VIEWPOINT

INDIA AND THE NEW LOOK OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

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U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone major transformations since 1945, and the most recent change, as expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement, represents an especially significant shift in policy. The document reverses more than a quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggesting that the current U.S. administration regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. This article investigates this policy shift, looking at the history of U.S. nuclear export policy and the potential ramifications of the new policy on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author also touches on the potential effects of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Finally, it is suggested that it is not too late for India and the United States to change the new policy with more consideration for the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Initiative.

KEYWORDS: India; U.S. nonproliferation policy; Nonproliferation; Nuclear; Nuclear exports; Nuclear proliferation

The old football adage “You can’t tell the players without a program” applies increasingly to the international politics of nonproliferation. Gone are the days when the United States routinely lined up on the side of those pursuing the goal of halting and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons. This change in Washington’s nonproliferation game plan has been under way for some time, but it was most clearly expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement. This extraordinary document, which reverses more than a quarter-century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggests that the national security team of George W. Bush regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing.

In light of the magnitude of this policy shift and its potential to harm the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), associated nonproliferation institutions, and even elements of the president’s own nonproliferation initiatives, one would have expected the policy announcement to follow a careful and systematic review of the costs and benefits of the proposed change. A rational decision would have required input from all of the major governmental players with nonproliferation responsibilities, including the senior officials in charge of nonproliferation policy in the Departments of State and Energy. In fact, however, the new policy appears to have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant engagement of many of the government’s most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear plan for achieving its implementation. Indeed, the policy shift bears
all the signs of a top-down administrative directive specifically designed to circumvent the interagency review process and to minimize input from any remnants of the traditional “nonproliferation lobby.”

What Precisely Has Changed?

U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone at least three major transformations since 1945. An initial emphasis on secrecy and denial, highlighted by the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, gave way in 1954 to the active promotion internationally of peaceful uses of atomic energy. This phase came to an end in 1974 following the Indian detonation of a “peaceful nuclear explosion” and the adoption by the United States of an export policy emphasizing technology control.

Although Washington’s public rebuke of India was mild, the Indian explosion not only led to a major revision in U.S. thinking about nuclear exports, but it had the effect of moving nonproliferation from the periphery toward center stage on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. One consequence of the change in priority was intensification of U.S. diplomatic efforts to establish strict guidelines for the major nuclear exporting states covering the transfer of nuclear fuel and sensitive technology. An important multinational initiative—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—was mobilized for this purpose.

The NSG politically obligates its 45 members to pursue two sets of guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. Central to the guidelines, which like other aspects of NSG policy were adopted by consensus, is the principle that only NPT parties or other states with comprehensive (“full-scope”) safeguards in place should benefit from nuclear transfers. It is this principle of comprehensive safeguards as a condition for export, which the United States labored long and hard to persuade the NSG to adopt, that will have to be abandoned if the India-U.S. Joint Statement is implemented.

The key provision of the Joint Statement that will necessitate a fundamental change in U.S. nuclear export policy is the promise by the U.S. President that he will seek to adjust U.S. laws and policies, as well as international regimes, to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. These adjustments are necessary since India does not have full-scope safeguards in place and is one of only four states (along with Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) that remain outside the NPT. By promising that the United States will work to achieve full civil nuclear cooperation with India, President Bush has announced, for all practical purposes, that technology control is no longer the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear export and nonproliferation policy. Instead, it has given way to a strategy in which politics has primacy and regional security and international economic objectives trump those of nonproliferation. Although this shift is not the first time nonproliferation objectives have been subordinated to other U.S. foreign policy considerations, it represents the most radical change in recent nuclear export policy.

The Underpinnings of the New Policy

It is always dangerous to attribute much rationality to the process by which policy changes or to assume that policy will be internally consistent. Moreover, as suggested above, it is
not obvious that nonproliferation considerations were given much weight in the decision to alter U.S. policy toward India. Nevertheless, to the extent that assumptions about proliferation influenced the shift in U.S. policy, they would appear to include the following perspectives:

1. Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed, not prevented. According to this perspective, nuclearization of the Indian subcontinent should have been anticipated and cannot be reversed. Although the pace of the global spread of nuclear weapons has been much slower than predicted, we are approaching a new “tipping point” in which several second-tier states may “go nuclear.” U.S. policy to counter proliferation must be selective. In those instances in which the United States cannot prevent nuclear weapons spread, it can and should seek to influence the development of responsible nuclear weapons policies on the part of new nuclear nations that are consistent with U.S. national interests, including the adoption of enhanced safety and security procedures and practices.

2. There are good proliferators and bad proliferators. U.S. decisionmakers and scholars generally have viewed the spread of nuclear weapons negatively. This perspective has persisted for most of the post-World War II period and has not varied greatly regardless of the orientation of the prospective proliferator. Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, for example, U.S. nonproliferation declaratory policy remained adamantly opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons despite the fact that many of the countries of greatest proliferation concern—states such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and even India and Pakistan—were either friends of the United States, or at least not its adversaries. This prevailing perspective continued during the 1990s at a time when the number of states of proliferation concern diminished but were seen to be more anti-American in orientation (e.g., Iraq and Iran).

A minority viewpoint, however, has long questioned the assumption that proliferation necessarily was undesirable. Kenneth Waltz, in particular, popularized the view that the spread of nuclear weapons may promote regional stability, reduce the likelihood of war, and make wars harder to start. Although it is not obvious that the proponents of a reorientation in U.S. policy toward India have been directly influenced by Waltz’s arguments, the India-U.S. Joint Statement indicates more clearly than ever before that Washington is not opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons by some states, including those outside of the NPT. This new policy of nonproliferation exceptionalism is far more explicit and pronounced than prior routine efforts by the United States and its allies to deflect criticism of Israel’s nuclear policies in different international fora. As one defense expert close to the administration reportedly put it, unlike the Clinton administration, which “had an undifferentiated concern about proliferation,” the Bush administration is not afraid to distinguish between friends and foes.

3. Multilateral mechanisms to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are ineffectual. The Bush administration has consistently exhibited a strong preference for foreign policy and military tools that are unconstrained by the need to seek approval from
international organizations or multilateral bodies be they the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council, or even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This general orientation applies with equal force to the nonproliferation sphere and was in evidence at the 2005 NPT Review Conference in which the United States invested few resources, was ill-prepared, and lacked even a realistic vision about what would constitute a productive outcome. For those inclined to be dismissive of the utility of multilateral instruments, the inability of the unwieldy NPT body to agree on any nonproliferation measures must have reinforced their prior conviction that nonproliferation progress will be achieved only by unilateral action or streamlined “coalitions of the willing.” Ironically, in light of the changes the Bush administration has promised to seek pursuant to the Joint Statement, the one established multilateral nonproliferation body that it had sought to strengthen recently was the NSG.

4. Regional security and economic considerations trump those of global nonproliferation. Diplomats and scholars have long struggled with the problem of how best to enhance nuclear stability in South Asia without appearing to reward those few states not party to the NPT—the most widely subscribed to treaty in the world. Compounding this dilemma is the difficulty of reconciling the reality that India, Israel, and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons with the language of Article 9 of the NPT that explicitly restricts nuclear weapon status to those five states that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. The India-U.S. Joint Statement essentially resolves the dilemma by ignoring how other states may interpret the repudiation by the United States of existing domestic law and international political obligations regarding nuclear trade with a non-NPT state. It does so, presumably, because the “powers that be” in Washington have determined that a combination of international political and economic objectives takes precedence over nonproliferation considerations. Although these objectives have not yet been publicly enunciated by the administration, there is good reason to believe that they include the conviction that a substantial Indian nuclear arsenal will serve U.S. interests in Asia in the future vis-à-vis a more assertive and powerful China.

