The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report

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International speculation about the possibility of Japan’s nuclearization is not a new phenomenon. A report written as early as 1957 by the U.S. Department of State considered the possibility of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons under a succession of conservative governments. However, since the latter half of the 1990s, in particular, overseas speculation has drastically increased due to various factors, such as: North Korea’s ambiguous nuclear and missile development program since the early 1990s; the Japanese government’s initial opposition to the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); a number of scholarly works emphasizing a link between the end of the Cold War bipolar international political structure and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan; Japan’s plutonium recycling program and its growing plutonium surplus in the face of international criticism; Japan’s civilian H-2 rocket development, which has prompted speculation concerning its ultimate role; and finally China’s assertive military posture, which has led to speculations that Beijing might push Tokyo to take counter-measures, including the production of nuclear weapons. Internationally, Japan has long been criticized for its pursuit of a “dual-track” nuclear policy of both “nuclear approval” as well as “nuclear denial.” While depending upon U.S. Extended Deterrence (U.S. ED) as its ultimate national security guarantee (“nuclear approval”), Japan boasts its 1967 “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”—to not manufacture, possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan—as an irrevocable national policy (“nuclear denial”). Moreover, Japan publicly advocates the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free world.

Given these factors, the perceptual gap between overseas speculation regarding this issue and accounts from Japan itself is thus becoming wider than ever. It is against this background that this article attempts to highlight the essence of Japan’s calculation with regard to nuclearization, as first demonstrated in a report about its alleged “secret nuclear program” of the late 1960s. This report, hereafter referred to as the 1968/70 Report (because its first part, examining technical and economic issues, was completed in September 1968, and its second part, reviewing strategic and political issues, was completed in January 1970) has attracted much attention both within and outside Japan. Even when this internal report was leaked to the press more than twenty years later in the fall of 1994, the response of the media—particularly that of the influential Japanese daily, Asahi Shimbun—was significant in
fomenting criticism of Japan’s “dual-track” nuclear policy. The Asahi Shimbun revealed the story with a front-page article that referred to “Japan’s secret nuclear plan,” further confusing the strategic picture among leading Japan watchers and nuclear specialists alike. Some argue that a covert nuclear weapons program was discussed by “…a large study group including military officers…” that was commissioned to consider a major expansion of Japan’s military forces.

One of the four authors of the 1968/70 Report emphasized that the document was not a blueprint of a secret nuclear weapons program, as often described outside Japan, but simply an assessment of the costs and benefits of nuclearization. According to this account, the following three factors affected the government’s decision to not publicize the report: (1) the Japanese population’s strong anti-nuclearism; (2) the prospect of the renewal of the 1960 U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty in 1970; and (3) the possibility of a hysterical response on the part of the Japanese media to this taboo issue at the time.

Strictly speaking, it is debatable to what extent the 1968/70 Report actually influenced Japan’s non-nuclear weapons policy in the late 1960s or early 1970s (and thereafter), as some former members of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) claimed. The report, after all, was not an official government document. And Japan may have likely remained non-nuclear regardless of any external security developments. However, an analysis of the 1968/70 Report is worthwhile for the following reasons:

- First, the report was written by four non-governmental Japanese university academics specializing in international security and nuclear science, and it was commissioned by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s Cabinet Information Research Office (Naikaku Chosa Shitsu), the advisory board to the prime minister. One may assume that the analysis found in the report likely included a more frank assessment of the costs and benefits of nuclearization than an official government assessment might have presented. Non-governmental researchers are typically freer from various external or domestic constraints, which government agencies inevitably encounter in such exercises. For example, in notifying the United States, Japan’s only military ally, about the report at the time, the government had to consider not only the response of the United States, but also possible negative responses from the domestic opposition political parties.

- Second, although it was never officially disclosed to the public, the 1968/70 Report is the most frequently cited report on this topic, both within and outside Japan. One of the four authors of this report claimed that it was the first comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of Japanese nuclearization. To my knowledge, the 1968/70 Report is also the only substantial document of its kind written in Japan during the Cold War that is available today. Unlike the United States, where classified records are routinely declassified after a number of years and can be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Japan rarely, if ever, discloses official documents on national security issues to the public. Hence, it is difficult to gain access to written evidence when conducting research. It was reported that in 1995 an internal study group in the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) prepared a report for internal use entitled, A Report Concerning the Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, concluding that a nuclear weapons program would provide few benefits to Japan. However, this internal report was not distributed publicly and cannot, therefore, be used in public analysis. No subsequent official report on this subject is known to exist. This article is the first to analyze the 1968/70 Report, apart from various short citations and references elsewhere.

- Third, the 1968/70 Report was written at a time when significant events affecting Japan’s security, both domestic and international, took place. First, China’s first nuclear explosion, which occurred in October 1964, alarmed both Japanese scholars and policymakers. Second, the NPT came into force in 1968, and the main targets of the treaty were West Germany and Japan, due to their financial and technological capabilities, which made them likely candidates for nuclear weapons development. Third, the issue of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction in May 1972 dominated Japan’s security debate domestically. Within this context, Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” were announced in an “off-the-cuff” manner by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.

This article attempts to highlight implications of the 1968/70 Report for Japan’s national security in the 21st century. While a comparison between the nuclear environments of Northeast Asia today—with the renewed “China threat”—and that of the late 1960s is interesting, it remains beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, the following questions will be addressed: How did Japan calculate the costs and benefits of nuclearization, both domestically and internationally? What was mainstream strategic thinking in the late 1960s, at the time when this report was written? What factors influenced Japanese government responses to China’s first nuclear explosion in 1964? What does Japan’s non-nuclear weapons policy suggest about the nature of state behavior and the kind of policies that are most likely to retard the spread of nuclear weapons?

