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Recent Developments in the NIS

Putin Amends Nuclear Control List

On February 4, 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that introduces changes to the country’s nuclear export control list. Decree No. 141 On Changes to the List of Nuclear Materials, Equipment, Special Non-Nuclear Materials, and Respective Technologies Subject to Export Control made the following two changes to the control list:

- The phrase “isotopes of uranium” was changed to “isotopes of natural uranium, depleted uranium, or special fissile material” in items 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.5.2 of Section 2, “Equipment and Non-Nuclear Materials.”
- The subsection “General Criteria for the Transfer of Technologies for Reprocessing and Enrichment of Uranium and Manufacturing of Heavy Water” was declared invalid. [Editor’s Note: This subsection provided explanatory notes on reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water. These technologies continue to be on appropriate control lists and subject to export controls.]

The modifications were made to bring the Russian list into conformity with changes made to the Zangger Committee’s Trigger List in accordance with the decision adopted at the September 24, 2002 Zangger Committee meeting in Vienna. The decree will take effect three months after its date of publication.[1,2]

Editor’s Note: The Zangger Committee was formed in 1971 as an informal group of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) supplier states to clarify the requirements of Article III.2 of the NPT with respect to materials and equipment that would “trigger” safeguards when supplied to non-nuclear weapons states. The Trigger List was first published in 1974 and has been further clarified several times since. With the reinvigoration of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992, the value of the Zangger Committee has been greatly diminished. The NSG list is more extensive, including additional conversion equipment and dual-use equipment and materials, and controls technologies for the development, production, and use of the items on the lists. More significantly, the NSG requires a recipient country to have a full-scope safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA (the Zangger Committee only requires that the export itself be subject to safeguards), and has a nonproliferation principle that says an export should not be made if the supplier isn’t satisfied that the export will not be used for a nuclear weapons program. The Zangger Committee guidelines have no such subjective criteria for proposed exports.


Kazakhstan Signs IAEA Additional Protocol

On February 6, 2004, in Vienna, Rakhat Aliyev, Kazakhstani ambassador to Austria and Vienna-based international organizations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei signed an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed in Almaty on July 26, 1994.[1,2,3]

As a legally binding document, the Additional Protocol grants the IAEA complementary inspection authority to verify that Kazakhstan’s declared nuclear materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes. Expanded rights of access to sites and information related to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle in Kazakhstan will allow the IAEA to determine that there are no undeclared nuclear materials in the country. By fulfilling requirements of the Additional Protocol, Kazakhstan is demonstrating commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology.[4]

Editor’s Notes: When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon test site. Kazakhstan transferred all of its nuclear warheads to Russia by April 1995 and destroyed the nuclear testing infrastructure at Semipalatinsk by July 2000. Weapons-grade nuclear material remains in Kazakhstan, however, including three metric tons of...
plutonium contained in spent fuel at a shutdown breeder reactor in western Kazakhstan and small amounts
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at two nuclear research institutes. Approximately 600 kg of weapon-
grade HEU was transferred to the United States from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in 1994 under a joint
U.S.-Kazakhstani operation known as Project Sapphire.[5]

Kazakhstan has been a member of the IAEA since 1994. In May 1992, Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon
Protocol, along with other USSR successors—Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine—and became a party to the
1991 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Having committed itself in that Protocol to
sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state “in the shortest possible time,” Kazakhstan formally acceded
to the NPT in February 1994.[6]

Sources: [1] “6 fevralya s. g. v Veneskom mezhdunarodnom tsentre sostoyalos podpisaniye Dopolnitelnogo protokola k Soglasheniyu o
vseobyemushchikh garantiyakh” [On February 6, 2004, the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement on comprehensive
safeguards took place in the Vienna International Center], February 12, 2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan website,
Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/504, March 1996, IAEA website,
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA website.
Protocol and The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, Washington,

New Azerbaijani Export Control Law under Parliamentary Review

by Victor Zaborsky, Senior Research Associate., Center for International Trade and Security, University of
Georgia

In 2002 a new law On Export Control, consisting of 14 articles and covering all aspects of a national export
control system, was drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan and submitted to government
agencies for review and comments. After interagency review, the amended draft was sent to the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce for external review. Many of the BIS
suggestions were incorporated into the final draft, which is now under review by the Milli Mejlis
(Azerbaijani parliament), in session since March 2004. The draft law has already passed through two
readings, and most likely will be adopted as a law in 2004. When the law is adopted, the Cabinet of
Ministers will have to issue a series of implementing decrees adjusting existing legal norms to the new law.

