## Inside this Issue

### Recent Developments in the NIS
- Kazakhstan Strengthens Borders; Opens Integrated Checkpoints
- Russian Government Distributes Responsibilities in the Area of Chemical and Biological Security
- Russia to Amend Administrative Offenses Code to Strengthen Export Control

### Changes in NIS Export Control Personnel
- New Deputy Chairman of Border Guard Committee Appointed in Belarus
- Ukrainian President Criticizes Customs Service, Fires Customs Officials

### International Assistance Programs
- Customs Control Center Established in Russia
- Uzbekistan Receives Export Control-Related Assistance
- Kyrgyzstan Receives Export Control Equipment
- Internal Compliance Program Training Seminar Organized in Russia
- Nuclear Dual-Use Commodity Identification Training in Georgia

### Summaries from the NIS Press
- Orphaned Strontium Plates Found in Murmansk Oblast, Russia
- Cesium-137 Container Found in Kurgan Oblast, Russia

### International Developments
- Ukraine Denies Reports of Israeli Demands for Return of Missiles from Iran

### Workshops and Conferences
- U.S.-Russian Seminar on Export Controls Held in Vladivostok
- Turkey and United States Organize Training Seminars in Turkmenistan

## Special Report

**EU Arms Trade to China: U.S. Officials Seek Added, Legal Assurances**  

_by Kathleen Walsh, Independent Consultant on Asian Security_
Recent Developments in the Newly Independent States

Kazakhstan Strengthens Borders; Opens Integrated Checkpoints

At their July 26, 2005, meeting, members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kazakhstan discussed measures to strengthen the country’s land and sea borders, including equipment upgrades for the Border Guard Service and other relevant agencies; improvement of interagency coordination in preventing illegal migration, poaching, and smuggling; better protection of offshore facilities; and organization of search-and-rescue operations. As announced at the meeting, Kazakhstan is currently considering an offer by BAE Systems to supply seven Defender 4000 aircraft designed to patrol land and sea borders, as well as related land-based service equipment. According to some Kazakhstani experts, because of its longer flight range and shorter sortie time, Defender 4000 is better suited to patrol borders than helicopters that are currently in use by the Border Guard Service. Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov tasked relevant ministries and agencies to evaluate technical characteristics of Defender 4000 and the cost-effectiveness of the suggested deal before reaching a final decision.[1,2] [Editor’s Note: BAE Systems is an international company engaged in the development, delivery, and support of advanced defense and aerospace systems in the air, on land, at sea, and in space.][3]

In a related development, the shipbuilding plant Scientific Research Institute Gidropribor located in Uralsk, western Kazakhstan, announced on July 25 that the construction of a new modernized patrol boat Shagala (Seagull) was finished. The boat was ordered by the Committee for National Security of Kazakhstan, which supervises the Border Guard Service, to patrol the country’s sea borders on the Caspian Sea. According to Gidropribor specialists, the Shagala is designed to patrol rivers and lakes as well as seashore areas, which makes it different from previous boats produced by the plant. The boat is currently being tested on the Ural River and will be sent to the port of Aqtau afterwards. Over the past several years, Gidropribor has produced 16 boats which currently patrol the Caspian Sea.[4]

In July 2005, the Customs Control Committee (CCC) of the Ministry of Finances of Kazakhstan opened three new checkpoints that incorporate an integrated control system based on the so-called “one-stop principle.” The new checkpoints—Auyl, East Kazakhstan Oblast; Karakoga, North Kazakhstan Oblast; and Ubagan, Kostanay Oblast—are located on the Kazakhstani-Russian border. The checkpoints were opened on July 7, 21, and 28, respectively. Under the arrangement, customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary-phytosanitary control, and sanitary-quarantine control officers will conduct necessary control procedures in a single building at these checkpoints.

Along with the integrated checkpoints previously established on the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border (Gani Muratbayev checkpoint, South Kazakhstan Oblast) and on the Kazakhstani-Russian border (Sharbakty checkpoint, Pavlodar Oblast), there are now five integrated checkpoints in Kazakhstan. The CCC plans to bring the number of integrated checkpoints to 25 by 2008.

In addition, according to CCC Chairman Berdibek Saparbaev, joint Kazakhstani-Russian customs control procedures will also be established at the newly opened integrated checkpoints starting 2006. The two countries plan to open a total of 19 joint customs posts on the Kazakhstani-Russian border in 2006-2008—10 in Russia and 9 in Kazakhstan.[5,6,7]


NIS Export Control Observer, August 2005
Russian Government Distributes Responsibilities in the Area of Chemical and Biological Security

On May 16, 2005, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed government Resolution No. 303, "On the Division of Authority among Federal Agencies in the Sphere of Biological and Chemical Security of the Russian Federation." The document, which is available in Russian on the official website of the Russian government press service, lists the respective responsibilities of federal agencies involved in chemical and biological security.[1,2] This article provides a summary of the functions of some of the ministries and agencies listed.

The Federal Technical and Export Control Service:
- Coordinates the activities of federal agencies and organizations in regard to protecting state secrets and classified information on activities related to biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation;
- In coordination with relevant federal executive bodies, controls the implementation of measures aimed at preventing leaks of state secrets and classified information on activities in the field of biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation;
- Develops jointly with the relevant federal agencies and organizations draft lists of biological and chemical goods that are subject to export control;
- Carries out export control and organizes and implements state expert assessments of exports involving items that can be used for creating biological and chemical weapons as well as their delivery systems; and
- Participates in the implementation of state policy on nonproliferation of biological and chemical weapons.

The Ministry of Defense:
- Participates in the formation of state policy on chemical and biological security and, in coordination with relevant federal executive bodies, establishes requirements for developing means of protection against dangerous biological agents and chemical substances;
- Protects the Russian Federation’s armed forces from dangerous biological agents and chemical substances and military infrastructure from pathogens of both natural and artificial origin;
- Ensures the implementation of measures to strengthen physical protection of critical chemical and biological facilities under the control of the Ministry of Defense;
- Conducts scientific research and experimental design tests aimed at creating protection against dangerous pathogens;
- Regulates the creation, maintenance, storage, and security of culture collections critical for the Ministry of Defense;
- Maintains in necessary readiness the radioactive, chemical, and biological protection units of the Russian Armed Forces;
- Ensures the implementation and organization of sanitary-epidemiological, veterinary-sanitary, and phytosanitary monitoring in the Russian Armed Forces;
- Conducts assessments of external and internal sources of biological and chemical threats and makes recommendations for preventing the development, acquisition, and production of biological and chemical weapons by other states; and
- Carries out, within the limits of its institutional competence, international activities regarding questions of biological and chemical security; implements the requirements of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and participates in monitoring their implementation by other states-parties.

The Ministry of Public Health and Social Development:
- Ensures biological and chemical security of the Russian population and coordinates interaction of federal agencies in this area;
• Coordinates work on state policy formulation in the sphere of biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation;
• Participates in drafting federal laws, presidential edicts, and government decrees concerning the establishment of biological and chemical security standards for industrial facilities;
• Regulates the creation, maintenance, storage, and security of culture collections of dangerous biological agents; and
• Interacts with foreign states and international organizations in the area of biological and chemical security, including issues related to the adherence to the BTWC.

The Ministry of Agriculture:
• Participates in the formation of state policy on chemical and biological security in the Russian Federation;
• Participates in drafting federal legislation, presidential edicts, and government decrees regarding technical requirements establishing biological and chemical security criteria;
• Provides legal and regulatory oversight of veterinary and phytosanitary control aimed at reducing the harmful impact of dangerous biological agents and chemical substances on farm animals, plants, and their environment, as well as on agricultural production and the food industry; and
• Regulates the creation, maintenance, storage, and security of culture collections consisting of dangerous biological agents at the facilities that are critical elements of the agricultural industry.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
• Ensures biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation at the international level;
• In coordination with the relevant federal executive bodies, drafts documents concerning issues related to the implementation of CWC and BTWC requirements by the Russian Federation; and
• Participates in drafting proposals for counteracting the development, acquisition, and production of biological and chemical weapons by other states.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs:
• Provides protection of critical facilities, important government facilities, special cargo shipments, and communication facilities, as well as facilities that are subject to mandatory protection by internal affairs units to prevent unauthorized access to these facilities and to dangerous biological agents and chemical substances used at such facilities; and
• Organizes and conducts special scientific research and experimental design activities aimed at improving the efficiency of internal affairs units and forces in emergency situations involving biological or chemical threats.

The Federal Security Service:
• Cooperates with other relevant federal agencies in developing measures aimed at identifying and thwarting the illegal trafficking of dangerous pathogens and poisonous chemical substances and their illegal use;
• Assists other federal agencies of the Russian Federation in implementing measures aimed at ensuring biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation; and
• In collaboration with the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, creates a classified, automated database containing information on biological and chemical security of the Russian Federation, including information on transnational terrorist threats.[2]

Russia to Amend Administrative Offenses Code to Strengthen Export Control

On July 28, 2005, the Russian government approved amendments to sections of the country’s Code of Administrative Offenses dealing with export controls. A draft law introducing amendments was presented by Russian Minister of Justice Yuriy Chayka at a meeting of the Russian Cabinet of Ministers. According to Chayka, the changes “increase administrative responsibility and improve control mechanisms in this [export control] sphere.”[1] To enter into force, the draft law should be ratified by the State Duma and signed by President Putin.

Under the amended code, fines for violating export control regulations will be raised.[1] At present, individuals, officials, or legal entities found in violation of export control regulations are fined the cost of goods or services involved with or without confiscation. In addition, officials and legal entities are additionally fined from 10 to 20 times the minimum wage for officials and from 100 to 200 times the minimum wage for legal entities.[2] [Editor’s Note: The minimum wage [minimalnyy razmer zarabotnoy platy or MROT in Russian abbreviation] is a unit used in Russia to regulate wages, compensation, and other payments made under labor legislation, as well as to calculate taxes, levies, duties, fines, and other payments As of August 2005, the federally mandated minimum wage in the Russian Federation is 720 roubles, or $25.30. Thus, fines for officials range from $253.00 to $506.00, and from $2,530.00 to $5,060.00 for legal entities.] Yuriy Chayka did not specify the amount of the new fines but mentioned that the statute of limitations for export control violations will be increased from six months to one year. According to Chayka, the amendments, if signed into law, will expand the right of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service and regional authorities to conduct investigations of export control violations. The revised code will also authorize personnel from the Russian Federal Security Service to draft protocols on administrative violations of export control regulations.


Changes in NIS Export Control Personnel

New Deputy Chairman of Border Guard Committee Appointed in Belarus

On July 26, 2005, the press service of Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenko announced that the Belarusian leader had signed a decree appointing Colonel Vadzim Zaytsau deputy chairman of the State Committee for Border Guard Troops and head of the committee’s main operations directorate.[1,2] Open sources do not provide information on Zaytsau’s predecessor nor do they specify Zaytsau’s background or professional credentials.

Zaytsau will report to the chairman of the State Committee for Border Guard Troops, Alyaksandr Paulousky, who is a member of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, which supervises the Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Controls. The commission determines the country’s export control policy and is the principal decision maker on the issuance of export licenses.[3]


Ukrainian President Criticizes Customs Service, Fires Customs Officials

Following a July 19, 2005, meeting of the State Customs Service (SCS) Board at which Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko criticized the SCS for “highly unsatisfactory” work, three high-ranking customs officials—SCS First Deputy Chairman Mykola Salagor and the heads of the Lviv and Rava Ruska customs services—were dismissed on allegations of corruption. Yushchenko told the board that there had
been no improvement in the SCS over the preceding six months and asked that the heads of all 50 regional customs offices be demoted to deputy heads. Later the same day, all 50 officials resigned as regional customs heads and assumed the position of deputy head in their respective posts. The offices will now be headed by individuals with backgrounds in economics or organizational management, according to SCS Head Volodymyr Skomarovsky, speaking at a July 20 press conference.

Yushchenko’s harsh criticism of the SCS follows similar statements made in March 2005, in which the president promised massive audits of the SCS and radical change to remove corrupt officers. (For more information on Yushchenko’s March remarks, see “Ukrainian President Plans Radical Customs Cleanup and Confirms Illicit Missile Transfers,” *NIS Export Control Observer*, No. 26, April 2005, pp. 12-13, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>.)


International Assistance Programs

Customs Control Center Established in Russia

On July 21, 2005, the Response and Customs Control Center for Fissile and Radioactive Materials opened at the headquarters of the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) in Moscow, as part of the U.S.-Russian Second Line of Defense (SLD) cooperative program. According to Nikolay Kravchenko, deputy head of the FCS Main Directorate for Information Technologies, equipment for the new center was purchased with funding from the U.S. Department of State. He did not specify, however, the total budget, saying that it ranges from $400,000 to $1 million.[1] FCS First Deputy Chairman Vladimir Shamakhov, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Russia Daniel Rassel, U.S. Department of State representative Lawrence Springer, and other officials attended the opening ceremony.[2]

The center represents the first level of a multi-level information management system that is being created for Russian customs under the SLD program. The system is designed to improve existing customs control of fissile and radioactive materials in Russia by introducing automated radiation control procedures and providing effective communications support to customs personnel. The multi-level information management system will improve the quality and speed of decision making by offering customs officials a possible sequence of actions. If a radiation control system sounds an alarm, customs officers are directed to fill out electronic protocols composed of a standard set of questions. The protocol, which serves both as an action guide and incident report, will then be automatically sent to a supervising customs operator who will analyze the information, make sure that complete and appropriate actions have been taken by lower-ranking personnel, and make the necessary recommendations.[2]


Uzbekistan Receives Export Control-Related Assistance

On July 22, 2005, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) country office in Uzbekistan handed over €17,567 ($21,395 as of July 2005) worth of passport control equipment to officials from Uzbekistan’s Committee for State Border Protection, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Consular Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The equipment, which includes specialized tools for passport control as well as computers, printers, monitors, etc., will be used at the Tashkent International Airport. The assistance was part of the Airport Control Project that is being implemented under the second phase of the European Union’s (EU) Central Asia Drug Assistance Program (CADAP), or CADAP-2.[1,2,3]

CADAP complements another EU assistance program—Border Management Program for Central Asia (BOMCA). The key goal of these programs is to assist the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in improving the effectiveness of their border management systems, as well as the overall security situation in the region, and to facilitate the movements of persons and goods across their borders. The programs include specific projects targeted at modernizing legislation, organization, equipment, and operations of the border services of these countries, promoting regional cooperation between them, and preventing drug trafficking and drug abuse in the region. BOMCA/CADAP programs are financed by the EU, whereas the UNDP implements and coordinates the programs through its country offices in each Central Asian country. UNDP implements the Airport Control Project in Uzbekistan in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration.[1,2,3]


Kyrgyzstan Receives Export Control Equipment

On August 10, 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan donated computers, copiers, and other office equipment to the State Customs Inspectorate (SCI) of Kyrgyzstan as part of the U.S. State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. The equipment will help modernize and automate Kyrgyzstani customs processes. According to the SCI press service, previous U.S. technical assistance to the Kyrgyz customs service included advanced inspection tools and photo and video equipment, while currently the United States assists in equipping Kyrgyz border crossings and customs posts.[1,2]


Internal Compliance Program Training Seminar Organized in Russia

On June 27-July 1, 2005, the Export Control Methodological Laboratories of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) and Rosatom’s subsidiary Atomenergo conducted a workshop on internal compliance programs with funding from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Eighteen staff members from 15 Rosatom facilities located in both the European and Asian parts of Russia participated. The seminar included 19 presentations by speakers from the Russian Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), Rosatom, the Russian Federal Tax Service (FTS), the Russian Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS), and Atomenergo, as well as by specialists from DOE national laboratories and from the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia (United States). The presentations covered a large spectrum of important export control issues, including the history of export controls, nonproliferation regimes, control lists, and national and international law enforcement procedures.

Nuclear Dual-Use Commodity Identification Training in Georgia

On July 20-22 and July 25-27, 2005, respectively, the DOE’s Argonne National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, in collaboration with the E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics of the Republic of Georgia Academy of Sciences, conducted two Nuclear Commodity Identification Training (CIT) courses in Batumi, Georgia.

Fifty officers from the Georgian customs, border guards, and the National Security Force posted in Batumi, Poti, and Sarpi attended the workshops. The border guard contingent also included several representatives from the Georgian Coast Guard.
The training included formal lectures on such issues as international nonproliferation regimes, nuclear commodities subject to export controls, and Georgian export control legislation. Georgian speakers from the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics, the Customs Administration, the Border Guard, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources presented nine lectures at each workshop. The training seminars also included practical exercise sessions and a final test at the conclusion of the session.

**Summaries from the NIS Press**

**Orphaned Strontium Plates Found in Murmansk Oblast, Russia**

A box marked “radioactive” was found by a local resident in Murmansk Oblast on August 8, 2005.[1] The box was discovered near the offices of the Rezets floating maintenance dock in the village of Tri Ruchya. Specialists from the Murmansk Oblast Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations arrived at the scene and examined the object. The box contained strontium plates. Tests revealed that the radioactivity level of these plates was low.[2] Apparently, the plates were part of an instrument in which strontium plates are used as control material for testing the performance of radiation dosimeters.[1] The box of plates was removed by emergency response specialists and taken into safe storage. Law enforcement officials opened an investigation to find the owner of the plates and to understand how the box and its contents ended up near the Rezets factory.[2]

*Editor’s Note: The Rezets floating maintenance dock specializes in performing complex ship and vessel repairs and maintenance. It is affiliated with the Open Joint Stock Company Murmannybprom.*


**Cesium-137 Container Found in Kurgan Oblast, Russia**

As reported by Russian media, on July 17, 2005, Mikhail Ignatyev, a resident of the village of Sadovoye, Ketsovsky District, in Russia’s Kurgan Oblast, found a metal container marked with a radioactivity sign in a pile of sand stored in his yard. After Ignatyev alerted the authorities, the local police, fire department, and emergency response officers arrived at the site and evacuated the residents of the house and their neighbors. Upon examination, it was established that the container, designed to store cesium-137, was empty. Radiation around the item did not exceed the background level. The container was placed in a special storage site in the nearby village of Vvedenskoye. It is expected that it will be transported to the Chelyabinsk branch of Radon for disposal. [Editor’s Note: Radon is a network of Russian state enterprises responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste.]

The origin of the container has not been identified. According to the Kurgan Oblast Chief Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations, Ignatyev bought the sand for construction purposes from the Staro-Prosvetskiy sand pit a year and a half ago. It is unclear if the container was present in the sand when Ignatyev bought it.[1,2,3,4]

This is not the first time that abandoned empty containers designed to store radioactive substances have been found in Russia. In its May 2004 issue, the *NIS Export Control Observer* reported a similar event involving a radioactive container that previously held iridium-192. The item was discovered near the Yekaterinburg-Tyumen highway.[5] In its August 2004 issue, the *Observer* reported on a metal container found in Groznyy, capital of Russia’s Chechen Republic, that previously could have held potent amounts of radioactive materials.[6] As reported in the November 2004 issue, three radioactive stainless steel containers were found in Saratov, central Russia. One of the containers was used for the transportation of uranium, and the other two were used to store depleted uranium-238.[7] And, finally, in its June 2005 issue, the *Observer* reported an attempt by a resident of Tver Oblast to sell a radioactive metal container to a scrap metal collection point in Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast. The suspect claimed that he had found the item abandoned in the open air.[8] Efforts by Russian authorities to establish the origin of such containers and locate radioactive materials previously stored inside have so far failed.
International Developments

Ukraine Denies Reports of Israeli Demands for Return of Missiles from Iran

The Ukrainian government denied reports carried by the Israeli press alleging that Israeli officials had asked Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko to demand the return of Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) cruise missiles from Iran. Six missiles, which originated from Ukraine’s military arsenal, were sold illegally to Tehran in 2001. The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that Israel made the request to Hrytsenko during his July 2005 visit to Tel Aviv. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry dismissed the allegations as provocative, exacerbating worsening relations between Ukraine and Middle Eastern countries.[1,2]

Workshops and Conferences

U.S.-Russian Seminar on Export Controls Held in Vladivostok

On August 1-5, 2005, a joint U.S.-Russian training seminar, “Export Control and Security of Seaports,” was held at a branch of the Russian Customs Academy in the Russian Far East city of Vladivostok. The seminar was organized by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Main Directorate for Commodity Classification and Trade Restrictions of Russia’s Federal Customs Service (FCS), with funding from the U.S. State Department’s EXBS program.

Attendees included 18 customs officials who specialize in customs control of military and dual-use goods and technologies from the Far Eastern Customs Directorate and its eight divisions—the Far Eastern Operational Customs and seven regional maritime customs offices in Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Khasan, Vanino, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and Magadan, three U.S. Coast Guard officials, two U.S. Embassy representatives, and Andrey Plotkin, head of the FCS department for military-technical cooperation and export control.

The training program, jointly prepared and taught by U.S. and Russian specialists, focused on customs control of WMD, means of their delivery, and related materials, as well as techniques for container inspection and detection of illegal shipments of WMD. The agenda also included training exercises at the commercial seaport of Vladivostok.[1,2]
Turkey and United States Organize Training Seminars in Turkmenistan

In early July 2005, the Turkish Partnership for Peace Training Center in cooperation with Turkmenistan’s State Border Guard Service organized the training seminar “Combating Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings,” for 40 Turkmen officials representing the State Border Guard Service and the State Agency for the Registration of Foreigners, in Ashgabad.

The courses, taught by Turkish experts, addressed such issues as countering terrorism and combating smuggling of arms and trafficking in drugs and human beings, as well as links between smuggling and terrorism. The participants also exchanged experiences on national practices of combating terrorism and smuggling. At the end of the seminar, all participants received certificates of completion. The parties agreed to organize such training seminars at least once a year.[1]

In a related development, in July-August 2005, the United States organized two export control training seminars in the Turkmen city of Turkmenbashy on the Caspian Sea. On July 25-29, the U.S Embassy in Turkmenistan, in cooperation with the Maritime Brigade of Turkmenistan’s State Border Guard Service, conducted a Boarding Officers Seminar for 25 U.S. Coast Guard and Turkmen border guard officers, as part of the U.S. State Department’s EXBS program. The seminar focused on boarding operations at sea, detaining vessels, discovering hidden compartments, the use of force, and drug identification.[2,3]

