Russian Nuclear Industry Reforms: Consolidation and Expansion

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Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
May 22, 2007

Russian Nuclear Industry Reforms: Rosatom Head Sergey Kiriyenko

Rosatom Head Sergey Kiriyenko,
Source: WikiMedia Commons

On April 27, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering the creation of Atomenergoprom, a government-owned holding company that will serve as the basis for the consolidation of Russia’s nuclear industry. The decree concludes a series of legislative actions aimed at enabling nuclear industry reforms, the plans for which were first announced by Sergey Kiriyenko, head of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), in February 2006. On February 6, 2007, Putin signed the Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses, which sets the terms for the corporatization and possible partial privatization of the civilian nuclear sector. (1) Earlier, in October 2006, the Russian government adopted the Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex, prepared by Rosatom, which sets ambitious targets for the industry through the year 2015.

The announced goals of the reform are domestic expansion–increasing the share of the nuclear industry in power generation in Russia–and the growth of Russia’s share of the global market for nuclear power generation. Plans include the commissioning of at least 10 new power units in Russia by 2015 and winning 20% of the world nuclear market. (2) Russia seems to be aiming to become the world leader in energy supplies, combining its large oil and gas exports with construction of nuclear power plants abroad and nuclear fuel exports.

At the heart of the reform is the creation of what Kiriyenko has called “a vertically integrated holding,” a giant corporation that would bring together all of the crucial elements of Russia’s nuclear industry–from uranium mining to fuel production to construction of reactors and power plants. (3) Rosatom officials claim that restructuring the industry is necessary to enhance its efficiency and international competitiveness. The law adopted on February 6 makes consolidation possible, allowing the conversion of federal state enterprises in the nuclear industry into joint-stock companies and their merger into one holding, Atomenergoprom. The law, however, grants the Russian president the power to decide which companies are corporatized and merged into the new corporation, as well as which entities will be able to own nuclear materials and installations in Russia. It has been announced on several occasions that the restructuring should take no more than two years, and it seems that the Putin administration is determined to complete it before the 2008 presidential elections. According to the presidential decree, Atomenergoprom should be registered as a joint-stock company by July 2007, and by the end of this year, the federal enterprises designated by the president will be converted into joint-stock companies and integrated into Atomenergoprom. Rosatom will manage the stocks of the new corporation, and the Russian president will appoint its head. (4)

Ambitious in its reach and targets, the reform raises a number of questions concerning the restructuring of the nuclear complex and Russia’s practical ability to advance its nuclear industry, especially in large-scale reactor construction both at home and abroad.

Restructuring the Industry

In summer 2006, the Russian media reported that after its reform the nuclear industry would consist of four “blocks” or branches–the nuclear weapons complex, a nuclear and radiological safety branch, the energy sector, and the scientific branch–each of which will have its own federal development program. The law on the management of stocks and assets of nuclear industry enterprises does not mention this structure but does provide for the separation of the civilian branch of the nuclear industry from the military complex, which is one of the key requirements for competing on international markets.

The law on the management of stocks and assets initiated the reforms by changing the structure of Russia’s nuclear complex, which currently consists of both joint-stock companies and federal state unitary enterprises, the latter often combining civilian and military functions. According to the Explanatory Brief submitted by Rosatom to the Russian Duma (lower house of parliament) together with the draft law, the change in the structure and ownership of nuclear enterprises is necessary to correct the “economic distortions” that arise due to the Soviet-style management of the industry, which involves state planning and cross-subsidies. (5) The February 6 law established the right of legal entities to own nuclear materials, installations, and facilities, as well as providing for the separation of the civilian and defense sectors of nuclear industry. While it authorized the Russian president to approve a list of federal enterprises to be designated as civilian and converted into open joint-stock companies, this should not be construed as a full-scale privatization of the Russian nuclear industry.

The civilian nuclear sector is being consolidated into a joint-stock holding company called the Atomic Energy and Production Complex, or Atomenergoprom, which will be wholly owned by the government. In accordance with the February 6 law, the new presidential decree identified 55 federal enterprises that will be converted into joint-stock companies and incorporated into Atomenergoprom. As expected, the list includes key enterprises in uranium mining and enrichment, fuel fabrication, and nuclear power plant construction, along with a large number of research institutes. Among these facilities are the enrichment plants in Angarsk, Novouralsk, and Seversk, the Rosatomstroy construction concern, the Rosenergoatom nuclear power generating concern, and other key nuclear industry assets. The decree also lists 31 joint-stock companies, the federally-owned shares of which will be contributed to Atomenergoprom. (6) As a result, Atomenergoprom will become a giant state-owned concern, similar to Gazprom, controlling over 80 companies the operations of which range from uranium mining to fuel fabrication, and from the engineering and construction of nuclear power plants to their operation. The only existing corporation in the world that provides services at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and NPP construction is Areva, a multinational public corporation based in France, which Rosatom seems to have taken as a model for Atomenergoprom. The new Russian holding company, however, aims to go even further, to include the management of nuclear power plants in its operations.

Article 3.2 of the law on the management of stocks and assets stipulates that those federal enterprises that the president does not include in the list for transfer to Atomenergoprom will not be subject to corporatization. The presidential decree specifically prohibits the privatization of 15 “strategic” enterprises and institutes, such as the Mayak Production Association–which includes a spent fuel reprocessing facility. It also remains unclear just how Russia’s nuclear industry will be separated into defense and civilian sectors, and how the companies to be merged into Atomenrgoprom were selected. Neither the new law nor the federal program specified the criteria used in the creation of the lists and how the separation/conversion should proceed after approval. From the presidential decree, however, it is evident that the enterprises selected for the Atomenergoprom merger include the most profitable companies that play key roles in the fuel cycle, NPP construction, and nuclear exports. It is likely that Rosatom played a major role in preparing the list of enterprises included in the presidential decree.

The presidential decree also designates three state-owned advanced education and professional development institutes to be transferred to the new concern. As was predicted by Russian media, these are the three major nuclear institutes in Obninsk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. In addition, 27 research institutes specializing in nuclear physics and related research are also included in the president’s list of enterprises to be privatized and merged into Atomenergoprom. It appears that none of those institutes will then be involved in military-related research, although in a recent interview, former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov highlighted the difficulties of separating research institutes into civilian and defense establishments, as the research personnel working in the two spheres is essentially the same. (7)

While the February 6 law established the right of legal entities to own nuclear materials and installations, it also stipulated that the president approve a list of nuclear materials that may be owned only by the state. The new decree includes this list along with the list of entities, all of which are Russian-owned, that can own nuclear materials and installations. The decree grants the right to own nuclear materials to 24 enterprises and institutes, while 13 enterprises are entitled to own nuclear installations. Again, neither the decree nor the law specified the agency in charge of creating these lists or the criteria used to do so.

A significant change in policy introduced by the February 6 law was the recognition of the right of foreign states to retain ownership over nuclear materials temporarily brought into Russia (e.g. natural uranium or UF6 brought to Russia for enrichment); previously such material was subject to nationalization. (8) This arrangement should help enable the operation of the international uranium enrichment center that Russia is opening in cooperation with Kazakhstan.

Atomenergoprom: From Mining to Power Generation

In the first half of 2006, the Russian media actively debated whether Atomenergoprom would be created on the basis of TVEL, a state-owned joint-stock company that controls several key nuclear fuel-manufacturing enterprises, or Tekhsnabeksport (TENEX), a state-owned joint-stock company dealing with nuclear exports. As it turns out, the presidential decree does not specify any single company as the “leader.” It appears that the core of Atomenergoprom is comprised of TVEL, TENEX, and Rosenergoatom (the federal unitary enterprise managing nuclear power generation).

