EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
The views, assessments, judgments, and conclusions in this report are the sole representations of the author and do not necessarily represent either the official position or policy or bear the endorsement of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, or the President and Trustees of Middlebury College.

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
nonproliferation.org

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. CNS at the Monterey Institute of International Studies is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.

Monterey Institute of International Studies
www.miis.edu

The Monterey Institute of International Studies, a graduate school of Middlebury College, provides international professional education in areas of critical importance to a rapidly changing global community, including international policy and management, translation and interpretation, language teaching, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. We prepare students from all over the world to make a meaningful impact in their chosen fields through degree programs characterized by immersive and collaborative learning, and opportunities to acquire and apply practical professional skills. Our students are emerging leaders capable of bridging cultural, organizational, and language divides to produce sustainable, equitable solutions to a variety of global challenges.

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
460 Pierce St., Monterey, CA 93940, U.S.A.
Tel: +1 (831) 647-4154
Fax: +1 (831) 647-3519

ISBN 978-0-9892361-2-6

© The President and Trustees of Middlebury College, April 2013
Cover image: www.istockphoto.com
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS ADOPTED AT THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

DISARMAMENT ACTIONS 1-22

2013 Monitoring Report

Executive Summary

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

With research assistance by Himayu Shiotani, Steven Anderle, Luejit Tinpanga, Jessica Bufford, and Casey Mahoney

JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ONLY.

The full version of this report can be found on our website, www.nonproliferation.org.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Three years after the adoption of an Action Plan by the states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), progress on implementing its disarmament section remains very limited. US-Russian dialogue on measures beyond the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (or New START) has been at a virtual standstill since late 2011, and the United Kingdom is the only nuclear weapon state (NWS) that has announced unilateral arsenal reductions since May 2010. The prospects of US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the near future appear dim, which also reduces the probability of other Annex 2 states—the ratification by which is required for CTBT’s entry-into-force—joining the ban. The new NWS (P5) consultations process has begun addressing transparency and verification issues, but so far has little to show in the way of outcomes. Furthermore, insisting that the focus should be on this consultative mechanism, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and a “step-by-step” approach, the NWS have rejected new initiatives such as an open-ended working group on multilateral nuclear disarmament and the conference on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that took place in Norway in March 2013.

NPT member states are approaching the second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which will convene in Geneva on April 22-May 3, 2013, against a mixed background. On the one hand, there is frustration with the stalemate at the traditional fora and stagnation in implementation of the Action Plan. On the other hand, many states—along with civil society—are enthusiastic about new approaches championed by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). However, the factor that may have the biggest impact on the 2013 PrepCom and the rest of the review cycle is the failure to implement fully the recommendations concerning the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. Those recommendations were crucial to the consensus at the 2010 Review Conference, and lack of progress in their implementation has implications for the NPT regime at large.

Background

The Eighth NPT Review Conference (RevCon) concluded on May 28, 2010 with the adoption by consensus of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, which contain 64 action items across the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An additional set of recommendations contained in the final document pertains to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. While the adoption of the Action Plan was widely and deservedly regarded as a success, its long-term impact will depend on the implementation by the NPT member states.

Monitoring and assessment of the Action Plan’s implementation is not an entirely straightforward task considering the number of action items, the range of activities they cover, challenges associated with obtaining reliable information, and the degree of specialized knowledge required. However, it is important for all NPT member states to have
access to information that would allow them to monitor implementation and judge whether progress is being made. With this in mind, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) launched a project tracking the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan and providing regular assessments to all interested parties.

This is the second implementation monitoring report produced by CNS and covers the first 22 action items—on nuclear disarmament, along with Principles and Objective contained in Part A of the Action Plan as well as practical steps on the Middle East. CNS decided to focus on the disarmament section in part due to methodological considerations. The formulation of disarmament section and decisions on the Middle East is significantly more “actionable” than other parts of Conclusions and Recommendations. While the disarmament section was initially conceived as an action plan, negotiated language on nonproliferation and peaceful uses had to be turned into an action-plan format for “balance” across the three pillars. More importantly, however, the project is driven by understanding the centrality of agreement on disarmament to the outcome in 2010 and, consequently, to the 2010-2015 NPT review cycle.

**Methodology**

To track and assess implementation of the Action Plan, CNS developed a set of indicators of progress. For the majority of action items, indicators are formulated as positive statements about measures being undertaken. For example, for Action 16 on fissile material declarations and disposition, one of the indicators is, “States submit declarations/reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on stocks of fissile material declared as no longer needed for military purposes.” Positive responses to an essentially yes/no question about the above statement would indicate progress in implementing Action 16. For most indicators, this format allows for short summary assessments—such as “yes, action implemented,” “no action,” “progress”—on the basis of more detailed information on specific states’ activities. In addition to these categories, “red flags” are used to flag contentious issues or areas of potentially greater concern, should certain observed developments or trends continue in the same vein.

Many action items required more than one indicator, as they encompass different kinds of activities and measures, and had to be broken down into more “digestible” bits. Action 2, for example, commits states to “apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency” in implementing the treaty, and CNS has formulated separate indicators for each of the principles. Indicators form a framework conducive to a dynamic review: for each action item, it is possible to focus on tracking the measures implemented during a particular reporting period, as well as the cumulative progress. Over time, this should allow one to observe change, be it positive or negative, from year to year.

