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Recent Developments in the NIS

Kazakhstan to Allocate $7.7 Million for Construction of a New Customs Terminal on the Border with Uzbekistan

During a three-day inspection of the customs posts located in the Manghystau oblast (western Kazakhstan) conducted on March 14-16, 2005, the chairman of the Customs Control Committee under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Finances, Berdybek Saparbayev, announced his government’s plan to build a large customs terminal to upgrade the existing Tazhen customs post on the Kazakhstan border with Uzbekistan.[1,2]

At present, the Tazhen customs office is only equipped to perform routine vehicle inspections, while passenger and cargo trains originating from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan cross the border of Kazakhstan without undergoing customs control. The trains are checked only later, after entering Kazakhstan, at the Beyneu railway station, which is located 85 km from the Tazhen border crossing.[2,3] The Beyneu station, however, also lacks special equipment to check the trains effectively.[2] In an interview with the Kazakhstani Khabar television channel, Saparbayev pointed out that, after the trains cross the border into Kazakhstan, they make several stops before Beyneu station, a process that allows smugglers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to transport contraband commodities and drugs with impunity onto the territory of Kazakhstan or use Kazakhstan as a transit country to transport drugs to Russia.

According to customs officials and police officers supervising the Beyneu station, the region is on the drug trafficking route that crosses Aqtau (the administrative center of the Manghystau oblast) and goes towards Moscow via Astrakhan (Russia).[2] Customs officials from the Manghystau oblast Customs Directorate indicated that from the point of view of drug trafficking, the Dushanbe (Tajikistan)-Astrakhan (Russia) as well as Kungrad (Uzbekistan)-Beyneu (Kazakhstan) trains are of particular concern.[4] Kazakh transportation and law enforcement officials believe the new customs terminal at the Tazhen border crossing will help solve many of the aforementioned problems.[2]

The construction cost of the new customs terminal at Tazhen is estimated to be approximately 1 billion Kazakh tenge ($7.7 million), and the terminal is slated to begin operating in 2006.[1,2] According to Saparbayev, the new terminal will operate according to the so-called “one-stop principle”[1] In this regard, Saparbayev noted, “As you might know, customs officials are not the only ones who work on the border…. We want to set up a single center to enable all services at the border [customs, sanitary-epidemiological, veterinary services, etc.] to work at one place. And they will work based on the ‘one-stop’ principle, which means that a vehicle, or any other mode of transportation will be stopped only once and controlled only once [by the various services present at the border].”[2]


Kazakhstan and Russia Test Joint Customs Control Procedures

In its past issues, the NIS Export Control Observer reported the establishment of joint Kazakh-Russian customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda checkpoint located on the border of the Pavlodar oblast, northeastern Kazakhstan, with the Russian Federation.[1,2] The initiative stemmed from recommendations made in October 2003 by the Customs Control Committee (CCC, then Customs Control Agency) of Kazakhstan after a fact-finding visit to Germany and Poland by a Kazakh interagency commission, which

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was set up by the Kazakhstani government in December 2002 to develop a comprehensive modernization program for Kazakh customs.\[1,2\]

On June 4, 2004, a bilateral agreement signed by Russia and Kazakhstan set the start date of the joint customs control experiment at the Sharbakty-Kulunda port of entry for July 1, 2004. However, due to the reorganization of the Russian government in spring 2004, the establishment of joint customs control was delayed until August 24, 2004.\[1,2,3,4\] Since then, Kazakh customs officials and their Russian counterparts have been jointly carrying out the inspection of vehicles crossing the border at the Sharbakty-Kulunda customs control post. The introduction of the simplified customs inspection procedures is aimed at boosting the cross-border trade between the two countries. The Kazakh and Russian customs services intend to increase the volume of bilateral trade by simplifying the rules for the movement of goods across the Kazakh-Russian border. The joint customs control experiment is supposed to show the benefits of cooperation in the customs area, and, if it is proved successful, joint customs control will be extended to the other border posts on the Kazakh-Russian border. In this regard, CCC Deputy Chairman Baurzhan Abdishev noted, “If the experiment produces good results and if our laws are harmonized, this rule will be applied to the entire border.”\[5\]

Editor’s Note: The agreement between the Siberian Customs Directorate (Russian Federation) and the Department of Customs Control for the Pavlodar Oblast (Kazakhstan), which was signed in Pavlodar on June 4, 2004, provided the legal foundation for the introduction of the pilot joint customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda vehicular point of entry. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the Russian and Kazakh customs officials jointly examine the commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions. The agreement also stipulates constant exchange of information on the volume of goods and vehicles crossing the border, which is aimed at helping in identifying illegal cross-border transactions. To avoid violations, customs officials from each side compare their records on commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions and launch search if necessary. The agreement specified that the length of the experiment was limited to six months, and therefore ended in late February 2005. Pavlodar Oblast customs officials sent a report on the results of the experiment to the CCCand Russia's Federal Customs Service outlining their achievements and identifying areas for improvement. As of April 2005, there was no information on when the joint customs control will resume. Note however that unlike joint control, exchange of information is continuing.\[3,4,6,7,8\]


**Russian Customs Officials Describe Radiation Control Procedure**

On March 23, 2005, Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS—formerly State Customs Committee, or SCC) officials held a press briefing at the Sheremetevo-2 International Airport in Moscow on the Russian customs control system for fissile (nuclear-weapons usable) and radioactive materials. Nikolay Kravchenko, deputy head of the FCS Main Directorate for Information Technologies, and Vladislav Bozhko, head of the FCS Department for Customs Control of Fissile and Radioactive Materials, provided a brief history of radiation control in Russia and outlined its procedures and related statistics.

Sketching the history of his organization’s involvement in the control of various nuclear materials, Kravchenko indicated that responsibility for the control of fissile and radioactive materials was transferred
in 1995 to the SCC from the Federal Border Guard Service in accordance with Presidential Edict No. 1923 On Priority Measures to Improve Nuclear Material Accounting and Control of September 15, 1994.[1] In 1995, a special Service for Customs Control of Fissile and Radioactive Materials was established within the SCC. And in 1997, the SCC initiated a currently ongoing government program to install advanced radiation detection equipment at all Russian border crossings and checkpoints.

Kravchenko also emphasized the improved efficiency of Russian customs service controls since 1995. While only four attempts at smuggling radioactive material were intercepted in 1995, about 200 cases were prevented in 2004 (80 percent of which were imports, and 20 percent constituted exports).[1] [Editor’s Note: Kravchenko did not indicate the status of any early undetected cases.] This progress is primarily attributed to the availability of radiation detection equipment, which according to Kravchenko, helped the FCS and its predecessor identify 95 percent of the intercepted illicit transfers of radioactive goods; the remaining five percent of interceptions were revealed during the review of intelligence data and license applications.[1,2] Kravchenko also reported that in 1995-2005, more than 2,000 customs officials went through radiation control training or retraining in the Russian Customs Academy in Lyubertsy, near Moscow, and its branches in St.-Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Rostov-on-the-Don.[1]

Describing Russia’s international cooperation in controlling illicit trafficking in fissile and radioactive material, Kravchenko mentioned the U.S. Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which has operated in Russia since 1998. [Editor’s Note: The SLD program is part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. SLD focuses on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials through major railways, airports, seaports, and other state entry and exit points in Russia. In 2002, SLD began expanding its operations into other key transit states. SLD installs and maintains radiation detection equipment, including hand held portal monitors, and provides training to officials in the use of the equipment. SLD is also responsible for the worldwide maintenance of portal monitors and X-ray vans provided through assistance programs by the U.S. Department of State. More information on the SLD Program can be found at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/interdicting/second.asp>.] Noting that the name of the program indicates that controls at Russian sites housing fissile and radioactive materials constitute the first line of defense, Kravchenko, nevertheless, pointed out that the SLD program also provides radiation detection equipment installed at Russian borders, as the first and only line of defense against illegal transfers of nuclear materials transiting through the Russian Federation.

Kravchenko also noted Russia’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under which Russian experts take part in drafting IAEA technical documentation and organizing training courses for foreign radiation control instructors. One hundred and fifty instructors from 19 countries completed such courses in recent years.[1]

Vladislav Bozhko described the procedure of radiation control used at Sheremetevo Customs (Sheremetyevo-1, Sheremetyevo-2, and Sheremetyevo-Cargo terminals), which serves as a testing ground for newly developed advanced radiation control systems. Radiation control is carried out in two areas: 1) radiation control of all vehicles, passengers, their luggage, and goods crossing the border; and 2) control of fissile and radioactive materials transferred under legally approved export and import licenses, where the actual radioactive cargo content is checked against the declared information.[1]

According to Bozhko, radiation control of passengers and their luggage, vehicles, and goods crossing the border is carried out on a 24-hour basis and includes three stages. The first stage involves the use of the Yantar [Amber] stationary radiation detection system, which is usually installed near X-ray screening equipment. This system works in a continuous automatic mode ensuring total control of all objects crossing the border and allowing for quick identification of a source of radiation. If the Yantar system sounds an alarm, its video recording system is automatically activated, and a customs officer proceeds with the second stage, which involves using hand-held devices to search for a source of radiation, measuring the level of radiation, and conducting an initial classification of the discovered source. This additional radiation control is carried out in a specially equipped cabin to ensure radiation safety of the personnel and passengers. The third stage involves expert examinations of the discovered source by specialized institutions.[1,2] According to Bozhko, a different procedure applies to passengers who have been under radiological
medical treatment. Because these individuals have ingested radioactive materials for cancer treatment or medical tests, they emit somewhat larger amounts of radiation than people who have not undergone such treatment. Thus, they can potentially be used as smugglers of radioactive items and are required to have documents confirming their treatment. They are subject, if necessary, to an intensive personal search.[1]