The convergence of U.S. and Indian national security interests with respect to China is emphasized by Robert Blackwill, U.S. ambassador to India during President Bush’s first term and often cited as the most influential proponent of the shift in U.S. policy toward India. According to Blackwill, there are “no two [other] countries which share equally the challenge of trying to shape the rise of Chinese power.”

This argument is made even more explicitly by Ashley Tellis in a report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace four days before the Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. According to Tellis, who served as senior policy advisor to Blackwill during his tenure in India and is also credited as one of the principal intellectual architects of the new U.S. policy, it would be a mistake to attempt to integrate India “into the nonproliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent.” To do so would be “to place New Delhi at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in
Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term.” 10 To his credit, Tellis openly acknowledges the fundamental danger to the global nonproliferation regime posed by the shift in U.S. policy that his report anticipated. However, he believes the risk is manageable and is justified by U.S. geopolitical interests that transcend nonproliferation.

In this regard, it should be noted that some elements of the new U.S. policy toward India have antecedents in which nonproliferation considerations in South Asia took a back seat to other foreign policy and national security objectives. This situation prevailed with regard to Pakistan throughout most of the 1980s following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It also can be discerned after September 11, 2001 in the less-than-forceful manner in which the United States has pressed Pakistan to reveal the full scope of the A.Q. Khan network. Prior to the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, however, the trade-offs between pursuing global nonproliferation objectives and those of regional security were never linked as directly or publicly.

**What Are the Likely Consequences?**

It is difficult to isolate the nonproliferation impact of the India-U.S. Joint Statement from other developments. It also is premature to assess the longer-term nonproliferation consequences of the reorientation in U.S. policy toward India. To some extent, the impact of the July 2005 statement will depend on its implementation by Washington and New Delhi, how widely it is emulated and/or supported by other major states, and the degree to which it is reflected in further departures from traditional U.S. nonproliferation policy. Nevertheless, one can venture some hypotheses about how the turn in U.S. policy may affect the international dynamics of nonproliferation.

**Erode the NPT**

One of the most influential studies of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy adopted as a guiding principle Florence Nightingale’s admonition that “Whatever else hospitals do they should not spread disease.” 11 Although the Joint Statement purports to encourage more prudent nonproliferation behavior by India, it is far more likely to promote the further spread of nuclear weapons by eroding the norm of nonproliferation embodied in the NPT. It is apt to have this effect by reinforcing doubts by many NPT members about the commitments by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to their treaty obligations and the benefits the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) derive from the treaty.

The timing of the Joint Statement, coming on the heels of the disappointing and largely unproductive 2005 NPT Review Conference, will be perceived by many states as further evidence that the United States cannot be counted on to honor its nonproliferation obligations. Contributing to this view is the not unrealistic assessment on the part of many NPT members that U.S. policy in the lead-up to the Review Conference and during its negotiation was characterized by relatively low-level and inexperienced representation, inadequate preparation, little interagency coordination, inconsistent policy implementation, and little concern for the consequences of a failed conference.
NPT members also will not overlook the parallels between the U.S. readiness to disavow political commitments it undertook with respect to arms control and disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference (i.e., the “13 Practical Steps”) and the further disavowals that the Joint Statement will require if it is implemented. These pertain to the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that “New supply arrangements...should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (paragraph 12) and the reaffirmation of this principle at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Given this recent proclivity by the United States to interpret selectively its NPT and NSG obligations, other NPT members may reasonably question the value Washington attaches to the current fabric of nonproliferation treaties, regimes, and guidelines and reduce their own investments in nonproliferation accordingly. How, one may ask, does the United States persuade Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, or China to strengthen their nuclear export controls when it announces its intention to weaken its own nuclear export regulations?