It is necessary to note that evaluation of progress in general is complicated by the near-absence of specific targets and deadlines in the Action Plan. It is not evident if all of the action items, or only some, are expected to be implemented by the 2015 RevCon—or by some other date. NWS are supposed to report on the implementation of Action 5 in particular to the third PrepCom session in 2014, and the 2015 RevCon would then “take
stock and consider the next steps,” but how much is really expected to be accomplished by then is open to interpretation.

While such ambiguity in targets and deadlines is not surprising, it can potentially breed problems further in the review cycle, as NPT members—with their different interpretations and expectations—attempt to assess progress. Inability to cope with such differences would risk derailing the review of Action Plan implementation altogether. At the same time, one must note that at the first PrepCom session in 2012, some convergence of views appeared as to the priorities among the action items, with Actions 2, 3, and 5 receiving particular attention.

**Findings**

The present report is cumulative, covering the developments since the 2010 Review Conference, and highlighting wherever possible the period from April 2012 to April 2013. Our assessment of implementation indicates that the overall progress since 2010 has been very limited and even appears to have slowed down since the 2012 PrepCom. Implementation has continued to be uneven across different NWS and action items, as were the starting points. Most of the measures implemented during the reporting period were initiated or planned before the adoption of the Action Plan, whereas actions that require a significant change in behavior or revision of policies for the most part saw little or no progress in implementation.

Similarly to the last reporting period, most progress was achieved on Action 4, as Russia and the United States continued implementing New START and, to a lesser extent, Action 5(g), with the NWS continuing the discussion of transparency and verification during the P5 consultations. Still, there has been no movement on the second part of Action 4, which calls for follow-on measures to achieve “deeper reductions” in the US and Russian arsenals. The NWS exchanges on verification and transparency issues, while certainly welcome, have also not yet yielded any observable results, such as a standard reporting form or any contributions to the UN repository created pursuant to Action 21. Confidential consultations among the nuclear weapon states, as called for in Action 5, are overall falling short of the expectations of the NNWS. Apart from verification experience, it is unclear to what extent other issues listed in Action 5 have been addressed. The P5 conferences also seem to be increasingly shifting focus to other “pillars” of the NPT and related subjects.

Compared to the first reporting period, there was modest progress on Action 22—implementation of disarmament and nonproliferation education recommendations adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2002. A record number of states submitted contributions for the Secretary-General’s implementation report issued in July 2012, though 10 states is not a very impressive record. The number of states co-sponsoring the biennial UNGA resolution on disarmament and nonproliferation education also increased, and in 2012, the United States joined this list for the first time.

After the positive developments on Action 9 in 2011, when Russia ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the five NWS settled their long-standing disagreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the provisions of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), progress in this area stalled. The US
Senate has not yet considered the protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and the signing of the protocol to the Southeast Asian NWFZ treaty was postponed because several NWS decided to attach reservations or interpretative statements.

An important area where progress has been lacking is the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts (Action 5c, also covered under Action 1), which presumably should provide the overall context for the implementation of other concrete steps. The 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review did signal a somewhat reduced role for nuclear weapons in the state’s doctrine, but at the same time, the United Kingdom is still considering the replacement of Trident, which would preserve its “independent nuclear deterrent” and project national reliance on nuclear weapons for decades ahead. In the United States, military strategy released in 2012 does not exclude the possibility that the US “deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force,” and a new, as yet unrevealed, policy guidance reportedly recommends reducing the US arsenal to about 1,000 deployed warheads. That said, optimization of the size of nuclear forces does not necessarily entail a significant change in the role of nuclear weapons in the national security doctrine. The United States is likely to seek some sort of a new/follow-on arrangement with Russia to implement these cuts. However, Russia—and France—showed no signs of working on further reducing their reliance on nuclear weapons.

In terms of red flags, the report again notes the ongoing modernization of arsenals in the NWS with respect to the development and production of new delivery systems, upgrades of existing ones, increased “effectiveness” of weapons, and extension of their lifetime. Such projects signal continued, long-term reliance on nuclear weapons. During the reporting period, Russia in particular posted advances in production of new strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and continued deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the United States, arsenal modernization projects and decisions might be more affected by budgetary issues in coming years, with the plans for the new plutonium pit production facility already being reconsidered. Overall, though, this updated monitoring report conveys more developments with modernization than on some of the key action items.

Planned or ongoing nuclear cooperation with NPT outlier India is also flagged as a problematic area in the context of advancing NPT universality as well as implementing NWFZ treaties.

While the Principles and Objectives in Part A of the Action Plan were not phrased as action items, perhaps the most remarkable developments took place in the sphere covered by Point v of the Principles and Objectives: humanitarian dimensions of the nuclear weapons problem. On March 4-5, 2013, Norway hosted the first international conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW), focused on practical aspects such as potential effects of nuclear weapons use and preparedness for response. Conference participants included representatives of 127 states, international organizations, and civil society, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. All five NWS, however, refused to attend the conference, dubbing it a “diversion” from the step-by-step approach they prefer.

Most significantly—and most damagingly—the relevant states so far have failed to implement practical steps on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and
all other WMD in the Middle East as endorsed in the 2010 Final Document. Though the NPT depositary states, together with the UN Secretary-General, did appoint a facilitator for the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution and a host country, they were unable to convene the regional conference on the Middle East zone in 2012. Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States could not even agree on how to characterize the postponement of the conference and each announced it separately, while the Arab states never formally agreed to the postponement. As a result, the Arab states have been considering boycotting the 2013 NPT PrepCom, and lack of progress in this area risks undermining the consensus achieved in 2010, particularly with respect to nuclear disarmament.

*****

The full version of this report can be found online at: www.nonproliferation.org.