

Report

Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

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The initiative for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) now appears to have come full circle. When it was first proposed in 1993, its realization appeared improbable, if not utopian. Four years later, in 1997, when the five Central Asian presidents endorsed the concept in the Almaty Declaration, and the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution supporting it, the prospects for the establishment of a CANWFZ appeared solid. At the end of 2000, however, its prospects again look gloomy. Developments since 1999, including the increased importance of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy and the resurgence of regional rivalries and insurgencies in the Central Asian region, have combined to place the establishment of a CANWFZ in serious doubt. Although the Central Asian states have negotiated almost all of a draft treaty establishing a CANWFZ, they have reached deadlock on a few remaining provisions regarding possible transit of nuclear weapons through the zone and the relationship of the CANWFZ treaty to other international agreements. The Central Asian states have made only minor progress on these issues in the past year, and the underlying conditions blocking further steps forward seem unlikely to change in the immediate future.

As a result, a CANWFZ appears unlikely to be established soon. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the negotiations to establish some of the existing nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) took many years to reach a successful conclusion. While recent progress has been slow, the Central Asian states show no sign of abandoning their effort to create a CANWFZ. If the political climate changes in important respects, the initiative may regain momentum. If the United States and Russia take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, for example, it could simplify the negotiations. Continued efforts by international and non-governmental organizations to assist the Central Asian countries in dealing with the substantial legacy of the Soviet nuclear weapons program that they inherited may also move the initiative forward over the longer term. Increasing international cooperation on environmental security issues associated with nuclear weapons production could also provide an additional incentive to the Central Asian states to overcome the obstacles that are currently blocking progress toward a CANWFZ. Although this emphasis on the potential negative environmental effects of nuclear industry may cause other states with active nuclear programs concern, enhancing environmental security has long been one of the central

objectives of the Central Asian states in seeking to establish a CANWFZ, and it may yet prove to be the catalyst that brings them together to finish the job.

BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANWFZ CONCEPT

The initiative for a CANWFZ reflects the growing support in the international community for the idea of establishing NWFZs. Since Poland proposed the first NWFZ in the Rapacki Plan of 1958, four NWFZs have been established in populated areas of the world, including Latin America (1967), the South Pacific (1985), Southeast Asia (1995), and Africa (1996). NWFZs now cover the inhabited areas of the southern hemisphere, and additional treaties ban nuclear weapons from outer space and the seabed.² NWFZs emerged as, and have remained, measures of both nonproliferation and disarmament. On the one hand, NWFZs are intended to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states by addressing regional security concerns and giving states in a particular region additional confidence that their neighbors will not develop a nuclear capability. On the other hand, the slow expansion of NWFZs across the globe can also be seen as a step toward the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.

The idea of a CANWFZ can trace its roots back to the 1992 initiative by Mongolia declaring itself a NWFZ. In its statement to the First Main Committee of the U.N. General Assembly announcing this initiative, Mongolia also declared its support for other regional disarmament measures, including a regional NWFZ.³ The first formal proposal for a CANWFZ was made by Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1993.⁴ In 1994, at the 49th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Kyrgyzstan voiced support for the establishment of a CANWFZ.⁵ The creation of a CANWFZ was the subject of a proposal by the Kyrgyzstani and Uzbekistani delegations at the 1995 Review and Extension conference of the state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)⁶. At the 51st session of the U.N. General Assembly in October 1996, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia submitted a draft resolution on the issue, although it was subsequently withdrawn when it did not receive the support of the other states in the region.⁷

None of these proposals made substantial headway because a regional consensus did not emerge on the is-

sue until early 1997. In large measure, the lack of regional consensus derived from the divergent foreign policy goals of the Central Asian states. Some of the states retained close ties to Russia through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as Kazakhstan, while others, like Turkmenistan, took a much more independent stance, and tried to distance themselves from Russia as part of the process of fashioning a new post-Soviet national identity. Rivalry over regional leadership and status, in particular between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, also hindered the emergence of a consensus about the establishment of a CANWFZ.

