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A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda

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US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.

Nuclear-arms reductions beyond New START have remained highly controversial. Although advocated by the Barack Obama administration, most of Congress remained skeptical or opposed. Now is the time to move beyond this previously tolerated deadlock and for the United States to engage in arms control.

The reason for a new US policy toward Russia is not nuclear weapons, but rather the other, non-nuclear capabilities, which have been, until now, the sole domain of the United States. Russia, which has achieved parity with the United States in nuclear weapons, is in the final stages of acquiring critical non-nuclear capabilities, which are not regulated by international regimes, primarily because Washington has resisted such limitations. If the situation remains unchanged, the United States will face unrestricted arms races in several key weapons categories and an increased risk of direct military confrontation with Russia (or between Russia and US allies, friends, and clients) with unpredictable escalatory paths. For that reason, a new effort at an agreement with Russia will be in the US national interest and should transcend ideological, political, or party divides.

The US Agenda is Becoming Obsolete

Traditionally, US-Russian arms control has centered on nuclear weapons. Today, there is relatively little interest in either Moscow or Washington in a serious dialogue on that issue. The continuing deadlock is determined not just by the relatively low interest in the further reduction of nuclear weapons, but, more importantly, by a fundamental difference in the framework: the United States wants to limit the dialogue to nuclear weapons (the most recent proposal, made by President Obama in 2013, was to cut the New START ceiling by one-third) while Russia insists on a so-called “integrative” approach, which includes, in addition to nuclear weapons: missile defense; long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons; and “space weapons.”

1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama at the Brandenburg Gate,” Berlin, Germany, June 19, 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-
saying it will not agree to isolate just one element of the global military balance while leaving untouched areas where the United States holds an edge.

That disagreement is not new. Conflict over missile defense began in the 1980s over the Strategic Defense Initiative, resumed in the late 1990s, and continued unabated throughout several iterations of US missile-defense programs. The issue of precision-guided conventional weapons dates back to the 1990s. In its present, comprehensive form, the two frameworks were formulated during the ratification of New START. The ratification resolution adopted by the US Senate ruled out, in no uncertain terms, negotiations over long-range conventional weapons and missile defense; the Russian ratification resolution demanded, in equally strong language, that these two issues be included in any future negotiations on nuclear-arms reductions. Since then, negotiations have become virtually impossible; multiple US-Russian track-one-and-a-half and track-two meetings have invariably failed to produce results due to disagreements on whether these two categories of non-nuclear weapons should be on the negotiating table.

Washington’s resistance to expanding the agenda is rooted in the belief that the United States would always enjoy a technological edge and that it would be folly to undermine the advantage by subjecting it to arms control. This is no longer the case, however. Russia has demonstrated that it has mastered key technologies, used them in combat, and in five to seven years plans to achieve full operational capacity in long-range conventional strike weapons and even sooner in missile defense. As a result, extant US non-nuclear primacy is diminishing, and may even vanish. Other countries—primarily China and India—are on the path toward acquiring the same capabilities.

If Washington continues to reject discussing these issues, it will face an unrestricted arms race in dangerous and potentially destabilizing areas. While the likelihood of nuclear war remains low, the probability of non-nuclear conflict is high—perhaps higher than during the Cold War. Even a small unintended clash can quickly escalate to large-scale conflict and, under extreme circumstances, even to a serious war with risk of nuclear use.

The situation is similar to that of the 1960s and early 1970s, when the Soviet Union was catching up with the United States in nuclear and missile-defense capability. The American response—advocated by both Democratic and Republican administrations—was to engage in arms control. It is worth recalling that the notion of arms control was, in fact, introduced by the United States in 1960s as an alternative to disarmament for stabilizing the strategic relationship and making war less likely. By the end of the 1980s, the US-Soviet (and later US-

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Russian) interaction came to emphasize deep reductions leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in an undefined perspective. Given the depth of the US-Russian disagreements on a broad range of international security issues, it makes sense to return to the beginning: postpone more ambitious goals and attempt old-fashioned arms control. It remains to be seen whether today’s decision makers can display the same boldness and common sense as their predecessors.

At least, modest additional reductions are desirable as a means of placating increasingly assertive non-nuclear states: a little more than a month ago, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of starting, in 2017, negotiations on a legally binding agreement to ban and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.2 The United States and Russia, as well as other nuclear weapons states, voted against the resolution. Neither will, obviously, participate in these negotiations, but the tension with those in favor of banning nuclear weapons is reaching critical levels and cannot simply be waved away.

