Volume 8 • Number 1
SPECIAL SECTION — New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements
Introduction
by Michael Moodie & Amy Sands
Revisiting Fred Iklé’s 1961 Question, “After Detection–What?”
by Brad Roberts
The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance
by Jonathan B. Tucker
Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance
by Javed Ali
The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
by Michael Moodie
VIEWPOINTS
South Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing
by Jungmin Kang & H.A. Feiveson
Making “No First Use” Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent
by Alan Dowty
Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors
by Chunyan Ma & Frank von Hippel
Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials
by Roger G. Johnston
REPORTS
Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure
by Oleg Bukharin
Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus: Assessing U.S.-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Achievements
by Evan S. Medeiros
Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
by Scott Parrish
Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies
