The Second NPT Preparatory Committee: Issues, Results, Implications for the 2005 Review Conference

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The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held from April 28 to May 9, 2003, in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary. The PrepCom was the second of three sessions that will be held prior to the 2005 Review Conference and represented the end of the first phase of the “enhanced” strengthened review process (agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference). Under the new process, the first two sessions (2002 and 2003) considered “principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.” The third PrepCom session, which will be held from April 26 to May 7, 2004, will need to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference, taking into account the deliberations and results of the two previous sessions.

One hundred and six states parties as well as representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) participated in the PrepCom, while representatives from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference attended as observers. Representatives from 37 nongovernmental organizations attended the plenary meetings of the PrepCom.

The 2003 PrepCom was held amid concerns about the continued viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime at large, generated by the lack of commitment by some state parties—nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) alike—to their respective treaty obligations. Despite Cuba’s long-awaited accession to the NPT in November 2002, the state parties...
were confronted with several challenges, most notably the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) decision to withdraw from the treaty and restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The U.S. National Security Strategy (which established the doctrine of preemptive strikes as official U.S. policy), the invasion into Iraq to rid it of weapons of mass destruction, allegations that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program, and the apparent lack of commitment by the NWS to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations, also served to focus attention at the meeting on the test of political will regarding nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and the role that the NPT will take in leading these efforts.

The second PrepCom session, similar to the first session, concluded relatively successfully. Despite some speculation that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT on April 10, 2003, (the first state party to do so) would lead to a procedural—and potentially divisive—debate at the start of meeting over North Korea's status, the chairman, in a display of diplomatic skills and political resolve, announced that he would take custody of the DPRK's nameplate and that it would not be displayed among those of the states parties, but remain in the conference room. This approach ensured a smooth start of the meeting. However, the states parties' acceptance of this soft reaction to one of the most significant challenges to the NPT seems to be indicative of a "business as usual" kind of approach by many state parties to the present day challenges to the treaty. In comparison to the lack of interaction between delegations at the first PrepCom session, innovative efforts by the chairman resulted in more active and substantive interaction at the second session. But many delegations, including some NWS, stayed notably quiet, both in engaging others and in responding to others' attempts to engage them. Although several issues were highlighted, such as security assurances, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and non-proliferation and disarmament education, with working papers offering concrete and constructive proposals as food for thought, much additional work will be required to fulfill the mandate of the 2004 PrepCom session, which is to make substantive recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference.

The following interview was completed at a workshop on assessing the 2003 PrepCom session organized by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations in New York on October 8, 2003.

NPR: Do you believe the outcome of the 2003 NPT PrepCom is indicative of the successful implementation of the strengthened review process as envisaged by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference?

Molnár: At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, states parties to the treaty made some important decisions concerning the future of the NPT, which was indefinitely extended. This indefinite duration of the treaty was paralleled
by all states making commitments to specific substantive actions and to a “strengthened” review process covering their implementation. The detailed modalities of this process, however, remained to be addressed. One key change was that sessions of the PrepCom for a Review Conference were to be held in each of the three years preceding it, rather than immediately prior to it. Each session was instructed to consider “principles, objectives, and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.” In order to achieve this goal, each session was supposed to consider specific matters of substance.

The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, building on the experiences and knowledge gained from its preparatory meetings, elaborated in greater detail the tasks of future PrepComs. The new arrangements did not require the parties to arrive at any consensus recommendations for transmission from the first two PrepCom sessions to the third—only a factual summary of the discussions prepared by the chairman was required from these sessions. The third session was still expected to provide draft recommendations to the Review Conference, and this is precisely the task that lies before next year’s PrepCom session as well.

It has to be said that the whole of the preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference is a “first,” and the states parties and subsequent chairs have to work out the modalities and substance as the process progresses. However, several states parties may be interested in exploring methods to further improve the strengthened review process. I would also not exclude the possibility that the rules of procedure may be reopened in 2005.

NPR: How did you approach your preparations for the PrepCom? How did you resolve the traditional difficulties over the timetable? Did you employ a different approach than your predecessor, Ambassador Salander?