Currently, export controls in Azerbaijan are regulated by various documents comprised of presidential
decrees and government resolutions that contain provisions pertaining to various aspects of export controls.
The most important of them is Presidential Decree No. 609 On Further Liberalization of Foreign Trade in
Azerbaijan, which was signed in June 1997 and established rules for exporting and importing goods,
including special rules for transfers of sensitive goods and materials.

In accordance with Article 7.1 of Presidential Decree No. 609, exporters of weapons, military technology,
and the essential spare parts for their production, nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-
nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste, must obtain explicit permission from
the Cabinet of Ministers. Unfortunately, the draft of the Law on Export Control does not clearly specify
interagency process as a part of the licensing mechanism, which can be considered a serious deficiency of
the draft law.

Presidential Decree No. 609 provides a list of goods subject to export controls. Appendix I of the Decree
specifies goods, the export of which has to be licensed by the Cabinet of Ministers. The Appendix also lists
commodity identification purposes. The current lists are derived, if not directly taken, from the Soviet
control lists. However, Azerbaijan is currently in the process of replacing the outdated lists and codification
system with a list based on the European Union (EU) Unified Control List. In the summer of 2002, the U.S.
The Department of Commerce began a series of training workshops with Azerbaijani government officials to persuade Baku to introduce the EU list. The Azerbaijani government has agreed in principle to the idea, and a national control list, based on the EU model list, is expected to be approved by the president as a follow-up to the anticipated adoption of the law On Export Control.

It is fair to say that Azerbaijan is still in the early stages of developing its nonproliferation export control mechanisms. It is not a member of any multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar Arrangement), although it is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Chemical Weapons Convention. Although Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act limits the ability of the U.S. government to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress has granted a waiver that allows for provision of nonproliferation assistance that is in the national security interests of the United States. Taking advantage of this, the United States has been providing funding for export control workshops in Azerbaijan, purchasing hardware and equipment for Azerbaijani customs and border guards, and conducting counterproliferation training.

**Changes in NIS Export Control Personnel**

**Kyrgyzstan Reassigns Export Control Responsibilities, Adds New Members to Export Control Commission**

In accordance with the law On Structure of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted on February 6, 2004, by the Kyrgyz Parliament, as well as edicts and orders of President Askar Akayev issued on February 6, 7, and 9, 2004, significant changes were introduced to the structure of the Kyrgyz government and functions of ministries and their subsidiary agencies.

A new Ministry of Economic Development, Industry, and Trade was created taking the place of the Ministry of External Trade and Industry and a number of subsidiary government agencies, such as the State Commission on Antitrust Policy, the State Commission on Business Development, the Center for Economic and Social Reforms under the Ministry of Finance, the Center for Attracting Direct Investments under the State Committee on State Property Management, and the Center on Corporative Development under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. In addition to assuming the responsibilities of these disbanded agencies, the new ministry will issue licenses for exports and imports of controlled items, except for nuclear materials and military goods, the exports and imports of which are licensed by the Ministry of Defense.