Control of legally transferred fissile and radioactive materials includes two stages of intervention by customs officers. The first involves the verification of necessary licenses, permissions, certificates, and other shipping documents, and an initial radiation scan. The second stage consists of a comprehensive inspection of the cargo being transferred. If any violation is detected, the shipment is stopped and a violation report is filed. An accredited laboratory then conducts an expert examination, the findings of which will determine the final decision made on the case.[1]

FCS officials announced that to further increase the effectiveness of radiation control at Sheremetevo Customs, the agency plans to integrate the currently functioning stationary radiation customs systems in a unified information network. The network will use advanced video control systems to conduct a permanent and simultaneous monitoring of three Sheremetevo Customs terminals, and will allow customs inspectors on duty to access the information from their workplaces.[1]

Russia to Open New Border Guard Outposts in North Caucasus

On March 28, 2005, Colonel General Nikolay Lisinskiy, head of the North Caucasus Regional Border Guard Directorate, told reporters that Russia has begun building 55 new border outposts in the North Caucasus. Ten of the new facilities will be completed by late May 2005, while another 10 will be built before the fall of 2005.[1,2] According to Lisinskiy, the majority of the new border outposts will be built at the Russian-Azerbaijani border.[1,2] He stated that all border facilities will be supplied with state-of-the-art weapons and military equipment, protective structures, and communication equipment.[3,4] Lisinskiy also pointed out that by the end of 2008, Russian border guard units in the North Caucasus will be staffed only by contract soldiers, who currently constitute more than one third of the border guard personnel in service.[3] A total of 14.8 billion rubles ($534 million as of April 2005) were allocated to fund this effort under a federal program approved by the December 2004 presidential edict On Measures for Enhancing Border Security in the North Caucasian Region.[3,5] [Editor’s Note: The edict has not been published in open sources.] This program provides for the construction of a total of 72 new border posts and border garrisons in the region, additional border crossings, new roads in this mountainous region, accommodation for border guards, and a centralized border guard training center in Stavropol, southern Russia.[4,5]

Changes in NIS Export Control Personnel

President Putin Expands Functions and Modifies Membership of Russian Export Control Commission

On April 26, 2005, President Vladimir Putin signed Edict No. 468 On the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation, which expands the commission’s functions and alters its composition.[1]

The new edict expands the main functions of the commission by including four additional responsibilities:
First, the commission is responsible for coordinating the interaction among federal agencies in regard to forecasting and identifying proliferation threats and threats to the security of the Russian Federation. The commission has also been charged with developing recommendations to counteract such threats.

Second, the commission is responsible for drafting annual government reports to the president on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. [Editor’s Note: The practice of preparing annual reports to the president on nonproliferation and WMD issues did not previously exist in Russia; this is a novelty introduced by the new edict.]

Third, the commission is now also charged with evaluating the efficiency of Russia’s international cooperation in the area of WMD nonproliferation and making recommendations to improve efficiency.

Finally, the commission is to prepare recommendations on the direction and form of Russian cooperation with foreign states and international organizations in the nuclear, space, and other science-intensive and high-tech industries.[2]

With regard to the changes in membership of the Export Control Commission, the new composition of the Commission reflects the changes in the Russian government introduced by President Putin in March of 2004. Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov—who oversees export controls—is now the Chairman of the Commission.[3] Of the 2003 members of the commission, only four individuals have been confirmed—E. Antipenko, I. Materov, S. Yakimov and G. Mesyats. [Editor’s Note: For comparison, see the 2003 list of members of the Export Control Commission in “New Appointee to the Russian Export Control Commission,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 4, April 2003, pp. 5-6, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis_excon>.] All the other appointees are new members as shown in the list below.

**Composition of the Commission on Export Control of the Russian Federation[4]**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Official Position (Position in the Commission) [Russian Abbreviation]</th>
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<tr>
<td>S.B. Ivanov</td>
<td>Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (Chairman of the Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.I. Grigorov</td>
<td>Director of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service of Russia (Deputy Chairman of the Commission) [FSTEK]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.E. Antipenko</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy [Rosatom]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.V. Bortnikov</td>
<td>Head of the Economic Security Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia [FSB]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.P. Buzhinskiy</td>
<td>Head of the Main Directorate of Foreign Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu.K. Demchenko</td>
<td>Deputy Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia [SVR]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.E. Zherikhov</td>
<td>Head of the Federal Customs Service of Russia [FTS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.I. Kislyak</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.V. Klimenko</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for Science and Innovations [Rosnauka]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.B. Malyshhev</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Federal Nuclear, Industrial and Environmental Authority [Rostekhnadzor]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.S. Materov</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.A. Mesyats</td>
<td>Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Novikov</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation [FSVTS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.N. Perminov</td>
<td>Head of the Federal Space Agency [Roskosmos]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.I. Pryadko</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Main Directorate of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A. Ryzhkov</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Government of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.G. Saveliev</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.N. Spasskiy</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.V. Fyodorov</td>
<td>Deputy Director of the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation [FSKN]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.I. Kholostov</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the Federal Agency of Industry [Rosprom]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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International Supplier Regimes

NSG Officials Visit Pakistan; Islamabad’s Membership Not Possible

On April 11, 2005, representatives of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), including current chair Richard Ekwall of Sweden, and incoming chair, Roald Naess of Norway, traveled to Pakistan for discussions with Pakistani authorities. The trip came after Pakistan’s president General Pervez Musharraf agreed to consider “sending nuclear centrifuges to [the IAEA] for inspection” in order to determine if Pakistani equipment was supplied to Iran through the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.[1]

The NSG delegation met with senior officials from Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry, including Additional Secretary Tariq Osman Hyder. [Editor’s Note: Additional Secretary is equivalent to an undersecretary or vice-minister.] Ambassador Ekwall described the visit as part of an “outreach program to states that are not members [of the NSG] but are important for the global export control regime.” NSG delegations have also visited Israel, Egypt, and India as part of this effort.[2] The meeting was described by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jalil Abbas Jilani as “extremely fruitful,” adding that the visit “afforded the opportunity to explain steps Pakistan has taken for the establishment of [an] export control regime…consistent with Pakistan’s strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.”[2,3] Jilani also stated that “Pakistan would welcome cooperation with NSG members in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and energy while maintaining our nuclear deterrence as an indispensable part of security.” He went on to clarify that this meeting was the first between NSG and Pakistani officials, that it had been exploratory, and that no formal request for membership had been made.[2,3]

Prior to the visit by the NSG delegation, however, Pakistani officials appeared to indicate an interest in joining the suppliers’ regime. According to Jilani, “Pakistan is fully prepared to interact with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to become a member.”[4] Jilani also stated that “being a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan has the capabilities of research and development of nuclear technology and materials…Therefore, Pakistan can contribute to the objectives of nonproliferation by joining the NSG as a partner.”[5] However this proposal did not meet with a favorable response from NSG member states prior to the arrival of the delegation. Indeed, inclusion of the South Asian state into the Nuclear Suppliers Group would contradict many of the current guidelines of the group as long as Pakistan continues to possess nuclear weapons and remains outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Adherence to the NPT or membership in a nuclear-weapons-free zone is required to become a member of the NSG.[6] To be admitted Pakistan would have to give up its nuclear weapons and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Editor’s Note: In September 2004, in reaction to revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market network, the Pakistani legislature passed the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, which strengthened domestic export controls and penalties for illegally transferring controlled items. For more information on changes in Pakistan’s export control regulations, see Shi-Chin Lin, “The A.Q. Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls,” NTI Issue Brief, October 2004, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_54a.html>.
International Export Control and WMD Security Assistance Programs

U.S. Government Provides Equipment to Ukrainian Border Guard Detachment

In March 2005, the U.S. government transferred technical aid, valued at $700,000, to a Ukrainian border guard detachment stationed in the town of Kotovsk on the Ukraine-Moldova border. The equipment—including metal detectors, radios, radiation gauges, night vision binoculars, and vehicles—was provided to Ukraine under a Defense Threat Reduction Agency technical aid program, known as “Strengthening Transborder Management along the Ukrainian-Moldovan Border,” as part of the U.S. government’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program.[1,2,3]

This latest tranche of U.S. support preceded the visit of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to the United States in April 2005, during which he and President George W. Bush issued a joint statement pledging deeper “cooperation on nonproliferation, export controls, border security, and law enforcement to deter, detect, interdict, investigate and prosecute illicit trafficking of these weapons [WMD] and related materials; enhance the security of nuclear and radiological sources; and dispose of spent nuclear fuel.”[4]

The Kotovsk border guard unit is part of Ukraine’s Southern Regional Agency of the State Border Guard Service, which is in charge of controlling the country’s 1,222 km-long border with Moldova, a border which includes 405 km of the frontier with Transdniester—a secessionist part of Moldova unrecognized by the world community.[2] The Transdniester region, which has industrial facilities and conventional weapons producers, remains a lawless enclave and has been described as one of the major international hubs of arms trafficking and other criminal activities.[5,6]

U.S. Government Provides Assistance to Armenian Border Guards

On March 14, 2005, the United States donated eight vehicles to the Border Guard Service of Armenia, under the U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program. The vehicles, including three Nivas, two Ladas, and three Specialized All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) will be used for off-road patrolling in particularly rugged terrain.[1,2]

The commander of the Armenian Border Guards, Colonel Vyacheslav Voskanyan, attended the donation ceremony, which was held at the headquarters of the Armenian Border Guard Service.[2,3] During the ceremony, U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Anthony F. Godfrey announced that in 2005 under the aegis of the EXBS program, the U.S. government will provide Armenia with border security assistance worth $1.3 million, involving “both equipment transfer and training.” In his remarks, Godfrey noted that “EXBS is one of the most important assistance programs the U.S. Embassy is involved in.” He also emphasized that “stopping the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons through proper border controls is very important to all countries, and we are glad to see that Armenia has made it a high priority.”[2]
The EXBS program in Armenia was launched in 2000. Under the program, formal training seminars, which are geared toward training Armenian border guards and customs officials in using advanced investigative methods for the identification of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related commodities, are organized regularly both in Armenia and in the United States. In addition, in 2004 the EXBS program funded several construction projects aimed at upgrading the following Armenian facilities: the Bagratashen border crossing point and customs checkpoint located on the Armenian-Georgian border (200 km from the capital of Armenia, Yerevan); border guard barracks at the Gogavan border crossing point and customs checkpoint located 174 km from Yerevan on the Armenian-Georgian border; as well as training facilities for border guards and customs officials in Yerevan.[1,2,4]

Editor’s Note: In the Republic of Armenia, the Border Guard Service is under the authority of the National Security Service, which is also responsible for intelligence, including signals intelligence, and ensuring the protection of the president.[5]


United States and Austria Organize Export Control Seminar for Armenian Officials

by Gene Shabat, U.S. Department of Commerce

During April 19-21, 2005, as part of the U.S. State Department-funded Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security and the Austrian Ministry for Economics and Labor conducted a joint export control seminar for Armenian government officials in Vienna, Austria.

The purpose of the seminar was to familiarize Armenian officials with export controls according to international best practices and to facilitate the adoption of an European Union (EU) model control list as the national control list of Armenia.

Armenian officials learned about the various international export control regimes whose control lists, in combination, comprise the EU control list. They also visited the offices of two control regimes located in Vienna (the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) and observed various aspects of the export control system of an EU country—Austria. In order to gain a full appreciation of product classification methodology, as part of the training portion of the workshop, Armenian officials interacted with a series of instructor-led, computer-based quizzes and simulations and participated in a series of paper-based exercises in which they were broken into groups of expert teams to classify “real-world” products.

Basic Instructor Seminar Organized for NIS Nuclear and WMD Specialists in Ukraine

On February 28-March 4, 2005, a Basic Instructor Seminar (BIT) sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) was organized at the George Kuzmycz Training Center of the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kiev, Ukraine. Participating in the workshop were 30 nuclear and WMD subject matter specialists from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

The BIT seminar, aimed at preparing the specialists to train export control enforcement officials in their home countries, focused on improving presentation skills and the delivery of Commodity Identification Training (CIT) technical content to enforcement audiences. Training modules included adult learning theory, classroom communication, methods of instruction, lesson planning, and the preparation and use of training aids. The workshop emphasized practical application of the lessons, and each participant gave 3-,
5-, and 10-minute presentations, after which they received feedback from peers on the style and technical content of their presentations.

Illicit Trafficking in the Newly Independent States (NIS)

Incidents of Illicit Trafficking in the NIS

Latvia

On March 9, 2005, customs officers at the Latvian Ventspils seaport detained cargo originating in Belarus on suspicion that the cargo, containing “four tractors with semi-trailers,” was of dual-use nature.[1,2] According to Agnese Grinberga, head of the public relations department at the Latvian State Revenue Service (SRS), the cargo, worth $1.5 million, was to be forwarded by sea to Angola.[3] 

[Editor’s Note: In Latvia, the Main Customs Directorate is subordinated to the SRS.]

The department for export control of dual-use goods of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a technical evaluation of the cargo and concluded that the equipment had military applications. Specifically, the tractors and semi-trailers could be used to transport tanks and other military equipment. The Belarusian consignor failed to obtain a transit license, which is required for such cargoes according to Latvian transit rules.[1,2,3]

On March 22, 2005, the SRS Kurzeme regional department announced its decision to confiscate the cargo. According to Grinberga, the SRS also imposed a fine of 6,000 Latvian lats (about $11,360 as of March 22, 2005) on the freight-forwarding company, Nortrop Ventspils Ltd.[2,4,5] Commenting on the incident, SRS director general Dzintars Jakans said that Latvia enhanced its controls over the transit of dual-use items after the country’s entry into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[3]

Ukraine

On March 1, 2005, officers from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) detained a man carrying 582 grams of uranium at Kiev’s Borispol International Airport. The individual was transporting a container with uranium-238 in the trunk of his car. The Ukrainian Ministry of Emergency Situations press service reported that specialists from Radon, the Ukrainian state enterprise responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste, removed the container from the car. No other details of the incident were reported. The SBU and Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs started an investigation into the case.[6,7] The material is not directly usable for nuclear weapons, and it would not fuel a potent radiological dispersal device because it is weakly radioactive.