Bearing in mind these questions, this article first looks at the security backdrop of the 1968/70 Report, including the three contending schools of Japanese strategic thought since 1945. Second, Prime Minister Sato’s view of nuclear weapons will be briefly addressed, as it was Sato’s Cabinet Information Research Office that directly commissioned the research group that issued the report at the same time that Sato himself announced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Third, the article moves to China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 and its impact upon Japan’s security debate. The view among Japanese academics as well as the official response of the Japanese government towards China will be reviewed. Interwoven into this discussion is an analysis of how the 1968/70 Report addressed this issue. Fourth, the costs and benefits of Japan’s nuclearization will be discussed in the context of the Northeast Asian security environment in the 21st century, with reference to the analysis presented in the 1968/70 Report (see Summary below).

The 1968/70 Report is composed of two parts: Part 1 addressed technical, economical, and organizational issues relating to possible nuclear weaponization; and Part 2 analyzed the costs and benefits of nuclearization from strategic, political, and diplomatic perspectives. This article will address the second only, since financial and technological obstacles Japan faced in the late 1960s have since then dissipated, while political costs remain the main obstacle in any decision to develop nuclear weapons.

THREE CONTENDING SCHOOLS OF STRATEGIC THOUGHTS IN POST-1945 JAPAN

The three traditional contending schools of strategic thought that developed in post-1945 Japan included: the nationalist right, the pragmatic centrists, and the idealist left. 20

Despite the attention often given to them in overseas media, the number of nationalists in Japan is actually quite limited. The main concern of this group is what it perceives to be Japan’s inferior position vis-à-vis the United States since 1945. According to this view, it is a humiliating irony of history that Japan was attacked with U.S. nuclear weaponry in 1945 and since then has been under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 21 Therefore, the nationalists argue that U.S. ED is “detrimental” to Japan’s national pride.

The pragmatic centrists, the mainstream of Japan’s security thinking since 1945, have pursued a security policy as a “trading state” based upon the following assumption: Japan’s security can be best maintained through a close relationship with the United States, in light of the required minimum self-defense capability placed upon Japan under the restrictions of Article 9 of its Constitution. 22 The centrists believe and have officially stated that the U.S. ED towards Japan is the ultimate security guarantee. 23

Finally, the idealist left, or the “pacifists” as they are called, regard Japan as the only victim of nuclear weapons in the world and oppose nuclear weapons completely. Hence, they severely criticize U.S. ED as detrimental not only to Japan’s national security, but also to world peace more generally, as the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons is an obstruction to the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free world. 24 Although anti-nuclearism amongst the population has been withering since 1945, particularly within the younger generation, it remains a distinctive cultural element in Japan’s discourse over nuclear weapons, and it was highly significant among the post-war population of the late 1960s. One opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in June 1969 reported that 72 percent of the interviewees opposed a nuclearized Japan, while only 16 percent were in favor. 25

PRIME MINISTER SATO AND THE “THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES”

In assessing Prime Minister Sato’s role in Japan’s policy regarding nuclear weapons, it must first be noted that he, the very person who declared the Three Non-Nuclear Principles—not to manufacture, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons in Japan—to the National Diet in December 1967, seemed to have had a pro-nuclear ideology at one point, which was expressed as early as December 1964:

If the other fellow has nuclear weapons, it is only common sense to have them oneself. The Japanese public is not ready for this, but would have to be educated....Nuclear weapons are less
SUMMARY OF THE 1968/70 REPORT:
“NIHON NO KAKU SEISAKU NI KANSURU KISO TEKI KENKYU”
(“A BASIC STUDY OF JAPAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY”)

BACKGROUND

Authors
For two and a half years beginning in 1967, the Cabinet Information Research Office (Naikaku Chosa Shitsu), the advisory board to then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, entrusted the “Study Group on Democracy” (Minshu Shugi Kenkyukai) to conduct research on the costs and benefits of Japan’s nuclearization. This independent study group was composed of four non-governmental Japanese university academics, both nuclear and political scientists. Research included technical, economical, organizational, strategic, and political/diplomatic perspectives. Reportedly, a dozen officials from various government agencies were consulted as well as various industry representatives. The authors and those consulted remained anonymous at the time, but the four authors are now known to be: Professor Hidetake Kakibana (nuclear chemist); Professor Michio Royama (political scientist); Professor Yonosuke Nagai (political scientist); and the late Professor Hisashi Maeda (political scientist).

Purpose
According to the Cabinet Research Officer as well as the members of the study group, the research was intended to explore the costs and benefits of Japan’s nuclearization in a comprehensive way. The government reportedly wanted to have a concise list of reasons why nuclearization would be undesirable for Japanese national security, in order to deflect the arguments from conservative Japanese who advocated nuclearization. It was also meant to allay the fears of those overseas Japan watchers who suspected that Japan was considering developing nuclear weapons.¹

Audience
According to the Cabinet Research Officer at the time, the 1968/70 Report was distributed to the core members of the Sato Cabinet as well as to the senior officials of various ministries and agencies within Japan. It is reported that approximately 200 copies were printed for distribution.²

Impact on policy
The introduction to the main text stated that the official role of the Cabinet Information Research Office was to advise the prime minister on policy matters without having a direct hand in foreign policymaking. The extent of the impact of the 1968/70 Report on policy regarding nuclear weaponization is not clear, and such an analysis is beyond the objective of this article. However, according to one of the authors, Professor Kakibana, the 1968/70 Report was the first comprehensive and objective analysis of the costs and benefits of Japan’s nuclearization. For this reason, he believes that the report did indeed influence Japan’s non-nuclear weapons policy.³

REPORT SUMMARY
The 1968/70 Report is composed of two parts. Part 1 (62 pages) was published in September 1968 and addressed technical, economical, and organizational issues relating to possible nuclear weaponization. Part 2 (28 pages) was published in January 1970 and analyzed the costs and benefits of nuclearization from strategic, political, and diplomatic perspectives. Part 2, summarized below, is composed of four sections: (1) “The Chinese Nuclear Threat;” (2) “Strategic Problems Associated with Nuclearization;” (3) “Diplomatic and Political Problems Associated with Nuclearization;” and (4) “Conclusion.”
The Chinese Nuclear Threat

This first section discussed the possibility of China having the capability to hit the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1970s. It was believed that China’s main goals were to deter the United States and the Soviet Union and to restrict the freedom of their activities in the East Asian region. The authors concluded, however, that despite its possession of nuclear-armed ICBMs, China would, as a practical matter, face constraints on intervention in East Asia because of U.S. E.D. protecting Japan and South Korea—constraints similar to those that confronted the United States in Vietnam because of that country’s alliances with the Soviet Union and China.

Strategic Problems Associated with Nuclearization

The report addressed Japan’s vulnerability to nuclear attack in the event that Japan should acquire a small nuclear arsenal. The authors felt that Japan was extremely vulnerable in the event of a nuclear attack: in October 1968, approximately 50 percent of the Japanese population and the major industries were concentrated in a mere 20 percent of Japanese territory. At that time, a single hydrogen bomb attack could paralyze the entire nation.

Diplomatic and Political Problems Associated with Nuclearization

The study group began by using the model of France’s nuclearization in assessing the diplomatic and political impact of Japanese nuclearization. However, the authors felt that the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific was significantly different from that in Europe. Japan’s nuclearization, they believed, would alarm not only China but also the Soviet Union and the United States. This, they believed, would lead to inevitable diplomatic isolation and eventually nuclear weapons development in Japan.

Conclusion

The authors concluded that if nuclearization could ensure Japanese security, it might be worth the risks and associated costs. Yet, the above mentioned analysis led them to the opposite conclusion. They asserted that it would be unwise for Japan to develop nuclear weapons due to technological, strategic, diplomatic, and political constraints. Japan’s status as a non-nuclear weapons state, moreover, was viewed as a positive factor with regard to its national security. Even if nuclearization would boost national morale and satisfy Japan’s nationalism for a short while, this positive effect would soon disappear. The authors felt, in conclusion, that Japan’s security would best be attained through a multi-dimensional approach including political and economic efforts, and not through a traditional militaristic, power-based approach.

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Ibid.

Ibid.

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In the late 1960s, Sato attempted to challenge the prevalent “nuclear taboo” that existed among the population at the time. In his New Year’s speech to the National Diet in January 1968, he addressed the issue openly under the title of “How to Survive in the Nuclear Age.” Sato did not foresee then how Japan’s security policy with regard to nuclear weapons would develop. He hoped to break the taboo among the Japanese population, especially among the idealist left, by openly questioning the validity of the ideas that would become the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. His attempt ironically rekindled a strong feeling amid the Japanese people that Japan should be the leading advocate of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Despite this development, the prime minister continued to make it clear that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles alone would not be a viable national security policy. Addressing the National Diet only a month after his 1968 New Year’s speech, Sato declared the “Four Nuclear Policies,” which included: (1) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; (2) reliance upon U.S. E.D., based upon the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960; (3) efforts towards global nuclear disarmament; and (4) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
This position was reaffirmed in a report on nuclear policy written and officially announced by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in March 1968, two months after the announcement of the Four Nuclear Policies. Although the policy paper explained that these were LDP ideas on Japan’s nuclear policy, it was considered to be another confirmation of the government’s policy as long as Prime Minister Sato remained at the head of the ruling LDP. Furthermore, the paper reorganized the Four Nuclear Policies, putting the peaceful use of nuclear energy as the first priority, disarmament as the second, and dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as the third. Following the three policies, the fourth policy was added: “...the LDP supports the Three Non-Nuclear Principles under the circumstances where Japan’s national security is guaranteed by the other three policies.” It is not, therefore, surprising that the Cabinet Information Research Office then summoned four non-governmental scholars to assess the costs and benefits of Japan’s nuclearization.

THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S FIRST NUCLEAR TEST ON JAPAN’S SECURITY DEBATE

Japanese Academic Perceptions

In the latter half of the 1960s, the focus of Japanese academics and defense analysts was not on the nuclear arsenal possessed by the Soviet Union, but rather on the nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions of the People’s Republic of China. In the mid-1960s, the image of China changed dramatically, while the United States and its allies started viewing the Soviet Union in a more positive way than previously. It is noteworthy that during this period, Japanese scholars began assuming that the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 had induced a move towards greater stability in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship. These scholars regarded the establishment of the hotline between Washington and Moscow in 1963 as a sign of the declining likelihood of nuclear war. In contrast, they viewed the impact of China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, on the eve of the Vietnam War, along with the Cultural Revolution, which started in 1965-66, as the cause of deteriorating relations between China and the United States.

Japan, in the mid-1960s, viewed China as a developing state with little technological capability. Hence, China’s first nuclear detonation created major unease among Japanese policymakers and scholars, generating fear that if China could build the bomb on its own, other developing states would soon follow suit. In addition, due to the lack of diplomatic ties between China and Japan, or China and the United States, there was a high risk of miscommunication regarding intentions in the case of a nuclear emergency. Within this context, three main concerns emerged, originating from the perceived threat of China’s nuclear weapons.