The newly appointed head of the Ministry of Economic Development, Industry, and Trade, Amangeldy Muraliyev, who served as prime minister of Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000, became a member of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control (CMTCEC) of the Kyrgyz Republic. Temirbek Akmataliyev, who was appointed minister of Ecology and Emergency in early 2004, also became a new CMTCEC member.[1,2]


**Belarus President Approves New Composition of Security Council**

According to the press service of the President of Belarus, on January 23, 2004, Alyaksandr Lukashenka approved the new composition of the country’s Security Council.[1,2] The Security Council supervises the Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Controls, which determines export control policy and is the principal decision-maker on the issuance of export licenses.[3]
The table below lists the members of the Security Council of Belarus, as of January 23, 2004.[1,2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alyaksandr Lukashenka</td>
<td>President of the Republic of Belarus, Chairman of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Syarhey Sidorski</td>
<td>Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Henadz Navitski</td>
<td>Chairman of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vadzim Papou</td>
<td>Chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ural Latypau</td>
<td>Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Henadz Nyavyhlas</td>
<td>State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus - Assistant to President of the Republic of Belarus on national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anatol Tozik</td>
<td>Chairman of the State Control Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Viktar Sheiman</td>
<td>Prosecutor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pyotr Prakapovich</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board of the National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Uladzimir Navumau</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Syarhey Martynau</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Leanid Maltsau</td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Valeryy Astapau</td>
<td>Minister of Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mikalai Korbut</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Leanid Yeryn</td>
<td>Chairman of the State Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Alyaksandr Paulousky</td>
<td>Chairman of the State Committee for Border Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Syarhey Hurulyou</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus—First Deputy Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**International Supplier Regimes**

**China Applies to Join the NSG; Begins Discussion with MTCR Members**

On January 26, 2004, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Office in Vienna, Zhang Yan, submitted China’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to the Group’s current president, Cho Chang-beom, of the Republic of Korea. Zhang also informed IAEA Director General Mohamed M. ElBaradei of China’s application for NSG membership.[1] China is currently the only major supplier and the only nuclear weapons state party to the NPT that is not a member of the NSG.

Nearly three weeks later, on February 12, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China Hu Xiaodi announced in a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, that China intended to join the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and that discussions were already underway with the MTCR.[2]

In the past several years, China has made significant progress in strengthening its export control system, including the adoption of regulations and control lists that mirror the lists of multilateral export control regimes. While the two announcements were the first significant public acknowledgements of Beijing’s intention to join the NSG and MTCR, Chinese officials had been indicating their country’s interest in joining these mechanisms for some time. Until recently, however, Chinese officials had been reluctant to commit publicly for fear that the United States or other member states would block their entry.[3] Nonetheless, in the latter part of 2003 China’s intentions became clearer, particularly with regard to MTCR membership. During his February 12 speech to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Hu announced that in September 2003 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing sent a letter to the then-Chair of the MTCR, Ambassador Mariusz Handzlik of Poland, indicating that Beijing was ready to consider applying for MTCR membership.[2] On January 27, 2004, in a joint statement between China and France, France welcomed “the development by China of national regulations on the control of sensitive exports and expressed[d] its support for China’s accession as soon as possible to the MTCR and, when the time comes, to the other multilateral export control regimes.”[4]

During a February 4, 2004, briefing in Washington, DC, Ambassador Handzlik announced that the first of a series of three talks between MTCR member states and China were to begin on February 15. According to Handzlik, the first meeting was to focus on comparing the MTCR Annexes with China’s own control lists. Subsequent meetings would concentrate on China’s export control system and nonproliferation policy.[5] According to U.S. officials involved in the discussions, the first meeting went well; however there was no clear indication of whether an invitation to join the regime would be forthcoming.[6]

These two moves were significant steps for Beijing, considering the continued uncertainty about member state reactions, as well as China’s previously hostile attitudes toward multilateral export control regimes. Until fairly recently, China officially viewed export control regimes—including the NSG and the MTCR—as discriminatory and exclusive. However, in Beijing’s most recent statements on arms control and nonproliferation, export control regimes are instead portrayed as an important element of international nonproliferation efforts.[7] While the United States and other regime members have pressed Beijing to accept guidelines for the NSG and MTCR, skepticism remains regarding China’s official entrance into these multilateral mechanisms. Supporters of export control regimes warn that inclusion of states not fully committed to curbing proliferation could severely weaken these institutions. Many in the United States also argue that membership “would exempt China from certain sanctions, provide it with intelligence, give it a potentially obstructionist role in decision-making, and relax missile-related export controls to China.”[8] This fear has apparently been behind the low-key reaction from the U.S. government to China’s announcements. Officials from member states have indicated that Beijing’s ascension to these regimes is not a foregone conclusion, and that questions remain about China’s export control mechanisms, particularly enforcement and implementation.[9]