Molnár: In the course of my preparations, as well as during the session itself, I did not intend to change much of the practice and structure of work introduced at the first PrepCom. Following a general exchange of views on all aspects of the treaty, most of the committee meetings were dedicated to substantive discussion on the following three clusters of issues: nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and international security; nonproliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and safeguards; and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Time was also allocated for consideration of specific issues, such as nuclear disarmament; regional issues, including the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programs. In line with the wish expressed by many state parties in consultations prior to the session, I suggested additional procedural means in order to enhance the interactive nature of the debate. State parties agreed to and started to make good use of this newly available working method.
Compared with the deliberations of the first session of the Committee, this year’s debates put more emphasis on the importance of compliance. This fact was reflected in a significant restructuring of the Chairman’s Summary as well, which highlighted the negative developments over the last year.

**NPR:** Given North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the treaty, how did you resolve the question about North Korea’s status at the PrepCom?

**Molnár:** Leading up to the PrepCom, the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, especially the announcement of its withdrawal from the treaty, raised many concerns. In addition, the disputed status of the DPRK in the NPT by itself threatened to undermine the substantive work of the committee right from the outset. Two divergent interpretations emerged prior to the session, which exist even today. While several states parties question the legitimacy of the DPRK’s withdrawal and insist that the country should still be considered as a state party, others, while also expressing regret, are ready to recognize the sovereign decision of the DPRK, and maintain that it is no longer a party to the treaty. This controversy presented itself in a serious procedural problem, namely where to put the DPRK’s nameplate, endangering the smooth start and the whole conduct of the session as well. Intensive consultations during the last week before the session resulted in a consensus-based solution. My initiative to keep the nameplate with me for the duration of the session without prejudice to the outcome of the ongoing consultations on this issue, gained overall support. Substantive work could start without any delay and no time was lost for any procedural problems at all in the course of the 19 meetings of the session. However, I better not shy away from admitting that by resorting to this unusual solution, we almost automatically postponed a thorough analysis of the problem presented by the intended withdrawal.

**NPR:** How did you manage the process of consultations on the content of the “Chair’s Factual Summary”? Were you content with the degree of transparency maintained during the PrepCom?

**Molnár:** As with the first PrepCom in 2002, the Final Document of the PrepCom was to include a procedural report as well as a “Chairman’s Summary” of the substantive discussions, on the sole responsibility of the chairman (hence, not a negotiated text). In order to increase the transparency of the preparation of the summary, I expressed my readiness already in the first week and was available from then on to consult bilaterally with all delegations wishing to do so. I tried to focus my efforts on leaving behind for the use of my successor at the third session of the committee a document that reflected a balanced approach and was comprehensive enough, and thus could serve as a useful basis to build on, keeping also in mind the need for concrete recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference. Ambassador Salander, as vice-chair, provided valuable assistance in
chairing the PrepCom on several occasions while I conducted bilateral consultations.

**NPR:** The issue of possible Iranian noncompliance with its treaty and IAEA safeguard obligations were notably high on the agenda for several delegations, in particular the United States. How did you resolve this difficult issue in your factual summary?

**Molnár:** Iran’s nuclear program, given its scope, raised many questions in the debate. It was especially challenging to tackle this question in the Chairman’s Factual Summary. Following intensive consultations with the states parties concerned, an acceptable language could be reached in the very last moment before the submission of the summary. A common denominator could be forged by referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its Board of Governors meeting in this context, which formed the basis for the chair’s consultations. In order to display an attitude of cooperation and goodwill, all parties concerned accepted the final text.

**NPR:** The submission of national reports to the NPT meetings was a topic which nearly brought the 2002 PrepCom to a standstill. The first PrepCom session was also characterized by a lack of interactivity among delegations during the cluster debates. This was not the case during the second PrepCom. You were in fact praised by many for your unprecedented initiative to encourage delegations to actively engage in this debate. How did you do it?

**Molnár:** In an attempt to make progress on this issue, I encouraged states to use the national reports already submitted as a basis for discussion at the PrepCom. Time was not spent elaborating potential formats for future reporting. Rather, the content of the reports was analyzed, permitting a new atmosphere of interactivity between states.

Building on this approach, I also encouraged state parties to ask and respond to questions right on the spot, or within the span of the meeting. This encouraged a fairly lively dialogue, a new feature in NPT meetings.

**NPR:** To what extent do you consider the second PrepCom session as successful?

**Molnár:** Against the backdrop of the many challenges facing the NPT regime, the outcome of the second PrepCom constitutes a real achievement for the international community. However, challenges will remain, and the next session will inevitably face serious additional difficulties as well in the course of trying to arrive at a document, which, unlike the Chairman’s Summary from the first two PrepComs, has to be fully negotiated and accepted by consensus.

