Nonproliferation Review Spring 2001

Volume 8 • Number 1

SPECIAL SECTION — New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements

Introduction
by Michael Moodie & Amy Sands


Revisiting Fred Iklé’s 1961 Question, “After Detection–What?”
by Brad Roberts


The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance
by Jonathan B. Tucker


Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance
by Javed Ali


The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
by Michael Moodie


VIEWPOINTS

South Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing
by Jungmin Kang & H.A. Feiveson


Making “No First Use” Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent
by Alan Dowty


Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors
by Chunyan Ma & Frank von Hippel


Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials
by Roger G. Johnston


REPORTS

Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure
by Oleg Bukharin


Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus: Assessing U.S.-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Achievements
by Evan S. Medeiros


Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
by Scott Parrish

 


Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies