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Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970, six multilateral conferences have been held to review its operation. Convened pursuant to Article VII.3 of the treaty, these conferences—known as Review Conferences (RevCons)—were held at five-year intervals from 1975 to 2000. Three of these RevCons (in 1975, 1985 and 2000) reached agreement on a Final Declaration containing detailed language on the NPT’s various articles. The three other RevCons failed to achieve consensus and did not produce such declarations. Achieving consensus is always difficult in large multilateral meetings. This uneven record has contributed to criticisms of the NPT regime as having failed to develop truly global nonproliferation norms.

Differing assessments have been offered for the failure to adopt a consensus Final Document in 1980, 1990, and 1995. In 1980, conference president Ismet Kittani (of Iraq) suspended negotiations in the two main committees in which specific issues were discussed, noting that there was “almost complete unanimity on language for universal adherence and on Articles III (safeguards), IV (peaceful use of nuclear technology), and V (peaceful nuclear explosions),” but that progress on Article VI (disarmament) was “disappointing.” In 1990, Article VI issues were also the stumbling block to a Final Declaration, with consensus-breaking disagreements over a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negative security assurances. In 1995, while not adopting a Final Declaration, the parties adopted a “Decision Package” containing Decision 2, which set forth a limited number of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and a Resolution on the Middle East.

However, even in the RevCons that failed to reach consensus on a Final Declaration, negotiations in the main committees produced texts with many paragraphs that were “unbracketed”—meaning that the language was generally acceptable to all parties. Thus, to a greater extent than is apparent at first glance, the NPT has fostered consensus on some key nuclear nonproliferation issues, although others still remain contentious. As the states parties prepare for the 2005 RevCon, it is important to look back on the evolution of the review process over the life of the treaty. Such a retrospective view can inform an understanding of the evolution of the treaty and shed light on its future development.
This article reviews the major issues and trends that have emerged over the 30-year life of the NPT. In doing so, it reviews the language of RevCon Final Declarations and unbracketed texts from other sources on an article-by-article and subject matter basis. After briefly reviewing the status and uses of NPT RevCon documentation and the context of preparations for the 2005 RevCon, the article then surveys the major issues using the general outline of the 2000 RevCon Final Document, with earlier documentation discussed under corresponding subject matter headings. About 40 issues are reviewed and major trends examined. An appendix following the main text of the article compares the actual texts of NPT RevCon documentation on a wide range of subjects, covering the NPT’s eight substantive articles (Articles I to VII and IX).

**STATUS AND USES OF NPT REVCON DOCUMENTATION**

Before turning to the specific texts of RevCon documentation over the past three decades, it may be worth considering the relationship of this material to the treaty regime as a whole. As one would expect, different parties have differing perspectives on the status of the documentation and its proper uses.

There seem to be two perspectives on the status of agreed RevCon documents. The first regards the language of consensus documents as having a binding (or at least quasi-binding) legal effect. For example, in the 2003 Preparatory Committee, the representative of Cuba stated that Cuba regarded certain language in the 2000 RevCon Final Document as binding on all parties. In contrast, the other perspective appears to view even consensus documents as nonbinding policy statements indicating desirable, but not compulsory, interpretations of the treaty or necessary steps for compliance with its provisions. This view was expressed in the 2003 PrepCom by the representative of the United States, who indicated that his government did not consider itself bound by all statements in the 2000 Final Document.

Notwithstanding the imprecise character of international law, as evidenced by perennial debates over its form and content, it is fair to say that NPT consensus documentation has both legal and policy dimensions. The legal dimension is presented by the responsibility of parties to any treaty to interpret its terms for purposes of determining its proper application. In this light, the language of Article VIII.3 of the NPT states that the objective of the RevCons is “to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.”

Further, international customary law, as reflected in the 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, clearly affirms the relevance of material such as that contained in agreed RevCon documentation as relevant to treaty interpretation. Under its general rule of interpretation in Article 31, the Vienna Convention recognizes that the following may be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.

If consensus language in a RevCon Final Document can properly be regarded as a “subsequent agreement” or “subsequent practice in application” of the NPT, such language can be considered to have at least some legal effect on its parties. At the least, such language could be taken to express a concrete statement of the parties on the interpretation of the treaty, unless and until revised or repudiated in a similar consensus document.

* Statement by UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament, Jayantha Dhanapala, in a keynote address to a meeting entitled “The NPT-Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, on April 29, 2003, during the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Turning to the policy dimension, the potential roles or uses of RevCon documentation are much broader than aiding treaty interpretation. The following are some of the most important potential uses of this documentary record:

1. A consensus document has been taken to represent an important political statement of the parties as to the continued importance and viability of the NPT regime. Indeed, the success or failure to achieve a consensus document has been viewed by some as the primary standard for assessing the success or failure of the RevCon as a whole.

2. RevCon documentation provides direction or guidance on further actions of the parties to assure compliance with NPT obligations.

3. Documentation can identify defects or weaknesses in the NPT or its application that suggest a need for amendments under Article VIII.1 and 2; such information can also be relevant to states that may wish to consider withdrawal from the treaty under Article X.1.

4. Documentation provides information concerning the treaty regime to nonparty states whose decision to join the NPT would be necessary to achieve the goal of universal adherence, a strongly affirmed goal of the treaty parties.

5. Documentation also provides vital information to interested nonstate stakeholders (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], press, media, academic institutions, scholars) on the status of the treaty regime.

6. Documentation from previous RevCons has provided a basic starting point for subsequent RevCons in evaluating the operation of the NPT. Also, because much of this language has been the product of intense negotiations over successive RevCons, familiar formulations can provide a desirable continuity in interpretation or application of the treaty. However, the obvious risk is that insistence on following past formulations can fail to reflect changed circumstances and the need to consider new issues and imperatives.

7. RevCon documentation can also provide language or references for possible inclusion in international instruments being developed on other nonproliferation or arms control issues.

8. RevCon documentation can play an important role in possible actions by the parties or relevant international bodies (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and United Nations Security Council [UNSC]) in response to incidents of noncompliance with relevant NPT provisions.

This discussion is intended to show that the process of developing consensus language for a RevCon Final Document can have significant benefits for the treaty regime as a whole and for individual parties with differing views and preoccupations. Indeed, the NPT Review Conferences have come to represent one of the few opportunities for states to conduct a broad debate over international nuclear security policy. Other forums are burdened by narrow procedural issues connected with negotiating mandates, partially developed texts of instruments addressing narrow issues, and similar problems. In contrast, the NPT is an instrument that has been seen by its parties for some three decades as providing the central legal underpinning of a regime that has supported the security interests of all its diverse parties.

**The Context of Current Events**

An obvious but perhaps underappreciated factor in determining which issues will receive greatest attention at a particular RevCon and whether a consensus Final Document can be agreed is the atmosphere created by events during the five years preceding the RevCon, especially in the months immediately preceding the conference. Although many of the issues considered by each RevCon are of long standing, others may emerge because recent political, legal, or technological events bring them more forcefully to the attention of governments or stakeholders. A prime example of how current events can influence the conference occurred at the 1985 RevCon as a result of Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Tuwaitha nuclear facility. Prior to 1985 the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities received little attention. After an extensive debate over the issue, the Final Document of the 1985 RevCon included language expressing “profound concern about the Israeli military attack” and encouraged parties to “provide immediate peaceful assistance” to parties whose safeguarded nuclear facilities had been subject to an attack.1 (See further discussion, infra, under Article IV.) Similarly, in 1995, events in Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) led to an extended debate over perceived inadequacies in safeguards verification and on compliance with NPT obligations. The sharpened focus provided by concrete cases of safeguards violations or evasions did not succeed in producing an agreed Final Document in 1995, largely because the RevCon was preoccupied by frenzied last minute negotiations to achieve indefinite extension of the treaty. However, in 2000, the Iraq and DPRK situations led to specific language regarding those two states.4
A more difficult contextual factor to assess is the impact of general policy approaches taken by major participants of particular RevCons. It is clear that achieving a consensus Final Document depends on key NPT parties showing flexibility and responsiveness to the concerns of other parties, not only on language, but on the substance of major issues. As indicated elsewhere, the failure of several RevCons to achieve a Final Document can be attributed to inflexible policy perspectives advanced by key participants. Attempting to assign primary responsibility for failure to achieve consensus is a fruitless task, since—as the saying goes—“it takes two to tango.” And in circumstances where important national and international security issues may be at stake, achieving a Final Document at a RevCon may not be the highest priority. However, in analyzing the outcome of various RevCons, it is not sufficient merely to consider what events may have taken place, but the way in which governments respond to those events and the concerns they may have generated among other NPT parties.

Looking Ahead to 2005

While the focus of this analysis is the past, it is hoped, as suggested by the two introductory quotations, that reviewing the history of NPT documentation over the life of the treaty provides a useful perspective on how issues considered in previous RevCons might be approached in the future. Particular themes likely to arise at the 2005 NPT Review Conference will be analyzed here in connection with the specific treaty articles under which they can be expected to arise. However, on the basis of preliminary debates at the first two Preparatory Committee meetings held in 2002 and 2003, some of the issues likely to receive greatest attention at the 2005 RevCon can be tentatively identified. A short list of these issues follows.

Treaty Compliance

Given recent events in the DPRK, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq, the 2005 RevCon is virtually certain to involve significant debates over issues of treaty compliance under Article II. As the analysis below demonstrates, compliance issues are a comparatively recent arrival on the RevCon scene. RevCon documentation suggests that many NPT parties are uncomfortable with conducting a detailed review of compliance issues under Article II in the RevCon process, preferring to see these issues resolved in the context of Article III safeguards compliance in other bodies, namely the IAEA Board of Governors or the U.N. Security Council. The urgency of the DPRK and Iran situations may lead, however, to a more active approach in the 2005 process.

Safeguards

Article III on safeguards has always provoked active discussion and generated extensive documentation at previous RevCons. However, a more focused debate is likely in 2005. This debate will involve the question of whether enhanced safeguards under the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) of 1997 should be considered a requirement for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties under Article III.1 of the treaty. Currently, Article III.1 is interpreted to require application of safeguards only under the IAEA’s basic NPT safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) of 1972. Under the 1972 document, safeguards basically involve material control and accounting measures for specific facilities. Under the expanded Model Additional Protocol, safeguards verification includes more intrusive measures such as environmental sampling, more extensive information requirements, and broader inspector access on a national basis. The language of Article III.1 states that each NNWS “undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute…and the Agency’s safeguards system…” (emphasis supplied). If consensus language could be adopted in a 2005 RevCon Final Document stating the parties’ interpretation that “the Agency’s safeguards system” refers to the INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol, that language would have legal effect under the interpretation article of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. An effort to seek such language poses some risks to its supporters, however, since failure to obtain a consensus could be taken as evidence that the interpretation lacks support.

Peaceful Nuclear Technology

Article IV of the NPT, affirming a right to the “fullest possible exchange” of peaceful nuclear technology, has not engendered the degree of controversy in the negotiation of past RevCon documentation as have other provisions. However, the 2005 RevCon process may see a revived debate of an issue that has not occupied past RevCons—namely, whether the “fullest possible exchange” language must be interpreted as requiring cooperation in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the so-called sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and plutonium re-
processing. Given the polarity of views on this issue between supplier and recipient states, these debates have typically been conducted in other fora, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The 2002 disclosure of Iran’s program of previously undeclared fuel cycle activities may provoke a more active debate on Article IV in 2005.

Disarmament

The most difficult and complicated negotiations over Final Documents at past RevCons have involved the nuclear arms race and disarmament provisions of Article VI. The 2005 RevCon process will not be an exception. A constant theme in the Article VI debate has been dissatisfaction on the part of a majority of NNWS parties that the NWSs have not made greater and more rapid progress toward reducing and eventually eliminating their nuclear weapons arsenals. In the last two RevCons, an effort was made to commit the parties (and particularly the NWSs) to a concrete program of actions relating to Article VI issues. The 2000 Final Document reflects consensus language identifying a set of “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI.” This rather comprehensive list of disarmament objectives—now known as the Thirteen Steps—is likely to provide the basic framework for the Article VI debate in 2005. Many governments are likely to see progress on these measures, or lack thereof, as the fundamental yardstick for assessing the adequacy of Article VI compliance. The Thirteen Steps will also constitute the initial baseline for negotiation of specific language for a 2005 RevCon Final Document.11

Among the range of specific arms control measures that have been discussed, the effort to conclude and bring into force a CTBT has taken center stage in all past RevCons. Indeed, the first measure identified in the Thirteen Steps is the “importance and urgency...[of] early entry into force of the CTBT.”12 With the 1999 refusal of the United States to ratify the CTBT and the current opposition to it by the Bush administration, the possibility of another stalemate over Final Document language cannot be discounted.