On August 11-19, 2005, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection held a joint Port Security Training program for 24 officials from Turkmenistan’s State Border Guard Service, State Customs Service, State Agency for the Registration of Foreigners, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service, and Maritime Transportation Administration. The program was designed to develop skills associated with cargo examination, passenger search, recognition of drugs, vessel search, and document review. The training involved practical exercises at the Turkmenbashy Cargo and Ferry Terminals, including boarding and inspection of vessels, inspection of containers, dry cargo and perishable cargo examination, and control of travel documents, passengers, and their luggage.[4]

Editor’s Note: NATO’s Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) program was launched at the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. PfP is designed to encourage practical cooperation between NATO states and individual partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The program aims, through joint activities and regular consultations, to encourage democratic control of the armed forces, improve transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, and promote cooperation with NATO in crisis management, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, air traffic control, and armament issues. Currently, 46 countries (26 NATO members and 20 partners) participate in the program. The Turkish PfP Training Center was established on June 29, 1998. Since its establishment, the center has been actively contributing to PfP by conducting courses and seminars for NATO, PfP, and Mediterranean Dialogue participating countries.[5,6] The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum for political consultation and cooperation launched in December 1994 by NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—to contribute to regional security and stability as well as mutual confidence-building and cooperation.[7]


NIS Export Control Observer, August 2005
Special Report

EU Arms Trade to China: U.S. Officials Seek Added, Legal Assurances

by Kathleen Walsh, Independent Consultant on Asian Security

Political shockwaves reverberated through Washington in December 2004 with the EU announcement that its then 15-year-long embargo governing arms transfers to the People’s Republic China (PRC) would soon end, pending formal agreement by EU members. The news was not entirely unexpected given the debate the issue had generated across the Atlantic over the previous several years. But the EU’s declaration, following an EU-China summit held a week earlier, nevertheless appeared to stun U.S. policymakers, who had long made clear Washington’s view that lifting the sanctions would undermine regional security and send Beijing the “wrong signal” on human rights. While the surprise evident in Washington might have been the result of low expectations given long delays in previous EU efforts to reach agreement on ending the embargo, in addition to the resoundingly negative vote the idea had received in Brussels just a year earlier, the American sense of shock highlighted the strategic chasm that has emerged in transatlantic relations since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the months since the EU’s December declaration, however, the momentum in support of lifting the ban on arms sales to China has markedly diminished. U.S. officials, including President Bush, have repeatedly and vociferously argued against the EU’s plan to end its embargo—imposed by EU members following the bloody crackdown in China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 while American legislators have drafted sweeping measures to penalize European firms involved in transferring arms and related technologies to the PRC. The measure ultimately passed the House, though not before the language contained in the East Asia Security Act was revised to assuage concerns raised by commercial and defense firms in the United States and across Europe about the original legislation’s overly broad terms, which had the potential to disrupt ongoing joint defense industrial projects. The measure, as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, awaits Senate action. Also dampening EU enthusiasm for an immediate policy change toward China was the untimely imposition by Beijing of an “anti-secession law” that threatened “nonpeaceful means” to prevent “Taiwan independence.” Consequently, the European Union put off making a formal change in policy at its June 2005 summit and is not expected to move forward with the initiative until mid-2006, when the United Kingdom’s term as EU president expires. In the meantime, despite the spate of inflamed rhetoric emanating from both sides of the Atlantic following the EU’s 2004 declaration, U.S. and EU officials appear to have taken a step back and are presently working to identify a possible near-term solution to this geo-political quandary.

Assuming the EU will in fact lift its China arms embargo sometime soon, the most immediate concern for U.S. policymakers is ensuring that the Europeans enact a legally binding export control system covering arms transfers to the PRC. European officials’ initial contention that the EU’s Code of Conduct governing European arms sales would suffice to safeguard EU and U.S. export control concerns vis-à-vis China was summarily rejected in Washington. U.S. officials view the voluntary and politically binding Code of Conduct, even if strengthened, as insufficient to ensure compliance. Rather, the American position is that EU members must adopt a legally binding process that would mandate more stringent review mechanisms, as well as penalties on those states or firms found selling arms and dual-use technologies to China in contravention of agreed-upon export control laws and regulations. While one could argue that Europe’s Tiananmen-era sanctions constitute a political embargo (in contrast to U.S. sanctions, which are codified in U.S. law) and that their termination, therefore, invites a political solution, Washington has made clear that adopting a legally based approach to managing future EU arms-related transfers to China is the price for U.S. support of any future easing of the EU embargo. Recent statements by the EU’s head of nonproliferation, Annalisa Giannella, suggest that such a compromise could soon be reached.[1]