Throughout 2006, both TVEL and TENEX actively worked to increase their control over various sectors of the nuclear industry, especially uranium mining and reactor construction. In May 2006, TVEL purchased additional stocks of Atomstroyeksport, Russia’s only exporter of nuclear reactors, bringing the government-owned share in this previously independent company to 50.2 percent. Since Atomstroyeksport itself is not fully state-owned, it cannot be entirely merged into Atomenergoprom. However, given the goal of expanding the construction of NPPs abroad, it is possible that TVEL or, eventually, Atomenergoprom will try to assume full ownership of Atomstroyeksport through the purchase of the remaining shares. TENEX, owner of a large share in the joint Russian-Kazakh-Kyrgyz uranium mining company Zarechnoye, concluded a long-term agreement on the purchase of Kazakh uranium in June 2006. (9) Later, in November 2006, TVEL and TENEX signed an agreement on the creation of a new uranium mining joint-stock company, Uranovaya Gornorudnaya Kompaniya (UGRK, Uranium Mining Company). TVEL is contributing the three uranium mining companies it owns in Russia to UGRK, while TENEX is transferring its share in Zarechnoye to the new company. (10) Along with TVEL and TENEX, UGRK will be part of Atomenergoprom.

Given that Russian domestic uranium reserves are not sufficient to support the expansion of the nuclear industry at home and abroad, Russia also has been actively seeking partnerships in uranium mining with various other countries, including Canada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and even North Korea. (11) One of the objectives of establishing the Kazakh-Russian international uranium enrichment center in Angarsk is to secure the supply of Kazakh uranium to Russia.

The Russian government has started consolidating control over nuclear engineering and machine building, as NPP construction in Russia and abroad is a key element of nuclear industry reform and development. One important target of this consolidation is the nuclear components of Obyedinennyye mashinostroitelnyye zavody (OMZ, United Machine Building Plants), a major engineering holding company that manufactures several crucial nuclear reactor components. In July 2006, Atomenergomash, a recently established TVEL subsidiary, agreed with Gazprombank to establish a joint venture that would purchase Izhorskiye Zavody (Izhor Plants), part of OMZ-Atom, and a controlling share of OMZ-Spetsstal (OMZ-Special Steel). (12) Izhorskiye Zavody is the only company in Russia that manufactures reactor vessels, core melt retainers, steam generator vessels, and other critical components. Atomenergomash is expected to have a controlling share of the new joint venture.

Earlier, in May 2006, Atomenergomash and EMAlyans signed an agreement to create a joint machine building holding company called EMAlyans-Atom. EMAlyans is a large holding company that controls several key enterprises specializing in machine building for energy industries. The newly created EMAlyans-Atom owns controlling shares in two companies that specialize in the engineering and production of equipment for nuclear power plants. In February 2007, Atomenergomash completed the purchase of a controlling share of EMAlyans-Atom. (13)

Kiriyenko was recently quoted at saying there was no need to include companies dealing with spent fuel reprocessing and storage/disposal in Atomenergoprom, and the presidential decree does not list spent fuel management as one of the company’s priority activities. (14) Rosatom has generally been backing away from its earlier plans to import foreign spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for reprocessing in Russia. Previously, Russia hoped to earn up to $20 billion by importing and reprocessing SNF, and in 2001, in a move that was criticized by domestic environmental groups, even amended its legislation to permit such operations. However, beginning in 2006, Rosatom officials have indicated a reversal in these plans, which may mean that Russia no longer sees foreign SNF reprocessing as a profitable venture. At the same time, Russian fuel supply agreements are expected to include a spent fuel take-back clause and the federal program has among its objectives the development of facilities for spent nuclear fuel. Russia also remains a believer in the so-called closed nuclear cycle, which includes reprocessing of spent fuel for its re-use in reactors. It seems that for now spent fuel management companies will remain in state ownership. Rosatom has not yet specified if Atomenergoprom will contract federal enterprises for SNF storage and reprocessing, but it seems likely. Should SNF management services prove profitable in future, the possibility of incorporating SNF management companies into Atomenergoprom cannot be ruled out.