Absent progress toward near-term entry into force of the CTBT, the call for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) may be pressed with greater urgency at the 2005 RevCon. The proposal to negotiate an instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons first entered RevCon documentation in the decision document of the 1995 RevCon. A call for “immediate commencement of negotiations” on such a ban is contained in the Thirteen Steps adopted in 2000.13 Such negotiations have not yet started, however.

A somewhat new set of issues that emerged in the discussion of the Thirteen Steps in 2000 that could be taken up with some energy in 2005 focuses on NWS actions to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Included in this category of issues are: unilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals, increased transparency of nuclear weapons capabilities, and reduction of operational status of nuclear weapons. An interesting element in this package envisions steps to engender “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies....”14 Reports that the United States is considering a program of developing new nuclear weapons designs for anti-terrorist purposes (earth penetrator devices to destroy deep bunkers or devices to neutralize chemical or biological weapons) are likely to provoke concerns by some NPT parties that reliance on nuclear weapons might increase rather than decrease.

Other perennial disarmament issues included in the Thirteen Steps are likely to receive some attention in 2005, but without the sense of urgency that would elevate them to “make-or-break” matters for achieving a consensus Final Document, including creation of a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament, agreement on irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, regular arms control reporting, and development of verification capabilities for disarmament.

Universal Adherence

A final issue that has been reflected in boilerplate language in past NPT RevCon documents involves the goal of achieving universal adherence to the treaty. Putting aside the anomalous status of the DPRK regarding the NPT, the only remaining countries with nuclear programs of significance outside the treaty are India, Pakistan, and Israel. Bringing these last holdouts into the NPT regime has been a policy objective of the other parties since the treaty was negotiated. For reasons of regional and global security, drawing these de facto weapon states into the NPT regime would be a desirable achievement. However, absent an unexpected rollback in the nuclear capabilities of one or more of these states, the goal of universal adherence will remain an unfulfilled wish. This is particularly the case because of the firm consensus of NPT parties, reflected in the 2000 Final Document, that the definition of nuclear weapon state contained in Article
IX should not be changed to permit any of the three holdouts to join the treaty.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{GENERAL TRENDS}

Trends in the development of specific subject matter areas will be discussed under each appropriate article. However, some general trends are evident from textual analysis of the documentation produced during the review process since 1975. One conspicuous trend over the three decades of NPT review has been the increasingly detailed focus on specific actions that parties have taken or could take to implement the substantive articles of the treaty. In the earliest review conferences, documentation is quite general and formalistic, often merely paraphrasing the terms of the treaty, with injunctions to parties to meet their obligations. However, by 1985—the mid-point of this historical survey—the parties have begun to adopt more extensive language covering issues of both immediate and long-standing concern. The more recent Review Conference documents reflect a process of “bargaining,” in which various political groupings seek recognition in the approved texts for specific actions reflecting their interests and preoccupations. By the year 2000, RevCon documentation has been transformed into a detailed 20-page program of action, with wide-ranging “recommendations” and agreement on “practical steps” deemed important for implementing the NPT’s obligations.

Another trend in RevCon documentation is the practice of developing separate, overlapping, and duplicative texts addressing the same or related issues in a confusing manner. To some extent this disorderly approach reflects a proliferation problem with the NPT review process itself—namely, the proliferation of bodies charged with conducting the review. Until 1985, the Review Conferences were structured into two main committees, the first for disarmament issues and the second for most other issues. With the creation of three main committees, a certain degree of overlap was unavoidable (especially of subjects like nuclear supply and regional issues). The 2000 RevCon created two additional entities, Subsidiary Bodies, to address implementation of Article VI, and regional issues (primarily those of the Middle East). The absence of a functioning Drafting Committee empowered to organize, edit, and reconcile duplicative or contradictory texts has also frustrated the development of a clear and well-organized Final Document. Given the limited time available at each RevCon and the parties’ resistance to altering past practice, a more coherent and structured Final Document will be difficult to achieve at future RevCons.

\textbf{ARTICLES I AND II: NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS BY NWS AND NNWS}

The first two articles of the treaty establish the central obligations of the parties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Article I binds nuclear weapon states parties not to transfer nuclear explosive devices or assist any non-nuclear weapon state to develop them; Article II commits non-nuclear weapon states parties not to receive or to otherwise acquire nuclear explosives.

\textbf{Compliance}

The issue of whether the states parties in either category have complied with these fundamental obligations would seem a natural task for the Review Conferences. Indeed, Article VIII.3 states that the purpose of these conferences is to “review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.”\textsuperscript{16}

At the first RevCon, in 1975, the parties adopted the reassuring statement that “[t]he review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties.”\textsuperscript{17} This was the last time such a definitive finding of compliance with Articles I and II would be adopted by any RevCon. It is now known that Iraq—then an NPT party in good standing—had embarked on a nuclear weapons program from at least the early 1970s (specifically purchasing its Osiris—renamed Osirak—reactor in 1974 to provide fissile material for an explosive device).

Yet, even before international inspections after the 1991 Gulf War documented the Iraqi program, participants in the RevCon process realized that a reliable finding of compliance under Articles I and II was a daunting task. By 1985, the final document merely “acknowledged the declarations” of states parties that they “had fulfilled their obligations” under Articles I and II, without any judgment about actual compliance.\textsuperscript{18} However, the parties called on parties to prohibit nuclear transfers to particular nonparties (Israel and South Africa), without mention of other nonparties. In 1995, the language acknowledging the NWS and NNWS declarations was repeated, but the call for suspension of nuclear transfers...
to Israel and South Africa remained bracketed (i.e., not supported by consensus). In 1995, with clear evidence of Iraq’s Article II violation a matter of public record, some finding of noncompliance might have been expected. However, the final decision package contains no direct language on compliance. The RevCon’s Resolution on the Middle East indirectly signals such a finding in its citation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), which referenced reports of Iraq’s NPT violations.

In 2000, the RevCon faced two continuing violations of Article II—by Iraq and the DPRK. In the Final Document, the conference “expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance by [unnamed] Treaty Parties, and calls upon those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.”19 However, with continued recognition of the difficulty of assessing compliance, the Final Document merely “notes that the nuclear-weapon States (and non-nuclear Weapon states) reaffirmed their commitment” under the relevant article. RevCon documentation under Articles I and II shows an interesting trend over the life of the NPT. Given the central character of these provisions and evidence of violations by states parties, it would be reasonable to expect an increasing focus on compliance. However, two basic factors seem to have led the parties to avoid substantive compliance findings. First is the technical difficulty of producing clear evidence of proscribed conduct where ambiguous and clandestine nuclear-related activities are involved. Second is the political sensitivity of identifying a specific state party as an international law breaker. Rather than confronting these difficulties, the parties have shifted the compliance debate from the treaty’s central nonproliferation obligations in Articles I and II to the consideration of issues having greater political interest for a majority of parties (particularly Article VI and the Resolution on the Middle East). This also probably represents an effort by many of the parties to confirm that responsibility for acting as the final arbiter of NPT compliance issues rests with the Security Council, the U.N. body most able to withstand the inevitable political repercussions of singling out violators.

**Article III: Safeguards**

The longest and most technical article in the treaty, Article III has generated its share of controversy. In a legal instrument largely devoid of enforcement provisions, the article importantly introduces a regulatory element into the NPT regime through the IAEA’s safeguards system. Article III documentation has drawn many of the internal IAEA debates over safeguards implementation and export controls into a separate international forum. RevCon debate is conducted outside the more formal structure of IAEA policymaking organs (the Board of Governors and General Conference) or supplier groups (the Zangger Committee and NSG). The interplay between the RevCons and the more formal IAEA and supplier bodies is a constant theme of Article III documentation. This interaction also illustrates how NPT parties are influenced by or seek to influence policy initiatives that must be implemented through alternative international mechanisms. This has regularly led to so-called forum shopping, in which a party who has failed to achieve a desired result in one body seeks to use another body for that purpose. A good example is the long-standing effort of a number of governments of exporting states to adopt full-scope safeguards as a universal condition of significant nuclear supply.

### Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements

A persistent theme in RevCon documentation since 1975 has been the call for all states parties to conclude applicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA. In 1975, the language “emphasizes the necessity” of the Article III.4 requirement and “recommends” that states parties that have not done so “conclude as soon as possible” a relevant agreement.20 This language remains virtually identical in the documents of all succeeding RevCons. In the 1990 unbracketed text, the parties observed that “51 States Parties…have yet to conclude their agreements.” Ten years later, the number of noncompliant states remained the same, even though the number of NPT parties had grown substantially. The 2000 Final Declaration again observed that “51 States parties…have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements….”21 With more than 180 parties, the IAEA’s task of concluding required safeguards agreements is not a trivial undertaking. Recognizing that many of the states without safeguards agreements conduct no activities that would require the application of safeguards, the RevCon injunction has become formalized boilerplate. Although not a high priority compared to other safeguards issues (e.g., the negotiation of enhanced safeguards agreements under INFCIRC/540), a ritualized reminder for states parties to meet their Article III.4 obligation does no harm. Perhaps future RevCon documents could list states not in compliance.
**Effectiveness and Efficiency**

Another constant theme in RevCon documentation over the life of the treaty has been the parties’ repeated injunctions to the IAEA to increase safeguards “effectiveness and efficiency.” This theme, in turn, reflects the long-standing debate in the IAEA over balancing the costs of so-called regulatory activities (i.e., safeguards) with promotional ones (i.e., technical assistance and cooperation). Some governments (mostly in developing countries) see safeguards costs as siphoning off funding that could be devoted to assistance. Some governments (those with the largest assessed contributions to the IAEA budget) also have a reason to seek cost savings in safeguards. Although different parties assign different meanings to “safeguards efficiency and effectiveness,” language on this issue has been included in RevCon documents since 1975.

**Financing and Staffing**

Another consistent feature of RevCon documentation is the focus on two safeguards issues of concern to developing countries; reducing their financial assessments for safeguards and recruiting more developing country nationals for the IAEA safeguards staff. RevCon Final Declarations from 1975 to 2000 have recorded these two policy objectives in remarkably consistent language. As will be seen, safeguards financing is linked to Article IV, with developing countries seeking greater assurance that safeguards (largely funded through the IAEA’s regular budget) will not divert funding from technical assistance (largely funded through voluntary means). Two developments have fueled these concerns: continuing financial constraints on the IAEA resulting from years of “zero real growth” demanded by major contributors, and the program of strengthening safeguards to address undeclared activities. Both these concerns are reflected in the 2000 RevCon Final Declaration.25

**Safeguards Improvement/Strengthening**

Prior to the revelations of safeguards inadequacies in Iraq, RevCon documentation on strengthening safeguards tended to be vague and anodyne. For example, the 1985 Final Document records “satisfaction with the improvements of IAEA safeguards, which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities.”26 This optimistic perspective was substantially altered by revelations that an extensive nuclear fuel cycle and weapons program had been conducted for years by an NPT party, notwithstanding the application of the standard INFCIRC/153 safeguards measures. The 2000 Final Document reflects a much more rigorous evaluation of safeguards, giving support to the fundamental movement away from a narrow facility-based approach to a nationwide approach using new authority under INFCIRC/540 to conduct short-notice inspections, utilize intelligence information, and conduct environmental sampling.27 As indicated earlier, the next RevCon is likely to involve an even more focused debate on safeguards improvements, including the question of whether the NPT should be interpreted as requiring INFCIRC/540 safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states.

**Safeguards as Proliferation Barrier**

A fundamental issue with IAEA safeguards is whether they constitute an effective barrier to nuclear proliferation. An interesting trend in RevCon documentation reflects the post-Iraq evolution in the perspective of NPT parties about how IAEA safeguards activities should be assessed. In 1975, the parties made no attempt to judge whether IAEA safeguards had been successful in preventing diversions of nuclear materials to unauthorized activities, merely stating that they “provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings…. “28 In 1985 and 1990, the parties went further, approving optimistic language, noting “with satisfaction that IAEA in carrying out its safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material…. “29 After inspections by the IAEA and U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) identified a major nuclear weapons program in Iraq conducted in clandestine, undeclared facilities, the focus of safeguards assessment was fundamentally altered—a shift reflected in the text of the 2000 Final Declaration. While noting that IAEA safeguards have been “successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material,” the 2000 RevCon recognized the need to address undeclared activities.30 Here, the language modestly recognizes that IAEA safeguards “have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.”31 As better tools for safeguards assessment are developed, it may be possible to develop more specific language concerning the concrete nonproliferation benefits of IAEA safeguards.
Compliance and Enforcement

A recent development of considerable importance is the question of how to handle potentially serious violations of IAEA safeguards. The issue had been considered speculative until revelations of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program surfaced in 1990. RevCon documentation before 1995 is devoid of language addressing a strategy for legal and political safeguards noncompliance. Under Article XII.C of the agency's statute, the process begins with the report of any noncompliance by the IAEA's Department of Safeguards to the Director General, who transmits it to the Board of Governors. In turn, the board may seek corrective action or forward the report to the UNSC and General Assembly (UNGA). In Decision 2 of the 1995 conference, NPT parties adopted language making it clear that the IAEA "is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure...compliance with its safeguards agreements."\(^1\) The 1995 document also enjoins "...Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance" to direct them to the IAEA.\(^2\) The more detailed document adopted in 2000 added the element of access by the IAEA to the Security Council and General Assembly. This addition reflects, in part, the series of measures adopted by the Security Council (most importantly in Resolution 687 of April 1991) to address Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear explosives.\(^3\) With continued safeguards problems in both Iraq and the DPRK, compliance and enforcement issues are likely to receive serious attention at future RevCons.

Nuclear Transfers and Supplier Arrangements

The linkage between nuclear exports and safeguards has meant that RevCon documentation concerning arrangements and conditions for nuclear trade has been developed under Article III, despite an overlap with Article IV on peaceful uses. Since the first RevCon, the parties have debated nuclear cooperation with non-NPT parties, with a primary focus on Israel and—until 1991—South Africa. RevCon documentation also reveals concerns about the activities of the two bodies that emerged to implement nonproliferation export controls: the NPT Exporters, or Zangger Committee (INFCIRC/209 guidelines issued in 1974),\(^4\) and the NSG (INFCIRC/254 guidelines published in 1978).\(^5\) RevCon documents consistently affirm the importance of export policies that do not permit assistance to any party to develop nuclear explosives and that encourage the broadest application of IAEA safeguards. However, many NPT parties (particularly importers of nuclear materials and technology) also expressed concerns that supplier controls not interfere with their Article IV right to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, a constant theme in RevCon documentation is that both IAEA safeguards and supplier arrangements should be implemented in a way that does not hamper legitimate nuclear commerce. However, the issue of access to the full fuel cycle has recently received more active consideration in the context of revelations concerning Iran's undeclared development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The debate has been taken up by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who proposed, in an editorial in the Economist magazine, that active consideration be given to the fuel cycle ar-

Safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States

Since 1985, increasing attention at the NPT RevCons has been devoted to the extension of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of nuclear weapon states. The 1975 and 1980 conferences do not mention the issue. However, in 1985 the Final Declaration "expresses...satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA."\(^6\) In 1990, with the conclusion of an agreement with China, the conference stated that it "recognizes the value of voluntary offer safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in strengthening the non-proliferation regime."\(^7\) Although nonweapon states have pressed for broader safeguards coverage in weapon states, they have also been concerned about what resources may be needed for such activities, including the impact on the agency's regular safeguards program. The IAEA's Department of Safeguards has implemented the voluntary offer agreements in a selective manner, applying its procedures to facilities of particular technical interest. A more recent trend in RevCon documentation has been discussion of applying safeguards to nuclear materials exported to weapon states and applying IAEA verification measures equivalent to safeguards to materials transferred from military to civil programs by the weapon states. The 2000 document supports both such initiatives.\(^8\) It is likely that future RevCons will pay even closer attention to how safeguards are being applied in nuclear weapon states, with a specific focus on identifying resources for this effort. This shift is also linked to increasing NNWS initiatives following the end of the Cold War to pressure the NWSs to restrict their nuclear weapons programs.
arrangements that would be more proliferation resistant. At any rate, the issue is likely to be prominent in 2005, with consideration under both Articles III and IV.

Full-Scope Safeguards

Since at least the mid-1970s, the United States and some like-minded states have attempted to persuade other suppliers to adopt what has come to be known as full-scope safeguards (FSS; later comprehensive safeguards) as a condition for supplying materials or equipment covered by Article III.2. This condition would require all Article III.2 commodities in a non-nuclear weapon state to be covered by IAEA safeguards, meaning that no nuclear exports would be permitted to a NNWS unless all its nuclear facilities were subject to safeguards. The RevCon documentation reflects this debate, largely conducted in meetings of the NSG (London Club). The 1975 Final Declaration was minimally able to record, in a provision related to the desirability of developing common safeguards requirements for nuclear exports, “the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty” that safeguards should extend to all peaceful activities.\(^4\) In the late 1970s a number of NPT suppliers (the United States, Canada, and Australia) had adopted FSS as national export policies. The 1985 RevCon document reflects a more positive view of FSS, in which the conference “urges all states...in their nuclear export policies...to non-nuclear weapons States not party...to take effective steps towards achieving [a commitment to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful activities, both current and future].”\(^4\) In 1990, the RevCon came within a single word of endorsing FSS. The draft report of Main Committee II called for all nuclear supplier states to “require” full-scope safeguards “as a necessary condition for transfers.” However, several important states (the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy) expressed reservations about the term require, proposing to substitute jointly require. In 1992, the NSG adopted FSS as a condition for new supply. The 1995 RevCon document recognized the principle in the Decision 2 document.\(^4\) At the 2000 Conference it was only necessary for the parties to reaffirm Decision 2, paragraph 12. The trend toward broader safeguards application as a condition of nuclear supply reflected in NPT RevCon documentation appears to have reached a logical end point. Therefore, unless political or economic conditions generate pressure to make exceptions to the principle, the debate over full-scope safeguards in future RevCons should focus on compliance.

Physical Protection and Illicit Trafficking

A significant trend over the life of the NPT has been increasing attention to the physical protection of nuclear materials. Although the NPT does not require any particular level of physical protection, IAEA documents contain guidance which has been adopted by many states. The 1975 RevCon expressed its view that “nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times.”\(^4\) The conference also urged IAEA action to “further elaborate” recommendations for physical protection and called upon states to “give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA’s recommendations.”\(^4\) In 1975 the IAEA published physical protection guidelines in document INFCIRC/225.\(^4\) In 1980, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was opened for signature. One weakness of the CPPNM is that it only applies directly to nuclear material in transit, a defect that most concerned governments agree should be corrected in an amended convention. The 1985 Final Declaration urged “States that have not done so to adhere to [the CPPNM].”\(^4\) With the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991, concerns about the large quantities of fissile material in both the civil and military programs of Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) focused increased attention on physical protection. Although the issue was actively discussed in 1995, the Decision 2 document references physical security only in passing, recommending that “[a]ll States should, through vigorous national measures and international cooperation...observe standards and guidelines in...(inter alia) physical protection.”\(^4\) In 2000 the parties gave detailed attention to physical security in the Final Declaration.\(^4\) They repeated the call for all states to adhere to the CPPNM and urged states to apply the revised IAEA physical protection document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected).\(^4\) Significantly, Revision 4 had been expanded to include measures to prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear materials.

The related subject of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials has also been a comparatively recent arrival on the RevCon scene. As discussed previously in the section “IAEA Safeguards as Proliferation Barrier,” early NPT documentation focused on the negative findings of IAEA safeguards inspections as demonstrating both that states were not diverting materials for national weapons programs and that no materials were being diverted for so-called subnational criminal or terrorist purposes. Although reports of thefts of small quantities of nuclear material
and scams offering such materials for sale have occurred regularly over the life of the treaty, they were generally considered rare examples of individual criminal misconduct, not a major, systematic threat. Only recently (in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet Union) have documented cases of illicit trafficking increased sufficiently to generate major concerns about the risks of diverted fissionable materials. Establishment of the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database in the mid-1990s has provided a centralized source for information concerning reports of diversions or attempted diversions of nuclear materials. In 2000, the Final Document expressed “concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear material” and urged “...all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such materials.” In addition, the 2000 document welcomed discussions among experts on revising the CPPNM.

Given recent terrorist attacks, the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and the prevention of illicit trafficking will undoubtedly receive greater attention in all relevant international fora, including NPT Review Conferences. Although the initiative to revise the CPPNM has not yet achieved consensus, recent events confirm the need for enhanced legal provisions on physical protection at the international level.

**Article IV: Peaceful Uses**

This article originated as one element of the so-called nonproliferation bargain, intended to provide NPT parties with compensation for accepting Article II restraints and Article III safeguards. Over the life of the NPT, Article IV has received increasing attention. In 1975, the parties were content with 10 rather general paragraphs reaffirming the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 1985, the Article IV discussion was considerably expanded to 24 paragraphs addressing such specific subjects as: assurances of nuclear supply, armed attacks on nuclear facilities, IAEA technical assistance, preferential treatment for non-nuclear weapon states, and promotion and financing of nuclear power in developing states. At the 1995 Extension Conference, Decision 2 reverted to a simplified statement of “Principles and Objectives,” devoting only seven very short and general paragraphs to peaceful uses. However, by 2000, the RevCon document had expanded to 42 paragraphs covering a broad range of topics, including nuclear safety, transportation, waste management, liability, and conversion of nuclear weapons material to civilian uses.

**Rights and Obligations of Parties**

All RevCons have affirmed the principle of the “inalienable right of all Parties” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—basically a restatement of Article IV.1 of the treaty. Language from Article IV.2 is also quoted in support of “the fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology. However, even these far-reaching commitments were found insufficient by some parties. A further gloss on Article IV emerged at the 1980 Conference (to be consistently reaffirmed) stating that “each country’s choices and decisions...in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected.” This language reflects concerns by states importing nuclear materials and technology that supplier states could attempt to limit access to certain technologies for political or other reasons. Unbracketed paragraph 7 of the 1980 Main Committee II noted that “introduction unilaterally of supply conditions without consultation among the Parties has been a cause of concern.” This is a coded reference to the NSG guidelines, published in 1978. Another event that may have contributed to this concern was the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Examination (INFCE), initiated by the Carter administration in 1977 for the thinly veiled purpose of discouraging early and widespread movement toward plutonium recycling. Regardless of the motivating factors, both the “inalienable right” and “respect for choices” language is permanently embedded in RevCon language. In contrast, one will search RevCon documentation in vain for a parallel “inalienable right” of nuclear suppliers to determine what nuclear materials and technology they are prepared to transfer and to whom.

**Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation and Development**

Another constant feature of RevCon documentation from 1975 has been language—only slightly varied from conference to conference—affirming the importance of giving “due consideration” (more recently “preferential treatment”) to the needs of developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. More recent formulations have gone even further. For example, the 1990 unbracketed text referred to the need to “recognize the particular needs of the least developed countries.”
Sustainable Development

In contrast, a new element in RevCon documentation is the effort to record a role for nuclear energy in “sustainable development.” The first reference to the concept is contained in an unbracketed text in 1990, in which the parties note that “the IAEA has reported on its contribution to achieving the objectives of environmentally sound and sustainable development.” The concept was codified in Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of June 1992.53 Supporters of nuclear energy (including former IAEA Director General Hans Blix) made no secret of their disappointment and annoyance that the Rio Conference gave no consideration to nuclear energy or IAEA reporting on the contribution nuclear energy could make to economic development or environmental sustainability. Although language on “sustainable development” did not find a place in the abbreviated Decision 2 document at the 1995 RevCon, it appears twice in 2000.54 In light of concerns over global warming and the “greenhouse effect,” future Review Conferences are certain to debate what role nuclear energy might play in mitigating global environmental degradation caused by hydrocarbon emissions.

Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

An interesting trend in NPT documentation is the emergence of nuclear safety as an important subject of review. Prior to the 1986 reactor accident at Chernobyl in Ukraine, NPT RevCon documentation makes almost no reference to nuclear safety. The sole mention is a passing reference in the 1985 document concerning IAEA assistance to developing countries in various fields, including safety. As one would expect, the 1990 RevCon following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster gave intense consideration to nuclear safety, with the unbracketed text of the Main Committee III report containing a lengthy Part IV, “Nuclear Safety, Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management,” consisting of 10 detailed paragraphs. In 1994 the new Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) had been opened for signature. The 2000 Final Declaration included a separate section entitled, “Nuclear and Radiation Safety,” which emphasized the importance of cooperation on nuclear safety and encouraged “all States...to become a party” to the CNS, which entered into force in 1996.55 Although the focus of discussion at future RevCons on power reactor safety will remain, also likely is attention on other safety and health risks, such as those arising from radiation sources (often poorly managed and monitored).