Editor’s Notes: On August 22, 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji signed new legislation (Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies) governing the export of missile components and technology. Under the new regulations, Chinese entities must obtain a license for exports of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as related technologies included in a control list, which was also released. The importer must guarantee that the items will be used for their stated purpose and will not be retransferred to another party without the consent of the government of China.[10] In October 2002, Beijing issued two additional export control regulations covering dual-use biological agents, chemical precursors, and production equipment that could be employed to manufacture chemical or biological weapons. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies were signed into law on October 14 and 18, 2002, respectively. Under the new measures, Chinese companies must obtain a license from the government before exporting items specified in the revised export control lists.[11,12]
China’s application to the NSG appears to signal a change in policy regarding full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports. In the past, Beijing has not required full-scope safeguards, thereby keeping open nuclear trade with Pakistan. Questions remain as to whether or not China intends to invoke a “grandfather” clause if accepted into the NSG in order to honor preexisting contracts, including the agreement to assist Pakistan with building a second reactor at the Chashma facility.


International Export Control and WMD Security Assistance Programs

United States Gives Equipment to Uzbek Border Guards

On February 11, 2004, Jon R. Purnell, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, presented nearly $1.2 million worth of equipment to the Uzbek National Security Service’s border guards. According to a press release from the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, the five Kamaz trucks, 40 Ural trucks, 50 Honda generators, 200 Nikon binoculars, 150 handheld spotlights, and six laptop computers will significantly enhance the border guards’ ability to perform their assigned missions. The equipment was presented under the U.S. State Department-funded Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program.

Since its inception in April 2000, the EXBS program has donated over $5 million in equipment and training to Uzbekistan. In the coming months, EXBS equipment donations will include night vision equipment, global positioning system receivers, voltage stabilizers, batteries, metal detectors, and other equipment valued at over $600,000. Other major equipment donations scheduled for delivery in 2005 include two helicopter simulators valued at $6.5 million and two patrol boats valued at $5.8 million.[1,2]

Editor’s Note: The EXBS program is led and funded by the Office of Export Control Cooperation in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Nonproliferation. The program draws on expertise from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Commerce, Energy, Defense, and the private sector to provide a range of legal, licensing, and enforcement training and equipment. EXBS has placed 20 dedicated program advisors at U.S. embassies to help coordinate and implement the program.


Illicit Trafficking in the NIS

Uranium Seized on Ukrainian-Hungarian Border

On February 24, 2004, a suspect attempting to transport a container holding 400 grams of radioactive material across the Ukrainian-Hungarian border was detained at the Tisa border post, near the city of Chop,
by operatives of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Fighting Organized Crime and regional authorities.[1,2,3] The arrest was the result of a four-month-long investigation by the Main Directorate that led to the arrest of Yuriy I., a resident of Mukachev, western Ukraine.[3]

Press reports commenting on the incident provide conflicting information regarding the profile of the perpetrator and the type of material seized. According to Mykhaylo Manin, deputy interior minister in charge of the Main Directorate, Soviet-era documents found with the materials indicated that they included uranium-235, uranium-238, cesium-137, cesium-134, and barium-137. However, according to the State Border Service of Ukraine, only uranium-238 had been seized.[1]

Deputy Minister Manin also stated that the suspect is a former Soviet intelligence officer who worked for the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate, the Soviet military intelligence agency).[4] The State Border Service, on the other hand, reported that the suspect carried documents indicating that he was a former Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) officer.[5] However, SBU representatives denied that the suspect had been an officer of the SBU or the GRU, or that he had possessed SBU documents when arrested.[6] Manin believes the suspect had at least two accomplices.[1] The radioactive material and the suspect’s minibus were confiscated, and the Main Directorate is conducting an investigation.