First, a minority of Japanese academics feared that what may have been an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union (and a de facto deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union for Japan as well), might not work with regard to China. These thinkers assumed that Chinese political leaders possessed a different notion of rationality than American or Soviet leaders. Before China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, Chairman Mao Zedong belittled the value of nuclear weapons. His famous statement in 1946, which characterized nuclear weapons as the “paper tiger” that was “outwardly strong, but inwardly feeble,” left the outside world with a strong impression: China was controlled by unpredictable leaders who did not share the same value system required for a stable nuclear deterrence arrangement.

Nonetheless, the majority of Japanese specialists on security issues, who were pragmatic centrists, responded that these statements about a “paper tiger” were part of a strategy orchestrated by China to deny the credibility of any attempt at nuclear blackmail by either the United States or the Soviet Union, since effective nuclear deterrence is based on the assumption that opponents share the same sense of “rationality.”

Second, other Japanese academics were concerned that China might take Japan as a “nuclear hostage.” This situation, it was thought, might be pursued by the Chinese leadership as a means of deterring any U.S. nuclear blackmail against China in the event of further deterioration in the Sino-U.S. relationship resulting from either a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, an aggressive Chinese military operation in the Taiwan Strait, or an unexpected escalation of the Vietnam War. Even before China possessed an ICBM capability that could directly attack the United States, Japanese anxiety was not allayed completely, due to the geographical proximity of China to Japan. The 1968/70 Report analyzed, in fact, the possibility of Chinese nuclear blackmail against Japan.

While admitting that the possibility of Chinese blackmail was very small, the 1968/70 Report examined possible outcomes if Japan did try to disregard an attempt of nuclear blackmail by China. The crucial question here was:
in such an event, would China attack Japan? The report concluded that such a possibility remained very small, as the purpose of blackmail would be different from that of an actual attack.37 The costs associated with a nuclear attack against Japan were deemed too high: China had to calculate the possibilities of nuclear retaliation not only from the United States, but also from the Soviet Union if the Sino-Soviet political confrontation was not resolved by that time.38 It was assumed that a nuclear attack on Japan would give the United States the best pretext to justify a counter-attack against China.39

In order to analyze the effectiveness of nuclear blackmail against Japan, China would have had to calculate a complicated triangular psychological interaction among three nuclear weapon states: China as a blackmailer against a non-nuclear Japan; the blackmailer (China) and Japan’s protector (the United States); and the blackmailer (China) and its potential nuclear adversary (the Soviet Union). Therefore, as nuclear deterrence relies heavily upon psychological factors, a straightforward affirmative calculation by China remained unlikely. In addition, China could not completely rule out the possibility of Japan’s nuclearization as a result of the threat of blackmail. The resurgence of a militarily strong and anti-Chinese Japan would have been a detrimental development for China’s security. Therefore, the 1968/70 Report concluded that as long as the U.S. ED towards Japan remained credible, and the Japanese government stood firm in the face of any nuclear blackmail by China, China would not achieve its objective.40 Here, the importance of U.S. ED towards Japan played a crucial role.

Third, however, many academics raised the question concerning the credibility of U.S. ED at the time when China developed its ICBM capability, which meant it could directly attack the United States. The 1968/70 Report inferred the costs and benefits of Japanese nuclearization by analyzing France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons.41 In the same line of thinking, after the Soviet Union acquired its ICBM capability (with the ability to reach U.S. soil), Europeans began to doubt the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. France, in particular, openly questioned whether the United States would act to protect Paris (from a Soviet nuclear attack) at the risk of sacrificing a U.S. city, such as New York.

In this context, some Japanese scholars in the late 1960s applied the logic of the French General, Pierre Gallois, to the Japanese case. They argued that Japan was indeed vulnerable to China’s nuclear threat, as it was unthinkable that the United States would defend Japan against a Chinese nuclear attack in exchange for mass U.S. casualties, and possibly the obliteration of U.S. cities. Even if the United States did take that risk, they argued, it would do so only after Japan had been attacked. Although a minority, those who supported a similar opinion argued that Japan should deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems in order to protect Japan without provoking China (which presumably would have been nuclear armed, following the U.S. and Soviet example). A member of the Japanese Upper House at the time, Shintaro Ishihara, advocated one of the most critical arguments. Ishihara, the current mayor of Tokyo and a well-renowned Japanese nationalist, defined the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a “broken umbrella,” which covered only the United States and Canada. He believed that Japan would consequently suffer from “nuclear rain,” as the U.S. nuclear umbrella had a “hole” just above Japanese territory. He concluded, therefore, that Japan had to develop its own multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable submarines, in order to deter any external nuclear threat.42

Still others argued that Japan had to abandon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, so that it would not become automatically involved in the event of a Sino-U.S. military conflict, as China might choose to attack U.S. bases located on Japanese territory in such circumstances. Thus, in this view, Japan would be safer if it abandoned the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 and sought security through neutrality. This brand of argument is referred to as “makikomare ron,” the basis for which was the claim that despite Japan’s hesitation, Japan would inevitably become engaged in a military conflict involving the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, due to the close security ties between the two countries. This argument was strongly voiced by the pacifists.