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

Three weeks after the 1980 RevCon’s closing plenary, Iranian aircraft conducted an unsuccessful bombing attack on Iraq’s Osirak research reactor. The Israeli Air Force was more successful in June of 1981, destroying the facility before it entered into operation. The first attack received no specific attention in RevCon documentation. Similarly, several Iraqi air raids against Iran’s Bushehr reactor project between 1984 and 1988 have not been mentioned in RevCon documents. In contrast, the Israeli attack on Osirak has been regularly and intensely debated at several RevCons. In 1985 the Final Declaration expressed “profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq’s safeguarded reactor” and went on to record—in four detailed paragraphs—the need to address the military attacks issue in various international fora, including the Security Council, General Assembly, IAEA General Conference, and Conference on Disarmament.56 Similarly, the consensus text of the 1990 Main Committee III report contained an eight-paragraph section entitled, “Attacks on Nuclear Facilities,” that did not specifically name Israel, but referenced IAEA General Conference documents that did. Following the revelations about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program (which had originally intended to utilize materials from the Osirak reactor), the “military attacks” debate became more generic. In 1995, the Decision 2 document uses the general formulation that “attacks or threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases...”57 The issue was dealt with in 2000 in a single paragraph, noting that attacks or threats of attack “jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications...which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with...the United Nations Charter.”58 In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, consideration at future RevCons may shift from the danger of state-implemented military attacks to attacks or threats against civil nuclear facilities (particularly reactors) by subnational entities such as terrorist or separatist groups or criminal elements. However, given continuing regional conflicts and tensions, RevCon documentation will continue to give at least formal attention to military attacks.
Safe Transportation of Radioactive Materials

Prior to the late 1980s the issue of safe transport of nuclear or radioactive materials received little attention. As early as 1956 the United Nations had developed guidance on the safe handling of radioactive material in national and international transport.59 By 1969, IAEA regulations promulgated on the basis of its guidelines had been adopted by almost all international organizations concerned with transport and used by many IAEA members in their own national regulations.60 More importantly, the IAEA regulations have been successfully applied for many years, with virtually no incidents or accidents having resulted in significant radiological releases during transport. The first ostensible mention of transport in RevCon documentation occurs in 1985, when the Final Declaration “notes with satisfaction…measures recommended to the IAEA…for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items.”61 Identical language was included in a consensus text in 1990. However, this reference has nothing to do with transport safety. Instead, it reflects a recommendation by the IAEA Board of Governors’ Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) concerning administrative measures for nuclear transfers thought by some states to be excessively burdensome.

Concerns about safe transport of nuclear materials date from the late 1980s when Japan announced its intention to conduct routine sea shipments of large quantities of spent nuclear reactor fuel to European fuel cycle facilities for reprocessing. States in the Pacific region, whose anxieties about possible contamination of the marine environment had been heightened by past nuclear weapons testing in the region, brought their concerns to the NPT Review Conference in 1995. Although the brief Decision 2 document does not reference transport, committee discussions in 1995 were intense and extended. By 2000 the Final Declaration included a specific four-paragraph section entitled, “Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials.” These four paragraphs endorse IAEA transport regulations and note “the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of the States concerned from the risks of transportation of radioactive materials.”62 It is unclear whether experience with sea shipment of spent fuel—so far conducted without incident—will lead to reduced attention to international transport of nuclear materials. A more politically volatile transportation issue involves domestic transportation of radioactive materials by road or rail, an issue pressed by anti-nuclear groups in several European countries. Although the issue is far from the original objectives of the treaty, some member states may seek to introduce it into the transport debate at future RevCons.

Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste

A discernible trend in RevCon documents has been an increasing focus on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. This attention is a logical result of the increasing accumulation of spent fuel inventories and nuclear waste from nuclear power reactors that have come online since the late 1960s. (The number of operating reactors worldwide has increased from 45 in 1965 to 81 in 1970, 167 in 1975, 244 in 1980, 365 in 1985, 419 in 1990, and 437 in 1995.) Nuclear waste was not mentioned as an issue under Article IV until the 1985 RevCon, when the conference merely “acknowledged” the importance of international cooperation in the field of nuclear waste storage. By 1990, in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, the parties affirmed “the crucial importance of an adequate national infrastructure” for nuclear activities, including waste. In 1990, consensus text called on the IAEA to “promote universal implementation of the highest standards” in areas relevant to nuclear safety, including waste. By the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been concluded and active negotiations were under way on an international convention to address the safe management of spent fuel and nuclear waste. The Final Declaration of the 2000 Conference noted the successful conclusion of this Joint Convention and encouraged all states to become a party (it entered into force in 2001). The 2000 document seeks to extend the reach of the principles of the Joint Convention to military or defense wastes, which were excluded from the instrument. It is likely that future RevCons will be asked to further consider spent fuel and waste issues, particularly in light of the difficulties many national governments are experiencing in implementing concrete technical and political solutions to their accumulating inventories of such materials.

Technical Cooperation and Assistance

A constant theme in documentation under Article IV since the first RevCon has been the importance of maintaining and expanding technical cooperation and technical assistance (TC/TA) in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The debate has focused primarily on the IAEA, although a large measure of technical cooperation is conducted
under bilateral arrangements, including commercial contracts. Developing countries have sought to use RevCons as leverage in the annual budget debate at the IAEA over the level and sources of technical cooperation funding. As previously noted, the agency’s regulatory (safeguards) program is largely funded through the regular budget, while a major portion of TC is funded through the voluntary Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund (TACF). Developing states parties to the NPT have argued that this arrangement leads to less resource predictability and reliability for Article IV-related activities at the IAEA, in contrast to those related to Article III. Documentation at all RevCons has addressed this issue, typically with language noting the importance of technical cooperation and calling for “predictable and assured resources” for technical assistance. In 1990, consensus language called for funding of technical assistance through the IAEA’s Regular Budget. However, by 2000, it was clear that the voluntary TACF had seen real increases, while the Regular Budget was being held at zero real growth. Thus, the lengthy section (11 detailed paragraphs) on Technical Cooperation in the 2000 document merely “urges States members of the IAEA to make every effort to pay in full and on time their voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.” The issue of TC/TA and resources will remain a major point of debate at future NPT RevCons, particularly in light of recent budgetary decisions by the IAEA to authorize safeguards and other budget increases going beyond zero real growth.

Supply Assurances

For more than a decade—from the late 1970s to 1990—the subject of supply assurances was actively debated under both Article III and IV of the treaty. The precipitating factors for this debate were the adoption of the NSG guidelines (published in 1978), that imposed conditions on transfers of certain nuclear technologies beyond acceptance of NPT safeguards and unilateral and sometimes retroactive controls by some supplier states (most notably the United States in its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978). Starting in 1980, RevCon documentation reflects concerns by member states about these enhanced controls, seeking more predictability in the conditions of nuclear trade through CAS. During the 1980s CAS met frequently, in contentious sessions, attempting to craft a “set of universally acceptable principles for nuclear cooperation.” The 1980 RevCon documentation welcomes the establishment of CAS, and the 1985 Final Declaration optimistically “commends...progress in the IAEA’s Committee on Assurances of Supply.”64 However, by the late 1980s, it was clear that the CAS process would not achieve a consensus on any principles going beyond the NPT and NSG guidelines. Therefore, whatever “assurances” recipients of nuclear technology were likely to get would be those set forth in bilateral nuclear cooperative agreements. The 1990 documentation noted that “CAS was not able to reach agreement” on principles and rather half-heartedly recommended “continuing efforts” and called for “resumption, when appropriate, of formal discussions in CAS.” That has never happened. As under Article III, the issue of supply assurances has not been pressed in the most recent RevCons. The much-altered, post-Chernobyl/post-Iraq situation has made it clear that additional multilateral principles on nuclear trade will not resolve the fundamental difficulties arising from nuclear energy development. It is unlikely that creating a formal set of supply assurances will be revived as a significant issue at future NPT conferences. However, certain “tough cases” arising from current events (e.g., DPRK and Iran) may well provoke a debate over whether certain forms of assured supply would be helpful in resolving particular proliferation-related problems. One could consider the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework as a special kind of “assurance of supply,” wherein the DPRK’s commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program would be “compensated” by the construction of two power reactors. The current situation in Iran raises similar issues that could be the subject of debate in 2005.

Conversion of Nuclear Materials to Peaceful Purposes

A new theme at the 2000 RevCon that is likely to be pursued at future conferences is the management of nuclear materials transferred from military programs to the civilian fuel cycle. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the United States and the Russian Federation embarked on a number of government-to-government and, later, commercial arrangements for withdrawal of excess stocks of fissile material (primarily HEU, but also plutonium) from military uses and the conversion of these materials to civilian uses. A number of technical and policy questions arising from this initiative have brought a disarmament-related issue, normally considered under Article VI, into the Article IV debate. The 2000 Final Declaration included four paragraphs focused primarily on verification and
environmental issues arising from conversion. States parties interested in the issue are likely to seek to influence the pace and direction of conversion efforts and related activities regarding military-origin fissile materials at future Review Conferences.

**Multinational Fuel Cycle Arrangements**

The issue of multinational fuel cycle facilities, including plutonium storage, received very active attention during the first years of the treaty’s life. However, these subjects have virtually disappeared from RevCon documentation since 1985. The 1975 Final Declaration spent four substantive paragraphs discussing regional or multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centers as a “way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States...while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards.” By 1980, RevCon documentation had already become less optimistic about multinational centers. A single paragraph called on parties to “give serious consideration” to such centers. By 1985, the conference continued to call for an international plutonium storage system, as envisioned by the IAEA Statute (Article XII(A)5). However, multilateral fuel cycle facilities were merely “commended,” with the parties recognizing that spent fuel and waste storage was “primarily a national responsibility.”

The early hopes for multinational fuel cycle centers have been a casualty of economic and political developments. First, the nuclear industry has not grown as rapidly as forecasted, reducing the amount of nuclear material needing the type of controls offered by joint facilities. Further, national decisions by major nuclear countries to forego recycling of spent reactor fuel has led to a more restricted “plutonium economy” than projected when the NPT was negotiated. Commercial, economic, and environmental factors have also restrained the expansion of fuel cycle facilities. And finally, the well-known NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) principle has led to widespread affirmation of the policies that: (1) each state should take care of its own waste or spent fuel and (2) imports of waste are not favored. These policies are codified in preambular paragraphs vi, xi, and xii of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (entered into force, 2001).

Although multinational nuclear fuel cycle centers, including waste storage, have not received recent attention at NPT RevCons, the concept of centralizing certain nuclear activities posing proliferation, safety, and environmental risks has an inherent logic. The 2005 RevCons could see a revival of interest in these ideas, particularly in light of the recent decision of the IAEA Director General to create, in response to expressions of interest by several agency members, a working group to reexamine the pros and cons of multinational fuel cycle centers.

**Article V: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions**

Article V on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) has undergone the most far-reaching transformation of any provision in the NPT. It has basically been interpreted out of the treaty. In 1975, the parties stated that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes “is still at the stage of development.” By 1985, the knowledge that no technical distinction could be drawn between PNEs and nuclear weapon detonations produced a formulation that “the potential benefits of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated.” After the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, the notion of any development, let alone testing, of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes was inconsistent with fundamental nonproliferation and global security interests. In 2000 the article was a dead letter and will remain so.

**Article VI: Nuclear Disarmament**

Although one of the shortest articles in the NPT (merely 48 words), Article VI has engendered the greatest controversy of any of the NPT’s provisions. And, although texts under other articles have remained bracketed at the end of some RevCons, fundamental disagreements over disarmament issues have usually been the primary stumbling block to reaching consensus on a Final Declaration. Article VI, itself, commits NPT parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith” in three areas: (1) “on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” (2) “to nuclear disarmament,” and (3) “on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” However, a fundamental trend under Article VI has been the elaboration of its terms to cover a broad spectrum of issues, some arguably beyond the terms of the article. A second fundamental trend has been the attempt to use the RevCon process to leverage the scope and pace of arms control and disarmament negotiations in other fora—whether bilateral or multilateral. This trend has received impetus from the perceived lack of progress in other such fora (most impor-
Compliance

In light of its extremely ambitious objectives (end of the arms race, general and complete disarmament), it is no surprise that RevCon documentation has never expressed satisfaction that the parties to the treaty have met their Article VI obligations. Rather, the language adopted under Article VI has typically reflected a litany of disappointments, frustrations, lost opportunities, and appeals for more rapid and concrete action on disarmament issues. In years when consensus final documents have been promulgated (1995, 1985, and 2000), the Article VI language has opened with the reaffirmation by the parties of their commitment to Article VI. Following this positive language, the compliance discussion typically becomes more negative, with statements of “serious concern that the arms race...is continuing unabated” (1975), or “regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review” (1985), or “deep concern at the continued risk for humanity...” (2000).

At most RevCons at least some progress is made on the objectives of Article VI. The 2000 document “welcomes the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reduction made unilaterally or bilaterally under the [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)] process...as steps toward nuclear disarmament.” Although numerous bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements have been concluded in the last three decades, the Article VI compliance review has given little attention to compliance with those instruments. Instead, discussion turns toward a generalized political debate over the expansive objectives of the article. The reluctance to review implementation of existing instruments may reflect a “what-have- you-done-for-me-lately?” perspective, or perhaps, an unwillingness of some activist states to recognize that the disarmament record is not entirely negative.

However, recent actions by the United States are likely to revive the compliance debate in 2005. Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate will be cited as evidence by many NPT parties that the record on compliance with Article VI is unsatisfactory. As will be discussed below, this issue will be placed in concrete focus during the debate over how parties have implemented the Thirteen Steps agreed at the 2000 RevCon.