**NPR:** How do you envisage the “Factual Summary” from the 2003 session being factored into the work of the 2004 session in preparation for the 2005 Review Conference?
Molnár: It is my sincere hope that a thorough examination of the second PrepCom Chairman's Factual Summary may bring to light evidence of a wide range of agreement on various issues concerning the implementation of the NPT, with a view to building consensus at the 2005 Review Conference. For example, there was no objection to the issue of disarmament and nonproliferation education. However, the summary also shows that vast differences also exist on many of the most pressing issues confronting the treaty today, while in other cases, some aspects of the treaty's implementation have not been considered thoroughly enough.

The chairman for the 2004 PrepCom will have a different task than Ambassador Salander and I did. The purpose of the 2004 PrepCom is to make recommendations to the Review Conference, which will entail negotiating a consensus-based document. It is difficult to predict what possible language could be used for consensus in 2004. One possible approach emerged recently during my visit to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, where it was suggested that perhaps it could be useful to try to break down the existing language of the Chairman's Factual Summary and list its components according to their likelihood for serving as a basis for a consensus language for the third PrepCom session. A thorough analysis of the wording of the Factual Summary will show the use of phrases such as “some agreed,” “others said,” “one State said,” which could be indicative of the level of agreement on particular issues.

NPR: In your view, which are the most important issues that emerged since the 2000 Review Conference?

Molnár: By far not intending to come up with a comprehensive list of issues in any of the above-mentioned “prefixed categories,” let me make an attempt to name a few examples on both sides of the spectrum, also pointing out a few new issues that came up in the course of this review cycle. Several new issues can be identified since the 2000 Review Conference, each of which has different levels of agreement by states parties. First, the issue of nonproliferation and disarmament education, in light of the resolution passed at the 57th session of the UN General Assembly (2002), drew clear support from all states parties. Second, the issue of Iran has newly emerged, both in the context of Article IV, the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and compliance, which the IAEA Board of Governors is currently addressing. Third, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, nuclear terrorism and how to address non-state actors have gained much attention. While there is clear concern expressed in combating nuclear terrorism, there is not clear consensus on the role of the IAEA in this endeavor. Fourth, in the context of discussion and action regarding “preemptive strikes,” multilateralism was stressed much more than in 2000 as a core principle by many states. Fifth, as I mentioned before, the announced withdrawal from the NPT by North Korea was somewhat deflected as a primary issue at the 2003 PrepCom. However, the question of withdrawal from the treaty—in particular in the case of a state that de-
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004

veloped nuclear weapons while still a member of the treaty—will clearly need to be addressed in a more concrete way at the upcoming PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference as well. Finally, the strengthening of the review process itself as well as possible NPT structures were identified as issues in need of consideration in 2005.

In addition to these “new” issues, nuclear disarmament—particularly the disarmament of nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons [discussed in more detail below]—received greater attention. A widespread recognition of the interdependence and the complementary nature of the goals of nonproliferation and disarmament could also be observed. Strong support was expressed for the maintenance, strengthening, and enforcement of fully universal norms. Contributions of international law and organizations, especially the IAEA, were generally appreciated. Regional issues were also dealt with in greater depth. While intentions to reflect on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons in the context of the successful implementation of the “road map” were strongly opposed by several states from the region, at the end I was lucky enough to offer an acceptable language.

NPR: Which issues emerged as potential areas for agreement?

Molnár: Clear agreement does exist on the importance of preserving and strengthening the NPT. This includes clear agreement on IAEA safeguards as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and on the agency as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with the NPT. Other principles which gained clear agreement were the need to strengthen existing measures such as the physical protection of nuclear material, the need for safe and secure transport of nuclear and radioactive material, and the importance of preventing the dumping of radioactive waste. Clear agreement was expressed for supporting Article IV (peaceful use of nuclear energy) and a commitment to Article VI. At the same time, and I hasten to add, many countries also expressed concerns that Article IV has been misused by some countries to divert peaceful uses to military applications. On the other hand, again, many countries were concerned by the lack of commitment to Article VI.

On particular cases, concern was clearly expressed regarding the unresolved question of Iraq’s WMD program and associated delivery systems. In the case of Iran, states parties clearly agreed to await the outcome of the June 2003 IAEA Board of Governor’s meeting, rather than address the issue at the PrepCom. Clear concern was also expressed about the North Korean nuclear weapons program and North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT. While the principles of all of these issues were much noted and clearly seen as a concern to all, the means by which each issue would be addressed drew less agreement, and sometimes, none at all.
NPR: Which issues clearly lacked agreement at the PrepCom?

