**Report**

**Missile Messages:**
Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq

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In the early hours of April 18, 2001, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) launched an unknown number of unidentified surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) or artillery rockets at several Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK) camps in Iraq. This entity is also sometimes referred to as the Iran Mojahedin or the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The MKO, which the United States designates as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” has admitted to launching over a dozen mortar attacks around Tehran recently, part of efforts to overthrow Iran’s Islamic government. Since 1994, Iran’s actions against the MKO have included at least four missile attacks against the group’s bases in Iraq (see Appendix 1, a chronology of earlier attacks, at the end of this report), but the number of missiles allegedly used in this most recent event is unprecedented. Lingering uncertainties over the quantity and type of missiles used against the MKO raise questions about Iran’s intended message. On one level, Iran’s missile strikes can be seen as a direct retaliation for the MKO’s increased terrorist activities. On another level, the attacks, along with the responses from the MKO, Iraq, and the United States, raise broader concerns about the use of ballistic missiles and rockets as an acceptable means of solving political disputes.

Iran’s previous attacks on MKO bases have included no more than a handful of missiles and rockets. Reports on the most recent strikes in April, however, indicate that Iran fired anywhere from 44 to 77 missiles, identified by most sources as “Scud-B” surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 300 kilometers (km). Initial reports by the MKO said at least 44 missiles were “launched.” As the MKO did not have anyone at the launch sites, this figure is presumably based on the number of missiles that the MKO claims actually hit Iraqi territory. By its “final count,” issued April 20, 2001, the MKO claims that Iran fired 77 Scud-Bs on seven camps, cities, and towns in eastern and southern Iraq (see Map 1 and Table 1 for details). The details of the number and type of missiles launched remain ambiguous, perhaps because all three parties—Iran, Iraq, and the MKO—may wish to exaggerate the number of missiles that were used and claim that they were longer-range ballistic missiles rather than artillery rockets. The issue, therefore, is to understand the
### Map 1: April 18, 2001 Iranian Missile Attack, According to MKO Claims

![Map showing the locations of missile attacks in Iraq](https://example.com/map.jpg)

### Table 1: The Locations and Number of Missiles That Hit MKO Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of hits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Habib</td>
<td>45 km north of Basra</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anzali</td>
<td>near Jalula (or Jalawla), approximately 120 km northeast of Baghdad</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashraf</td>
<td>near Khalis, 110 km northeast of Baghdad</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiz (or Faizah)</td>
<td>near al-Kut, 172 km south of Baghdad</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alavi</td>
<td>near Miqdadiyah, approximately 115 km northeast of Baghdad</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homayun</td>
<td>near al-Amarah, 365 km south of Baghdad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
message each of the parties hopes to send by reinforcing this fiction.

RESPONSES FROM IRAN AND THE MKO

Iran has not disputed MKO claims that they did in fact use Scuds, but information from Tehran has been intentionally vague, as is characteristic when dealing with Iran’s missile designations, numbers, and related matters. In all cases, Iranian sources simply quote “facts” reported in foreign media. For example, the conservative Tehran daily, Kayhan, which covered the report on its front page, quoted three different sources with varying numbers of missiles used, the highest number standing at 66, as quoted from Israeli radio.3 By not denying the exorbitantly high number of Scuds used, the message Tehran sends to Iraq and other regional powers is clear: Iran has a very robust missile capability that may even surpass Iraq’s capabilities prior to the destruction of its long-range missiles after the Gulf War. In delivering this message, Iran assures itself of at least a tacit degree of parity with the advanced militaries of its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors and, additionally, warns Iraq that Tehran can fully respond to any aggression on the part of Baghdad.