Nuclear Power Plant Construction: Plans and Targets

As stated in the Federal Targeted Program, Russian electricity consumption is growing rapidly, exceeding the growth rate envisioned in the government’s Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2020 by 50 percent on average. (15) While the nuclear industry’s share of electricity generation in Russia was 16 percent in 2005, absent reform it is forecasted to fall to two percent. The reform aims to end the current stagnation of the industry to avoid the shrinking of its share in domestic power generation and to begin increasing that share, reaching 18.6 percent by 2015 and possibly 25 percent by 2030. (16) To this end, the development program envisions the commissioning of new power units at the country’s nuclear power plants, increasing the total capacity by 2 GW annually. (17)

The nuclear industry development program covers the period between 2007 and 2010 in detail and sets tentative targets up to 2015. It envisions the completion of power units currently under construction at Rostov, Beloyarsk, and Kalinin NPPs, and construction of 10 new power units. None of the reactors is expected to be completed before at least 2011, as funding for the construction is projected to continue into the 2011-2015 phase, while the construction of three of the units is not expected to start before 2011. (18)

According to Kiriyenko, construction of the BN-800 reactor at Beloyarsk NPP remains a high priority and the basis for future development of new fast neutron reactors. (19) The nuclear industry development program allocates 65.58 billion rubles ($2.55 billion) for the construction of this reactor, with 5 billion rubles allocated in 2007. Plans call for BN-800 to be commissioned by 2012, and the work on the next fast neutron reactor, BN-1800, to start immediately after that. (20) At the same time, while the program does mention the plan to construct a MOX fuel production facility, there is no schedule or allocation of funding envisioned to this end. According to the website of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), which is in charge of developing the new fast neutron reactor, the BN-800 reactor is supposed to at least partially operate on MOX–mixed plutonium and uranium oxide–fuel. (21) Under the US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement, Russia has committed to construct a facility for conversion of plutonium into MOX fuel and might be hoping for the international funding for its construction. (22)

Another goal of the program is to enhance the cost effectiveness of the nuclear industry and the economic viability of “nuclear sector organizations.” The program calls for cutting the operational costs of nuclear power plants by 2.5 percent per year, bringing them down to 80 percent of the 2006 level by 2015, along with reducing capital investment per kWh of commissioned capacity in the construction of power units. (23)

Rosatom aims to enhance Russia’s competitiveness on the world nuclear market and increase its share in the construction of new reactors and fuel supply worldwide. It is expected that within 20-30 years, nuclear power units with a total capacity of about 300 GW will be commissioned in developing countries. (24) Sergey Shmatko, Atomstroyeksport president, said Russia is planning to win contracts to construct 20-25 percent of these reactors. (25) It should be noted that Russia expects the construction contracts to come with fuel supply and spent fuel take-back agreements, though this revenue is small compared to the cost of construction. Atomstroyeksport is currently building five power units in various countries and recently won a bid to complete the construction of Belene NPP in Bulgaria.

The most attractive markets for Rosatomprom are Central and Eastern Europe, with whom Russia’s nuclear industry had established ties during the Soviet era, and Asia, since up to 60 new power units are planned to be commissioned in China and India alone within the next two decades. (26) However, whether Russia can effectively compete with Western companies, such as Areva and Westinghouse Electric, remains open to question. Most recently, in December 2006, Atomstroyeksport lost its bid to supply several nuclear reactors to China; the contract, with an estimated value of $5-8 billion, was awarded to Westinghouse. (27) Given the need for additional funding to implement Russia’s nuclear industry reforms, more failures to secure construction contracts abroad in future could deal a serious blow to Rosatom’s plans.