Molnár: There were a number of issues in which agreement was not clear, and several, rather divergent views were expressed in this regard. The importance of transparency in export controls in the context of Article III was an issue that prompted disagreement. An issue that failed to generate consensus was the question of negative security assurances, especially whether or not they should be legally binding, in the form of an agreement, or as a protocol to the treaty. Further, there was no agreement on linking security assurances to the fulfillment of treaty obligations. How this issue will be addressed at the 2005 Review Conference also remained unclear. In addition, how to address the Middle East question remains a contentious issue. And, needless to say, a wide range of concerns were also expressed on the DPRK's nuclear program and on how to address the status of the DPRK.

Finally, a good deal of concern was expressed by non-nuclear weapon states that there was not enough progress on the Thirteen Practical Steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement nuclear disarmament, agreed to in 2000. In contrast, all of the nuclear weapon states informed states parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI. Also within the context of the 13 steps there was no agreement on linking the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to other types of nuclear weapons.

NPR: You have taken a bold step by including a detailed paragraph in the Chairman's Summary reflecting substantive proposals on nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Given the strong views by at least two nuclear weapons states against such emphasis, what led you to include these proposals? What was the role of the New Agenda Coalition countries in this regard? To what extent do you think these proposals will be reflected in the recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference?

Molnár: The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is one of the most contentious issues of the current review cycle. This issue received a great deal of attention in the deliberations of the second NPT PrepCom, even more so than during the 2002 session. This is a fairly new development, since the first occurrence of TNW in the NPT context was in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as part of one of the Thirteen Practical Steps to advance nuclear disarmament. The issue has been raised by non-nuclear weapon states at various NPT and nuclear related forums of the past three years, and even the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions on this matter in 2002 and in 2003.

I believe that the PrepCom's role is invaluable in clarifying the views of interested states on this new and still vague issue. Standpoints are still unclear and somewhat volatile, and the debate is still in its initial phase so far. We must recall that there is no internationally accepted definition of what constitutes a TNW. Nevertheless, some non-nuclear weapon states feel that the changing interna-
tional security environment does not justify the deployment of such weapons, designed for tactical or battlefield use. They also link TNWs to the threat of terrorism, because they feel that in certain cases TNWs are not adequately accounted for and protected.

It can be safely stated that by now, TNWs form an integral part of the review process and they will continue to be addressed in the context of the NPT. As I said before, this year, as it was the case last year as well, special time had been allocated for discussions on nuclear disarmament, which gave a special opportunity for interested states to present their views. Most interventions by non-nuclear weapon states were directed toward Russia and the United States, who in their turn addressed the issue substantially.

Non-nuclear weapon states traditionally put the emphasis on the disarmament aspect of the NPT, and this year’s PrepCom was no exception. In these debates, many states expressed the view that the past focus on strategic reductions had been misplaced, since TNWs are just as lethal and dangerous as their strategic counterparts. The most frequent demands made by non-nuclear states included: formalization of the 1991-92 U.S.-Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; new, legally binding, formal agreements on TNW reductions; transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility of reductions; a halt to the development of new types of low-yield nuclear weapons; reduction of TNW operational status; special security and protection measures.

The New Agenda Coalition, a cross-regional grouping consisting of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, was in the forefront of the debate. The NAC stated that—and I quote—"the possession of TNWs poses real risks, which, we believe, require our collective attention for a number of reasons. For instance, the comparative portability of non-strategic weapons and the ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict makes them more susceptible to use in combat or theft."

Sweden, acting also on behalf of Austria and Mexico, presented a working paper addressing “Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” The paper focuses on TNW characteristics and proposes a possible way ahead for reductions. It states that “non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern, but due to the lack of transparency, general knowledge about these weapons is limited. There are deeply worrying signs that some countries are planning to develop new types of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons and to use them as so-called ‘battlefield weapons’…TNWs are increasingly seen by some countries as a counter to conventional forces.” As for the way forward, the working paper proposed the prohibition and complete elimination of certain types of TNW, such as nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells, etc., which have already been removed from active duty as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

The so-called NATO-3, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, also presented a Working Paper with a section dedicated to non-strategic nuclear
NATO’s efforts in the reduction of its nuclear arsenal are mentioned in the paper. Germany, having also presented a Working Paper on TNW in the first PrepCom in 2002, now stated, that "In line with the significantly reduced role for these nuclear systems after the end of the Cold War there is no reason to avoid the issue. We urge that non-strategic weapons be addressed as a matter of priority."