Various Japanese experts on China argued that the principal goal of China’s nuclear build-up was to regain control of Taiwan, and that China would launch aggressive military operations in the Taiwan Strait once it achieved a credible second-strike nuclear capability. This, they argued, would provoke confrontation with the United States. Therefore, they maintained, Japan should abandon the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and become neutral to avoid such a crisis.43

These arguments indicate that there were many different and sometimes opposing views of extended deterrence among Japanese security scholars. As Terumasa Nakanishi
stated in 1987: “...[deterrence] is given shape by perceptions of both U.S. and allied military capabilities and political determination. Its existence can be inferred but not verified.”44 Japanese writers have pointed to the requirements of an effective extended deterrence arrangement, identifying three factors: (1) a nuclear state A, who possesses an effective nuclear capability and provides a nuclear umbrella to its allies; (2) state A makes clear its intention to use its nuclear weapons to protect its allies; and (3) the adversary of A recognizes A's commitments to the first and second factors.45

When it turned to these issues, the 1968/70 Report argued that the key to determining China’s nuclear behavior lay in the minds of Chinese policymakers. It was felt that China would only attack Japan if its leadership were convinced that the United States would not retaliate under any circumstances.46 It was argued that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, therefore, should be analyzed in light of the uncertainties in the minds of both sets of policymakers, the “deterer” (the United States) and the “deterree” (China). Judging from this logic, whether or not Japan believed the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella did not affect China’s calculation when it came to blackmailing Japan. Consequently, the 1968/70 Report concluded that Japan could do little but rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, regardless of whether it was credible or not.47

In this respect, the report echoed mainstream Japanese military analysts in the late 1960s, who believed in the effectiveness of rational deterrence theory. This logic assumes that if the potential aggressor is not 100 percent certain that its opponent will be unable to retaliate after the aggressor’s first nuclear attack, the aggressor will be deterred due to the “unacceptably high” risk of response.48 Rational deterrence theory was useful in guiding Japanese defense specialists in their approach towards China’s nuclear posture. It is also worth noting that this was mainly because, at this time, there were few diplomatic contacts between China and Japan. As a result, Japanese analysts, knowing very little about the Chinese domestic context, could do little more than to see China as a monolithic state entity.49

Another feature of the 1968/70 Report was its assessment of the problems relating to Japan’s nuclearization in comparison with the French experience of the early 1960s. In particular, the following issue was discussed: if France developed an independent nuclear weapons capability because it doubted the credibility of U.S. ED, then Japan might follow France’s example as a state dependent on the “unreliable” protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Yet the report considered the primary reason for French nuclearization as political: President Charles De Gaulle’s France sought to regain great power status inside Europe and boost French morale, which had been tarnished by the experiences of World War II and the process of decolonization. Ultimately, France’s “independent” nuclear capability was deemed to be merely a small umbrella that still resided under the protection of the larger U.S. one. France, in reality, failed to regain its great power status through this attempt. Therefore, the report posed the question of what would happen if Japan followed the same path.50

Several differences between France and Japan regarding their respective security environments were identified. First, while the Soviet Union was the only nuclear threat to France, Japan faced two hostile nuclear states, the Soviet Union and China—though, admittedly, the possibility of a nuclear exchange was lower in the Asian theater than in the European one during the Cold War.51 Although small, China’s nuclear capabilities simply added an extra factor of uncertainty to the strategic calculations in the minds of policymakers in Washington and Moscow. Second, there was a clear confrontation between the two multinational security organizations in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, while in Asia there existed no such security organizations.52 Although mutual nuclear deterrence between the two blocs seems to have worked in the European theater, as there were no major military conflicts in Europe, the existence of the U.S. nuclear deterrent did not prevent the outbreak of the Korean War or the Vietnam War. Third, the U.S.-French relationship was different from the U.S.-Japanese one in terms of historical, cultural, and racial links. Although independent French nuclear weapons created political friction between the two states, the United States never considered the French arsenal as a military challenge. Japan’s nuclearization, however, would pose a military threat not only to China, but also to the Soviet Union, other regional states, and above all, the United States.53 There was speculation inside the U.S. government concerning Japan’s nuclearization as early as the 1950s, as mentioned earlier. The outcome would thus have been deterioration in the security environment of the entire region, in particular due to the deterioration of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.54
The 1968/70 Report also pointed out Japan’s vulnerability to any nuclear attack, no matter its origin. In 1968, Japan’s population density was 3.6 times higher than that of China. About 50 percent of the entire Japanese population lived in 12 cities, which covered an area of about 19 per cent of the total territory of Japan. Other studies in the early 1970s suggested that 400 nuclear weapons would be sufficient to kill half or perhaps even the entire Japanese population. On the other hand, even with damage inflicted on 1,000 cities by nuclear weapons targeted at China, it was estimated that somewhere in the region of 11 percent of China’s entire population would be killed.

As a result of these factors, the report concluded that the cost for Japan’s nuclearization would be too high.

The Japanese Government’s Response

While Japanese scholars were paying much attention to China’s first nuclear test, the Japanese government’s reaction was quite muted. Government statements were more cautious than those of the United States, Australia, and the Soviet Union. After the test, the chief cabinet secretary issued a statement of regret, but not condemnation. At the same time, however, the Japanese government clearly stated that Japan’s peace and security would be in no way affected so long as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty continued to exist. On top of this, the Japanese government sought further assurances from the United States, in addition to the Security Treaty of 1960. Article 5 of the treaty obliges the United States to come to the aid of Japan’s defense, but the wording is not as committed as that under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides a clear expression of the obligations of NATO members under the collective principle of self-defense. Rather, Article 5 of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan reads:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

China’s nuclear test in October 1964 did alarm the Japanese government, as China was the first developing state to join the exclusive “nuclear club.” In order to reduce the anxiety among the Japanese population, U.S. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato issued a joint communiqué in January 1965. Article 8 of the Communiqué read, “…the President reaffirmed the United States’ determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside.” The word “any armed attack” was regarded by the Japanese as the first explicit statement of the U.S. obligation to defend Japan with both conventional and nuclear forces. This pledge was reaffirmed on several occasions through subsequent joint communiqués issued by the two governments, such as those of November 1967 and November 1969, as well as the comments by U.S. President Nixon and his Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. On his visit to Japan in September 1970, Laird confirmed the U.S. offer by stating that the United States was committed to use “all types of weapons” for the defense of Japan under the 1960 Security Treaty. Japan’s first White Paper on Defense, which was published in 1970, quoted Laird’s statement as confirmation of U.S. readiness to come to Japan’s defense.