In India, Atomstroyeksport is currently constructing two power units at the Kudankulam NPP, which is to be launched in 2007, and intends to build four more units there. Russia will also supply the Kudankulam plant with nuclear fuel. (28) However, further expansion of nuclear cooperation with India, the plans for which were announced during Putin’s visit to the country in January 2007, will also depend on changes to Nuclear Suppliers’ Group guidelines. (29)

Apart from such giants as China and India, Russia has been discussing NPP construction with a number of other countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, and Vietnam. Russia and Kazakhstan have also agreed on the construction of an NPP in Kazakhstan and established a joint venture to design new small and medium reactors and promote them on domestic and foreign markets. (30) The joint venture is supposed to complete the work on VBER-300–a new “medium-power” light water reactor that Russia also hopes to start selling to developing countries, as it is smaller than the VVER-1000, cheaper, and easier to build. (31) The VBER-300 is to come in both land-based and floating variants.

Financing Nuclear Industry Expansion

The total amount of funding allocated by the Russian government for the implementation of the nuclear industry development program in 2007-2015 is 674.8 billion rubles ($26.2 billion), all of which is to be invested in the construction of nuclear power reactors. However, the estimated total amount needed for program implementation is 1,471.4 billion rubles ($57.2 billion). (32) Therefore, to go ahead with the reform and expansion of the nuclear industry, the new holding company and the companies associated with it will have to raise an additional 796.6 billion rubles (about $31 billion) through loans and foreign contracts for NPP construction and fuel supplies.

In the past year, Rosatom and several key companies in the industry have been actively negotiating and signing new agreements with banks to secure financing. Gazprombank figures especially prominently in the plans for nuclear industry expansion. The bank has declared its readiness to finance Rosatom’s projects in nuclear engineering and signed cooperation agreements with several state-owned nuclear enterprises. In February 2007, Gazprombank and TENEX concluded a cooperation agreement, one of the aspects of which is the financing of TENEX programs aimed at increasing nuclear exports and investment in uranium mining abroad. (33) As noted earlier, Gazprombank and Atomenergomash have signed an agreement on establishing a joint venture to acquire shares in the machine building industry. (34) (The majority owner of OMZ is a group of investors represented by Gazprom, which also owns a controlling share in Gazprombank. Gazprombank is also a partner of TVEL, Rosenergoatom, and Atomstroyeksport.)

In the meantime, Atomstroyeksport has signed an agreement with Vneshekonombank on financing NPP construction projects abroad, which covers two NPPs under construction in China and India. And on September 15, 2006, Rosatom and Vneshtorgbank signed a cooperation agreement under which the bank will support the expansion of nuclear exports and participate in financing Rosatom’s nuclear energy programs and foreign contracts. (35)

Conclusion

The ongoing reform of Russia’s nuclear industry is remarkable in many respects. While one of its main objectives is the shift of the management of civilian nuclear enterprises from inefficient government planning to a corporate mode, the reform will also consolidate all of the crucial elements of the industry into one government-owned organization. If thoroughly planned and carefully implemented, this “vertical integration” could indeed help enhance Russia’s competitiveness on the world nuclear market through cutting the industry’s costs and improving the cohesiveness of the activities of its various elements.

However, the scale of the current reform plans raises questions about their feasibility, while the decisions and changes taking place seem rather rushed and worked out “on the fly.” Given the sweeping powers granted by the new law to the Russian president, and the speed with which the reform is progressing, it seems clear that Rosatom and the Kremlin intend to complete the reforms while President Putin is in power. On the one hand, the high priority assigned to the reform is likely to guarantee the allocation of necessary funding for the industry and speed up the otherwise protracted processes of implementing changes and projects. On the other hand, the urge to complete the reform as soon as possible may lead to certain problems being overlooked rather than addressed in the early stages. There area already some discrepancies between the provisions of the February 6 law and the presidential decree; if the reorganization overall is not well thought through, the consolidation of the industry risks creating more confusion than efficient solutions.

