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Recent Developments in the NIS

Belarusian and Ukrainian Customs Agencies Promote Mutual Cooperation

On August 27, 2004, Alyaksandr Shpilevsky, chairman of the State Customs Committee of Belarus, and Mikola Kalenskiy, chairman of the State Customs Service of Ukraine, met in Minsk to sign two protocols increasing customs cooperation between the two countries. The first protocol provides for interaction in controlling the customs value of goods, while the second protocol deals with sharing information on goods and vehicles crossing the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The protocols will allow to better counter customs legislation violations and improve customs statistics. Belarusian and Ukrainian customs experts will work together to develop an information-sharing mechanism.\[1,2\]

In addition, Shpilevsky and Kalenskiy announced that the two countries plan to introduce joint customs control at the Belarusian-Ukrainian border by late 2004-early 2005 to reduce delays at the border. In 1995, Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement on joint customs control but it was not implemented due to poor customs infrastructure in the two countries. The parties decided to create a joint working group to examine border crossings and decide on the feasibility of joint control. The officials indicated that two border points—Novaya Guta-Novyye Yarilovichi or Novaya Rudnya-Vystupovichi—may become the first border crossings with joint customs control.\[3,4\]


Joint Customs Checkpoint Opened on Kazakhstani-Russian Border

In late August 2004, a joint Kazakhstani-Russian customs checkpoint was opened in Sharbakty, Pavlodar Oblast, in northeast Kazakhstan. The opening of this joint post, agreed to in 2003 and originally scheduled for early July 2004, was delayed due to structural changes in the Russian government and, more particularly, in the Russian State Customs Committee, which was transformed into the Federal Customs Service.\[1,2\]

According to Seytgali Mulkin, head of the Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan Customs Control Department, an integrated control system based on the so-called “one stop shop” principle will be implemented in Sharbakty. Under the arrangement, Kazakhstani and Russian customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary-phytosanitary control, sanitary-quarantine control, and goods certification control officials will conduct necessary control procedures in a single building at the checkpoint. Inspection certificates must be recognized by both parties.\[2\] According to Berdibek Saparbayev, chairman of the Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency, five additional joint checkpoints will be built if the Sharbakty post is deemed a success.\[3\]


Export Control Regulations to Be Amended in Kyrgyz Republic

by Nikolay Ryaguzov, deputy head of the Directorate for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic

At its July 14, 2004 session chaired by prime minister Nikolay Tanayev, the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control of the Kyrgyz Republic tasked the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Economic Development, Industry, and Trade (MEDIT) with creating working groups, one in each ministry, to develop coordinated amendments to Governmental Decree No. 330 of May 4, 2004 On

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**NIS Export Control Observer**, September 2004 2
Measures Establishing a National System of Export Control in the Kyrgyz Republic. Amendments are necessary to eliminate interagency disagreements resulting from the decree between the MOD and MEDIT. Previously, the MOD licensed exports and imports of military goods, nuclear materials, special non-nuclear materials, and means of WMD delivery. Decree No. 330 designated the MEDIT as the government authority to implement export controls with regards to all controlled items. Arguing that exports and imports of sensitive items should remain in their purview for national security reasons, MOD officials initiated the revision process. MOD officials also quoted the recent changes in Russia’s export control system, in which the Federal Technical and Export Control Service under the Russian Ministry of Defense now licenses exports and imports of all controlled items, as another argument supporting their continued control over exports.

Major-General Asylbek Ormokoyev, deputy minister of defense, heads the working group in the Ministry of Defense, and the MEDIT working group is headed by deputy minister Nina Kirichenko. On September 8, 2004, the two working groups held a joint session at the Office of the Prime Minister and agreed on changes to Decree 330 that will allow the MOD to license military goods, nuclear materials, special non-nuclear materials, and means of WMD delivery. The respective government decree draft is currently under interagency review. It is expected that it will be submitted to the government of the Kyrgyz Republic for consideration in October 2004.