The Joint Statement also is apt to be reviewed particularly closely and critically by a number of NPT members who themselves previously possessed nuclear weapons or pursued their acquisition. Although the United States did not formally recognize India as an nuclear weapon state in the Joint Statement, the voluntary nature of IAEA safeguards that the Indian prime minister agreed to accept and the limitation of these safeguards to India’s civilian nuclear program convey the impression that the United States is prepared to treat India for some purposes as it does other NWS recognized by the NPT. This change in posture, which will almost certainly be viewed by most states as a reward to India for its nuclear weapons tests, is likely to be resented strongly by countries such as South Africa and Ukraine that previously claimed nuclear weapons but relinquished them in order to join the NPT as NNWS. It will be regarded with equal resentment by regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt that explored a nuclear weapons option, but voluntarily chose to forego that possibility in favor of NPT membership.

It is reasonable to assume that these and other states that at one time or another seriously contemplated and/or pursued military nuclear programs may reconsider the wisdom of their prior nonproliferation decisions in light of the new U.S. posture toward India. A similar reassessment of the value of the NPT for their national security may be undertaken by a set of NNWS that have not actively pursued a nuclear weapons option, but made explicit the conditionality of their NPT membership on assurances that the international community would not recognize any additional NWS.

Japan is perhaps the best example of this group. Not only has it has been the most consistent and outspoken critic of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, but its senior officials repeatedly have emphasized that if the assurances Japan received prior to joining the NPT were not honored, it would have to reconsider the role of the treaty in promoting its security. The point to emphasize in this regard is not that Japan or any other state necessarily will repudiate their NPT membership as a direct consequence of the shift in U.S. policy toward India, but rather to acknowledge that decisionmaking about
nonproliferation is a dynamic process that does not end with accession to the NPT. Just as Washington’s policy preferences regarding nonproliferation may change over time, so may those of countries that currently adhere to the NPT as NNWS.

The shift in U.S. policy toward India also coincides with growing frustration by many NNWS with the pace of nuclear disarmament and the commitment on the part of the NWS to their Article 6 legal obligations, as well as those political commitments assumed under the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives and the 13 Practical Steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference final declaration. If, as is likely, the reorientation in U.S. policy toward India is embraced, or at least accepted, by the four other NWS parties to the treaty, one or more NNWS may decide that dramatic action is required to demonstrate the erosion of the NPT and its diminished value as a means to achieve disarmament.

Although the Joint Statement by itself is unlikely to lead directly to defection by one of these disenchanted NNWS, it could provide further impetus for such an act by a country such as Mexico or Egypt. In the case of Mexico, the defiant action almost certainly would be only symbolic. In the Egyptian case, however, a desire to highlight the disarmament shortcomings of the NPT may coincide with other less symbolic reasons for leaving the treaty, including dissatisfaction with the lack of implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and wariness in Cairo that Iran has embarked on a dedicated nuclear weapons program. If, as a consequence of the Joint Statement, Egyptian decisionmakers perceive the costs of leaving the NPT to be diminished, their overall nonproliferation calculus could be significantly altered.

**Undermine Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls**

On February 11, 2004, President Bush gave a major address at the National Defense University in which he outlined a new nonproliferation strategy. A key component of his proposal was to close a perceived loophole in Article 4 of the NPT that enables NNWS to acquire all forms of nuclear technology, including sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, as long as they are under IAEA safeguards and are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In particular, President Bush called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group to tighten its export control guidelines by prohibiting the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to countries that do not already operate enrichment and reprocessing plants. This initiative, prompted in particular by Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability, appeared to attach increasing importance to the NSG as a primary anti-proliferation mechanism that might compensate in part for deficiencies in the less flexible NPT.

The president’s 2004 proposal also was consistent with U.S. efforts to strengthen the NSG throughout much of its existence, including successful efforts to fend off attempts by Russia in recent years to dilute the body’s guidelines by creating a special nuclear export exception for India. The tough U.S. stance on exports, apparent as late as the last NSG meeting in June 2005, actually appeared to yield some results as Russia, in what one commentator described as a “fit of law-abidingness,” reluctantly told India in late 2004 that it could no longer supply nuclear fuel for two reactors at Tarapur because of NSG constraints.12
No doubt, policymakers in Russia feel vindicated by the shift in U.S. policy signaled by the July 2005 Joint Statement. Nuclear vendors in France and some other NSG states that have long eyed the market opportunities in India also will applaud the new U.S. approach and can be expected to encourage their governments to support the creation of a special export regime for India under the NSG, even if it means establishing the principle of exceptionalism. Although numerous NSG members are likely to have major reservations about the harmful nonproliferation impact of nuclear exports to a non-NPT state, most are likely to hold their noses and not overtly oppose Washington’s efforts to modify the NSG export guidelines. According to several U.S. officials who asked not to be named, ultimately the NSG will adopt the change in policy advocated by the United States, although at the cost of undermining the ability of President Bush to achieve what had been the priority objective of limiting exports of uranium enrichment technology and equipment.