Armenian Customs Officials Seize Radioactive Object in Shipment Bound for Iran

On February 12, 2004, Nuclear.ru reported that on December 29, 2003, at the Megri border checkpoint on the Armenian-Iranian border, Armenian customs officials discovered a radiation source in a scrap metal shipment bound for Iran. However, Nuclear.ru mistakenly indicated that the scrap metal was outbound from the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[1,2] According to Vladimir Kurghinyan, spokesperson for the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA), the Armenian NPP in Metsamor is not linked to the radioactive object.[2,3] Later ANRA head Ashot Martirosyan also confirmed that neither Iran nor the Armenian NPP were connected to the radioactive object.[4,5,6] On February 25, ITAR-TASS quoted Martirosyan as saying that the radioactive object discovered at the Armenian-Iranian border was an empty casing from a radioactive source, which previously contained strontium-90.[5]

After its discovery, Armenian authorities immediately neutralized the object and reported the incident to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[1,6] According to Martirosyan, Armenia has launched the investigation into the incident with the assistance of the IAEA and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (now Federal Agency of Atomic Energy). He added that a spectral analysis showed that the object has a high radioactivity level and that it was not registered among the 1,292 sources in a 2003 government inventory of radiation sources. According to Martirosyan, the object could have been brought to Armenia from Georgia.[4,6,7] According to Kurghinyan, the investigation is aimed at revealing both the origin of the source and the circumstances of its appearance in the scrap metal shipment.[1]

Editor’s Note: The presence of the casing for a radioactive source without the radioactive source itself would appear to imply that the source now rests at an unknown location without the protective barriers necessary to avoid injury to the public.

Summaries from the NIS Press

Cesium at Georgian Gas Stations Causes Concern

On February 12, 2004, a Georgian official revealed that disused gauges containing cesium-137 are stored at more than 30 gas stations in Georgia. According to Levan Gogua, deputy head of the Georgian Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS), the gauges were once used to measure the gasoline level in tanks but are no longer needed.

Gogua commented on the cesium-filled gauges after operators of a gas station in the western city of Kutaisi requested that the NRSS remove containers holding such gauges from the station’s premises. According to Georgian press reports, the gas station held five containers, three of which were open. Because the two existing radioactive waste sites in Georgia are filling up, the containers will be moved to a basement at the gas station, according to Gogua. Publicly available reports did not reveal the amount of cesium-137 in the disused gauges.[1,2]

This latest incident involving highly radioactive materials in Georgia follows on the heels of several such cases in 2003. In February, Georgian officials announced that three containers holding radiation measuring devices powered by cesium-137 were missing from a military base.[3] In May, officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs searched the trunk of a taxicab and found two metal boxes filled with cesium-137 and strontium-90 and a third box filled with liquid mustard gas agent.[4] In September, two radiation sources identified as cesium-137 were discovered at a gas station in Marneuli district and two radiation sources identified as military dosimeters containing cesium-137 were found in a former radioactive waste dump in the village of Saakadze.[5]

Editor’s Note: Cesium-137 is used in a wide variety of industrial instruments, such as level and thickness gauges and moisture density gauges. Cesium sources have been used to measure the level of liquids in a variety of applications, including gasoline in gas tanks and beer in beer cans. It is also commonly used in the food processing industry for food irradiation purposes as well as in healthcare in various diagnostic procedures, sterilization of medical instruments and equipment, and blood irradiation. Because the material is so potent, even a small amount of cesium-137 can pose a considerable danger to the public if used in a radiation dispersal device, or a “dirty bomb.”


International Developments

Experts Doubt New Allegations that Al-Qai’da May Have Suitcase Nukes

A February 8, 2004, article in the London-based Arab-language newspaper Al-Hayat regarding the alleged 1998 purchase by al-Qai’da of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and a March 22, 2004, interview of bin Laden’s authorized biographer, Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation
regarding the supposed purchase of “briefcase” nukes by al-Qa’ida from Central Asian states have revived interest in so-called suitcase nuclear weapons. Stories about suitcase nukes arose in 1997 after the late General Aleksandr Lebed—former Secretary of the Russian Security Council and later governor of Krasnoyarsk Kray—alleged the loss of approximately 100 portable nuclear devices, in the former Soviet Union. Similar stories were also published by other Arab-language sources in 1998 and in 2000.[1] The new and past allegations have been reviewed by experts at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies who have concluded that the loss of portable nuclear weapons was highly unlikely.