The MKO likewise stands to gain by exaggerating the extent of the missile attack and by portraying Iran as the aggressor. As an opposition group with limited resources, the MKO perhaps wishes to portray itself as a greater threat to the Islamic Republic than it actually is. Therefore, it may encourage claims that in spite of Iran’s attack using 77 Scud-Bs, the organization not only survived, but promptly resumed its activities by retaliating. For example, just days after the missile attacks, the MKO reportedly blew up oil pipelines in the Dehloran region, clashed with IRGC forces, and launched mortar attacks on the border city of Qasr-e Shirin.4 The MKO response to Iran’s attacks was clear and direct—the missile strikes had little impact on the MKO mission to undermine Iran’s Islamic rule. Retaliation against Iran continued over a month after the missile strikes, including a May 23, 2001, rocket-propelled grenade attack against the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Tehran.5

The MKO was quick to cite Iran for violating international law and Iraq’s territorial sovereignty. Massoud Rajavi, President of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, stated that the attacks were in violation of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598, which called for ending the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The MKO therefore seeks to draw international condemnation of the missile attacks, further undermining the Iranian government. Rajavi also said the attacks were directly related to the upcoming presidential elections in Iran, which took place in June this year: “The scale of today’s missile attacks and the use of Scud missiles as weapons of mass destruction show that the mullahs’ [clerical] regime is determined to export crisis only weeks ahead of presidential elections.”6

THE IRAQI PERSPECTIVE

Meanwhile, Baghdad claims that Iran launched 56 Scuds and appears to be using the attack to paint Iraq as a victim of aggression at the hands of archenemy Iran. The Iraqi government, furthermore, alleged that Iran is working in cooperation with Saudi Arabia to promote the policies of the United States. The Iraqi newspaper Al-Qadisiyyah commented that Iran’s attacks on Iraqi territory were coordinated between Tehran and Riyadh and constituted part of the recently signed Iranian-Saudi security pact. This, accordingly, illustrated Iran’s “…readiness to serve American and Zionist schemes [against Iraq].”7 Affirming the same sentiments and alluding to Iran’s position as a chief military partner of the United States prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, Al-Iraq noted that Tehran’s actions were signals to the United States and Saudi Arabia that Iran hopes to reclaim its position as the “…policeman of the Gulf.”8 In protest to the Iranian attack, Iraq boycotted a conference of parliamentarians from Islamic countries that opened in Tehran on April 24, 2001.

By linking the attacks with the Iranian-Saudi security cooperation agreement, Baghdad probably hopes to generate support among the smaller Gulf states that might see a Riyadh-Tehran alliance as detrimental to their own security. In particular, the United Arab Emirates, which has a longstanding dispute with Iran over the ownership of three islets in the Persian Gulf, may regard Iraq as the only power willing to confront what Abu Dhabi views as Iranian expansionism in the region. This is especially true since the largest GCC member, Saudi Arabia, is currently forging stronger ties with Tehran.

Moreover, the Iraqi government views the attacks as an aggression and a direct threat to the tenuous ceasefire between the two countries. The state-run Iraqi News Agency quoted an unnamed government official as saying, “Iraq condemns this cowardly Iranian act of aggression, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the U.N. charter and the rules of international law. Iraq reserves...
the right to respond with the appropriate means and at the appropriate time.”

A Jordanian source quoted the warning of an Iraqi government spokesman, who reportedly stated that the authorities in Tehran “…should understand that such acts have led to the eight-year war [between Iraq and Iraq].” This statement echoes Iraqi responses to previous Iranian missile attacks against MKO bases. After a June 1999 attack, in which Iran reportedly launched four Scuds on MKO bases in Iraq, an Iraqi spokesman reported, “…this stupid aggressive act reminds us of the stupid and shortsighted acts that were practiced frequently by the Iranian regime 19 years ago, acts that led to war.” Iraq’s retaliatory rhetoric, however, has been louder than any actual military action, which has been limited to shooting down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the border region of Mandal, 400 km northeast of Baghdad, the day after the missile attacks.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

While statements from the MKO and Baghdad have been characteristically fierce, the United States has been silent on this issue. When asked about the rising tensions between Iran and Iraq, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Walker replied, “The escalating situation? Iraq had said there were Scuds. Well, this happens periodically.” In response to reports that Iraq shot down the Iranian UAV, U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said, “I don’t think we take sides on that one.” Likewise, Boucher stated that he was not aware of the possibility for a renewed conflict between the two countries.