Already, Iranian nuclear negotiators have pointed out the inconsistency of U.S. efforts to deny enrichment technology to a NNWS party to the NPT while supporting nuclear trade with a non-NPT state that has a dedicated and demonstrated nuclear weapons program. The tenuous logic of the new U.S. position also is not apt to be lost on North Korea or some NPT NNWS that would like to acquire dual-use technology capable of producing weapons-grade fissile material under the guise of a civilian nuclear energy program. In addition, one must assume that new NSG members such as China will find it much more difficult to internalize the argument about the importance of stringent nuclear exports when U.S. policy is applied in an exceptionalist fashion. A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, for example, observes that the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify nuclear exports to Pakistan.

Can One Limit the Damage?

It is unrealistic to assume that the Bush administration will acknowledge that nonproliferation instruments and norms have been weakened as a result of the India-U.S. Joint Statement or attempt to repair the damage that already has been done. It also is unlikely that Congress will challenge the president directly on his initiative, particularly if it is cast in terms of power politics vis-à-vis China. The administration, however, does not yet appear to have a clear plan about how to obtain the changes in or waivers of complex U.S. domestic law governing nuclear exports; nor can it be assured that Congress will be prepared to support either presidential waivers or amendments to relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act prior to implementation by India of the safeguards commitments Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged to undertake under the terms of the Joint Statement.

At a minimum, before acting on the administration’s request, Congress should insist that India implement its safeguards commitments and pledge to continue to honor all prior legal understandings regarding U.S. nuclear transfers, including U.S. prior consent. Although the administration is apt to resist an attempt by Congress to attach any additional conditions to the Joint Statement, it would be appropriate for Congress to call attention to the conspicuous absence in the Joint Statement of any commitment by India
to cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and to express the sense of Congress that such a pledge should be forthcoming before the United States is prepared to resume nuclear trade.

The Bush administration is apt to meet resistance initially at the NSG, which operates on the principle of consensus, to create a separate export control regime for India. Critics of the new approach will remind Washington of its own powerful arguments against such a move, and some NNWS members of the NSG, such as South Africa, Germany, and Brazil, may oppose an exceptionalist approach, as it will appear to devalue the benefits of NNWS membership in the NPT. Although it would be desirable for the NSG to resist the Bush administration’s new plan, ultimately Washington is likely to get its way, particularly given the support its proposal will have from Russia, France, and possibly other NWS.

This victory, however, is likely to be at the cost of losing any prospect for obtaining the restrictions Washington previously sought on the export of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment. The best that can be hoped for from a nonproliferation perspective, is that NSG members can be persuaded that indeed India is an exceptional case and that similar exceptions should not be granted to other states that are outside of the NPT and do not subscribe to full-scope safeguards. Ashley Tellis, for example, argues that “[s]eeking exceptions while still trying to maintain universal goals need not weaken the larger nonproliferation order if the United States uses its power artfully to bring along leading countries within the regime. . . .”19 That expectation, however, probably is unrealistic given the less-than-artful exercise of power typically displayed by the United States, the precedent that the Indian case will set, and the history of nuclear trade between other NSG and non-NPT members (such as China and Pakistan).

