Melissa Hanham

True Detectives

On California’s magnificent Central Coast, a group of North Korea experts track Pyongyang’s every nuclear move. But—if we’re listening—the story they’re telling us is also about ourselves.

CNS Deputy Director Elena Sokova

CNS Celebrates International Women’s Day

Celebrating the outstanding work and achievements of CNS women leaders, researchers, and staff.

Occasional Paper #34 Pyongsan uranium mine map

OP#34: Open-Source Monitoring of Uranium Mining and Milling for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

Rapidly evolving open-source tools are giving researchers a window into the first step toward a possible nuclear bomb.

Melissa Hanham on PBS NewsHour

Technical and Political Insights into North Korea

Warring words, nuclear tests, and increased missile capabilities: CNS experts on the developments and implications.

Taiwan’s Export Control System: Overview and Recommendations

OP#32: Taiwan’s Export Control System: Overview and Recommendations

Occasional Paper #32 provides an overview and assessment of Taiwan’s export control program, with a focus on strategic high-tech commodities (SHTC).

Five Myths About Missiles

We couldn’t necessarily destroy all of North Korea’s on the ground. Or in the air.