Putting aside, for the moment, the “space weapons” issue—since not even Moscow can clearly define the term—addressing issues of long-range conventional weapons and missile defense is critical for US and Russian security.3 The rest of this issue brief attempts to formulate a possible negotiating agenda on these two issues and outline complementary measures regarding nuclear weapons.

**Long-Range, Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons**

The United States held a monopoly on these weapons for a quarter of a century—since the 1991 Gulf War. Since nuclear weapons are effectively unusable except to deter others’ use of nuclear weapons, long-range, precision-guided conventional assets gave the United States a near-monopoly on the use of force in support of foreign policy. In 2015, Russia used long-range sea- and air-launched conventional cruise missiles against targets in Syria and has repeated the experience several times in combat since then. That development marked a watershed. Russia has demonstrated that it now has the same capability and is prepared to use it; China and India are rapidly closing the gap, too.

The Russian long-range conventional capability includes sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of more than 1,000 miles, even longer-range (about 3,000 miles) air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), short-range land-based missiles (Iskander), which can reach targets anywhere in Poland and parts of Germany, and a variety of sea- and land-based

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2 The resolution was approved by 123 countries with 38 against (including all nuclear weapons states) and 16 abstaining. For the text and the analysis of the resolution, see “UN Votes to Outlaw Nuclear Weapons in 2017,” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), October 27, 2016, [http://www.icanz.org/campaign-news/un-votes-to-outlaw-nuclear-weapons-in-2017/](http://www.icanz.org/campaign-news/un-votes-to-outlaw-nuclear-weapons-in-2017/).

3 Eventually, however, the United States may be interested in negotiating restrictions on antisatellite weapons.
anti-ship missiles. Recently, it also used anti-ship missiles—the 400-mile-range Onyx—against land targets. The United States has accused Russia of developing a long-range, ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Furthermore, some reports suggest that a new liquid-fueled, heavy strategic missile, Sarmat, which is entering the testing phase of the development program, may have a conventional role in addition to its nuclear mission.4

The technological level of today’s Russian capability roughly matches the capability the United States has had for many years. Moreover, like the United States, Russia is working on a new generation of long-range strike assets, including those with hypersonic speed, some of which may have strategic range.

A full-scale Russian operational capability in long-range conventional weapons is still several years away. Russia needs to produce more weapons and more platforms as well as integrate them into command-and-control structures. Perhaps most importantly, it needs to complete a space-based target acquisition, guidance, and tracking capability. Available information suggests that a full long-range conventional capability is currently planned for around 2022, although it might be delayed as a result of financial constraints and Western sanctions.

An arms-control regime for long-range conventional weapons can be more relaxed than existing nuclear arms-control regimes: conventional weapons are much less powerful and are truly destabilizing only if used in significant numbers; there is no need to engage in “bean counting” or hunt down every weapon. Since both countries plan to keep and upgrade these assets (as well as use them in certain contingencies), the main principle should be management of the capability rather than strict and inflexible limitations.

For conventional ALCMs, it may be sufficient, at least in the foreseeable future, to agree on transparency and confidence-building measures: for example, exchange data on the stockpile and limit the number of strategic bombers equipped with them (for example, an agreed limit on the number of strategic bombers within a 2,000-3,000-mile radius of the other country), as well as advance notifications in case the agreed ceiling is exceeded, such as when these weapons are intended for use against a third party (in the Middle East, for example).

If the parties decided to establish a rough, flexible limit for conventional ALCMs, they could use the precedent of existing nuclear arms-control treaties. Nuclear ALCMs have already been limited indirectly in both START I and New START—by assigning each strategic bomber with a certain number of these weapons for accounting purposes (ten in the 1991 START I and one in New START). The same principle can be used for conventional ALCMs.

A regime for long-range conventional SLCMs would be more challenging. There are no precedents to build on and it is difficult to track some types of platforms. Nuclear SLCMs have not been part of arms-control regimes with two partial exceptions. START I provided a non-binding, unverifiable (and very high) limit on the number of such weapons and for exchange of data on the planned number of nuclear SLCMs several years into the future. Under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the two countries declared they would not deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons (including SLCMs) onboard ships and submarines; the United States eventually eliminated all nuclear warheads for SLCMs.