The crucial step in the process of moving the CANWFZ from an abstract proposal to a concrete policy initiative was taken on February 27, 1997, when the five presidents of the Central Asian states issued the Almaty Declaration endorsing the creation of a CANWFZ.⁸ The declaration specifically placed the establishment of the CANWFZ in the context of the environmental challenges faced by all five Central Asian states. Each of these states housed parts of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure, and they now confront common problems of environmental damage resulting from the production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons. For example, the Soviet Union conducted hundreds of nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan, while uranium for Soviet nuclear weapons was mined and milled in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

It was this common focus on nuclear-related environmental challenges, as well as the desire to foster broader regional cooperation, that prompted the Central Asian leaders to forge the regional consensus that had previously been lacking. This top-level political endorsement of the CANWFZ concept opened the way to the first practical steps toward its realization. It also met one of the internationally recognized criteria for the establishment of a NWFZ, which states that they should be established "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned."⁹ Largely because it does not share a common border with the former Soviet Central Asian states, Mongolia was not included in this CANWFZ initiative. However, the Central Asian states generally support Mongolia's nuclear-weapons-free status, and they acknowledge that they have drawn inspiration from Mongolia's example.

The regional consensus was further emphasized at the April 1997 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), when the states of the region issued a joint statement formally calling attention to the Almaty Declaration. The five Central Asian states subsequently collaborated in holding an international conference on the issue in Tashkent, Uzbekistan from October 14-16, 1997. At this conference, experts from the four existing NWFZs discussed lessons that might be useful to the Central Asians as they undertake the drafting of their own regional NWFZ treaty. Following the conference, the five Central Asian foreign ministers issued a joint statement, reaffirming their commitment to establish a CANWFZ and calling on the United Nations and other interested states to lend all possible assistance to the process of its establishment.¹⁰

In the wake of the Almaty Declaration and the Tashkent conference, a number of non-nuclear weapon states endorsed the proposed CANWFZ at the United Nations. This support included a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement, and individual endorsements by countries such as Australia, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Poland. This international support quickly grew to include most of the international community, including, at least on the declaratory level, the nuclear weapon states.

Earlier, in 1994 and 1995, Russia and China had expressed reservations about the CANWFZ concept. At the 52nd session of the U.N. General Assembly, however, the five Central Asian states jointly submitted a draft resolution endorsing the initiative aimed at establishing a CANWFZ. Diplomats from the Central Asian states were initially uncertain how the five nuclear powers would react to this resolution, especially since the proposed CANWFZ would border on two nuclear weapon states, Russia and China. The United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain, however, endorsed the resolution after the Central Asian states agreed to accept several amendments to its original text. The amended resolution was then adopted by consensus on November 10, 1997 by the First Main Committee of the General Assembly, and later endorsed by the full General Assembly on December 9, 1997.¹¹

Following the adoption of the resolution by the First Main Committee, the United States delegation made a statement in which it affirmed its support in principle for the establishment of a CANWFZ, but noted that “the

devil is in the details.” The statement added that final U.S. support would hinge on the detailed provisions of the treaty establishing the zone.¹² This statement foreshadowed the less than enthusiastic U.S. support for the establishment of the zone in the coming months. Some U.S. officials, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, feared that the CANWFZ might serve as a precedent for the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Europe, as proposed by Belarus, which the United States opposes. U.S. officials also worried that the CANWFZ might hamper U.S. options if its provisions, like those of the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok, restricted the transit of nuclear weapons across its territory. Such objections appeared to ignore geopolitical reality, as contingencies in which the United States would want to transport nuclear weapons across Central Asia are quite remote. Nevertheless, these views inhibited the United States from actively supporting the zone in 1998, when the Almaty Declaration and the U.N. General Assembly resolution had created momentum that could have led to the rapid conclusion of a CANWFZ treaty, had it received more vigorous support from the United States and other nuclear powers. However, it would not be until the 1999 NPT PrepCom that the United States would make a definitive statement in support of the CANWFZ.

Nevertheless, following the passage of the U.N. General Assembly resolution, the Central Asian states made rapid progress during 1998 and 1999 toward establishing a CANWFZ. In early 1998, an expert group of Central Asian diplomats began work on the basic elements of a draft treaty to establish the zone. As called for by the U.N. General Assembly resolution, the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs has provided expert advice to the group, and Jozef Goldblat, an arms control expert based in Geneva, Switzerland, was appointed as a special advisor to the expert group. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also provided expert advice to the Central Asian states during the drafting of the treaty. At a meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in July 1998, Central Asian experts discussed the “basic principles” of the draft treaty with representatives of the five nuclear weapon states.¹³ At subsequent meetings, held in New York, Geneva, Switzerland, and Sapporo, Japan, the expert group agreed on almost all of the text of the draft treaty, although several significant points of disagreement remain to be resolved. These points of dis-

agreement are serious enough that they now threaten to block the establishment of a CANWFZ.

MAJOR TERMS OF THE CURRENT DRAFT TREATY

Among the terms of the draft treaty that have been agreed upon by the five Central Asian States are the following:¹⁴

- **Zone of Application:** The draft treaty envisages the establishment of a CANWFZ that would comprise the territory of the five Central Asian states. Delineation of the zone is relatively straightforward, with the exception of the Caspian Sea, where there are outstanding territorial disputes involving two of the members of the proposed CANWFZ (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) and the other littoral states (Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan). This difficulty was resolved at the October 1999 meeting of the working group in Sapporo, Japan, so that the zone does not include territorial waters. A clause in the draft treaty also specifically notes that its terms do not prejudice the rights of any of the Central Asian states with regard to disputes concerning the ownership or sovereignty of any lands or waters that may or may not be included within the zone. As currently drafted, then, the CANWFZ treaty would cover the land territory of the five Central Asian states and their internal waterways. The treaty allows for the zone to expand in the future. Article 14 explicitly states that the treaty is open to “states having common borders” with the proposed zone, provided that the treaty is amended (requiring consent of all parties to the treaty) to include the new state. Some of the Central Asian delegations have said that they would like to see states such as Iran and Afghanistan join the zone in the future. As currently worded, the treaty would not allow Mongolia to join, since Mongolia does not have a common border with any of the Central Asian states.

- **Possession/Development of Nuclear Weapons:** The draft treaty prohibits the parties from conducting research on, developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or having control of any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device anywhere. It also pledges the parties not to seek or receive any assistance in the development of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, or to assist or encourage other states in doing so. The parties agree not to allow the acquisition, use, storage, stationing, or pro-

duction of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on their territory. The treaty reaffirms the commitments made in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and pledges the parties not to carry out nuclear tests or other nuclear explosions, or to assist others in doing so.

- **Radioactive Waste Disposal:** The parties agree not to allow the disposal on their territory of radioactive waste from other states.

- **Environmental Security:** A specific article in the draft treaty pledges the parties to assist one another in their efforts to clean up those areas that were contaminated by activities related to the former Soviet nuclear weapons program. The desire to foster greater international collaboration and assistance in coping with this legacy clearly remains one of the major motivations for the Central Asian states to establish a CANWFZ. The Central Asian states hope that the establishment of a CANWFZ will not only foster regional collaboration to address the environmental legacy of the Soviet nuclear program, but will also attract international financial assistance. These provisions may also spark concern, however, among states with active civilian or military nuclear programs. States with nuclear weapons programs may feel that the treaty singles them out as damaging the environment. Russia, in particular, may feel that this provision of the treaty tacitly blames it for the environmental damage of the Soviet era.