After the 1965 Joint Communiqué, Sato confirmed his statement with the U.S. president by stating that as long as a U.S. nuclear deterrent remained viable, no country would dare to attack Japan. Therefore, since the mid-1960s, even the slightest change of this government line has caused political chaos in Japan. For example, a public statement in February 1966, by a senior MOFA official, Takezo Shimoda, that Japan was not under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, caused panic within the ministry. Two days later, Shimoda’s statement was replaced by the “unified viewpoint” of MOFA, which emphasized the importance of U.S. nuclear deterrence in preventing total nuclear war. Thus, the conclusion was that Japan, as a U.S. ally, was protected by “the U.S. nuclear umbrella” in general terms.

In this context, repeated U.S. verbal assurances regarding Japan’s security played a crucial role for Japan in addressing the China threat of the late 1960s. The U.S. policy of nuclear retaliation for a conventional attack on Japan was expressed in 1970 by President Nixon: “…the nuclear capability of our strategic theater nuclear forces serve as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies.” In 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird further supported this position of coupling Japan’s conventional defense with U.S. strategic nuclear weapons by saying:
...our theater nuclear forces add to the deter-
rence of theater conventional wars in Europe
and Asia; potential opponents cannot be sure
that major conventional aggression would not
be met with the use of nuclear weapons. The
threat of escalation to strategic nuclear war re-
ains a part of successful deterrence at this
level.69

By the time the strategic analysis portion of the 1968/
70 Report was completed in January 1970, the United
States, at Japan’s urging, had significantly strengthened
its security guarantees as a counter to China’s growing
nuclear capabilities. The 1968/70 Report firmly endorsed
the path of reliance upon the United States that the Japa-
nese government had chosen, an approach, which as noted
above had been reinforced two months before the report’s
completion by President Nixon’s statement of November
1969 and would be further buttressed by the declaration
of U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in September
1970.

From the end of the World War II, the Japanese gov-
ernment was clearly aware of the potential benefits of an
early Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Initially, however, in
exchange for the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty
of 1951, in which Japan regained its post-war independ-
ence, Japan was forced to accept the U.S. request not
to recognize the government of the People’s Republic of
China.70 For Japan, eventual rapprochement was consid-
ered essential, not only for the security of Japan, but also
for the peace of Asia.71 Thus, the government did not
wish to publicly emphasize the China threat, fearing it might
harden China’s posture. This cautious attitude was reflected
in the statement of Nakasone, the new JDA director at the
time. In April 1970, at the Lower House Budget Com-
mittee, Nakasone stated that even if China developed
nuclear missiles, Japan did not believe that China intended
to invade Japan. Japan did not, according to Nakasone,
see China as an actual threat.72 The Japanese government
seemed convinced that adherence to the Security Treaty
of 1960 would be the best option. This was especially so
in light of the increased mutual understanding between
the United States and Japan, as was witnessed in the re-
version of Okinawa to Japan in 1972—a year often de-
scribed as “the culmination of a friendly relationship.”73

Although the efforts of Japanese leaders to obtain reaf-
firmation of U.S. security guarantees make clear that they
perceived China as an increasing threat after the 1964 test,
their official pronouncements on Japan’s relationship with
China took a more cautious tone.74 Since 1945, it has
been Japan’s policy not to define China even as a “poten-
tial” adversary, since Japan must live with China as a neigh-
bor. But more importantly, the key factor remained Japan’s
alliance with the United States. At the time the 1968/70
Report was written, the United States deployed robust con-
tentional forces in Asia and enjoyed nuclear predominance
in the world, and understanding between the United States
and Japan increased, which was considered the key ele-
ment of the stable bilateral security relationship.

CURRENT POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF NUCLEARIZATION

The above analysis suggests that the potential costs and
benefits of Japan’s possible nuclearization have not dras-
tically changed since the late 1960s. It seems highly un-
likely that Japan would resort to a reversal of its
non-nuclear weapons policy as long as the policy contin-
ues to be underpinned by two major factors: (1) the Japa-
nese public’s anti-nuclear sentiment; and (2) the

In other words, Japan’s non-nuclear weapons policy
has been implemented through the government’s efforts
to strike the right balance between idealism (stemming
from the domestic political situation) and realism (stem-
ning from the regional security environment). This is not
to say that there has been no change in the security envi-
ronment since the writing of the 1968/70 Report. Japan’s
anti-nuclearism has been gradually waning since the late
1960s, and, in recent years, more assertive, realist Japa-
nese voices have been heard among the younger genera-
tion. Still, it is difficult to foresee a complete disappearance
of anti-nuclear sentiment from Japanese society. This
emotion is deeply embedded in Japan’s post-1945 culture
and has certainly played a role as the main constraining
factor in the debate over Japan’s nuclearization. To over-
look this cultural factor would be to miss a vital aspect of
the domestic debate in Japan. However, it must be noted
here that there remain limits to the utility of this single
factor in explaining all dimensions of Japan’s non-nuclear
weapons policy, as suggested by the 1968/70 Report. Un-
armed neutrality without nuclear weapons, the sheer ex-
pression of Japan’s idealism, has never been a practically
viable security policy for Japan, due to the international
power politics that exist in Northeast Asia as well as Japan’s
geostrategic importance in the region.