In principle, the same transparency and confidence-building measures as those proposed for ALCMs could also be applied to long-range conventional SLCMs. It would not be difficult to exchange data on their overall number and on the types of vessels that are equipped to carry them (these types are already well known). It would be much more difficult to agree on measures to limit concentration of SLCM-carrying vessels in the vicinity of the other party. Such measures can be agreed for surface ships (with due acknowledgment that Russia deploys SLCMs on a greater variety of surface ships than does the United States, including on small ships), but not for submarines.

Submarines are inherently difficult to detect and thus could be concentrated in the vicinity of the other party. Moreover, Russia deploys conventional SLCMs not only on nuclear-powered submarines, as does the United States, but also on diesel submarines, which the United States does not have. Thus, any transparency and confidence-building measures applied to submarines are bound to be weaker; for example, parties can agree to refrain from sending more than a certain number of submarines equipped with SLCMs to the vicinity of the other and perhaps provide notifications about the general area of patrol (but not the exact location). It might be possible to provide notifications on the number of SLCM-equipped submarines on patrol at any given moment to make sure that deviations from standard patrol routines can be detected.

The United States and Russia do not have long-range ground-launched missiles (except strategic ones) because they are banned by the INF Treaty (Russia may be developing one in violation). At the moment, the only weapon system at stake is the Iskander, a tactical missile with a range of about 300 miles, which, after several years of speculation, was deployed in October 2016 to Kaliningrad, an enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. Iskanders, however, should more properly be addressed within the regional context (see below).

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Finally, the new Russian strategic land-based missile, (ICBM) Sarmat, which is rumored to have a conventional role, can be subject to the same accounting and restrictions as nuclear strategic weapons under New START and any new treaty that the parties may conclude. It can be subject to the aggregate limit for strategic nuclear weapons (with the freedom to mix nuclear and conventional warheads) or subject to a separate limit—the parties have already agreed on procedures that would allow differentiating between nuclear and conventional warheads.

The most serious challenge for a bilateral US-Russian agreement on regulating long-range conventional capability is geography. On the one hand, a limit on the concentration of US vessels and strategic bombers in the vicinity of Russia may interfere with US obligations to NATO allies, since NATO airspace and waters directly border Russia. On the other hand, all Russian long- and even tactical-range conventional weapons reach NATO from within Russian territory and territorial waters. The challenge is undoubtedly serious: contrary to the popular image of Russian tanks rolling across borders, Russia can achieve most missions, in case conflict erupts, without ever crossing the borders of any NATO state by relying on long-range strike assets, which reach almost any point across Europe. NATO is not only ill-equipped for such a contingency, but, in fact, barely even thinks about it.

The NATO situation can hardly be resolved in the bilateral US-Russian format, but doing nothing is equally if not more untenable, because Russian long-range conventional capability will only increase over time. The issue needs to be addressed in the regional context. That need is well understood in Europe; recently, a group of fourteen states supported a German proposal to launch negotiations on a new treaty that would help stabilize the security situation on the continent.6

One option is to follow the example of the now-defunct 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which established regional limits to ensure a low concentration of forces in the center of Europe. That precedent will be difficult to apply, however, because of these weapons’ long range and the ease of relocation from inside Russia closer to its borders. Another option is to apply the confidence-building and transparency measures outlined in the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 2011 Vienna Document, such as what Germany proposes, to long-range conventional (and possibly other) weapons following roughly the same guidelines as proposed above—exchange of data and a ban on high concentration of systems.7 Applying these measures to Iskander tactical weapons, for example, would be feasible, since Russia clearly does not intend to further increase the number of Iskanders in Kaliningrad and the system can be tracked

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7 For an overview of the Vienna document, see US Department of State website, [http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/e43837.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/e43837.htm).
from satellites. If the United States were to deploy similar missiles in Europe, these could be subjected to the same measures.

**Missile Defense**

NATO is already concerned about the area defense and anti-access (A2/AD) capabilities of Russia vis-à-vis NATO in its northwest, but this is not the end of the story. With the advent of the S-500 and A-235 missile-defense systems, which are currently in the advanced stages of development, Russia will have roughly the same missile-defense capability as the United States, and, Moscow boasts, may even exceed it.