- **IAEA Safeguards:** The draft treaty requires all parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA within 18 months of its signature. It explicitly says that these agreements should be “in accordance with the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system,” meaning that the Central Asian States would be required to sign additional protocols under the 93+2 guidelines. To date, only Uzbekistan has signed and ratified an additional protocol.¹⁵ Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan do not yet have safeguards agreements in force with IAEA. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have not signed such agreements, while Kyrgyzstan signed one in 1998, but has not yet ratified it.¹⁶ The parties also pledge to provide physical protection measures to nuclear material and nuclear facilities on its territory at least as effective as those called for by the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the recommendations and guidelines of the IAEA (as contained in INFCIRC/226). This provision will place new obligations on the

Central Asian states, as the Convention on Physical Protection only requires safeguards on nuclear material in international transport, while the guidelines contained in INFCIRC/226 are currently only recommendations, and are not legally binding.¹⁷

• **Export Controls:** The draft treaty requires that nuclear material and specially designed and prepared equipment be exported only to non-nuclear weapon states that have comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA under the strengthened safeguards system. At one point in the negotiations, the treaty would also have required that nuclear exports to nuclear weapon states be permitted only if they were “in conformity with applicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA.” However, some of the Central Asian states expressed concern that the nuclear weapon states might object to this language (even though similar language is included in the treaties of Rarotonga and Bangkok), and that it could interfere with their exports of uranium to Russia. This clause has now been removed from the draft treaty. The current draft will require IAEA safeguards only on nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states.

• **Treaty Implementation:** During the negotiations, the Central Asian states debated whether or not to create a separate organization to administer the CANWFZ treaty (like the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example). Early drafts of the treaty provided for such an organization, but it was subsequently decided to remove that language. The current draft calls simply for the parties to meet once a year on a rotating basis to discuss treaty implementation. Extraordinary meetings can also be called at the request of any party in order to discuss implementation or compliance issues.

DISPUTED PROVISIONS

Even though the Central Asian states have reached agreement on almost all of the draft treaty, the outstanding issues that divide them may well prevent the establishment of a CANWFZ. The differences on these issues have been fuelled by continuing regional rivalry among the five Central Asian states. While Kazakhstan has retained fairly close ties to Russia, including on security issues, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have taken a much more independent stance, for example. The two principal divisive issues are how the treaty will treat the pos-

sible transit of nuclear weapons through the CANWFZ, and the relationship of the CANWFZ to previous international agreements to which the Central Asian states are parties.

Both of these issues are apparently linked to Russian concerns about retaining future freedom of action in the Central Asian region, including the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons. In 1997 and 1998, these Russian concerns were muted, and Russian diplomats even voiced support for the initiative to establish a CANWFZ.¹⁸ To some extent, this publicly expressed support may have reflected an underlying belief in Moscow that the Central Asian states would not succeed in negotiating a CANWFZ treaty.¹⁹ This stance changed after April 1999, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing campaign in Kosovo prompted Russia to place enhanced emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy.²⁰ At about this time, Kazakhstan stiffened its position in the negotiations on the two disputed issues.

With respect to transit, Kazakhstan has argued that the treaty should allow each party to independently resolve issues related to transit of nuclear weapons through its territory by air, land, or water.²¹ Other states, particularly Turkmenistan and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, have argued for more restrictive language. The current language in the draft treaty reflects this Kazakhstani view, and could be interpreted as allowing transit of nuclear weapons across the zone. However, this language is ambiguous, because it states that decisions about transit should not be prejudicial to the purposes and objectives of the zone, which could be interpreted as prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons. Perhaps because of this ambiguity, which allows them to paper over their differences on this issue, this draft language has now been accepted by four of the Central Asian states, but not by Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan does not accept language that would allow transit, and insists that the treaty include an explicit ban on transit of nuclear weapons through the zone. In addition, the current language does not define “transit,” so that nuclear weapons might theoretically be “in transit” for an extended period of time without clearly violating the terms of the treaty. As a result, the current language in the draft treaty could be interpreted as permitting at least the temporary redeployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan (or any of the other CANWFZ signatories, for that matter),

should the countries involved agree that such a deployment is necessary.

The relationship of the CANWFZ to previously concluded treaties remains an even larger point of disagreement among the Central Asian states. Although not publicly acknowledged, the reason for this disagreement is the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, to which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are currently signatories.²² Russia interprets this treaty as allowing the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the other signatories if they reach a joint decision that it is necessary.²³ As a result, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have said that they want the CANWFZ treaty to explicitly state that its provisions do not affect previously concluded treaties. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are not parties to the Tashkent Treaty, by contrast, are not willing to accept this language, resulting in a deadlock on this issue.