Another important question is whether industry reform and development plans are realistic at all. Given the stagnation of Russia’s nuclear industry, slow progress in reactor construction, the limited capacities of machine building plants, and recent setbacks in NPP construction abroad, the targets and optimism concerning large-scale construction of NPPs inside and outside of Russia appear unwarranted. Russia’s plans to win a bigger share of foreign markets could be significantly aided by the successful conclusion of the US-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, currently being negotiated between the two states. This agreement will open some new markets to Russia, particularly in Asia. However, even with the opening of new markets it is questionable that Russia will make enough profits to finance domestic expansion plans, as the Russian nuclear industry does not yet appear ready to actually capitalize on the potential opening of the markets. It will take time for the Russian nuclear industry to increase its reactor construction capacity and overall efficiency, both needed to win and honor foreign NPP construction contracts.

Finally, the law on the management of stocks and assets of nuclear enterprises does not specify any procedures for the actual separation of the defense and civilian sectors of the nuclear industry, beyond the provision for a president-approved list of enterprises subject to privatization. The issue is fairly straightforward when it comes to enterprises that are already designated as entirely civilian, but the precise fate of the facilities that currently have both military and civilian functions, as well as research institutes, remains unclear. Overall, it remains to be seen if after the reform’s high-speed start there will be sufficient follow-through, and if the management of the new holding company will be able adequately to address current problems related to construction capacity, reactor safety, and financing. Thus far, it seems unlikely that the many targets set forth in the nuclear industry development program can be achieved in the time frame indicated.