The only U.S. criticism of Iran’s missile attacks against the MKO has come from nine American lawmakers who have sent private letters—one of which has been publicly released—to President George W. Bush, calling for an official condemnation of the attack. These include: Senators Mary Landrieu and Robert Torricelli; and Representatives Chris Cannon, William L. Clay, Sheila Jackson Lee, Nick Lampson, Sue Myrick, Edolphus Towns, and James Traficant. In his letter, Congressman Lampson said, “…it is vital that the United States respond promptly and lead an international condemnation of the Iranian government’s Scud missile attack.” He further urged President Bush “…to firmly denounce the unconscionable military action of the Iranian government and make every effort at the international level, including the United Nations Security Council, to prevent similar actions in the future.”

According to the MKO, these nine U.S. politicians are among 2,000 parliamentarians and other political and human rights figures from 24 countries who have issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s recent use of surface-to-surface missiles. The letter was signed by a number of politicians lacking executive power; thus, no reports indicate that any capital, other than Baghdad, has directly denounced Iran. The White House, despite personal letters to the president, has not issued any statements regarding the attack. The U.S. State Department’s most recent terrorism report (released just a few days after the missile attacks in April 2001), recognized Iran as the world’s “most active state sponsor of terrorism.” Iraq and the MKO are also included in the report as sponsors of terrorism. While all three parties remain on the U.S. terrorist list, Washington will be unlikely to encourage restraint by any of the parties against one another.

IRAN’S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MISSILE ATTACK

Iran hopes to downplay any suggestion by Baghdad that these attacks may constitute increased tension between the two countries. In a letter to the UNSC, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, stated “…these limited and appropriate operations were aimed at halting the attacks against Iran launched by the Munafeqin (“hypocrites” (a term used by Iran to describe the MKO)) with Baghdad’s support from inside Iraqi soil, but should not be interpreted as a measure against Iraq’s territorial integrity.”

Nejad-Hosseinian also stated that the attacks lasted for three hours and 15 minutes—from 4:15 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.—and were strictly defensive measures in response to MKO terrorist attacks on Iranian cities. Iran has previously notified the United Nations of MKO attacks against Iran and claims that its response was in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which allows for military actions for self-defense. Nejad-Hosseinian acknowledged that the Ashraf, Anzali, Faiz, Homayun, and Alavi camps were hit (see Map 1 above).

The letter also pointed out that, while Tehran wishes to establish cordial relations with Baghdad, it expects Iraq to respect its obligations under international law as well as Article 32, UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 687 (1991) and Article 3, UNSCR 949 (1994). Article 32 of UNSCR 687 requires that Iran “…not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its ter-
ry,” Article 3 of UNSCR 949 demands that “…Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbors or the United Nations operations…” in that country.

In informing the United Nations of the attacks, Nejad-Hosseini also emphasized that the Iranian attacks were “defensive” and appropriate under international law, and that Iraq’s violation of its obligations under the two aforementioned UNSCRs further justified the missile strikes. Meanwhile, the IRGC has taken a more confrontational approach, stating that the attacks were part of its determination to put an end to MKO terrorist activities. A senior IRGC officer, Brigadier-General Ahmad Kazemi, stated that Iran will continue attacking the MKO in Iraq “…until their full annihilation.”

One week after the strike, Iran’s Intelligence Minister Ali Younessi claimed that all of the terrorist MKO bases in Iraq had been destroyed: “[t]hose who survived the (recent missile) attacks fled their bases….The attacks were carrying an important message to the hypocrites (an allusion to the MKO’s [sic]) that Iran will not let MKO’s [sic] impede normalization of relations between her and her neighbors, especially Iraq.” Continued MKO attacks against Iran, however, indicate that the group remains active. As of late May, the MKO claimed to have carried out at least 25 operations against Iran in retaliation for the April 18 missile attacks.

THE SCUD QUESTION

None of the media, government, or other reports asserts that Iran used anything other than Scuds for its attack on MKO positions. However, the reported claims should be carefully evaluated in light of operational and other issues to determine their veracity. A logical first step is to determine if Iran was physically capable of launching that many missiles. As part of that assessment, recall Nejad-Hosseini’s statement that the strikes lasted three hours and 15 minutes, beginning at 4:15 a.m. and ending at 7:30 a.m. Also note a GCC report that asserts, “Iran was able to deploy 17 Scud launchers at the same time, far higher than previous assessments.”