Among the nuclear weapon states, China, Russia, and the United States presented their views. The Chinese position has more or less remained the same over the years: “Any nuclear disarmament measures, including various interim measures, should follow the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all…. No state should research and develop low-yield and more-likely-used nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapon states should withdraw and return home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside of their own territories.”

Russia stated that it “proceeds from the understanding that it is impossible to consider the issues of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments.” By using this language, Russia explicitly linked nuclear disarmament to other types of disarmament measures. The Russian delegation also expressed the view that the subdivision of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is very conditional. They also stated that “on our part, we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the cold-war period.”

Finally, the delegation of the United States also had a lot to say about this issue, and even circulated a fact sheet addressing inter alia TNWs. The U.S. statement proclaimed that “the United States and NATO long ago decided that reductions in NSNW [non-strategic nuclear weapons] were appropriate…. NATO has considerably reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons…. In recent years, the United States has looked at the prospect of formal arms control treaties on NSNW and concluded that such an approach is not possible. The nature of these weapons and their delivery systems make it far more difficult to have confidence in treaty implementation than is the case for strategic systems. Delivery systems for NSNW are often dual-use, i.e. for conventional and nuclear roles, which makes it very difficult to have confidence that they have been retired from a nuclear role.” Therefore, the U.S. rejects any formal and legally binding agreements in this field. On the other hand, the American delegation announced that as of January 2003, the U.S. obligations under the Presidential Nuclear Initiative have been fulfilled.

Naturally, the Chairman’s Factual Summary had to reflect on this aspect of the PrepCom’s deliberations as well, and I tried to come up with a language that was balanced and acceptable to all. Paragraph 16 of the Summary reads as follows: “The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons,
based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization and increased transparency in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was also pointed out that substantial reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons had taken place through unilateral actions, and that the dismantling of these weapons under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative had been partly concluded. It was stressed by some states parties that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a transparent, accountable, verifiable, and irreversible manner, and that negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible. Substantive proposals were made on this issue. It was argued that these proposals would also serve the purpose of helping to ensure that terrorists would not be able to gain access to non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the importance of enhancing security of transport and storage with regard to these weapons was also emphasized. A view was expressed that the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of a comprehensive nature and is linked to other aspects of strategic stability and therefore cannot be considered separately from other types of weapons.

All evidence indicates that the issue of TNW will figure high on the agenda of the next PrepCom, and especially of the 2005 RevCon. The views are still evolving, but they are clearly divided and hard to reconcile. At the same time, the issue is receiving more and more attention in the deliberations of other fora, such as the United Nations.

NPR: The issue of tactical nuclear weapons was also prominently addressed in the UN General Assembly. What relationship exists between the UN approach and the initiatives by the NPT state parties?

Molnár: The issue of tactical nuclear weapons was first introduced in the UN General Assembly—and in the UN context in general—by the New Agenda Coalition in 1998 as part of their “omnibus” resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: The need for a new agenda.” In this resolution (53/77Y), the General Assembly “...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities.”

The NAC resolution has been on the UN First Committee’s agenda for the last five years, and so have tactical nuclear weapons. Last year brought a significant change though, since a new, separate resolution was introduced by NAC entitled, “Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons” (57/58). This resolution stresses the importance of the commitments made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. According to its language the GA “agrees that reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the
nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process.” The resolution basically re-
iterates demands made at the 2002 session of the PrepCom regarding tactical nuclear weapons, for example for “transparent, verifiable and irreversible” re-
ductions, or for the formalization of the presidential nuclear initiatives. Last year 120 states voted in favor; therefore the resolution was adopted. A few negative votes were cast by nuclear weapon states, along with a significant number of abstentions from a variety of other states.

The NAC reintroduced its separate draft resolution on tactical nuclear weap-
ons this year in the First Committee again. There were some changes to it, mak-
ing the demands more concrete, especially regarding those for security and physical protection measures. New operational paragraphs deal with several of those new concerns of non-nuclear weapon states, which were introduced at the Second Session of the PrepCom. The draft says that the General Assembly “stresses the need for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states that possess such weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use.” It also “calls for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear weapon states and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons.” It is interesting to note that the operational paragraphs of the resolution are also included in the “omnibus” NAC resolution of this year (“The need for a new agenda”). Voting on these resolutions in the First Commit-
tee of the UN General Assembly took place on the 4th of November 2003, and the voting patterns remained pretty much the same as last year. [Editor’s Note: For example, General Assembly Resolution 58/50, “Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” was adopted by a vote of 128-4, with 41 abstentions. The nuclear weapon states (except China) voted against it, while many NATO allies of the United States abstained.]