In a separate development, on March 28, 2005, four items marked with the “radiation danger” symbol were found during the demolition of a private garage in Vinnitsa, Ukraine. Specialists from the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergency Situations, Vinnitsa oblast directorate, established that the items were components of a GAMMARID gamma radiography device.[8,9] [Editor’s Note: GAMMARID is a Russian gamma radiography device known as “defectoscope” for the non-destructive testing of the quality of welding seams and foundry products.][10] Radiation around the items exceeded the background level by 15-25 times. A joint response unit composed of emergency and civil defense specialists, as well as police, security, and sanitary and epidemiological service officers examined the site further and found a 3-liter container with a radioactive liquid. These items were placed in an unidentified storage site. The investigation is under way to determine the origin of the radioactive items.[8,9]

Russia

On February 24, 2005, two residents of Tatarstan, Russia, were arrested in the town of Oktyabrskiy, Bashkortostan, Russia, while attempting to sell a 16-kilogram (-kg) container with depleted uranium for 220,000 rubles ($7,917 as of February 24, 2005). The arrest resulted from a sting operation with a Federal Security Service (FSB) agent posing as a potential buyer. The FSB cover agent asked the 32- and 26-year old perpetrators to bring the container to the Scientific Research Institute of Geophysical Studies located in Oktyabrskiy for examination by institute specialists to make sure the material was indeed uranium. The dealers brought a metal container with a sign indicating “Uranium; Radiation; GAMMARID-192/120.” The
radiation measured around the container exceeded the background level by 200 times. The perpetrators were arrested after the money exchanged hands. The 26-year old individual told the FSB that he had obtained the container from a relative. An investigation has been opened to establish the origin of the seized container.[11,12] [Editor’s Note: Depleted uranium is a residue of the uranium enrichment process, specifically uranium with a concentration of uranium-235, which is less than the concentration found in nature. Enriched uranium has a higher-than-normal concentration of uranium-235. Low-enriched uranium can fuel nuclear power plants, and highly enriched uranium can fuel nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.]

In late February 2005, members of a local club of catacomb explorers in Vladivostok, Russian Far East, found a 650-kg lead-shielded container designed to store radioactive materials during a routine visit in the city’s catacombs. The container marked “KL-3-4" was found unattended near the Vladivostok State Medical University, in a former gunpowder depot that was turned into a bomb shelter in the 1970s and is now abandoned. The diggers alerted the authorities, and on March 1, representatives from the FSB, police, and Primtekhknopolis, a local company responsible for radiation safety, opened the container but found no radiation source inside. According to Ivan Skogorev, head of Primtekhknopolis, the size and weight of the container suggests that it was designed to store a potent radioactive source, such as cobalt or cesium that could be used in gamma radiography systems or medical equipment. Primtekhknopolis experts believe that the source had been cut off with a gas-operated welding machine. They also assume that the individual or individuals who took the source have died due to radiation exposure. No radiation, however, was detected around the empty container. The FSB launched an investigation into the case to locate the source and find out whether the container was dumped by a local company to avoid the costs of properly disposing of the source or whether it was stolen from an industrial enterprise.[13, 14,15]

Kazakhstan
Citing the Mangystau Oblast Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate, Kazakhstan Today news agency reported on February 8, 2005, that two individuals were arrested while attempting to steal approximately 4 tons of radioactive scrap metal at the Aktau Chemical and Hydrometallurgical Combine, in Western Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea. During a night patrol of the site, law enforcement officers discovered a KamAZ truck at the combine’s temporary radioactive waste storage site. The vehicle was almost completely loaded with radioactive scrap metal. According to the police, a section of the facility’s concrete fence had been removed with a crane to let the truck enter the facility. The detained truck driver is an Aktau resident, while his accomplice is from Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan). Both individuals are unemployed. Kazakhstan Today reported that the suspects would be charged with theft or extortion of radioactive materials in accordance with Article 248 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[16]

Editor’s Note: The Aktau Chemical and Hydrometallurgical Combine, formerly a part of the Prikaspiyskiy Mining and Metallurgy Combine, produced uranium ore concentrate until the mid-1990s and has a substantial amount of insufficiently safeguarded radiation-emitting equipment and radioactive waste on site. Scrap metal has been stockpiled at the facility since 1962, when the combine was put into operation. In November 2004, more than 5 tons of radioactive scrap metal was reportedly stored at the combine.[17,18]

Summaries from the NIS Press

Ukrainian President Plans Radical Customs Cleanup and Confirms Illicit Missile Transfers

On March 30, 2005, during a ceremony presenting Volodymyr Skomarovsky, the new State Customs Service (SCS) chairman appointed on March 4, 2005, to SCS personnel, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko harshly criticized the agency’s work. He said that the “honeymoon” of the customs service, which lasted for 14 years, was over and that dishonest customs officials would be fired or prosecuted. [1,2,3]