These two issues were not resolved at the most recent meeting of the Central Asian experts group negotiating the treaty, held in Sapporo, Japan in April 2000. A previous meeting in October 1999 had also discussed these issues without making substantial progress. Turkmenistan declined to send a delegation to the April 2000 meeting, arguing that it was not worthwhile to attend the meeting unless significant progress was made on the transit and other agreement issues prior to the meeting. Despite the lack of progress at this session, none of the states involved has given up, and discussions between the Central Asian states continue, in particular at the United Nations in New York. The five states again co-sponsored a resolution supporting the establishment of a CANWFZ at the 55th session of the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 2000. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on November 20, 2000.²⁴

POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS

Under current conditions, prospects for the conclusion of an effective CANWFZ treaty in the near future are not promising. Although discussions continue, the transit and other agreements issues are effectively deadlocked, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on one side, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the other. Recent developments in Russia and in Central Asia have not improved the prospects for a CANWFZ. On the one hand, the recent modification of Russian nuclear doc-

trine at the August 11, 2000 meeting of the Russian National Security Council, which appeared to de-emphasize the role of strategic nuclear weapons in Russian security policy, might reduce possible Russian objections to the CANWFZ.²⁵ On the other hand, it is not obvious that these changes will affect the increased importance attached by Russia to tactical nuclear weapons. Since tactical nuclear weapons are the nuclear weapons systems most likely to be considered useful in Central Asia by the Russian military, Russia remains unlikely to change its stance on the disputed issues in the near future. This Russian attitude appears to be driving the Kazakhstani, Kyrgyzstani, and Tajikistani positions in the CANWFZ negotiations.

The increase in activity by Islamic insurgents in Uzbekistan during 2000, which has prompted Tashkent to request Russian assistance, may well lead Uzbekistan to move closer to Russia on security policy issues. This could lead to a softening of the Uzbekistani stance on some of the disputed issues in the draft CANWFZ treaty. However, if Uzbekistan softened its position, any treaty that emerged would probably be weaker in its terms than the other recent NWFZ treaties, which could be viewed as a step backward from the point of view of global denuclearization (although it must be admitted that such a treaty would reflect the unique local circumstances in Central Asia). Given that Turkmenistan shows no signs of moving closer to Russia on security issues, however, it seems unlikely that the Turkmenistani position on the disputed issues in the CANWFZ treaty will soften any time soon. In that case, even a change in the Uzbekistani position will not necessarily produce a CANWFZ treaty.

It is also possible that the upsurge in insurgent activity in the region, which also affects Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, may push the CANWFZ negotiations into the background. As they face more urgent security threats, the Central Asian states may simply not have the time and resources to resolve the outstanding issues regarding the CANWFZ. In late 2000, Central Asian diplomats indicated that the establishment of a CANWFZ had indeed become "less important" as a result of concern over insurgent activity.²⁶ In recent years, the Central Asian states have often blamed one another for failing to stop cross-border incursions by insurgents. If this pattern continues, it could worsen relations among the Central Asian countries and diminish the prospects for successful conclusion of the CANWFZ treaty.

Overall, then, the most likely outcomes in the near term are either continued deadlock, or (less likely) a fairly weak CANWFZ treaty with permissive terms with regard to transit and other agreements. Such terms would strip the treaty of much of its significance as a disarmament measure. From the point of view of the global non-proliferation regime, temporary deadlock may be a preferred outcome to rapid conclusion of a weak draft treaty. Eventually, it may prove possible to influence the underlying political conditions that are hampering the conclusion of an effective treaty that would build upon the precedents set by the already existing NWFZs.

On the positive side, the development to date of the CANWFZ process shows that non-governmental organizations can play an important role. The Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, for example, provided advice to the Central Asian states at various points in the negotiating process. This role has now largely been assumed by the United Nations and the IAEA, which are providing substantial technical assistance, with generous financial support from the government of Japan.