Changes in NIS Export Control Personnel

FSTEC Head Appointed Chairman of Commission for Protection of State Secrets

On August 27, 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Edict No. 1130 appointing Sergey Grigorov, currently director of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS), chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission for Protection of State Secrets to replace Boris Alekhin, former deputy prime minister and currently head of the Federal Industry Agency. [1,2] [Editor’s Note: The Interdepartmental Commission for Protection of State Secrets of the Russian Federation is a collegial body that coordinates activities of state agencies involved in the protection of state secrets to facilitate the development and implementation of relevant legislation.]

Before the March 2004 Russian government reform, Grigorov served as chairman of the now-disbanded State Technical Commission (STC) that was responsible for coordination of government and industry activities directed at ensuring the protection of information classified as state or official secrets. As the STC’s successor, the FTECS is also responsible for technical protection of information and state secrets. [3]


International Export Control and WMD Security Assistance Programs

NNSA’s Role in Preventing Weapons Proliferation: CIT Workshop Indigenization Moving Forward

by Richard Talley, U.S. Department of Energy

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is expanding efforts to prevent illicit trade in items and technologies needed to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As part of that work, NNSA’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) has been involved in the development of a package of training modules collectively referred to as the Commodity Identification Training (CIT) program. This program educates foreign customs inspectors and other border enforcement personnel on export control practices and improves their ability to identify dual-use commodities, based on key visual and other distinguishing characteristics.
As in other elements of its work, INECP initiates export control enforcement activities through partnerships between U.S. national laboratory technical experts and counterparts in nuclear and other scientific and engineering institutions in selected foreign states. These experts work together to adapt CIT curricula to address local proliferation threats and to enhance partners’ training capabilities. This ensures that knowledge necessary to identify WMD-related trade reaches all relevant export control personnel in the foreign state, while simultaneously introducing these officers to in-country experts to whom they can refer technical questions that arise during inspections or investigations.

In July 2004, CIT workshops were held in Azerbaijan and Georgia for customs and border security officers. Both countries are seen as possible transshipment countries for nuclear dual-use goods. On July 12-14, a team of technical experts from the U.S. DOE Argonne National Laboratory and the Institute of Radiation Problems of Azerbaijan presented a three-day nuclear dual-use commodity identification training workshop for 25 officers representing eight Azerbaijani customs posts from around the country. The training was held at the Azerbaijani State Customs Regional Training Center. On July 15-16 and July 19-20, two two-day nuclear CIT workshops were held in Georgia for front-line officers at the main headquarters of the Department of the Georgian Border Guard in Tbilisi. The presentations were delivered by technical experts from the Argonne National Laboratory and the E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics. Thirty-seven officers representing six customs and border guard posts participated.

While the INECP, its technical experts, and counterparts abroad recognize the value of the short CIT course format, it is also recognized that two to three days is neither sufficient to cover all the commodities listed in the control lists nor to allow for adequate retention of the workshop material by the participants. Therefore, in many of the countries where INECP is active, work has begun on the development of a semester-long CIT course for front-line officer cadets. On July 7-9, a team from INECP met with instructors from the Academy of the State Customs Service of Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk to discuss the inauguration in the fall of 2004 of a semester-long WMD commodity identification course. This course will be for fifth-year customs cadets and will cover commodities controlled by the various multilateral regimes. Most of the course modules will be presented by academy staff members with Ukrainian and U.S. technical experts serving as consultants and guest lecturers.

At the conclusion of the two- and three-day nuclear CIT workshops in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the U.S. team met with the heads of the countries’ respective customs and border guard agencies. In both countries, the proposal to develop a semester-long CIT course for their training academies was met with enthusiasm. The INECP team is identifying now what further steps need to be taken to fully develop a semester-long, country-specific, self-perpetuating CIT course for these countries.