According to Yushchenko, corrupt and nonprofessional customs practices negatively affected the performance of Ukrainian business and the well-being of ordinary citizens.[1,2,3] He added that in 2004 alone, 2 billion hryvnias ($386.4 million as of June 2004) were stolen from the national budget through a single customs scam: fictitious VAT (value added tax) refunds. In addition, according to Yushchenko, the declared value of some imported goods is often understated by a factor of 10, while domestic manufacturers suffer from abuses of customs officials.[3,4,5]

Yushchenko called upon the SCS to be actively involved in implementing the country’s foreign trade policy and to restore the trust of Ukrainian businessmen.[3] He promised massive audits of SCS activities by law enforcement agencies and announced that he expects a detailed report from the customs internal control service on the performance of each of Ukraine’s 50 regional customs offices in a month’s time. He also demanded a radical change in personnel at the SCS to be completed in 60 days to eliminate corrupt officers. Yushchenko said that he would not settle for half-measures.[1,2,3,4,5] On the same day, Yushchenko signed edicts dismissing two SCS deputy chairman, Anatoliy Pedeshko and Andriy Voytseshchuk, from their positions.[6]

In a separate development, in a March 31, 2005, interview with U.S.-based NBC TV, Yushchenko confirmed that Ukraine had illegally sold 12 Kh-55 nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles to Iran and China (six each) in 2001. “I confirm this, though I do so with bitterness,” Yushchenko declared.[7,8]


International Developments

U.S. Container Security Initiative Operational at 35 Ports

On March 26, 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Robert C. Bonner and Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, executive chairman of the Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, United Arab Emirates (UAE), announced that the UAE port of Dubai had joined the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to become the 35th CSI operational port. The UAE is the first Middle Eastern country to join the initiative.[1]

CSI cooperation between the United States and the UAE began on December 12, 2004, when the Declaration of Principles was signed in Dubai. A CBP team of experts will work closely with UAE government personnel to target high-risk cargo containers destined for the United States. Dubai Customs Administration officials are responsible for screening any container identified jointly with CBP officers as a potential terrorist risk. According to Bonner, “the Port of Dubai, which includes the much larger seaport of Jebel Ali, are modern and extremely efficient ports and I am confident that the CBP officers stationed there will benefit greatly from this remarkable opportunity.”[1] [Editor’s Note: The port of Jebel Ali is situated 35 km southwest of Dubai, and has the largest man-made harbor in the world, with 67 berths and extensive dry-dock capability.][2,3]

The CSI is a U.S. initiative launched in January 2002, with the aim of securing maritime containerized cargo shipped to the United States against terrorist threats, by inspecting such cargo at the port of embarkation. As of April 2005, the 35 operational ports collaborating in the CSI effort and representing the world’s major seaports are: Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, Canada; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Le Havre and Marseilles, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium; Singapore; Kobe, Nagoya, Tokyo, and Yokohama, Japan; Hong Kong; Göteborg, Sweden; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport, and Tilbury, United Kingdom; Genoa, Gioia Tauro, La Spezia, Livorno, and Naples, Italy; Busan, South Korea; Durban, South Africa; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algeciras, Spain; Laem Chabang, Thailand; and Dubai, UAE.[1]


IAEA Issues Report on Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle

by Lawrence Scheinman, Center for Nonproliferation Studies

On February 22, 2005, an international expert group with representatives from 26 countries released a report on ways to strengthen controls over sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. The group was created in June 2004 by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei.

Concerned about the impact on the international nuclear nonproliferation regime of the continuing spread of nuclear technologies that can provide direct access to nuclear-weapons-usable materials, ElBaradei convened an international group of experts to consider possible approaches to these sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle that would place them under multinational controls rather than under the control of individual countries. In particular, the group was charged with identifying and analyzing multilateral approaches to managing uranium enrichment, which can give states the ability to enrich uranium to levels
usable for nuclear weapons, and to plutonium separation (or reprocessing), which can enable states to acquire plutonium, the other material that can be used as the core of nuclear weapons.

The group was asked to assess the policy, legal, security, economic, institutional, and technological incentives and disincentives for cooperation on alternative multilateral arrangements. It was also asked to provide a brief review of relevant historical and current experiences relating to multilateral arrangements covering these sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The expert group submitted its report to the IAEA Director-General in February 2005. He in turn transmitted the report to the IAEA Board of Governors for their consideration and recommendations and plans to circulate it for information at the 2005 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Four aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle were identified as areas of concern and were addressed in the study. These were uranium enrichment, reprocessing, permanent repositories for used (spent) nuclear reactor fuel and facilities for the shorter-term storage of used nuclear reactor fuel. [Editor’s Note: Plutonium is created in reactor fuel as it is used; if the plutonium is separated from the other components of the used fuel, it could potentially be used in nuclear weapons. For this reason, multilateral approaches for managing used fuel were one of the areas studied by the international expert group.]