Comprehensive Test Ban

Since 1975, the effort to commit NPT parties to negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of a ban on all nuclear weapons tests has been a constant feature of RevCon documentation. Since the CTBT was opened for signature (in September 1996), the conference has called upon “all States, particularly on those 16 States whose ratification is a prerequisite for entry into force of the [CTBT] to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty.” The Thirteen Steps program codified in the 2000 Final Declaration repeats the “urgency” of entry into force of the CTBT and calls for a moratorium on testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT. The willingness of the United States to include language favorable to the CTBT in the 2000 Final Document was an important factor in achieving agreement on a consensus document. With virtually unanimous support among other NPT parties, the CTBT will be pressed again in 2005, even though the Bush administration does not support the treaty and has no plans to reopen the issue of its ratification. The current U.S. policy of continuing a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing will be viewed favorably by CTBT supporters, but it will not be viewed as a substitute for action toward bringing the CTBT into force. Reports of U.S. interest in possible development and testing of nuclear weapons for anti-terrorist missions have heightened concerns in some states, concerns that will be voiced at the 2005 RevCon. Absent a change in U.S. policy, no crystal ball is required to predict that the CTBT debate will be one of the most contentious issues for NPT documentation in 2005.
Fissile Material Production Ban

A new disarmament objective that emerged at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference is recorded in the Decision 2 document as the “...immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a...convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” Parallel language was recorded in the Final Declaration of the 2000 RevCon. The 2000 Conference expressed its “regrets” that negotiations have not been pursued by the Conference on Disarmament Ad Hoc Committee created in 1996 to pursue the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty initiative. It is clear that future RevCon debate will focus on efforts to advance the FMCT concept.

Anti-Ballistic Missiles

The 2000 Final Declaration contains two provisions relevant to the hotly contested issue of defense against ballistic missiles. Paragraph 13 welcomes agreements signed in 1997 between the United States and Russia and the NIS relating to the ABM Treaty. In the Thirteen Steps program, the conference agrees on “preserving and strengthening of the [ABM] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.” Given the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, this issue is bound to be actively debated in future NPT RevCons.

Irreversibility

Although “irreversibility” might be considered an inherent element of the disarmament process not requiring separate reference, the 2000 RevCon gave approval to the concept in paragraph 5 of the Article VI review. Although its substantive content is far from clear, irreversibility is difficult to oppose, in principle. Paragraph 11 of the Final Declaration links the concepts to verification, management, and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes. It is likely that future RevCons will either attempt to give more specific content to irreversibility as an emerging norm of disarmament, or retain the current vague, but unobjectionable, formula.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons

The legality of the use or threat to use nuclear weapons under international law has been debated since the earliest RevCons. Prior to the 2000 Conference, no consensus could be mustered to adopt specific language on this contentious issue. However, the 2000 Final Declaration opens the door to further consideration of the legality of nuclear weapons through two references to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice requested by the World Health Organization. The court’s opinion, entitled, “Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,” is noted in both paragraphs 7 and 15(12) of the Article VI review. Although the court was evenly divided on the central issue of whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would violate the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and humanitarian law, the court was unanimous in affirming “an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” This finding specifically interprets Article VI, making it directly relevant to the RevCon process. The interpretation of the 1996 Advisory Opinion is certain to be discussed at future RevCons.

Nuclear Doctrine

Another new area of NPT documentation in 2000 concerns nuclear doctrine—namely, that set of principles, policies, and procedures through which nuclear weapon states manage their nuclear weapons capabilities. Until total nuclear disarmament is achieved, many NPT parties have advocated changes in nuclear doctrine that could reduce the risks that nuclear weapons would ever be used. Several of these proposals found their way into the 2000 Final Declaration by way of the Thirteen Steps paper. Paragraph 15(9) records several proposed steps that weapon states should take, including increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities (tiret 2), measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons (tiret 4), and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies (tiret 5). Paragraph 14 also, for the first time, addresses the issue of “targeting” of nuclear weapons, noting “the nuclear weapons States declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.” Further proposals on nuclear doctrine are likely at future RevCons, particularly in light of recent reports that the United States may undertake development of new types of nuclear warheads for certain anti-terrorist purposes.

General and Complete Disarmament

Until recently, a constant theme in Article VI documentation has been the reaffirmation of the treaty’s obliga-
tion to take measures relating to cessation of the arms race and on a treaty for general and complete disarmament. Given that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and START processes have produced significant reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, it can be persuasively argued that the arms race provision of Article VI is being effectively implemented. Indeed, the Final Declaration at the 2000 RevCon does not use the term “arms race” in its review of Article VI. Article VI refers to “the nuclear arms race,” suggesting that only one such race is relevant to the treaty. It is worth considering whether, in light of nuclear developments on the Indian subcontinent, Article VI might be interpreted to apply to another arms race, not involving the United States and Russia.

Regardless of whether progress on ending “the nuclear arms race” is deemed satisfactory (though unstated), the most recent RevCons have continued to reaffirm that the “ultimate objective” of the disarmament process is “general and complete disarmament” and to express disappointment that it has not been achieved. Future RevCons will undoubtedly continue to adopt similar formulations.

Unilateral Reductions

A new trend in RevCon documentation at the 2000 Conference concerns the encouragement of unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons, in addition to the traditional call for the parties to conclude formal arms control agreements. The Bush-Gorbachev Presidential Initiatives of 1991 that reduced nuclear forces in Europe demonstrated that, in some circumstances, unilateral arms control measures could contribute to lessening tensions and increasing international security. Further, they showed that this could be accomplished without protracted and difficult negotiations of formal treaties. The role of unilateral weapons reduction measures may expand in the post-Cold War world, and the conference lends its support to such initiatives in paragraph 15(9) tirets 1 and 3.82

Other Nuclear Weapon States

Prior to the 2000 Conference, review of Article VI focused almost exclusively on the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers—the United States and Russia (formerly USSR). It was generally felt that the nuclear arsenals of the other three designated nuclear weapons states (United Kingdom, France, and China) were of less concern because of their modest size. With the reversal of the arms race between the United States and Russia, attention has turned to what disarmament steps might be appropriate for the other nuclear weapon states. The 2000 Final Declaration raises this issue in very general terms in paragraphs 10 and 15(9) tiret 6. Absent any concrete events that might increase the visibility of the nuclear arsenals of the other NWS parties, this issue is unlikely to receive extended consideration in 2005.

Reports and Verification

The 2000 Final Declaration also adopted language on two issues related to compliance with Article VI. As part of the Thirteen Steps initiative, the conference agreed on “regular reports...on implementation of Article VI” as a way of enhancing the strengthened review process approved in 1995 (paragraph 15(9) tiret 12). Further, the parties called for “further development of verification capabilities...to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements” (paragraph 15(9) tiret 13). These initiatives are certain to be examined at future RevCons.

Article VII: Nuclear-Free Zones and Security of NNWs

Article VII is the shortest in the NPT. Nevertheless, it has become the vehicle for review of highly important issues, such as security assurances, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and regional nonproliferation developments.

Security Assurances

The issue of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT has been a central issue at NPT RevCons since 1975. The issue was actively debated during negotiations of the treaty itself. In fact, without the adoption of Security Council Resolution 255 in 1968, extending so-called positive security assurances to the NNWSs, it is unlikely that the treaty would have been approved. Both the 1975 and 1985 Final Declarations took note of UNSC Resolution 255 and its importance for the NPT regime. In 1995, all five NWSs joined in supporting Security Council Resolution 984 reaffirming their commitment to security assurances, a measure that was important to achieving the indefinite extension of the treaty. The 2000 RevCon document noted the reaffirmation of UNSC Resolution 984 by the nuclear weapon states parties. Beyond the Security Council resolution, the various RevCons have debated the desirability of “legally binding” security assurances by the NWSs in treaty form or
through some other mechanism. Paragraph 2 of the 2000 Final Declaration agrees that legally binding assurances would "strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime" and specifically "calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

**Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones**

Article VII was basically adopted for a very narrow legal reason; namely, to avoid any interpretation that the NPT somehow displaced the previously concluded Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) of 1969 or future regional nonproliferation treaties. Since that time, four additional regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have been concluded: the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) of 1986, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) of 1996, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) of 1997.

A constant feature of all RevCon documentation has been a statement (variously framed) that the conference "considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones...constitutes an important disarmament measure...." Over the life of the treaty, the parties have given support to specific regional initiatives as they were being developed. In 2000, the Final Declaration specifically supports creation of a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, proposed by five regional states in the 1997 Almaty Declaration. That initiative has also received support from UNGA resolutions, but has not yet been brought to a successful conclusion. Since at least the 1990 RevCon, the parties have also encouraged the initiative to establish a Middle East zone and, more recently, a zone covering South Asia. The conference has also noted that regional weapon-free-zone treaties can play an important role in the extension of negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states.

**Middle East**

A significant trend beginning in 1995 was the inclusion of separate language in the RevCon documentation on regional issues, with the Middle East a dominant subject. This approach overlaps with the review conducted under various articles, with the intent of giving greater political visibility to a region of continuing security concern. As part of the 1995 Decision Package, a Resolution on the Middle East was adopted in traditional United Nations form, with a preamble and operative paragraphs. The six operative paragraphs of that resolution endorsed the Middle East peace process (paragraph 1), called on all states not yet party to the NPT to join the treaty (paragraph 2), urged full-scope IAEA safeguards on all facilities in the region (paragraph 3), reaffirmed the importance of universal adherence to the NPT (paragraph 4), called for establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone (paragraph 5), and called on all NPT states to cooperate in establishing such a zone (paragraph 6). At the 2000 Conference a separate Subsidiary Body was established in Main Committee to examine regional issues, particularly the Middle East. That body produced a document of ten paragraphs that was incorporated into the Final Declaration. The 2000 document basically paralleled the 1995 Middle East resolution, but significantly named Israel as the "exception" to universal NPT adherence of states in the region and reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession..." (paragraph 3). In a final paragraph, the 2000 document addresses the situation in Iraq, affirming the importance of Iraq's compliance with the NPT and noting that the IAEA has not been able to provide assurance of compliance with UNSC Resolution 687 since Iraq's cessation of inspections in December of 1998 (paragraph 10). The 2000 document calls for a report through the United Nations Secretariat to the 2005 RevCon on steps taken to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and “the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East” (paragraph 7). Thus, it is clear that the Middle East will remain a particular focus of the review in future conferences. What is unclear, however, is what impact the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq and the situation in Iran may have on the debate. These developments certainly highlight the proliferation dangers in the Middle East. However, the continued conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is likely to prevent concrete progress toward a free zone in the region.

**South Asia**

With their explosives tests of 1998, India and Pakistan demonstrated their possession of nuclear weapons. The 2000 Final Declaration contains five paragraphs devoted to the situation in South Asia, urging the two states to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states, to continue their declared moratoria on future testing, to adhere to the CTBT, and to support a treaty banning production of fis-
sile material for weapons (FMCT). Handling of the South Asia issue at the 2005 RevCon will largely turn on recent developments in the region. If terrorist incidents continue in India and Pakistan, if Islamic fundamentalists destabilize Pakistan's government, and if the situation in Kashmir remains unresolved, the nuclear situation in South Asia will receive more active attention. The rather ritualized calls for India and Pakistan to join the NPT are certain to be repeated. However, whether the parties will attempt to go beyond this point to seek other nonproliferation measures in the region is unclear.

**East Asia**

Concerns about the nuclear program of the DPRK date from early in the life of the NPT. However, specific mention of the DPRK is a recent trend. In 1990 an unbracketed text noted the DPRK's proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Paragraph 16 of the 2000 Final Declaration notes that the DPRK remains an NPT party and expresses concerns about verification of the DPRK's declaration of nuclear material to the IAEA. The 2000 document also welcomes the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea and urges its “rapid implementation.” The collapse of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and the DPRK's January 2003 declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons and has withdrawn from the NPT has created a dangerous security problem in the region. Unless significant progress toward resolving the DPRK situation has been made by 2005, the issue will be high on the agenda of the parties.

**South Africa**

South Africa is a former regional issue of major concern that has passed from the RevCon scene. In 1990, unbracketed language expressed the conference’s view “that development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the...Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa...” The text called for “urgent steps for...a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.” With the rollback of its nuclear weapons program and accession to the NPT in 1991, South Africa has become a firm supporter of the treaty. The Pelindaba Treaty (1996), when it enters into force, will establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the continent of Africa. Against the backdrop of current difficulties, it is encouraging to note that some proliferation problems can be resolved.

**Article IX: Adherence, Accession, and Definition of Nuclear Weapon State**

A consistent element in RevCon documentation has been the call for universal adherence. Even as the NPT has grown to become the most widely adhered-to multilateral arms control agreement, its members have continued to press at each RevCon for “universalism,” using increasingly stronger language. In 1975, the parties merely expressed the “hope that States that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.” In 1985, the parties “appealed to all States” to adhere. By 1995, universal adherence had become “an urgent priority.”