Even if a CANWFZ is not established soon, NGOs inside and outside the region may help prepare the ground for its emergence in the future. One of the major obstacles to the establishment of a CANWFZ is the increasing emphasis placed on nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy in the past few years. Nuclear weapons continue to occupy a central place in the national security policies of all the nuclear weapons states. NGOs can work to convince the governments of the nuclear states and those who elect them, that the time is ripe to drastically reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy and take concrete steps to further limit nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles. If progress can be made on this issue by Western governments, it may lay the ground for parallel progress in Russia. This, in turn, would alter the security environment in Central Asia and improve the chances for a positive resolution of the outstanding disputes blocking the finalization of the CANWFZ treaty. Barring unforeseen developments, however, this is task that will take some time. NGOs can also continue to emphasize that the establishment of the zone might bring more international attention and assistance to bear on the former Soviet nuclear legacy in Central Asia. The "environmental angle" could yet bring the Central Asian states together and lead them to finalize a CANWFZ treaty.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of additional NWFZs has been one of the most positive disarmament steps in the last decade. Each of the successive NWFZ treaties has not only expanded the part of the planet that is free of nuclear weapons, but has also included stricter limits on nuclear weapons-related activities. While the CANWFZ seemed to be the next logical step along this path only a short time ago, its prospects have now considerably dimmed. A window of opportunity that was open in 1997 and 1998 now appears to have closed. Even if a treaty is finalized in the near future, its terms may be weaker, instead of stronger than those of the previous NWFZ treaties. Perhaps this should not be a surprise, given the geopolitical realities of Central Asia. But even if the CANWFZ is not established soon, the states of the region and non-proliferation advocates in the international community will continue to take steps to establish the foundation for its emergence in the future.

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² For a discussion of the development of the NWFZ concept and the negotiations that produced the existing NWFZ treaties, see Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment," *Nonproliferation Review* (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 18-31, and Jan Prawitz, "Existing NWFZs: History and Principles," Paper Presented at the International Seminar Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: Crucial Steps Towards A Nuclear-Free World, Uppsala, Sweden, September 1-4, 2000.

³ For more information on the Mongolian initiative, see Tariq Rauf, "Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status," *CANCAPS Bulletin/Bulletin de CONCSAP* No. 27 (November 2000), <<http://www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/cbul27.html#mongolia>>.

⁴ For other discussions of the origins of the CANWFZ concept and its development, see Alexander Sergounin, "Denuclearizing Central Asia," *Pacifica Review* 11 (October 1999), pp. 273-291; Burkhard Conrad, "Regional (Non)proliferation: The Case of Central Asia," available at the web site of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, <<http://www.igc.org/disarm/bccentan.html>>; Guzel Taipova and Vladimir Chumak, "Vozmozhno li sozdaniya bezyadernoy zony v Tsetralnoy Azii?" *Yadernyy kontrol* No. 20-21 (August-September 1996), pp. 26-30; the essays in *Problema sozdaniya v Tsetralnoy Azii zony, svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya* (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan Association of Nonproliferation Researchers, 1998); and Jozef Goldblat, "Central Asia: A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Statu Nascendi," *Pacifica Review* 11 (October 1999), pp. 325-328.

⁵ "Foreign Ministry Protests PRC Nuclear Test," *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* (Bishkek), October 21, 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV-94-212; and "Foreign Minister on International Relations," Interfax, November 28, 1994, in FBIS-

SOV-94-229.

⁶ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Report of Main Committee II," NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1.5, May 5, 1995, in International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/474.

⁷ "Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia: Draft Resolution on the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Central Asian Region," United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, Draft Resolution A/C.1/51/L.29, October 29, 1996.

⁸ "Text of Almaty Declaration on Aral Sea Pollution," *Narodnoye slovo* (Tashkent), March 4, 1997, in FBIS Document FTS19970530002474.

⁹ A recent summary of the internationally recognized criteria for the establishment of a NWFZ is "Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived at Among the States of the Region Concerned," Report of the Disarmament Commission, Annex I, United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, Supplement No. 42, A/54/42.