Earlier, on June 23-24, 2004, INECP and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) sponsored a nonproliferation and export control seminar for Kazakhstani nuclear industries. The workshop was part of INECP’s ongoing support of the EXBS program to improve export controls in Kazakhstan. The goal of the seminar was to improve these enterprises’ knowledge of general export control and nonproliferation topics, Kazakhstani export control requirements, and the procedures necessary for developing internal compliance programs. The attendees included representatives from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, Altrade, Vostok-Isotope, KazSabton, and a Kazakhstan-based branch of the Russian conglomerate TVEL. On June 28, U.S. team members also met with officials from the Agency for Customs Control of Kazakhstan to discuss the possible provision of portable X-ray fluorescence equipment. These devices will be used for the identification of metals at Kazakhstani ports.

CIT and other NNSA international export control training sessions are coordinated and funded in part by the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, which sponsors training and equipment deliveries to countries seeking to strengthen their national export control systems. Funding for projects in Georgia is from the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program. INECP also works globally with supplier countries and countries that might serve as transshipment points for proliferation-sensitive equipment. INECP’s projects reflect NNSA’s goal to promote international nonproliferation and reduce the global danger from WMD.
Embargoes and Sanctions Regimes

U.S. Companies Settle Charges over Illegal Exports

In the United States, a number of government departments and agencies are responsible for investigating violations of U.S. export control regulations. These include:

- The Arms and Strategic Technology Investigations division of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security seeks to prevent terrorist groups and hostile nations from illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology by investigating illegal exports of U.S. munitions and technology. For a list of investigations recently conducted by the division, please see <http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheets/ICEarmsstrategic.htm>.

- The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce is responsible for the regulation of exports for national security, foreign policy, and nonproliferation reasons and the enforcement of those regulations. For a description of investigations conducted by BIS, please see <http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/index.htm>.

- Other government bodies that conduct export investigations include the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State, which licenses defense services and defense (munitions) articles and the Office of Investigations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which licenses nuclear material and equipment.

If found guilty of violating export control regulations, the U.S. companies in most cases pay civil and criminal fines. In some cases, the companies are prohibited from exporting for a certain period of time. Recent U.S. government investigations into exports by U.S. companies have uncovered a number of violations, including illegal exports of military parts and sensitive biotechnology equipment to companies in China, India, and Iran. These include the following:

Rotair
In July 2004, Rotair Industries Inc., a Bridgeport, Connecticut producer of military helicopter parts, paid a $500,000 fine to the federal government for shipping military hardware overseas without a State Department license. ICE launched its probe of Rotair in 1998, after items made by the firm were found to have ended up in Iran. Two subsequent undercover investigations by ICE agents posing as buyers from Austria and the United Kingdom confirmed that Rotair was exporting controlled items without a license. In addition to the fine, the company’s founder agreed to retire and cut ties with Rotair by January 2005. His son agreed to pay a $10,000 fine and spend one year on probation for impeding the federal investigation. The U.S. Department of Defense has suspended Rotair as a contractor. Prior to the suspension, the U.S. military accounted for 75% of Rotair’s business.[1,2,3] Rotair makes replacement parts for helicopters built by Sikorsky Aircraft, a major U.S. manufacturer of commercial, industrial, and military helicopters.[4]

Chyron
In August 2004, a developer of broadcast television graphics software and hardware, Chyron Corporation of Melville, New York, agreed to pay a $15,300 civil penalty to settle charges that it knowingly exported an animation system to the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) Space Applications Center in Ahmedabad, India, in violation of the Export Administration Regulations.

BIS charged that Chyron exported the animation system to the ISRO Space Applications Center without a license, even though the ISRO Space Applications Center was on BIS’s Entity List, requiring that exports to that entity receive prior U.S. government authorization. BIS also charged that Chyron made a misrepresentation on the Shipper’s Export Declaration when submitting the required shipping documents. Chyron fully cooperated with the investigation.[5]

Interaero
In August 2004, a Westlake Village, California, aircraft parts supplier, Interaero, Inc., pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act. In pleading guilty, Interaero admitted to exporting, between June 2000 and March 2001, six shipments of military aircraft parts, valued at over $40,000, to the People’s Republic of China, including parts for F-4 Phantom Fighters, F-5 Phantom/Tiger Fighters, and Hawk Missiles, without the required Department of
State export licenses. Under the plea agreement, Interaero has agreed to pay a criminal fine of $500,000 and receive five years of corporate probation. According to a U.S. Department of Justice press release, Interaero knew it was selling the equipment to a buyer in China who planned to forward the parts to Iran. Under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, transfer of military aircraft parts is prohibited without an export license. Furthermore, the United States currently has embargoes in place against the transfer of such parts to China and Iran. The company pleaded guilty following an undercover investigation by ICE, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. Interaero is scheduled to be formally sentenced on October 26, 2004.[6]