In 2002, CNS conducted a study to assess the allegations made by General Lebed and the threat posed by such weapons. The text of the study, “‘Suitcase Nukes’: A Reassessment” can be found at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020923.htm>. The study concluded that portable nuclear devices did exist, in spite of the multiple denials by Russian officials prior to 2002. Several official statements made in 2004 finally acknowledged that the Soviet Union had developed and produced such weapons.[2,3,4,5] However, the study also stated that the loss of any nuclear weapons, including portable devices, during the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from former Soviet republics to Russia in the early 1990s was highly unlikely. The argument supporting this finding was that the accounting for nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine was particularly thorough because it was subject to a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine, which checked every weapon against records kept in both countries.

In addition, when General Lebed made his statement about the inability to account for about 100 portable nuclear devices, the special commission on portable nuclear devices had not yet completed its work, and a number of these devices were apparently listed as originally located outside Russia; by the time Lebed was forced to leave his post as Secretary of the Security Council, the exact whereabouts of each of these warheads had not yet been determined. In February 2004, however, the former chairman of that commission, Vladimir Denisov, declared that the work was completed and that each and every portable nuclear device was accounted for in “physical” form, thus confirming that the commission checked not only the “paper trail,” but also compared records to actual weapons.[5]

Regarding the threat such weapons posed if they were to fall into the wrong hands, CNS experts concluded that based on the information available in 2002, “nuclear suitcases” had a very short shelf-life—perhaps as short as six months. Without proper servicing and, most important, replacement of vital components these weapons could only “fizzle,” i.e., become unable to produce a chain reaction and a nuclear explosion. This means that even if a few portable nuclear devices were stolen years ago, they could, at best, serve as a source of radioactive material for a “dirty bomb” or as a partial source of fissile material for an improvised nuclear device. They could not be utilized to produce a nuclear explosion. These conclusions have also been confirmed by the newly available data in the Russian press.[2,3,4,5,6]


China and United States Sign Document on Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation

During an official visit to China, U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Chairman Zhang Huazhu of the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), China’s nuclear regulatory body, signed a Statement of Intent for cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and security. The Statement of Intent, signed on January 12, 2004, “establishes a process for cooperation [between the United States and China] and for collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on a range of nuclear nonproliferation and security activities.”[1] The document sets the groundwork for further cooperation in the areas of nuclear technology transfers and nonproliferation, including export controls and counterterrorism.[2] This

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The Statement of Intent does not specify in detail the cooperation and projects that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and CAEA will carry out, but instead lays out a general framework for collaboration. Areas for collaboration are broken into two different categories—peaceful use of energy and nonproliferation. Under the peaceful use section, the United States and China agree to cooperate in the areas of “nuclear reactor technology and nuclear application technology” and “nuclear energy management and safety.” As part of the nuclear technology cooperation, this new document opens the way for transfer of reactor designs and nuclear materials. Under its nonproliferation section, the Statement of Intent pinpoints export controls, nuclear safety, and security of radioactive sources as areas for future collaboration.[2]

The Statement of Intent coincides with other recent positive signs in China’s nuclear nonproliferation and export control policies, including publication of a White Paper on Nonproliferation in December 2003 and Beijing’s application for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In an article published in the January 22, 2004, issue of Nucleonics Week, a U.S. government official is quoted as saying that the new document was further evidence that China’s nonproliferation policy was “moving very much in our direction.”[5]

Cesium-Filled Container Stolen in China

A football-sized lead container filled with cesium-137 that was stolen from a power plant construction site in northern China’s Shaanxi Province was subsequently melted down at a nearby steel plant, contaminating a smelter and slag with the highly radioactive substance.