The report outlined for further consideration a number of means by which to strengthen nonproliferation efforts while making peaceful uses of nuclear energy more economical and attractive. Specifically, the report outlined a number of mechanisms for ensuring supplies of enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power plants to reduce incentives for additional states to develop new uranium enrichment capabilities under national control. Among these mechanisms was reinforcing existing commercial arrangements for the supply of nuclear reactor fuel by possibly creating backup arrangements such as inter-governmental agreements among supplier states to ensure NPT states in good standing that they would have predictable and reliable fuel supplies for their civil programs. A second option discussed was the development of international supply guarantees involving IAEA participation, perhaps as an administrator of a “fuel bank” upon which an NPT party in good nonproliferation standing could draw, if necessary. Another concept thought to deserve further study and consideration included the possibility of voluntary conversion of existing uranium enrichment facilities into regional or international entities in which nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, and even non-NPT states could participate. Creating new multinational facilities through voluntary agreements based on joint ownership was also reviewed. There was also widespread interest in ideas involving fuel leasing and fuel take back options that opened the possibility for benefiting from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without having the burden of spent fuel storage and disposal.

Workshops and Conferences

Ninth PSI Operational Experts Meeting is Held in Omaha, Nebraska

On March 20-22, 2005, the U.S. Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense hosted the ninth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operational group of experts (OEG) meeting at the Omaha Qwest Center in Omaha, Nebraska.[1,2] [Editor’s Note: The OEG has been meeting quarterly since July 2003.][3] Approximately 200 participants, including political and military officials, law enforcement and intelligence officers, and lawyers from 19 countries attended the meeting to discuss ongoing international efforts aimed at enhancing the operational capability of PSI members to stop the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.[1,2,3] The 19 states represented were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In his opening remarks, Commander of STRATCOM General James Cartwright emphasized that it was particularly important for STRATCOM to host this meeting because it has been recently charged with synchronizing all U.S. Department of Defense efforts to combat WMD proliferation.[1,2] During the
meeting, participants addressed such topics as “operational concepts, training exercises, industry outreach, and legal authorities related to the interdiction of WMD-related air shipments.”[2] In addition, the participants discussed preparations for joint exercises to be organized in 2005. These include a maritime interdiction exercise led by Portugal, which was held in April; an air interdiction exercise, which will be hosted by Spain in June; a ground interdiction exercise to be held in Poland, also in June; maritime interdiction exercises to be led by Singapore and the United Kingdom in August and November, respectively; and an air interdiction simulation to be hosted by Norway in October.[1,2,3] A total of 15 sea, air, and land exercises are planned by the PSI for 2005-2006.[3]


Announcements


The April 2005 *NPT Briefing Book*, the most comprehensive source of information related to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, is now available online as part of the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies NPT Resource Page at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/npt/index.htm>. The conference will take place from May 2 to 27, 2005 at UN headquarters in New York.

Published jointly by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies and the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the *NPT Briefing Book* is a source of information on the evolution of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, its relevant treaties and agreements, and documentation of all the latest developments leading up to the 2005 Review Conference.

The *Briefing Book* is composed of two parts:

Part I provides an historical overview of the emergence and evolution of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Encompassed within this overview is a description of the initial proposals for addressing nuclear energy and atomic weapons in the aftermath of World War II, as well as their development in the NPT, and an examination of the first 30 years of the NPT’s implementation and Review Process. The *Briefing Book* places particular focus on the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference. It includes an up-to-date compilation of the most concrete and substantive proposals submitted as working papers, as part of national or group statements, and as other submissions to the 2004 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference.

Part II contains a compilation of treaties, agreements—including export control regimes—and documents relevant to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This compilation includes official documents from the 1995, 2000, and 2005 NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees, as well as related agreements adopted by the UN General Assembly, the IAEA, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and bilateral arrangements. A section on export controls is also included, which details the history, role, and functions of both the two organizations controlling nuclear exports, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It also lists the NSG guidelines for the transfer of nuclear and related dual-use technology. In addition, the *Briefing Book* provides documents regarding NPT compliance cases such as those involving Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
NIS Export Control Observer (http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon) is devoted to the analysis of WMD export control issues in the NIS. It is published monthly in English and Russian for the NIS and international export control community by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), with financial support from the U.S. Department of State. Although every reasonable effort has been made to check sources and verify facts, CNS cannot guarantee that accounts reported in the open literature are complete and accurate. Therefore, CNS shall not be held liable for any loss or damage caused by errors or omissions. Statements of fact and opinion expressed in NIS Export Control Observer are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, or the U.S. Government. Copyright 2005 by MIIS. May be freely reproduced and distributed with proper citation.

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