New Brunswick Scientific
In August 2004, New Brunswick Scientific of Edison, New Jersey, agreed to pay a $51,000 civil penalty to settle charges that it exported various types of laboratory equipment and other items to India, Israel, and Taiwan in violation of the Export Administration Regulations.

BIS charged that, on seven occasions between March 13, 1999 and August 24, 2001, New Brunswick Scientific exported various types of laboratory equipment and other items to India, Israel, and Taiwan without the required export licenses. BIS also charged that New Brunswick Scientific made false statements on export control documents and, in certain instances, failed to file the requisite export control documents. At the time of the exports to India, two of the recipients of such shipments were on BIS’s Entity List, requiring exports to those entities to receive prior U.S. government authorization.[7]

New Brunswick Scientific manufactures research and production-scale equipment for culture growth, detection, and storage. Its products include biological and combinatorial-chemistry shakers, fermentors and cell culture bioreactors, CO2 incubators, biological air samplers, automated plate preparation equipment, and ultra-low temperature freezers. The company also provides a range of contract research services, and has an active used equipment program.[8]


Summaries from the NIS Press

International Team Assesses Control on Tajik-Afghan Border
An international team comprised of representatives from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the embassies of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and drug control agencies from Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, met in Tajikistan in mid-August 2004 to assess that country’s border and customs services performed in the Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region, which borders Afghanistan. The group, created at the initiative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, will make recommendations aimed at raising overall standards, making sure the checkpoints have necessary equipment to prevent smuggling, and improving the skill of border control personnel. According to Sergey Bozhko, the program coordinator of the UN drug mission to Tajikistan, the group will travel from Badakhshon to the Langar section of the border, patrolled by the Ishkoshim border detachment, and on to the Khatlon Region, patrolled by the Panj and Moskva detachments.

Smugglers Attempt to Transfer Russian Tank Parts to Lithuania

The Russian daily *Moskovskiy komsomolets* reported on two attempts by a Shchelkovo (Moscow Oblast) firm to illegally export tank parts to Lithuania. In July 2004, the firm attempted to move T-80 tank engines through the Shchelkovo customs office by painting the engines bright colors and trying to pass them off as subassemblies for tractors. Shchelkovo customs officials recognized the tank engines for what they were, seized the goods, and initiated criminal proceedings against the firm.[1]

During the investigation, the firm attempted yet another illegal export of military equipment to Lithuania by loading a T-72 tank engine and other parts into a refrigerator truck, trying to pass off the cargo as drilling rigs and spare parts for tractors. The smugglers bypassed their local customs and instead went through the Smolensk customs office. There, too, customs officials were not fooled and seized the truck and its cargo. A second criminal case against the firm has been opened.[1,2]


Tekhsnabeksport to Receive General Licenses to Export Nuclear Materials

According to Directive No. 1032-r of August 7, 2004, signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control is to issue general licenses to Tekhsnabeksport, in accordance with established procedure, for the export of minor amounts of certain nuclear materials.

The list of goods permitted for export includes uranium, plutonium, radium, deuterium, and tritium. The materials are used in a variety of industrial and research settings. Tritium, for example, is used in airport runway lighting and other self-luminous items, while the type of plutonium to be exported (which is not usable in nuclear weapons) is used in power sources for space probes. In the small quantities allowed, the materials do not pose a proliferation risk. The general licenses will be valid until March 19, 2007.[1]

Wholly-owned by the Russian government, Tekhsnabeksport exports goods and services produced by enterprises subordinate to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy.[2,3] The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control, located within the Russian Ministry of Defense, is the successor to the Department of Export Controls, formerly located within the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, which has been abolished.