The No. 1 Northwestern Power Construction Company reported the missing container on February 6, 2004 sparking the deployment of troops and authorities equipped with Geiger counters throughout the surrounding regions. A week later, on February 13, 2004, authorities sealed off a steel plant in Fuping County, some 65 km from the construction site, after inspections of the plant revealed radioactive contamination, which indicated that the container had inadvertently been smelted. Pucheng city police detained three individuals suspected of stealing the container from the construction site. Police believe the suspects, all local villagers, mistook the canister filled with cesium-137 for scrap metal and sold it to a recycling vendor, who subsequently passed it to the steel plant.[1,2,3,4,5]
According to Zhu Guoying, an expert at the Shanghai Radioactive Materials Research Institute, China has rarely reported missing radioactive material in the past because such cases are considered state secrets and handled quietly. [1]


Workshops and Conferences

U.S.-Ukrainian Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Control Meets in Washington, DC

On January 26-27, 2004, the Ukrainian-U.S. working group on nonproliferation and export control met in Washington, DC. As the Ukrainian Embassy in the United States told the UNIAN news agency, the parties discussed bilateral cooperation in the disposal of solid propellant from dismantled SS-24 missiles, as well as military-technical and export control cooperation. One of the issues discussed was U.S. assistance in improving Ukraine’s export control system and border security, and disposing of excess stockpiles of small arms and ammunition. The parties also discussed the possibility that Ukraine might receive assistance under the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. As a result of the meeting, the working group agreed to hold regular consultations on these issues twice a year. [1]

Editor’s Note: The G8 Global Partnership is an initiative launched at the June 2002 Kananaskis Summit by the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. The G8 countries committed to providing up to $20 billion of assistance over 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia, but also in other nations, including other former Soviet republics. [2]


Regional Workshop on SALW Trafficking and Control Held in Moldova

On March 4-5, 2004, Moldova, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) held a workshop in Chisinau for representatives of the Black Sea region countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) to discuss the enhancement of regional standards for small arms and light weapons (SALW). The following four issues were addressed within the framework of the workshop:

- **Implementation of multilateral documents—gaps and achievements.** Discussions on this topic focused on the implementation of the UN Program of Action in the region after the July 7-11, 2003 UN Biennial Meeting on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as on the progress made in the implementation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Document on SALW. In this session, participating countries shared their experience in implementing OSCE Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons and SEESAC disarmament standards.

- **National frameworks.** Workshop participants evaluated the legislative/regulatory framework for the manufacture, marking, possession, and import/export control of SALW.
• **Stockpile security.** Discussions on this topic focused on the OSCE best practices regarding national procedures for stockpile management and security, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency experience in the field of stockpile security and destruction, and lessons learned in the field of SALW destruction.

• **Enhancement of border control.** Representatives from the European Union Border Police, Interpol, and Southeast European Cooperation Initiative shared their experiences regarding methods for interdicting and tracing illegal weapons.

At the end of the workshop, participating states agreed that they should have a consistent policy for controlling the production and export/import of SALW. They also agreed to improve information sharing mechanisms on SALW.

**Editor’s Notes:** The 2003 United Nations First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects at the National, Regional and Global levels was part of the follow-up process to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was held in New York July 9-20, 2001. The aim of the Meeting was to exchange information on initiatives undertaken during the first two years of the implementation of the Program of Action by states, regional and international organizations, and civil society. It highlighted the successes achieved and identified problems encountered.[1]

The November 2000 OSCE Document on SALW introduced strict standards and measures to restrain transfers, secure stockpiles and remove weapons from circulation.[2] To assist in the implementation of the OSCE Document, a group of 12 participating states (Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) developed the *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*.[3]

**U.S.-Sponsored Export Control Meetings Organized in Azerbaijan in February 2004**

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In February 2004, the U.S. Departments of Energy, State, and Commerce sponsored several meetings to promote export controls and WMD nonproliferation in Azerbaijan. This article provides a summary of the export control-relevant workshops that took place in Baku, Azerbaijan.

**Conference on “Transit Controls as a Nonproliferation Tool”**

The conference entitled “Transit Controls as a Nonproliferation Tool” was organized on February 18, 2004, in Baku by the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) and the Baku Center for Foreign Trade Security with funding from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation. The list of participants included managers from Azerbaijani freight forwarding companies, who were the target audience of the conference, and representatives from governmental agencies, including the licensing office of the Cabinet of Ministers.