An interesting development at the 2000 Conference was the adoption of language urging specific non-party states (Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan) to accede to the treaty. (Cuba’s recent adherence to the treaty narrows the holdouts to three states.) The parties also noted that “States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty only as non-nuclear weapon States.” This text explicitly resolves a legal issue that had been recognized, but not heretofore addressed by the parties—namely, whether new NPT parties possessing nuclear explosives would be classified as nuclear weapon states under the treaty. With India and Pakistan having demonstrated their nuclear status through explosive tests in May 1998, and in light of Israel’s undeclared—but generally acknowledged—nuclear capability, the issue of status has practical implications for bringing the remaining holdout states into the NPT system. The language adopted in 2000 recognizes that, unless the Article IX.3 definition of nuclear weapon state were to be amended, all new parties would be considered non-nuclear weapon states, regardless of their actual nuclear capabilities.

**Conclusion**

This survey of documentation produced by NPT Review Conferences over the life of the treaty constitutes a record of how parties to the treaty have used the RevCon process to pursue important security interests. Some states parties and interested stakeholders have seen the achievement of a consensus final document as the primary evidence of the success or failure of a particular RevCon, or even of the NPT regime itself. Some parties regard agreed documentation as binding legal commitments. Others view it only as a policy declaration or as a snapshot of the circumstances surrounding the treaty at a particular mo-
The study upon which this article and appendix are based was part of a project conducted by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) under a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy. The judgments and conclusions reflected in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any U.S. government agency, SAIC, or any other person involved in the project. The author expresses his appreciation to Dr. Lewis Dunn (who led the study) and Michele Ledgerwood (who assisted with the textual comparisons) for their invaluable support and assistance.


7 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article III.1.


9 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article IV.2.


15 Ibid.

16 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article VIII.3.


22 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article III.

23 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.


25 Ibid, Paragraphs 30 and 32.

26 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference, Paragraph 11.


28 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.

29 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.


35 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


40 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.

41 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


43 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.

44 Ibid.


46 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


49 International Atomic Energy Agency, Information Circular 225/Rev4: The...
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.


51 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.


56 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


60 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


63 Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference.

64 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968).


68 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.

69 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


72 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference.


74 Ibid, Paragraph 15, Sub-paragraph 9, Tiers 1-2.


77 Ibid, Paragraph 15(7).

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid, Paragraph 15, Sub-paragraph 9, Tiers 1-2.


83 Ibid.

84 Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference, Paragraph 2.


86 Ibid.
APPENDIX I
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS

The following document represents an historical survey of language covering key issues arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) over some three decades. At each of the six Review Conferences (RevCons) conducted at five year intervals since the NPT entered into force in 1970, the parties attempted to adopt language reflecting a consensus view on how “the provisions of the Treaty are being realised” (Article VIII.3).

In three of the RevCons (in 1975, 1985 and 2000) the parties were able to reach agreement on a detailed Final Declaration. At the other three conferences (in 1980, 1990, and 1995) no such consensus could be reached. However, the record at these three RevCons is not entirely blank. In 1995, the conference convened to determine whether the NPT would be extended indefinitely, the parties agreed on a decision package that contained important (if compressed) language on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and a resolution on the Middle East. In 1980 and 1990, although no Final Declarations were adopted, the records of the Main Committees contain texts with “unbracketed” paragraphs on certain issues. These “unbracketed” texts were basically agreed by all parties.

The following comparison of texts includes language from agreed Final Declarations, from the 1995 decision package documents, and “unbracketed” texts from committee reports for the 1980 and 1990 RevCons.

Where no parallel language on an issue could be identified at a particular RevCon, this is recorded by three asterisks (****) opposite the date of the relevant conference. It should be emphasized that this marking does not indicate whether the issue in question was discussed or not discussed at a RevCon. The absence of language may reflect that the issue was not a matter of sufficient concern at a particular Revcon to warrant comment in the final documentation. Or, on the contrary, it could mean that the matter was intensely debated, but that—at the end—no agreement could be reached on language describing how it should be treated. A further examination of RevCon documentation would be needed to explain these lacunae in the record.

The Final Declaration of the 2000 RevCon has been used to establish the basic order of issues reflected in the comparison document. As would be expected, this has required some rearrangement in the order of texts from other conferences.

This analysis covers the eight substantive articles of the treaty (Articles I through VII and IX) plus Regional Issues and Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Review Process. Some 62 individual subject matter topics have been derived from the texts, and language comparisons have been provided for each of them. This report seeks to provide a reasonably comprehensive picture of the Review Conference documentation over the 30-year life of the NPT.
## Appendix I
### NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

#### Articles I and II: Nonproliferation

**Compliance of Nuclear Weapon States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment…” (para. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>“…acknowledges the declarations by nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I.” (MC I, para. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“…acknowledged the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.” (Purposes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“The States Party to the Treaty reaffirm…their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.” (Purposes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Compliance of Non-Nuclear Weapon States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment…” (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>“…further acknowledges the declarations that non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II.” (MC I, para. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“…further acknowledged the declarations that non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II.” (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“The States Party to the Treaty reaffirm…their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.” (Purposes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cases of Noncompliance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance…and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations” (para. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>“…underlines the vital need for all Parties…to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations.” (MC I, para. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“…confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II…have been faithfully observed by the Parties.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Article III: Safeguards

**Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…notes that 51 States parties…have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, and urges them to do so as soon as possible.” (para. 44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>All States parties required by Article III…to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, and urges them to do so as soon as possible.” (Decision 2, para. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>“…notes with satisfaction that eights States have concluded safeguards agreements in compliance with Article III.4…since 1985…expresses concern, however that 51 States parties…have yet to conclude their agreements and urges them to do so…as soon as possible. (MC II, para 21).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“…recommends that all States party…that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III.4 conclude such agreements…as soon as possible. (para. 7(a))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“emphasizes the necessity for the States Party…that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA” (para. 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safeguards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“affirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. [IAEA Board decisions] aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards should be supported.” (para. 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. [IAEA Board decisions] aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented. (Decision 2, para. 11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

1990 “…welcomes the continued improvements in safeguards effectiveness and efficiency and urges that this process be maintained inter alia by utilizing new cost effective technologies and methodologies.” (MC II, para. 7)

1985 “…urges [IAEA] to continue to ensure the maximum technical and cost effectiveness and efficiency of its operations.” (para. 10)

1980 * * *

1975 “…recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards…to ensure optimum cost effectiveness.” (para. 4)

Staffing of IAEA Safeguards Department

2000 * * *

1995 * * *

1990 “…emphasizes the importance of maintaining a staff of the highest professional standard, with due regard to the call for an increase in the number of safeguards inspectors from developing countries, in order to have the widest geographical distribution possible. (MC II, para. 7)

1985 “…welcomes the Agency’s endeavour to recruit and train staff of the highest professional standards for safeguards…with regard to the widest possible geographical distribution. (para. 8)

1980 “…notes that more regard needs to be paid to the importance of recruiting and training staff of the Agency on as wide a geographical basis as possible.” (MC II, para. 13)

1975 “…attaches considerable importance to…recruiting of staff…safeguards training…available to personnel from all geographic regions.” (para. 10)

Safeguards Resources/Funding

2000 “requests that the IAEA continue to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including safeguards…strongly urges all States to ensure that IAEA is provided with these resources” (para. 50);…notes financial constraints under which the safeguards system is functioning (para. 30); …strengthening should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance an cooperation.” (para. 32)

1995 * * *

1990 “…requests the IAEA to continue to identify all resources needed for effective and efficient safeguards…urges all States to ensure that the IAEA is provided with these resources through…continued assured regular budget financing…welcomes efforts…to find a lasting and equitable solution to the question of a safeguards financing formula. (MC II, para 8)

1985 “…calls upon States Parties to continue their political, technical and financial support for the IAEA safeguards system. (para. 20)

1980 “…recommends that during the review of arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards…the less favorable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account.” (MC II, para. 14)

1975 “…seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs” (para. 9)

Role of Safeguards

2000 “…safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role” (para. 6)

1995 * * *

1990 “…IAEA safeguards…promote further confidence among States and… play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.” (para. 3)

1985 “IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” (para. 2)

1980 “…IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices by way of deterring diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful activities to explosive purposes…” (MC II, para 11)

1975 “IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.” (para. 2)

Improvement/Strengthening of Safeguards

2000 “…notes measures endorsed by the IAEA Board in June 1995 for the strengthening and making more efficient the safeguards system, and notes that these measures are being implemented pursuant to existing legal authority… (para. 18)

1995 “fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.” (para. 19)
APPENDIX I

NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

"...notes, in particular, the relationship between the additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and a State party as set out in article 1 of the Additional Protocol...recalls the interpretation provided by the IAEA Secretariat...that, once concluded, the two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement." (para. 20)

1995 * * *
1990 "...invites the IAEA to consider studying new safeguards approaches, including...randomized inspections." (MC II, para. 7)
1985 "...notes with satisfaction the improvements of IAEA safeguards, which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities." (para. 11)
1980 * * *
1975 "...recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data handling and implementation (para. 5)

Safeguards Results

2000 "...have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities." (para. 20)
1995 * * *
1990 "...notes with satisfaction that since the last Review Conference, the IAEA has again,...not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown." (MC II, para. 4)
1985 "...notes with satisfaction that since the last Review Conference, the IAEA has again,...not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown." (para. 8)
1980 "...notes with satisfaction that as a result of its verification activities, the Agency has not detected any diversions, anomalies or misuses of safeguarded material to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices." (MC II, para. 2)
1975 * * *

Verifying Compliance

2000 "...IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring...compliance with its safeguards" (para. 7)
1995 * * *
1990 "[IAEA] is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements." (Decision 2, para. 9)
1980 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Enforcement

2000 "States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty...should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate...(para. 7)...emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly...by the IAEA...in ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations...[Decision 2, para. 9]
1995 "States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty...should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate." (Decision 2, para. 9)
1990 "...in the event of questions arising about the commitment to the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty of any State party, and in particular about the safeguards coverage of its [nuclear] materials...appropriate steps need to be taken by the Agency and by the State Party...urges the Agency not to hesitate to take full advantage of its rights..." (MC II, para. 28)
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States

2000 "...notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements...(para. 26)...call for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States..." (para. 12)
APENDIX I
NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

1995  “Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.” (Decision 2, para. 13)
1990  “recognizes the value of the voluntary safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in strengthening the non-proliferation regime…calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States.” (MC II, para. 24)
1985  “…expresses its satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA…recommends further evaluation of the…possibility of extending application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in the [NWSs] as and when IAEA resources permit…and consideration of separation of the civil and military facilities in the [NWSs].” (para. 5)
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

Safeguards on Material Supplied to Nuclear Weapon States
2000  “…nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should be, as appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards…” (para. 25)
1995  * * *
1990  “…expresses the opinion that these nuclear supplies [for peaceful purposes] should be subject to the safeguards agreements concluded between the nuclear-weapon States and the IAEA.” (MC II, para. 25)
1985  “…affirms the great value to the non-proliferation regime of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons…Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA can verify observance of those commitments.” (para. 6)
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

Nuclear Material Withdrawn from Military Uses
2000  “…underlines the importance of international verification of nuclear material designated…as no longer required for military purposes…” (para. 29)
1995  “Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should…be placed under Agency safeguards…” (Decision 2, para. 13)
1990  “…urges the nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear installations that may be transferred from military use to peaceful activities…under their voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the IAEA.” (MC II, para. 26)
1985  * * *
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

Nuclear Cooperation and Assistance
2000  “…stresses the need to respect the letter and spirit of the Treaty with respect to technical cooperation with States not party to the Treaty,” (para. 24)…the transfer of nuclear-related equipment; information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States’ obligations under the Treaty (para. 33)…calls upon all States parties not to cooperate or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclear-related field to States not party…in a manner which assists them in manufacturing nuclear weapons…(para. 34).
1995  * * *
1990  “…urges all States Parties to ensure that their exports to non-nuclear weapon States not party…do not assist any nuclear weapon programme.” (MC II, para. 5)
1985  “…noted the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel.” (para 20)
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

* * *
APPENDIX I
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

Full-Scope or Comprehensive Safeguards
2000  “…reaffirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference…” (para. 36)
1995  “New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissile material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissile material to [NNWSs] should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards…” (Decision 2, para. 12)
1990  [language on full-scope safeguards remained bracketed (MC II, para. 20]
1985  “…urges all States…in their nuclear export policies…to non-nuclear weapon States not Party to the Treaty…to take effective steps towards achieving [a commitment to accept IAEA safeguards] on all their peaceful activities, both current and future.” (para. 4)
1980  [language on full-scope safeguards remained bracketed (MC II, para. 7]
1975  “…takes note of…the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III.2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States…” (para. 8)