The Bush administration has avoided commentary on the possible impact of the Joint Statement on Indian–Pakistani relations. Although it is not obvious how the new U.S. stance toward India will enhance regional stability in South Asia, that objective needs to be pursued as a priority, as does the goal of improving the security of both nuclear weapons and fissile material. If the Joint Statement provides the United States with additional leverage to influence the nuclear posture of India and to reinforce prudent practices with respect to securing nuclear weapons and material, that opportunity should be exploited. In particular, the United States should discourage strongly any further expansion of the Indian nuclear arsenal and the production of additional fissile material for that purpose.

Both India and Pakistan should also be encouraged to refrain from nuclear weapon practices that could reduce crisis stability and prompt rapid employment of nuclear arms. Although the Joint Statement also should be utilized to reinforce India’s prior good behavior in the nuclear export sphere, the far greater risk of imprudent exports resides in Pakistan, and it is not apparent how the new U.S. approach to India will improve Pakistani practices with respect to either nuclear exports or the safeguarding of its nuclear assets.

Some of the more harmful nonproliferation outcomes identified above could be mitigated were India and the United States to demonstrate that as part of their new strategic relationship they also were committing themselves or strengthening their
existing commitments to disarmament and nonproliferation measures highly valued by most members of the international community. Although there is no prospect that either state will undertake what would be the most powerful and significant gesture—ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—it is conceivable, if unlikely, that several more modest but important measures could be supported. Both countries, for example, should express their support for an indefinite moratorium on nuclear testing. India also should agree to a moratorium, already in place for the United States, on the production of fissile material for military purposes, and both countries should support the conclusion of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

In addition, Washington should initiate the return to the United States of the small number of non-strategic nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe and propose steps to reduce its stockpile of nuclear warheads in addition to its deployed weapons. Although implementation of these measures by India and the United States would not rectify all of the damaging nonproliferation consequences of the Joint Statement, it would help to replenish what currently is a serious disarmament and nonproliferation credibility deficit in both countries.

Conclusions

In terms of nonproliferation, the best that reasonably can be expected to result from the India-U.S. Joint Statement is a one-time detour by the United States on the road toward promoting universal adherence to the objectives of the NPT. Sadly, this “best case” interpretation is more likely to be correct if, in fact, the recent decision to reverse policy on India was made in haste without due input from senior officials with nonproliferation responsibilities and with little regard to nonproliferation considerations. In that case, it is possible that the course of U.S. nonproliferation policy has not yet been fully determined and may constitute less of a break with traditional policy than has been suggested in this viewpoint. One indication of this tendency would be a disavowal by the Bush administration of its commitments under the Joint Statement if there is inaction or backsliding by India in its promised undertakings.

Some backsliding by both the United States and India is probably inevitable given complaints in both countries about who has to do what first. If treated as a target of opportunity, this slippage actually might be a good thing. It could afford the United States the opportunity to refurbish its nonproliferation credentials while still offering India the prospect of greater cooperation in the realm of nuclear safety and security, as well as research in nuclear fusion for power generation. Such a package could be crafted creatively so as not to collide directly with the NPT and the NSG and could serve as a basis for similar arrangements with Pakistan.

To return to the football analogy, it is now an appropriate moment to call timeout. It is not too late to change the game plan. The stakes are very high and neither the United States nor the international community can afford to lose this nonproliferation match.
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NOTES


2. A number of these assumptions are shared by actors other than those wielding power in the Bush administration, and several variants of them also found expression during the Clinton administration.


4. One prominent advocate for the new policy who is familiar with Waltz’s arguments is Ashley J. Tellis. See his important study, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).


9. Ibid, p. 25: For relevance to Tellis’s role in the plan to change U.S. policy, see Milbank and Linzer, “U.S., India May Share Nuclear Technology.”

10. Ibid. Consistent with this perspective is the absence in the Joint Statement of any commitment by India to stop production of fissile material for weapons.

A revised version of the report was published as *Swords from Plowshares* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).


14. U.S. government officials (names withheld by request), telephone and personal interviews by Center Of Nonproliferation Studies staff, week of July 18, 2005.


18. On the issue of prior consent, see Sokolski, “The India Syndrome.”