The main theme of the conference was the acknowledgement of the role that freight forwarders should play in controlling transfers of dual-use goods and equipment. The business community and government representatives were introduced to export control basics such as elements of an effective export control system, multilateral regimes, nonproliferation challenges and responses, and current Azerbaijani export control infrastructure. Through their questions and comments at the conference, the freight forwarders demonstrated inadequate knowledge of nonproliferation and export control, but showed interest in learning more about the subject and actively participated in Q&A sessions.

A survey distributed among the participants demonstrated that the conference made a difference in terms of providing the participants with initial basic information on such important security issues as
nonproliferation export controls. At the same time, the survey also revealed the need for follow-up activities and more detailed discussions with Azerbaijani companies engaged in cargo transit.

“Nuclear Export Control Enforcement Workshop—Maritime Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification”
On February 19-20, 2004 the “Nuclear Export Control Enforcement Workshop—Maritime Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification” was organized in Baku for Azerbaijani land and maritime Border Guard officers. Sixteen representatives of each division attended the workshop, which concentrated on the identification of nuclear-related dual-use materials and equipment during inspections of ships or on-land cargoes. At the end of the training sessions, the participants were given certificates of completion.

The workshop was the fourth training exercise of its kind organized in Azerbaijan by the DOE’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), which operates under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). INECP conducted “Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification Training Workshops” for Azerbaijani Customs and Border Guards officers in June and September 2002, and in February 2003. In 2003, INECP awarded a contract to the Baku-based Institute of Radiation Problems (IRP) under the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan to develop a training plan for an indigenous version of the commodity classification course. A letter from the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan to the National Academy of Sciences officially designated the IRP as a National Training Center for customs in the areas of nuclear and dual-use items. The IRP is also the principal consulting organization for customs when it comes to practical identification of seized goods.

Export Control Legislative Briefing
On February 23, 2004, CITS conducted an export control briefing for members of the Azerbaijani parliament in Baku under a grant given by the U.S. State Department. A similar meeting was previously organized in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October 2003.

More than 20 Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijani Parliament) members from seven key standing parliamentary committees (Security and Defense Issues Standing Committee; Economic Policy Standing Committee; Legal and Political System Standing Committee; Social Policy Standing Committee; Human Rights Standing Committee; Natural Resources, Energy, and Ecological Issues Standing Committee; and Regional Issues Standing Committee) attended the briefing. Formal presentations addressed such issues as general WMD proliferation threats, the basics of export control systems, the importance of export control legislation, and the role of the U.S. Congress in development, implementation, and enforcement of export control legislation in the United States. A group of Azerbaijani lawyers also presented a legal assessment of the draft of the Law on Export Control scheduled to be reviewed during the next parliamentary session, which started in March 2004. The Milli Mejlis is expected to adopt the law later in 2004.

Another event, the U.S.-Azerbaijan National Control List and Classification Workshop sponsored by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce, originally planned for February 24-26, was rescheduled for a later date—March 9-11, 2004.

OSCE Organizes Training Seminars for Turkmen Border and Customs Officials
On March 5-6, 2004, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Center in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan and the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized training seminars in Ashgabat aimed at assisting Turkmenistan in improving the skills and strengthening the operational capacity of its border and customs authorities. These seminars, held for the second time in the last two years, focused on combating the smuggling of drugs, small arms, light weapons, and human trafficking. This year, the seminars in Ashgabat were preceded by similar seminars held at the regional administration level in late February-early March 2004 in Turkmenbash, Dashoguz, and Mary.

Other issues covered at the training seminars, which were attended by officials from the Turkmen State Border and Customs Services, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior, and various central and regional agencies, included the legal framework for border and customs control and cooperation with other relevant domestic and foreign agencies, as well as specific problems concerning border and customs control procedures. Experts in the field from France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan, as well as from
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the
International Organization of Migration Mission in Ashgabad, were involved in the training seminars.
Source: “OSCE Centre holds training seminars for border and customs officials in Turkmenistan,” OSCE Centre in Ashgabad press