Notes

(1) The full title of the law is the Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.
(2) Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex 2007-2010 and up to 2015, October 6, 2006; Georgiy Bovt, “Alla Belova – You can bring a horse to water but you cannot make it drink,” Profil, February 26, 2007.
(3) “Atomnyy kush” (Atomic stake) Profil, in Integrum database, June 12, 2006, http://www.integrum.ru.
(4) “Prezident Rossii podpisal Ukaz o sozdanii OAO ‘Atomnergoprom'” (Russian President signed decree on the creation of Atomenergoprom), Regnum News Agency, April 27, 2007.
(5) Explanatory Brief on the Draft Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency.
(6) “Prezident Rossii podpisal Ukaz o sozdanii OAO ‘Atomnergoprom,'” op. cit.; The Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, Article 3.
(7) “Atom rezhut po zhivomu” (Atom under vivisection), Moskovskiye Novosti, March 2, 2007, http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2007-8-31.
(8) The Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, Article 12.
(9) “Po porucheniyu Prezidenta Rossiyskoi Federatsii Rosatom pristupayet k prakticheskoy realizatsii proyektov s kazakhstanskimi partnerami v oblasti dobychi i pererabotki urana” (Under the order of the Russian Federation president, Rosatom is starting the implementation of uranium mining and processing projects with its Kazakhstani partners), TENEX website, http://www.tenex.ru/digest/Zarechnoe_new.htm.
(10) “Rossiyskiye uranovyye rudniki obyedinili v kompaniyu” (Russian uranium mines united into one company), Lenta.ru, in Integrum database, November 2, 2006, http://www.integrum.ru.
(11) “Russia uranium plans may include N. Korea,” United Press International, March 29, 2007, http://www.upi.com/Energy/russia_uranium_plans_may_include_n_korea/20070329-115657-2357r/.
(12) “Atomenergomash i Gazprombank podpisali soglasheniye o sozdanii SP po upravleniyu Izhorskimi zavodami” (Atomenergomash and Gazprom signed an agreement on establishing a joint venture to manage Izhorsiye Zavody), Rosatom press release, July 15, 2006, http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=35099&idChannel=73.
(13) “OAO ‘Atomenergomash’zavershilo sdelku po priobreteniyu kontrolnogo paketa aktsiy OAO ‘EMAlyans-Atom'” (Atomenergomash has completed the purchase of a controlling share in EMAlyans-Atom), EMAlyans press center, February 5, 2007, http://www.em-alliance.com/ru/press/news/index.asp?nid=113&p=4.
(14) “Duma passes bill on nuclear sector reform,” RIA Novosti, January 9, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070119/59353751.html.
(15) Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex 2007-2010 and till 2015, October 6, 2006.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid., Section II.
(18) Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex 2007-2010 and up to 2015, Annex IV, October 6, 2006.
(19) Oksana Korotkova, “Dayesh mirnyi atom sovetskimi tempami?” (Peaceful atom with a Soviet pace?), Nakanune.ru, June 1, 2006, http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/Budet_razvitie_atomnojj_jenergetiki.
(20) Ibid.
(21) BN-800 Reactor Project, website of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, http://www.ippe.obninsk.ru/rpr/3-4rpr.php.
(22) “United States-Russian Federation Plutonium Disposition Agreement,” Russia: Full-text Documents, NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/plutdisp/factsht.htm.
(23) Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex 2007-2010 and up to 2015, Section II, October 6, 2006.
(24) “Intervyu: Sergey Shmatko, president ‘Atomstroyeksporta'” (Interview: Sergey Shmatko, Atomstroyeksport president), Vedomosti, in Integrum database, June 22, 2006, www.integrum.ru.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Vladimir Rychin, “Rossiyskiy atom: Aleksandr Glukhov: Na konu 25 milliardov dollarov” (Russian atom: Aleksandr Glukhov: 25 billion dollars on stake), Iran News, in Integrum database, April 14, 2006, www.integrum.ru.
(27) Keith Bradsher, “Westinghouse wins China nuclear reactor bid,” International Herald Tribune, December 17, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/17/business/nuke.php.
(28) “Russia, India to sign deal on building NPPs – Ivanov,” RIA Novosti, January 22, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20070122/59517660.html.
(29) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is an informal group of states that cooperate to ensure that nuclear exports are made according to guidelines, which include safeguards and physical protection requirements and other nonproliferation conditions. Under the current guidelines, NSG members cannot trade in nuclear materials and technologies with states that do not have in place full-scope IAEA safeguards. India is not a member of the NPT and has not accepted full-scope safeguards on its nuclear materials and facilities. The United States has requested that the NSG make an exception in its guidelines for India, after the US president and Indian prime minister agreed to increase civilian nuclear cooperation. The US Congress has approved the bill allowing the Unites States to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with India, but the bill contains a clause that requires NSG approval of the exception for India before such an agreement can come into force.
(30) “The Russian Government has summed up the key results of the activities of the Federal Nuclear Power Agency,” Press Center of Nuclear Energy and Industry, January 9, 2007, http://www.rosatom.ru/en/news/3363_09.01.2007.
(31) “Bolshiye perspektivy ‘malykh’ reaktorov” (The big future of small reactors), Rosatom, August 10, 2006, http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=36150&idChannel=72.
(32) Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex 2007-2010 and up to 2015, executive summary, 6 October, 2006, http://www.rosatom.com/en/news/4033_14.03.2007.
(33) “Generalnyy director OAO ‘Tekhsnabeksport’ Vladimir Smirnov i Predsetadel Pravleniya AB ‘Gazprombank’ Andrey Akimov podpisali Generalnoye soglasheniye o sotrudnichestve,” Press Center of Nuclear Energy and Industry, February 15, 2007, http://www.rosatom.ru/news/3791_15.02.2007.
(34) Tatyana Yegorova, Yelena Medvedeva, and Aleksei Nikolskiy, “Yadernyy bank” (Nuclear Bank), Vedomosti, in Integrum database, July 19, 2006, http://www.integrum.ru.
(35) “Vneshtorgbank pomozhet Rosatomu prodavat produktsiyu za rubezh” (Vneshtorgbank will help Rosatom’s sales abroad), Lenta.ru, in Integrum database, September 15, 2006, http://www.integrum.ru.

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