¹⁰ "Central Asian Ministers Support Nuclear-Free Zone Proposal," Interfax, September 15, 1997, in FBIS Document FTS199970915001229.

¹¹ "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia," United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, Resolution 52/38 S, December 7, 1997.

¹² "Explanation of Vote (EOV) for L. 44, Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia," United Nations General Assembly, 52nd Session, First Main Committee Proceedings, 10 November 1997, A/C.1/52/PV.18.

¹³ "Central Asian Foreign Ministers Meet on Nuclear-Free Zone," Interfax, July 9, 1998, in FBIS Document FTS19980709000486.

¹⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the details of the draft treaty discussed below come from discussions with anonymous Central Asian government officials. It should also be noted that none of the terms of the draft treaty discussed below can be regarded as definitively agreed until the entire text of the treaty has been finalized. Any of the states involved could change its mind regarding previously agreed language until the time when the treaty is signed.

¹⁵ "Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols," December 8, 2000, <http://www.iaea.or.at/wordatom/Prgrammes/Safeguards/sg_protocol.shtml>.

¹⁶ "Situation on 31 December 1999 with Respect to the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements Between the Agency and Non-Nuclear Weapon States in Connection with NPT," *1999 IAEA Annual Report* (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2000), Table A14, <<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/Safeguards/>>.

¹⁷ George Bunn, "Raising International Standards for Protecting Nuclear Materials from Theft and Sabotage," *Nonproliferation Review* 7 (Summer 2000), pp. 146-156.

¹⁸ See for example, "Moscow Welcomes Karimov's Initiative on Nuclear Weapons," Interfax, September 16, 1997, in FBIS Document FTS19970916000227; "Statement by Ambassador G.V. Berdennikov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, to the preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Geneva, Switzerland, April 27, 1998; "Central Asian Foreign Ministers Meet on Nuclear-Free Zone," Interfax, July 9, 1998, in FBIS Document FTS19980709000486.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the development of the Russian position on the CANWFZ in 1997 and 1998, see Ivan Safranchuk, "Rossiyskaya pozitsiya po voprosu sozdaniya v Tsentralnoy Azii zony, svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya," in *Problema sozdaniya v Tsentralnoy Azii zony, svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya* (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan Association of Non-proliferation Researchers, 1998), pp. 24-40.

²⁰ For a discussion of this issue, see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Nuclear Doctrine: The End Of The Period Of Transition?," paper presented at Presentation at a U.N. Symposium on Nuclear Doctrines, New York, October 18, 1999.

²¹ This language is more permissive than that in the last NWFZ treaty signed, the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established the African NWFZ. Article One of the that treaty effectively prohibits land transport of nuclear weapons, by defining "stationing" of nuclear weapons to include "transport on land or

inland waters." See Tariq Rauf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Jenni Rissanen, *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2000 Edition* (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2000), p. 169.

²² Uzbekistan was an original signatory of the 1992 Tashkent Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, but declined to renew its membership in April 1999, when the initial five-year term of the treaty expired. See Yekaterina Tesemnikova, "Tashkent's Official Renunciation," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (electronic edition), February 25, 2000, in FBIS Document FTS19990226001038; and Yuriy Chubchenko, "Russia has Fewer and Fewer Supporters: The CIS Collective Security Treaty No Longer Works," *Kommersant*, April 21, 1999, p. 2, in FBIS Document FTS19990421001307. Turkmenistan never signed the treaty.

²³ CIS Collective Security Treaty, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, May 23, 1992. Article 4 of the treaty states that signatories will render each other "all necessary assistance, including military assistance," in response to aggression. It is this article that Russian officials have interpreted as allowing transit and deployment of nuclear weapons.

²⁴ United Nations General Assembly, 55th Session, A/RES/55/33W, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia," November 20, 2000.

²⁵ See Nikolai Sokov, "The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on 11 August," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site, <<http://www.cns.miis.edu>>.

²⁶ Uzbekistani diplomat (name withheld by request), interview by CNS staff, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, November 2000.