What, then, did the 1968/70 Report reveal about any
potential benefits Japan could reap in developing nuclear
weapons? The only perceived benefit of a nuclear Japan would be less dependence on the United States; Japan would not have to be the “little brother” any longer. This issue of national pride was expressed not only in the 1968/70 Report, but also by the then recently retired Minister of Trade and Industry, Kiichi Miyazawa (who later became prime minister), during an interview in December 1971, in the aftermath of President Nixon’s unilateral overtures to China:

Recent events have been influenced by distinctions between “first-rate” and “second-rate” nations, using nuclear capabilities and atomic stockpiles as yard-sticks. There is already a body of opinion in Japan which feels that dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella is basically incompatible with our national sovereignty. When the coming generations assume a greater role in the society, they may want to choose the lesser of the two evils and opt to build their own umbrella instead of renting their neighbor’s, if only to satisfy their desire to be their own masters. This may become likelier as time passes and memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki recede.75

While national pride is regarded as the only benefit of Japan’s nuclearization by some Japanese,76 the costs of Japan’s nuclearization—economically, militarily, and above all, politically—have overridden these considerations, as has been acknowledged by successive governments. As suggested by the 1968/70 Report, for the foreseeable future, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be detrimental to Japan’s national interests.

In addition to Japan’s domestic political costs mentioned earlier, international costs must be taken into consideration. First, Japan’s nuclearization would likely trigger a severe regional arms race, resulting in the deterioration of the stable international environment Japan deems essential for its position as a trading state without indigenous natural resources.77 Securing a stable international environment, therefore, has been considered a crucial security policy priority for Japan.78 A nuclear Japan would be perceived as a serious threat by various states in the Asia-Pacific region, where there are already numerous sources for a potential arms race. Regional territorial disputes include the Spratley Islands, Takeshima Island (between South Korea and Japan), the Senkaku Islands (between China and Japan), and the four northern islands off Hokkaido (between Russia and Japan). Also, the situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense, though some improvement in the last two years has occurred. Unlike Europe, there is no multilateral security scheme in the Asia Pacific where these issues can be aired. Some efforts to create confidence-building measures in the region, such as the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in 1993, are still in their formative stages as far as security functions are concerned.

Second, and more fundamentally, there is little doubt that a nuclear Japan would severely harm the U.S.-Japanese relationship, as emphasized by the 1968/70 Report.79 The importance of this bilateral relationship, not only for Japan’s security but also for the security of the entire region, cannot be overemphasized. The role of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance has been a mixture of defending Japan as well as containing Japan’s resurgence as a great military power, to put a “cap on the bottle” so to speak.80 In the face of increasing military assertiveness by China in the latter half of the 1990s, U.S. engagement in the region has become even more significant. On one hand, it serves as an alliance against uncertainty (i.e., to deter unexpected chaos in Asia); on the other, it serves to promote regional cooperation. This dual role of U.S. ED—to both protect and to contain Japan—has been critical since the inception of the treaty between the two states. This is why, as emphasized by the 1968/70 Report, the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Japanese relationship is so important. If the U.S. security commitment was seen to be declining drastically, especially if there was a parallel deterioration in the regional security environment, the pressures on Japan to reconsider nuclearization as an instrument of ensuring national security would likely increase. The importance of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship with regard to Japan’s non-nuclear policy cannot be overemphasized. So far, this relationship has indeed allowed Japan to reject nuclearization; at the same time, the idealist crusade for the abolition of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, “makikomare ron,” has not been successful.

As a final note, it should be mentioned that the concept of extended deterrence, as applied to Japan, is often misunderstood both abroad and in Japan, as suggested by the 1968/70 Report. Domestically, those who argue against the U.S. nuclear umbrella typically do not completely comprehend the concept. An effective nuclear deterrent greatly depends on the uncertainty in the mind of the potential aggressor (the deteree) regarding the consequences of aggression. Therefore, to argue whether Japan, protected
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, desires the umbrella or not is irrelevant, as emphasized by the 1968/70 Report.

Two distinct arguments against U.S. ED exist within Japan. The nationalists claim that the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not fully guarantee the security of Japan and that, therefore, Japan must develop its own nuclear forces. The idealists, on the other hand, place emphasis on the immorality of nuclear weapons per se from the victim perspective and oppose U.S. ED in that light. However, due to Japan’s geostrategic importance, it naturally played a significant role as a base for U.S. global strategy during the Cold War. It was not Japan that decided the status of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over its territory, but rather the United States itself. As emphasized by the 1968/70 Report, it was ultimately the United States which would make any decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons to protect Japan.

Underlying these misunderstandings about extended deterrence is an interesting cultural factor: the lack of opportunity in Japan to learn about nuclear issues, due to Japan’s traditional anti-nuclearism. Until the early 1990s, Japan was the only developed state where there were few courses on military strategy taught at higher educational institutions. Therefore, it has been difficult for the Japanese—both public and policymakers alike—to grasp a basic knowledge of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, which is commonly shared in other developed states. The memory of 1945 has created a culture of anti-nuclearism in Japan that continues to have enduring significance for discussions related to nuclear issues.

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2 In this article, “nuclearization” refers to Japan developing and/or acquiring nuclear weapons, rather than its nuclear power program (Japan depends upon nuclear energy for about 30 percent of total energy consumption).


4 Kenneth Waltz’s 1993 article in International Security is a typical example of this kind of argument. See: Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79.


6 Various academics and industry representatives in Japan have taken different sides in this debate over a nuclear-armed Japan. See, for example, Mataké Kamiya, “Kaijū no o koreku Kaka Busto ron,” Kokusai Mondai, No. 426 (September 1995), pp. 59-73; and Tetsuya Endo, “Answering the Nuclear-Armament Arguments,” Plutonium 31 (Autumn 2000), pp. 15-18.

7 Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994. For other works that refer to this article, see Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today 20 (July/August 2000), footnote 3, <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/julau00/japanjulau00.html>.


11 Former official of MOFA (name withheld by request), interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, January 1996 and January 1998.

12 Some MOFA officials deny any influence of the 1968/70 Report upon Japan’s actual security policymaking, as MOFA is the governmental agency responsible for such types of policy. Former officials of MOFA (names withheld by request), interviews by author, Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 to January 1998.