Rumyantsev: All Nuclear Material Stolen in Russia in Past 25 Years Has Been Recovered

In a September 15, 2004, statement apparently intended to reassure the public of the safety of Russian nuclear materials following a spate of deadly terrorist attacks in the country, Federal Atomic Energy Agency head Aleksandr Rumyantsev stated that all weapons-grade nuclear material stolen in Russia has been recovered. Thefts of weapons-grade nuclear material have “consisted of tens of grams and all have been found and returned in the course of a few years,” according to Rumyantsev. [Editor’s Note: This is far less than would be needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, eight kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium would be needed for this purpose.]

RIA Novosti news agency quoted the agency head as saying that in the past 25 years, approximately 100 kg of “non-weapons grade natural uranium” have been stolen.[1] According to another source, Agence France Press, Rumyantsev noted that only 10% of the 100 kg has been recovered.[2] “Those who steal natural uranium are by and large ignorant people who think that natural uranium may be sold for large sums of money,” said Rumyantsev.[1]
Rumyantsev noted that, “It is clear that terrorists are planning to attack nuclear power stations” and made reassurances that Russian nuclear power plants are under tight security. He called for stepped up efforts to prevent the theft of radioactive materials from industrial and medical facilities. Such thefts have occurred “relatively frequently,” according to Rumyantsev. [2] [Editor’s Note: Such radioactive materials could be used in a device to disperse radioactivity—sometimes known as a “dirty bomb,” but could not be made into a nuclear weapon.]

Editor’s Note: For a review of cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear-weapons materials from the states of the former Soviet Union, see William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illlicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New and What’s True,” <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92potsok.pdf>.

Sources: [1] “Za 25 let v Rossi bylo ukradeno oko 100 kg neoruzheynogo urana glava federalnogo agentstva po atomnoy energii” [100 kg of non-weapons grade uranium have been stolen in Russia over the past 25 years, according to the head of the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy], RIA Novosti, September 15, 2004; in Integrum-Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.


Belgorod Customs Post Detected 145 Radioactive Cargoes During 2004

Citing the Belmedia information agency, Regions.Ru reported on July 23, 2004, that the Belgorod customs post, located in southwest Russia on the Ukrainian border, had conducted customs radiation control on nearly 5 million cargoes and transport vehicles since January 2004. During that same period, there were 145 incidents involving cargoes with elevated radiation levels. Currently, an investigation has been opened regarding a radioactive item not declared by an individual who was crossing the border. In two cases, radioactive cargoes entering Russia from Ukraine were detained and then sent back. The article did not specify how many of the 145 incidents involved attempted imports and how many involved exports nor did it indicate how many incidents involved attempts to illegally transfer radioactive or nuclear material.


International Developments

U.S. Container Security Initiative Operational at 25 Ports

As of the end of August 2004, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a U.S. initiative launched in January 2002 with the aim of securing maritime cargo shipments against terrorist threats, was operational at 25 ports in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. With the August additions of the Malaysian port of Tanjung Pelepas and the Thai port of Laem Chabang, the 25 participating ports represent the world’s major seaports, according to a press release on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website.

According to CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, the United States plans to expand CSI to strategic locations that ship substantial amounts of cargo to the United States and that have the infrastructure and technology in place to participate in the program. “The expansion will extend port security protection to more than 80% of all containers coming to the United States,” said Bonner.

CSI is founded on four core elements: 1) using intelligence and automated information to identify and target all containers that pose a risk for terrorism; (2) pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk; and (4) using smarter, tamper-evident containers.

Editor’s Note: The 25 operational CSI ports are: Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, Canada; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Le Havre, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp, Belgium; Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan; Hong Kong; Göteborg, Sweden; Felixstowe, United Kingdom; Genoa and La Spezia, Italy; Busan, South Korea; Durban, South Africa; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algeciras, Spain; and Laem Chabang, Thailand.