Yet, even if this type of trans-Atlantic political solution is achieved in the near term, larger strategic issues remain. Despite common U.S. and EU interest in exploiting the PRC’s enormous consumer market and in promoting a stable, prosperous, and status-quo China, the United States and European Union are divided on the larger strategic questions surrounding the PRC’s military modernization and future strategic outlook.
To EU member states, the latter are peripheral, long-term concerns, if worrisome at all. But to U.S. officials, China’s strategic intent and expanding military capabilities are central and near-term concerns.

Washington’s strategic anxiety is reflected most conspicuously in the Pentagon’s *Chinese Military Power* annual reports, which in the past two years have outlined Defense Department views on the potential harm that EU arms sales to China could pose to U.S. allies, friends, and forces in the region. The main concern noted in the 2004 report was that “…a more diverse post-embargo supplier base may enhance China’s leverage in negotiating purchases of advanced conventional weapons and technology.”[2] Following the EU’s December 2004 announcement, the Pentagon’s latest annual report is more specific, stating that “Lifting the embargo could allow China access to military and dual-use technologies that would help China to improve current weapon systems and to improve indigenous industrial capabilities for production of future advanced weapons systems. Ending the embargo could also remove implicit limits on Chinese military interaction with European militaries, giving China’s armed forces broad access to critical military ‘software’ such as modern military management practices, operational doctrine and training, and logistics expertise.”[3]

As suggested by these statements, Washington is extremely wary, far more than are European leaders, of China’s double-digit military budget increases and modernization efforts carried out over the past two decades. This is a function primarily of the U.S. security presence and commitments in the region, which the European Union lacks. U.S. anxiety is exacerbated by the potential not only for new EU weapons sales to China but conceivably also the possibility of future EU-PRC defense industrial cooperation as part of an expanding trade relationship with China. The worry in Washington is that expanded EU-China defense ties could expose Chinese engineers to advanced U.S. and allied technologies and undermine ongoing efforts to foster enhanced trans-Atlantic defense industry cooperation premised on harmonized U.S.-EU export control measures. The more fundamental concern, however, is whether lifting of the EU embargo will fuel the debate in Europe over where its long-term strategic interests lie: with the United States or with China.[4] This prospect has led analysts on both sides of the Atlantic to call urgently for a U.S.-EU strategic dialogue on the question of how to deal—in a cooperative fashion—with the challenges posed by China’s rising power.[5]

In the meantime, policymakers in Washington are attempting to buy more time by pressing EU members to delay further making a formal decision (or, at least, making a formal announcement of a changed arms transfer policy). Until U.S. and EU officials can reach a new strategic consensus on how to deal with an increasingly influential China and its military modernization efforts, the U.S. position on lifting the embargo is unlikely to shift dramatically. As reiterated recently by Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, the American position remains that “…the EU has not made a compelling case for why the embargo should be lifted, and our government is united in the belief that there are compelling national security reasons for maintaining the embargo. After all, we and the EU have a shared interest in maintaining regional peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, and in promoting human rights in China. And so our view is that the E.U. should seek to align itself to this mutual interest, [and] strengthen our export control regimes, so that we can limit sales to China that put those interests at risk.”[6] Given the widening gap in EU and U.S. threat perceptions of China that this statement suggests and the current lack of strategic consensus on China, the year 2006 could be an important turning point in trans-Atlantic relations.