Physical Protection
2000  “…notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection…” (para. 42)…urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on the earliest possible date…” (para. 56)
1995  * * *
1990  “…urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the [CPPNM] at the earliest possible date.” (MC II, para. 22)
1985  “…urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the [CPPNM] at the earliest possible date.” (para. 22)
1980  “…welcomes the opening for signature of the [CPPNM]…urges all States that have not done so to become party, as soon as possible.” (MC II, para. 15)
1975  “convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges…further…concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material…” (para. 11)…calls upon States…to enter into such international agreements …as may be necessary to ensure such protection” (para. 12)

Illicit Trafficking
2000  “Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials…urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material.” (para. 43)
1995  * * *
1990  [see Safeguards Results, page 6, supra]
1985  [see Safeguards Results, page 6, supra]
1980  [see Safeguards Results, page 6, supra]
1975  * * *

Supplier Arrangements
2000  “…requests that any supplier arrangement should be transparent…not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…” (para. 53)…transparency of export controls should be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation…” (para. 54)
1995  “Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation.” (Decision 2, para. 17)
1990  “…requests that the Zangger Committee should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export requirements laid down by it do not hamper the acquisition of such items by States parties for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” (MC II, para. 27)
1985  * * *
1980  “…notes concerns of many countries that…a group of countries in closed consultations between themselves on nuclear supply conditions adopted and applied…common guidelines for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology…” (MC II, para. 6)…States participating in the Conference…note that the introduction of supply conditions without consultation…has been a cause of concern…considers that…new non-proliferation measures should be the subject of consultation and the broadest possible consensus…” (MC II, para. 7)
1975 “…urges that…such common [export] requirements be accorded the widest measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients. (para 7) [see, also, Nuclear Cooperation and Assistance, page 9, supra]

### Article IV: Peaceful Uses

#### Rights and Obligations of Parties

**2000** “…reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…(para. 2)

**1995** “Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…(Decision 2, para. 14)

**1990** “…reaffirms the inalienable right of all the Parties…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…(MC III, para. 2)

**1985** “…reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party…to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination… (para. 1)

**1980** “…re-emphasizes its conviction that noting in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties…to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…(MC II, para. 1)

**1975** “…reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the Parties…to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…(para. 1)

#### Respect for National Nuclear Energy Policies

**2000** “…each country’s choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected…(para. 2)

**1995** * * *

**1990** “…each country’s choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected…(MC II, para. 2)

**1985** “…each country’s choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected…(para. 8)

**1980** “…confirms that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected…(MC II, para. 4)

**1975** * * *

#### Needs of Developing Countries

**2000** “….. notes contribution [peaceful uses] can make to helping to overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries.”(para. 3)…urges that…preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account. (para. 4)

**1995** “In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.” (Decision 2, para. 16)

**1990** “reaffirms the undertaking…to cooperate…with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world…recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.” (MC III, Section I, para. 4)…urges that, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the NNWS Parties to the Treaty…(MC III, Section I, para. 5)

**1985** “due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world…and recognizes the needs of the least developed countries” (para. 3)…assistance to developing countries (para. 16)…urges that preferential treatment should be given to the [NNWS] Party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and mechanisms to assist developing countries (para. 21)…economic and social development.” (para. 23)

**1980** “…recognizes that due to their weaker infrastructure and financial base, the developing countries are more vulnerable…considers that effective measures can and should be taken to meet the specific needs of developing countries…(MC II, para. 15)…the [NNWS] Parties… should be provided preferential treatment in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…(MC II, para. 19)

**1975** “…due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world…continue and increase assistance…bilaterally and through…the IAEA and UNDP (para. 3)…growing needs of developing states…supplemental voluntary aid” (para. 5)
APPENDIX I
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

Sustainable Development
2000 "...importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (para. 8)...welcomes [IAEA's] new strategy [for] ensuring sustainability..." (para. 10)
1995 * * *
1990 "...recognizes the importance of the report by the World Commission on Environment and Development...and notes that...the IAEA has reported on its contribution to achieving the objectives of environmentally sound and sustainable development." (MCIII, Part VII, para. 1)
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Nuclear and Radiation Safety
2000 "...acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories...and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety...(para. 1)
1995 "All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety...(Decision 2, para. 18)
1990 "...underlines the fundamental importance of ensuring the highest standards of safety in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (MC III, Part IV, para. 1)...acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for the safety of nuclear installations within their territories (MC III, Part IV, para. 3)...considers nuclear safety an important responsibility of both supplier and recipient States (MC III, Part IV, para. 4)
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

International Cooperation in Nuclear Safety
2000 "...international cooperation on all safety-related matters is indispensable...encourages the efforts of the IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects (para. 2)...welcomes the activities of the IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors." (para 3)
1995 [See Nuclear and Radiation Safety, supra]
1990 "...urges that nuclear co-operation under the NPT give increased attention to nuclear safety and radiological protection (MC III, Part IV, para. 1)...welcomes the intensification of international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety...since the Chernobyl accident, mainly under the auspices of the IAEA (para. 2)...commends the efforts of the IAEA in...nuclear safety...and calls on the IAEA to consider further ways of enhancing international cooperation in [safety] (para. 5)
1985 "...proposes IAEA assistance to developing countries in [inter alia] safety of nuclear power projects...(para. 16(i)
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Nuclear Safety Instruments
2000 "...welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and encourages all States, in particular, those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet...become party to the Convention to do so. (para. 4)...encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency...(para. 5)
1995 * * *
1990 "...commends the entry into force in 1986 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident...urges all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify these Conventions (MC III, Part IV, para. 2)
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *
APPENDIX I
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities
2000  “…considers that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with… the Charter of the United Nations.” (para. 7)
1995  “Attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with… the Charter of the United Nations.” (Decision 2, para. 20)
1990  “…attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes could jeopardize the development of nuclear energy (MCIII, Section VIII, para. 1)…an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, operational or under construction, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with the… United Nations Charter (para. 2)…encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance…to any Party…if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack…” (para. 3)
1985  “…expresses its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq’s safeguarded reactor (para. 10)…recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with… the United Nations Charter (para. 11)…encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance…to any Party…if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack…” (para. 12)
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials
2000  “…endorses the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials and urges States to ensure that these standards are maintained (para. 9)…underlines the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of the States concerned from the risks of transportation of radioactive materials (para. 10)…invites States shipping radioactive materials to provide, as appropriate, assurances to concerned States, at their request, that national regulations…take IAEA transport regulations into account (para. 11)
1995  “All States, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation…observe standards and guidelines in (inter alia) transport of nuclear materials.” (Decision 2, para. 18)
1990  * * *
1985  * * *
1980  * * *
1975  * * *

Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
2000  “…notes conclusion of the Joint Convention [on Spent Fuel and Waste Safety]…encourages States that have not yet… become a party to do so…underlines the importance of managing waste…within military or defence programs in accordance with the objectives of the Convention (para. 13)…commends the efforts of IAEA in radioactive waste management, and calls upon the Agency…to strengthen its efforts in this field as resources permit (para. 14)
1995  * * *
1990  “…affirms the crucial importance of an adequate national infrastructure in…waste management…commends efforts of the IAEA [in this area]…and calls on the IAEA to consider further ways of enhancing international cooperation…to promote implementation of the highest standards.” (MCIII, Section IV, paras 3 and 5)
1985  “…while recognizing that the operation and management of the back end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international collaboration for arrangements in this area. (para. 9)
1980  * * *
1975  * * *
## Appendix I

### NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

#### Nuclear Liability

**2000**  
“...notes adoption of 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage...stresses the importance of having effective liability mechanisms in place.” (para. 16)

**1995**  
* * *

**1990**  
“...recognizes the importance of suitable arrangements providing adequate and timely compensation in case of liability for damage arising from nuclear or radiological accidents...commends the IAEA and [OECD/NEA] for their efforts...in further improvement in the international regime for liability...conclusion of joint protocol in 1988...encourages the IAEA to continue its work...” (MC III, Section IV, para. 10)

**1985**  
* * *

**1980**  
* * *

**1975**  
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#### Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes

**2000**  
“...urges all States that have not done so to accept the 1983 amendment of annex I to the London Convention, which prohibits contracting parties from dumping radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter at sea.” (para. 15)

**1995**  
* * *

**1990**  
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**1985**  
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**1980**  
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**1975**  
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#### Technical Cooperation and Assistance

**2000**  
“...affirms the importance of the Technical Cooperation activities of the IAEA, as well as other bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in fulfilling the obligations set forth in Article IV of the Treaty.” (para. 3)

**1995**  
* * *

**1990**  
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**1985**  
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**1980**  
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**1975**  
* * *

#### Financing of Technical Cooperation

**2000**  
“...every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA’s financial and human resources necessary for Technical Cooperation activities are assured, predictable and sufficient...” (para. 6)

**1995**  
“Every effort should be made to ensure that [IAEA] has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should...find ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.” (Decision 2, para. 19)

**1990**  
“...welcomes the continued growth of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund...reiterates importance [of]...necessary measures so that technical assistance is funded through the Regular Budget of the Agency...” (MC III, Part V, para. 2)

**1985**  
“...welcomes the establishment by the IAEA...of a mechanism to permit the channeling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those funded from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund (para. 15)...underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources...” (para. 17)

**1980**  
“...suggests the continuation of the study of financing the technical assistance programme of the IAEA (MC II, para. 16)...calls on States Parties...to give consideration to the establishment on the basis of voluntary contributions of a Special Fund to be administered by the IAEA...for the provision of technical assistance to the developing non-nuclear weapon
Access to Nuclear Material and Technology

2000  “…observe the legitimate right of all States parties…to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes…Transfers…would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.” (para. 11)

1995  “Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.” (Decision 2, para. 15)

1990  “…reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” (MC III, Section I, para. 3)

1985  “…reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty…to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange.” (para. 2)

1980  “…urges further efforts to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy are made available to all Parties to the Treaty…(MC II, para. 2)

1975  “…reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the right of all parties…to participate in such exchange…(para. 2)

Supply Assurances

2000  * * *

1995  * * *

1990  “…recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation… notes that CAS was not able to reach agreement on a set of universally acceptable principles for cooperation… recommends continuing efforts…calls for resumption, when appropriate, of formal discussions in CAS.” (MC III, Section II, para. 1)

1985  “…recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation…commends…progress in IAEA’s Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS).” (paras. 5-6)

1980  “…welcomes the establishment of an IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) to consider…ways and means in which supplies of nuclear material, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis…” (MC II, para. 7 and 9)

1975  * * *

Conversion of Nuclear Materials to Peaceful Purposes

2000  “…underlines the importance of international verification, as soon as practicable, of nuclear weapons material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military programmes and that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes.” (para 1) (See also, Article VI, para. 10)

1995  (See Nuclear Material Withdrawn from Military Uses, page 9, supra)

1990  (See Nuclear Material Withdrawn from Military Uses, page 9, supra)

1985  * * *

1980  * * *

1975  * * *

Multinational Fuel Cycle Arrangements

2000  * * *

1995  * * *

1990  * * *

1985  “…recommends IAEA establish an internationally agreed system of international plutonium storage (para. 14);… commends… the merits of establishment of international fuel cycle facilities.” (para 19)
APPENDIX I

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

1980  “...supports efforts directed at the early establishment of an internationally agreed effective scheme for international plutonium storage...calls on Parties to give serious consideration to the establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle facilities.” (MC II, para. 17)
1975  “...recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be...advantageous; welcomes IAEA's studies in this area; urges Parties to cooperate in these studies...(paras. 8 and 9)

Article V: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

2000  [Interpreted in light of 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)]
1995  * * *
1990  “...confirms that, if the potential for the safe and peaceful application of nuclear explosions were demonstrated and were made available...the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which such applications could be made available (MC II, para. 1)...notes that the potential for the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions has not been sufficiently demonstrated...(and) that no (NWS) has an active programme for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions.” (para. 2)
1985  “...confirms the obligation of Parties...to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available...on a non-discriminatory basis (para. 1)...confirms that the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which potential benefits could be made available (para. 2)...notes that the potential benefits of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated (para. 3)
1980  “...reaffirms the obligation of Parties...to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to (NNWSs) (MC II, para. 1)...confirms that IAEA is the appropriate international body through which any potential benefits...could be made available (para. 2)...calls on (NWSs) to continue to provide the Agency with any information (para. 3)...notes the extensive work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions...forwarded to the (UNSG) in 1977 (para. 5)...notes that peaceful uses of nuclear explosions are at an early stage of development and no application has reached the stage at which projects can be subject to the economic assessment judged appropriate...notes that potential benefits...have not been demonstrated.” (para. 6)
1975  “...reaffirms the obligation of Parties...to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to (NNWSs) ...on a non-discriminatory basis (para 1.)...considers the IAEA the appropriate body...through which the potential benefits could be made available (para. 2)...notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects...which still need to be investigated (para. 4)...believe that the IAEA should broaden it consideration of the subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.” (para. 5)