Russia Repatriates Nuclear Fuel from Uzbekistan

Nearly 11 kilograms of Russian-origin enriched uranium fuel, including three kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), have been repatriated to Russia from a research reactor near the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. HEU is potentially usable for nuclear weapons. The fuel was airlifted under guard on September 9, 2004, from an airport outside of Tashkent to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad, Russia, where it will be downblended into low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel suitable for use in nuclear power reactors. LEU cannot be used for nuclear weapons.

The nuclear fuel assemblies were originally supplied to Uzbekistan for use in the Russian-designed 10 megawatt VVR-SM research reactor, located at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Ulugbek, 30 km northeast of Tashkent.

The one-day secret operation was a joint effort between the governments of Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Uzbekistan provided guarded transport for the fuel from the reactor to the airport in Tashkent; Russia supplied transportation canisters and coordinated the implementation of the project; and the IAEA provided safeguards inspectors to confirm the removal of the material from Uzbekistani control to Russia.[1,2,3,4] The United States provided funding and technical expertise under the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The mission of the GTRI is to remove and/or secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and to the international community. Under the GTRI, which is implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy, the United States will work with Russia to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel from non-Russian research centers formerly supported by the Soviet Union. The work is to be completed by the end of 2005. All Soviet-Russian-origin HEU spent fuel is to be repatriated from such centers by 2010.[4,5,6,7]

Two cooling ponds at INP in Ulugbek still house at least 237 irradiated fuel elements containing HEU, which, according to Matthew Bunn of Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, are no longer “self-protecting,” meaning that the material is no longer so radioactive that it would injure anyone who handled it. According to a Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency official, the transfer of these irradiated fuel elements to Russia’s Mayak facility is expected to take place in 2005.[4,5,8]

This is the fifth repatriation of HEU fuel to Russia since August 2002. Earlier transfers involved Russian-origin fuel from Serbia and Montenegro (August 2002), Romania (September 2003), Bulgaria (December 2003), and Libya (March 2004).

Editor’s Note: INP was founded in 1956 as part of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan.[9] INP is often described as the largest facility of its kind in Central Asia and aims to become the primary nuclear research and isotope production facility for the region.[10] In addition to the VVR-SM reactor, the institute houses two cyclotrons, a gamma source facility, a neutron generator, and a radiochemical complex.[11] From 1959 to 1971, the reactor used LEU fuel elements enriched to 10%. (HEU is defined as uranium enriched to more than 20%, but the material enriched to more than 80% is considered the most useful for nuclear weapons.) From 1971 to 1979, the reactor was modernized under a project developed by Russia’s Kurchatov Institute. From 1979 to August 1998, the reactor used IRT-2M type fuel assemblies with 90% HEU-based fuel. The reactor was converted to use 36% HEU under the Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, a process lasting from August 1998 to February 1999. The last of the 90% HEU fuel was loaded into the reactor core in August 1998. Uzbekistan has agreed to further reduce the enrichment level of fuel at the reactor to 19.7% HEU.[3,12]
Workshops and Conferences

Joint Kyrgyz-U.S. Export Control Workshop Held in Bishkek

by Nikolay Ryaguzov, deputy head of the Directorate for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic

On August 23-26, 2004, a joint Kyrgyz-U.S. workshop on control lists of military and dual-use commodities was held in Bishkek. The workshop was organized by the U.S. Department of State and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for Kyrgyz officials involved in export control from the MFA, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Economic Development, Industry, and Trade (MEDIT), Ministry of Environment and Emergency (MEE), Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Security Service, Customs and Border Guard services, and Academy of Science, as well as representatives from local industrial enterprises.

During the first two days, U.S. specialists gave presentations on developing a national control list based on essential principles outlined by international export control regimes. Kyrgyz officials from the MEDIT, MOD, and MEE made presentations on the status of Kyrgyzstan’s export control system and measures for implementing that system. On August 25-26, workshop participants examined the European Union’s (EU) Common List of Military Goods, held commodity identification exercises, discussed the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, and exchanged views on problems in the implementation of Kyrgyzstan’s export control system. U.S. officials in attendance assured their Kyrgyz counterparts that the United States would provide all assistance necessary to support Kyrgyz efforts to implement the country’s export control system.