Moscow has claimed for many years that US missile-defense systems will be able to intercept Russian strategic missiles undermining mutual deterrence. While the validity of that claim is questionable (it is difficult to assess it accurately as long as characteristics of US systems remain classified), similar claims may be made in the future by the United States as Russia’s defense capability progresses.

As a remedy, Russia foresees, in effect, a new version of the now-defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, from which the United States withdrew in 2002, which would establish strict limits on the missile-defense capabilities of both countries. The United States has consistently refused, insisting that its missile-defense deployment plans are limited and thus cannot affect Russian deterrence. Moscow responds that, in the absence of legally binding limitations, current plans can be revised upward in the future. As Russia completes development of its new-generation missile-defense systems, the United States is likely to face similar uncertainty. Thus, it only makes sense to revisit the current US position and consider efforts to create a more predictable strategic environment—for Russia, but also for the United States.

Similar to a long-range conventional-strike capability, a future missile-defense regime does not have to be excessively restrictive—certainly not to the extent of the ABM Treaty. Both the United States and Russia need missile defenses for reasons other than the bilateral strategic balance: Washington has pointed at Iran and North Korea; Moscow may need them against other countries with intermediate-range and strategic missiles. Thus, that capability must be managed in a flexible manner rather than with permanent restrictions. The key condition for successful management is predictability.

A management regime can include data exchanges on existing and planned systems as well as the exchanges of production and deployment plans for a significant period of time—perhaps five to seven years into the future. It is noteworthy that Russian military officials, in fact, agree (albeit only privately) that existing US missile-defense deployment plans in Europe and on US territory will not undermine mutual deterrence—the scale of that deployment is, indeed, too limited for a noticeable effect. Their key concern is the possibility that these
plans are just a “foot in the door.” Exchange of deployment plans and regular consultations to clarify intentions and concerns should help maintain a sufficiently flexible regime that could alleviate negative effects.

Numerical limits, which Moscow desires, are not truly necessary, but may be agreed upon as long as they provide sufficient flexibility. It appears, based on close study of Russian official and unofficial statements, that Moscow might be amenable to a limit about twice the current US plans for deployment of missile-defense systems.

Another possible element of an agreement is to limit the concentration of missile-defense systems in certain sensitive areas—especially to the north of Russia, including the Arctic Ocean (effectively, locations from which intercept of Russian strategic missiles may be possible); the United States can choose sensitive areas of its own, where a high concentration of Russian missile-defense systems would be limited. Such an agreement will not entail a complete ban on the deployment of missile-defense systems in these areas; rather, it would acknowledge that a significant number of systems deployed in these areas can affect bilateral deterrence, and that a small number is not only permissible, but perhaps is even desirable as insurance against unintended or accidental launches.

**Nuclear Weapons**

The United States and Russia have two options when dealing with nuclear weapons: to be minimalistic or ambitious. The minimalistic approach appears advisable as an initial step and would amount to an extension of New START, which will expire in 2021, perhaps with a modest reduction of the limit on the number of nuclear warheads. There are several reasons why the minimalistic approach is advisable at this stage:

- If the United States and Russia decided to address long-range conventional weapons and missile defense, the plate will already be full. These categories of weapons have never been tackled at the negotiating table and reaching an agreement will be challenging, especially given the high sensitivity of these issues in domestic politics; it is easy to anticipate strong opposition in the Republican-controlled US Senate, but domestic opposition in Russia will be at least as strong. An ambitious agreement on nuclear weapons may simply overload the agenda.

- The transparency and confidence-building measures for sea- and air-launched cruise missiles essentially replicate the ALCM accounting and verification provisions of New START. Hence, it would be only logical to retain consistency of principles across the board—a measure even more desirable since all of Russia’s new long-range missiles are dual-capable, i.e., can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads.

- Any negotiations on long-range conventional weapons and missile defense will take a long time, both because these issues are controversial domestically and because there
exist few precedents; most provisions will have to be developed from scratch. There might simply not be enough time until the expiration of New START to resolve all outstanding issues.

- The minimalistic approach can help keep the agreement bilateral: Russia insists that the next stage of deep reduction of nuclear weapons should include other nuclear states, but if New START is extended in its present form or with only modest reductions, such involvement will not be necessary.