13 Former official of MOFA (name withheld by request), interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, December 1997.

14 A copy of the 1968/70 Report was given to the author by an original author of the 1968/70 Report. Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, January 1996.

15 Original author of the 1968/70 Report (name withheld by request), interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, January 1996.


18 Professor Hidetake Kabikana (one of the four authors of the 1968/70 Report), interview with the Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994.

19 After Japan signed the NPT in 1970, it took six years for Japan to ratify the treaty. This was mainly because the NPT involved a number of issues of great significance to Japan, and it was not easy for the centrist Japanese government to secure the national consensus for participation in the NPT, because of its far-reaching consequences. The main reason for the delay was that the NPT directly affected central areas of Japan’s industrial and security policies. All three key players in the Japanese political system—the political elite, bureaucrats, and the business-industrial community—were reluctant to let Japan become tied to the restrictions imposed under the treaty for 25 years, without having a clear picture of its implications. The problem caused by the prospect of Japan’s participation in the NPT were related to the following three issues: (1) nuclear disarmament; (2) the national security of non-nuclear weapons states; and (3) the equality factor among the members of the NPT with regard to the application of the safeguard inspections by the IAEA for the civil use of nuclear energy. For a detailed analysis of these factors, see: Eiichi Sato and Shuzo Kimura, The Okinawa Islands, at the southern tip of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, remained under U.S. jurisdiction even after a peace treaty was signed between the two states in 1951. The Japanese government accepted the presence of...
U.S. bases in Okinawa. After the territory reverted to Japanese control in 1972, yet understood that the bases be subject to the restrictions applied under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Additionally, Japan applied a ban on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese territory, in accordance with the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were not the result of a detailed deliberation in the Japanese domestic sphere, nor of consultations between the United States and Japan. In answering the questions asked by a member of the Socialist Party regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan at the National Diet in December 1967, the Japanese prime minister announced the principles.

For an analysis on the different political groups and their views regarding Japan’s national security, see Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthenum,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150.

Iituro Shimizu, Nippon yo Kokka tare: Kaka no Sentaku (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1980). More recently in October 1999, the then vice minister of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Shingo Nishimura, was forced to resign after making a comment favoring Japan’s development of nuclear weapons.

Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalisation,” International Organization 51 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is often seen as the major constraint on any possibility of Japan acquiring or developing nuclear weapons, yet there is no explicit provision against nuclear weapons possession.

This category. The opinion magazines, such as Sekai and Gunshaku Mondai, regularly feature anti-nuclear articles.

Yomiuri Shimbun, June 5, 1969, 2,311 Japanese adults (20-years old or older) were surveyed at random.


The Three Non-Nuclear Principles is one of the few post-1945 Japanese security policies where there is a clear consensus among the different political camps and a diverse cross section of the public. Even the center-right Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s, who once refused to recognize the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as kouke (the irreversible national policy) and merely referred to it as “an important policy” of the government, later gave in to the symbolic power it wielded, not only with the opposition political parties but also the Japanese public at large. The negative reaction to Prime Minister Nakasone’s statement, which came from the mass media and the Japanese public, forced him to publicly correct his views and apologize for his “lack of understanding.” See Asahi Shimbun, February 22, 1983.

According to the founder of the Four Nuclear Policies, Kei Wakaizumi, who was Prime Minister Sato’s political advisor, soon after the declaration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in December 1967, Sato realized the significant security implications they posed. Hence, by formulating the Four Nuclear Policies, he tried to emphasize that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles could only be maintained along with the other policies. Wakaizumi (1994), pp. 140-141.

The Yomiuri Shimbun, March 16, 1968.

Former officials of MOFA (names withheld by request), interview with the author, Tokyo, Japan, December 1997 to January 1998.


Yonosuke Nagai points out that Chinese leaders’ statements about a “paper tiger” were part of a well-calculated strategy to deny the credibility of U.S. or Soviet nuclear blackmail. See: Nagai, Heiwa no Daisho (24th edition) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1994), p. 50. For a general assessment regarding the assumption of the “rationality” of political leaders, see for example Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 204-209.

See, for example, Tomomi Okabe, “Hatashite Chugoku no Kyoi wa aruka?” Ushio (Spring 1968), pp. 15-21.


The Soviet cancellation of supplying a sample atomic bomb to China in 1959 is often regarded as the beginning of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. This confrontation led China to develop its “self-reliance” security policy. See for example, Alvin Goldstein, “Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China’s National Experience,” Security Studies 2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 213-255. If Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989 is considered as the end of the confrontation, the Sino-Soviet political confrontation lasted for 30 years, which was longer than the U.S.-China confrontation (1949-1972).


Ibid., pp. 13-14.

Ibid., pp. 20-25.


Buzan, Introduction to Strategic Studies, pp. 167-172.


Ibid., pp. 24-5.

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 18.

Yatabe, Kakuheiki Fukakusan Jyoyaku ron, p. 189.


A similar view is expressed by Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hosh o (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shim bun, 1997), pp. 219-221.


1968/70 Report argued that Japan's nuclearization would satisfy some nationalists for a short while, yet the costs would far exceed such a short-term gain. 1968/70 Report, Part 2, p. 28.

Ibid., pp. 24-5.

Japan considers its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing states as an important national strategy to promote and maintain a stable international environment, upon which Japan's national security as a "trading state" relies heavily.


Even within MOFA, political opinions have not always been unified. The idealists have regarded U.S. ED as either detrimental or not necessary. See Motofumi Asai, Hikaku no Nihon, Mukaku no Sekai (Tokyo: Rodo Kimpo sha, 1996); and Kumao Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 (March/ April 1996), pp. 46-51. Both are former members of MOFA.