Article VI: Nuclear Disarmament

Commitment to Disarmament

2000  “...notes the reaffirmation by the States parties of their commitment to Article VI (para. 1)
1995  “...the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in Article VI...(Decision 2, para. 3)
1990  * * *
1985  “...reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this Article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the Article.” (para. B.2)
1980  * * *
1975  “...recalls the provisions of Article VI...(quoted) “ (para. 1)

Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race

2000  “...despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands...expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used.” (para. 2)
1995  “Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war.” (Decision 2, para. 3)
1990  * * *
1985  “...recalled the declared intention of the Parties...to achieve at the earliest date the cessation of the nuclear arms race...
and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (para. A.3)…noted…that the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of NWSs were undergoing continued development…(para. A.6)…noted with regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review.” (para. A.8)…noted the last five years had thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures related to cessation of the nuclear arms race…(para. A.17)

1980
* * *
1975 “…expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race is continuing unabated…urges constant and resolute efforts by…the Parties to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI” (paras. 1 and 2)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
2000 “…reaffirms that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions…will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons…(para. 4)…calls upon all States to ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (para. 5)
1995 “…achievement…is important [of]…the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996…pending entry into force… the NWSs should exercise utmost restraint” (Decision 2, para. 4(c)
1990 * * *
1985 “…reaffirms the determination…to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time…(para. B.5)…recalled that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty…had not continued after 1980…(para. A.14)…and stresses that adherence to [a Treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests] by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective.” (para. B.6)
1980 * * *
1975 “…affirms the determination…to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. (para. 4)…expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race…appeals to these (NWSs) to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.” (para. 4)

Legality of Nuclear Weapons
2000 “…notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons issued at the Hague on 8 July 1996.” (para. 7)
1995 * * *
1990 * * *
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Fissile Material Production Ban
2000 “…notes the establishment…by the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee…to negotiate…a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons…regrets that negotiations have not been pursued…(para. 8)
1995 “…achievement…is important [of]…immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons…(Decision 2, para. 4(b))
1990 * * *
1985 * * *
1980 * * *
1975 * * *

Progress in Disarmament
2000 “…welcomes the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process…ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step…ratification…by the United States remains a priority (para. 9)…welcomes significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other (NWSs)…(para. 10)
## APPENDIX I

### NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

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<td>1985</td>
<td>“…recalled that a stage of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) had been concluded in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which had remained unratified…(para. A.10)…noted the lack of progress on relevant items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament…(para. A.15)…welcomes the fact that the (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) are conducting bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms…(para. B.3)</td>
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<td>“…appeals to the (NWSs) parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavour to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement…outlined by their leaders in November 1974 (para. 5)…notes that…the CCD has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures…urges…all members of the CCD…in particular the (NWSs) to efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD. “ (para. 6)</td>
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### Irreversibility

2000 "…welcomes the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament irreversible…through…verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes.” (para. 11) (See also, para. 15.5)

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### Targeting

2000 "…notes the (NWSs) declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.” (para. 14)

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### Anti-Ballistic Missiles

2000 “…welcomes the signing in 1997…of significant agreements related to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems…welcomes ratification…by the Russian Federation…ratification…by other countries remains a priority.” (para. 13) (See also, para. 15.7)

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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Practical Steps for Article VI Implementation (The Thirteen Steps)

At the 2000 Review Conference, the Parties agreed to a set of thirteen measures described as “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty…and the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” Although these thirteen steps overlap and duplicate the text of other Revcon language, they have been separately recorded at this point in the Comparison document for completeness and because of their significance for future NPT review activities.

### Steps 1 and 2: Nuclear Testing

“…importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions…to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (para. 15.1)…moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions…pending entry into force of that Treaty,” (para. 15.2)

[See also, discussion under Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, supra at pages 24-25]
APPENDIX I
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)

Step 3: Fissile Material Ban Treaty
“...necessity of negotiations...on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons...which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.” (para. 15.3) [See also, discussion under Fissile Material Production Ban, supra at page 26]

Step 4: CD Subsidiary Body
“...necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.” (para. 15.4)

Step 5: Irreversibility
“...the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.” (para. 15.5) [See also, discussion under Irreversibility, supra at page 27]

Step 6: NWS Undertaking on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
“...an unequivocal undertaking by the (NWSs) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament” (para 15.6 and para. 15.9, tiret 1)
[See also, Commitment to Disarmament, supra at page 23]

Step 7: Disarmament Instruments
“...early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible...” (para. 15.7) [See also, Progress in Disarmament, supra at page 26]

Step 8: Trilateral Initiative
“...completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russian Federation and (IAEA).” (para. 15.8)

Step 9: Actions by Nuclear Weapons States
“...further efforts...to reduce...nuclear arsenals unilaterally” (para. 15.9, tiret 1)
“...increased transparency with regard to...nuclear weapons capabilities...and voluntary confidence-building measures” (para.15.9, tiret 2)
“...further reduction of non-strategic weapons...”(para. 15.9, tiret 3)
“...concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.” (para. 15.9, tiret 4)
“...diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies...”(para 15.9, tiret 5)
“...engagement as soon as appropriate...in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.” (para. 15.9, tiret 6)

Step 10: Verification of Fissile Material Removed from Military Control
“...arrangements...to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated...as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification...and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes...”(para. 15.10) [See also Nuclear MaterialWithdrawn from Military Uses, supra at page 9]

Step 11: General and Complete Disarmament
“[r]eaffirmation that the ultimate objective...is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” (para. 15.11) [See also, Commitment to Disarmament, supra at page 23]

Step 12: Reporting
“...regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the (NPT) by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI...”(para. 15.12)
“...and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.” (para. 15.12)] [See also, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, supra at page 25]
The Evolution of NPT Review Conference Final Documents

**APPENDIX I**

**NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)**

**Step 13: Verification Capabilities**

“…further development of the verification capabilities…to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. (para. 15.13)

**Article VII: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States**

**Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” (para 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“…achievement…is important [for]…systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons…(Decision 2, para. 4(c))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” (para)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>* * *</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Security Assurances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…notes the reaffirmation by the (NWSs) of their commitment to UNSC resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances for (NNWSs) parties to the Treaty.” (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“…noting UNSC resolution 984 (1995)…as well as the declarations of the (NWSs) concerning both negative and positive security assurances.” (Decision 2, para. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“…takes note of the continued determination by the Depositary States to honour their statements…in resolution 255 (1968)…to ensure the security of the (NNWSs) party to the treaty.” (para. 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“…takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements…in Resolution 255 (1968)…to ensure the security of the (NNWSs) party to the Treaty (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…recognizes the important role which the establishment of new nuclear-weapon free zones and the signature to the protocols of new and previously existing zones by the (NWSs) has played in extending negative security assurances to the (NNWSs) parties to the Treaty…” (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“…the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon free zones…enhances global and regional peace and security is affirmed.” (Decision 2, para. 5)…the cooperation of all the maximum effectiveness of such…zones…” (Decision 2, para. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>“…reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones…constitutes an important disarmament measure…and should be encouraged…(para. 2)…recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any…nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the (NWSs) is necessary.” (MC II, para. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* * *</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“…considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones…constitutes an important disarmament measure and…and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons (para. 2)…recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any…nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the (NWSs) is necessary.” (para. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>* * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>“…considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones…represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons…(para. 4)…for maximum effectiveness…establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the (NWSs) is necessary.” (para. 5)</td>
</tr>
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**Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“…welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly…that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security…urges all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for…a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East…(para. 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1995 | “The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East…should be encouraged as a matter of priority…(Decision 2, para. 6)…calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in
appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards…the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological…(Middle East Res., para. 5)

1990 “…welcomes the initiative by Egypt; to establish a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East…(MC II, para. 15)

1985 “…considers that acceding to the (NPT) and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region…(para. 13)

1980 * * *

1975 * * *

Additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

2000 “…regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority…supports the intention …of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region (para. 14)…believes that the international community should continue to promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones…(para. 15)

1995 “…the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in 2000 would be welcome.” (Decision 2, para. 6)

1990 “…reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones…constitutes an important disarmament measure…and therefore the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged…”(MC II, para. 2)

1985 “…considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones…constitutes an important disarmament measure…should be encouraged (para. 2)…takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the world.” (para. 9)

1980 * * *

1975 “…considers that establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon free zones…represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons…welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.” (para. 4)

Regional Issues

Middle East

2000 “…reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension conference (para. 16.1)…reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process” (para. 16.2)

1995 “…recalls that [1995 Resolution] calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and place their nuclear facilities under full-scope (IAEA) safeguards” (para. 16.3)

1990 “…notes that nine States parties in the region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements…invites [them] to negotiate such agreements…as soon as possible”(para. 16.4)

1995 “…requests all States parties, particularly the (NWSs)…to report…to…the 2005 Review Conference…on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone] “(Middle East Resolution, para. 1)

1995 “…endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process”(Middle East Res., para. 2)

1980 * * *

1985 * * *

1980 * * *

1975 * * *

APPENDIX I

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LANGUAGE: A COMPARISON OF TEXTS (CONTINUED)
## Appendix I

### NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

#### Iraq

- **2000**: “…notes the statement…by the IAEA Director General that, since the cessation of IAEA inspections…the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991)…reaffirms the importance of Iraq’s full continuous compliance with IAEA and compliance with its obligations.” (para. 10)
  - **1995**: * * *
  - **1990**: * * *
  - **1985**: * * *
  - **1980**: * * *
  - **1975**: * * *

#### South Asia

- **2000**: “…notwithstanding their tests India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States (para. 12)…urges India and Pakistan to accede to the (NPT) as NNWSs and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards…urges both states to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures (para. 13)…notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on future testing…urges both States to sign the [Comprehensive Test Ban] Treaty (para. 14)…urges both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of [fissile material for nuclear weapons] (para. 15)
  - **1995**: * * *
  - **1990**: * * *
  - **1985**: * * *
  - **1980**: * * *
  - **1975**: * * *

#### DPRK

- **2000**: “…notes with concern that, while the (DPRK) remains a party to the (NPT), IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the (DPRK) and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion…looks forward to the fulfillment by the (DPRK) of its stated intention to come into full compliance…emphasizes the importance of action by the (DPRK) to preserve and make available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory.” (para. 16)
  - **1995**: * * *
  - **1990**: * * *
  - **1985**: * * *
  - **1980**: * * *
  - **1975**: * * *

#### South Africa

- **2000**: * * *
  - **1995**: * * *
  - **1990**: * * *
  - **1985**: * * *
  - **1980**: * * *
  - **1975**: * * *

### Article IX: Adherence, Accession, NWS Defined

#### Universal Adherence

- **2000**: “…undertakes to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty (para. 4)…calls upon those remaining States not party to the Treaty to accede to it…(these States are Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan (para. 6))…underlines the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty” (para. 9)
APPENDIX I

NPT Review Conference Language: A Comparison of Texts (Continued)

1995  “Universal adherence to the (NPT) is an urgent priority...every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.” (Decision 2, para. 1)

1990  “…having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the (NPT) ...recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty...strongly appeals to all States...to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.” (MC III, para. 1)

1985  “The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the NPT is the best way to strengthen the barriers against proliferation and urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.”

1980  * * *

1975  “…notes with concern that the Treaty has not yet achieved universal adherence...expresses the hope that States that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.”

Definition of Nuclear Weapon State

2000  “…reaffirms that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty only as non-nuclear-weapon States.” (para. 4)

1995  * * *

1990  * * *

1985  * * *

1980  * * *

1975  * * *

Improving the Effectiveness of the Review Process

2000  “…reaffirmed...decision on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference” (para. 1)

“...stressed that three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, normally for...10 working days each...should be held...a fourth session would, if necessary, be held in the year of the Review Conference” (para. 2)

“...subsidiary bodies can be established at the Review Conference to address specific relevant issues” (para. 4)

“...first two sessions...would...consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality...should consider specific matters of substance” (para. 5)

“...Chairpersons should carry out consultations...”(para. 6)

“...a meeting should be allocated to non-governmental organizations” (para. 7)

1995  “…agreed to strengthen the review process...” (Decision 1, para. 1)

“...Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference...(Decision 1, para. 3)

“...Preparatory Committee meetings would...consider principles, objectives and ways...to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality...” (Decision 1, para. 4)

“...present structure of three Main Committees should continue...” (Decision 1, para. 5)

“...subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues...(Decision 1, para. 6)

“...Review Conferences should look forward as well as back...” (Decision 1, para. 7)

1990  * * *

1985  * * *

1980  * * *

1975  * * *