One category of nuclear weapons that the minimalistic approach cannot address is tactical nuclear weapons. The entire START line of treaties, including New START, limits nuclear weapons indirectly—through accounting for delivery vehicles (missiles and launchers, submarines, strategic bombers), which are assigned a certain number of warheads. That approach made sense because all strategic delivery vehicles used to be equipped with nuclear warheads (exceptions are cruise and, in the future, conventionally armed ICBMs, if Russia decides to deploy them). The situation with non-strategic weapons is different. Historically, all short-range delivery vehicles have been dual-capable and nuclear warheads have not been deployed in peacetime. Moreover, the number of potentially nuclear-capable delivery vehicles is much greater than the number of warheads, thus accounting based on START principles will show extremely high levels of tactical nuclear weapons and will, by implication, unnecessarily restrict systems equipped solely with conventional warheads. For that reason, verifiable limitation of the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons remains impossible until accounting is shifted from delivery vehicles to warheads themselves.

Consequently, in the near future, an arms-control regime for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will have to be limited to transparency and confidence-building measures that involve all of NATO. Such measures may include, among elements outlined above, an exchange of information on the numbers and location of delivery vehicles that are intended to receive nuclear warheads in time of war. That exchange of data will have to include the aircraft of NATO countries (such as the dual-capable aircraft of Germany, Belgium, and other basing states).

Initiating such a regime would require leaders to make difficult political decisions, since it would involve on-site inspections at facilities that remain highly classified, such as nuclear-weapon storage sites, and even partial disclosure of designs of nuclear weapons to verify their irreversible dismantlement. All this is certainly not impossible: the United States and the United Kingdom have for several years pursued a joint program to develop verification procedures for that type of regime. Yet, the US-UK work progresses at a slow pace,

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attesting to the difficulty of such efforts even among close allies, let alone within highly charged negotiations between Moscow and Washington.

There are two key advantages of focusing on nuclear stockpiles:

- Such an approach will finally allow verifiable limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons; and
- It is consistent with the overall logic of managing military capability instead of static, inflexible restrictions.

Yet, as both the United States and Russia increasingly emphasize more usable conventional strike assets, an increasing share of delivery vehicles that are today exclusively nuclear will be reoriented to non-nuclear missions. A more comprehensive approach that limits the entire nuclear stockpile seemed feasible just a few years ago, but today we need to retrace our steps and return, at least for a limited time, to traditional stabilization measures before trying our hand at a more ambitious and more complex endeavor.

**Conclusion**

Any country’s arms-control policy is usually driven by national interests and calculations rather than by more abstract principles of greater good. This dictates that advantages must be safeguarded and can only be sacrificed in return for comparable concessions by the other party. US arms-control policy is no different in this respect. Accordingly, the United States has for years safeguarded its advantage in long-range conventional precision-guided weapons and missile defense. Perhaps it should have been more internationalist in its approach, but the prevailing position made sense from the standpoint of national egoism. Contrary to implicit expectations, the US advantage has been lost or at least will be lost in the near future. As a result, the internationalist, common-good approach and national egoism should now overlap—the issue areas, which until today have remained untouchable, should be on the negotiating table.

That transition will not be easy: excluding conventional long-range weapons and missile defense from the arms-control agenda has become deeply ingrained in the thinking of many in Washington, first and foremost among Republicans in Congress. Inertia is difficult to reverse. Yet, unless such a reversal is implemented, the United States will, in a not-so-distant future, be forced to face arms races in these categories of weapons, an increase of instability of the global and the bilateral US-Russian security environment, as well as direct challenges to national security.

The longer the change in the approach is postponed, the more concessions the United States will be forced to make in order to restore strategic stability. It was noted above that Russia is still perhaps five to seven years away from full operational capacity in these categories, and thus it may be inclined to display more flexibility at the negotiating table. The closer Moscow
is to full operational capacity (and the more money is spent to achieve it), the less it will be predisposed to sacrifice or limit ongoing programs.

The chances of adopting the new approach do not appear high. Inertia, emotional attachment to old positions, and resistance to any accommodation with Russia will work against such a change. It will require foresight and wisdom—qualities that American policy makers displayed in the early 1970s, but may not be as characteristic of present-day US politics of national-security policy. In contrast to the Cold War, very few members of Congress today possess sufficient expertise in arms-control matters. One can only hope that common sense and strategic national-security thinking will prevail over habit, and that the domestic political incentives for confrontation with Russia are not allowed to override national interest.
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