Generally, once a Scud Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) arrives at a pre-surveyed location with a fueled missile, it takes about 20 minutes—or less with a well-trained crew—to erect the missile, rotate the launch table, and fire. This time does not include warhead mating and gyro installation, which usually occurs near the launch site. If a depot containing a store of fueled missiles was

available—which would seem likely—then additional time would be taken up by the short drive to a storage location, missile loading, and return to the launch site. If the IRGC indeed used 17 TELs, and the launches did in fact occur over the stated three hour and 15 minute period, then Iran’s missile forces would have to complete one launch approximately every 65 minutes (with the first launch occurring at time = zero). By this theoretical account, Iran might have been capable of launching some 60 or more Scuds.

However, operational theory does not always equate with reality. First, one must assume that fueled missiles, along with warhead mating and gyro installation crews, were located near the launch site. This is entirely possible, given that Iraq was unlikely to attack the launch sites during the operation, thereby significantly reducing force protection concerns that would require disbursement of precious assets. Moreover, it assumes that there were no launch failures, malfunctions, or other “normal” events requiring maintenance (such as umbilical replacement). Given reliability rates for such missiles—such as Iraq’s experience during the Gulf War—this is unlikely. It further assumes that the figure of 17 launchers cited by the GCC is correct. Finally, while 65 minutes is probably enough time to load and launch a missile, a window that narrow does not allow much margin for anything beyond a perfect operation.

The MKO claimed that the strikes were launched from the southwestern Iranian provinces of Kermanshahan, Ilam, and Khuzestan, all of which border the general vicinity of the MKO camps in Iraq (see Map 1). None of the MKO camps reportedly struck by Iranian missiles is farther than 100 km from the Iranian border. With an estimated 200 to 300 Scud-B SSMs and approximately 10 to 20 launchers, Iran had no logical reason to waste up to one third of its Scud-B arsenal on targets that could be hit with shorter-range and less expensive artillery rockets. The Scud-B is the second most potent ballistic missile in the Iranian arsenal after its 100 to 150 Scud-Cs. Iran is also developing the Shehab-3 missile, which would be its most advanced. Numbering 10 or 12 at most, the Shehab-3 has been flight-tested but is probably not yet fully operational.

Reports on casualties are also uncertain and do not equate with such a massive missile attack. The MKO says that nine Iraqi citizens and one MKO member were killed, along with an additional 25 hospitalized. Iraqi sources reported that six people were killed and an unidentified number injured. Initial Iranian reports, quoting “news
agencies,” indicated “…a number of the MKO members were killed or injured…and sections of their headquarters were destroyed.”28 The surprisingly low number of reported casualties further increases the likelihood that the type and number of missiles used has been exaggerated.

When considering logistics and launch procedures, the entire attack could have conceivably consisted of Scud-Bs, although in the end those claims are doubtful. Perhaps Iran used a few Scud-Bs to send a message that it has a more powerful punch to throw, if needed. Most likely, however, Iran used its indigenously produced Zelzal-1 rocket, which is based on the Russian Luna-M (FROG-7B) with a maximum range of 70 km, or the larger Neza’at-6 or Neza’at-10 rockets. Based on the information provided by Iran at the International Defense Exhibit (IDEX) earlier this year in Abu Dhabi, the Neza’at-6 and -10 are Iranian produced artillery rockets with ranges of 100 km and 125 km respectively.29

**IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN’S U.N. MISSILE PROPOSAL**

In the absence of any internationally negotiated treaty regarding the use or development of ballistic missiles, Iran feels it did no wrong in striking the MKO. This action, however, contradicts—at least in spirit—the Iranian-sponsored U.N. General Assembly Resolution 55/33A, which calls for the establishment of an international panel to assess “…the issue of missiles in all its aspects.”30 This resolution was the result of an earlier request by the 55th U.N. General Assembly calling on all member states to submit a report on item 74(h) addressing general and complete disarmament of missiles. The Report of the U.N. Secretary General on item 74(h) lists Iran as one of only seven countries (Bangladesh, India, Japan, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Kingdom) that responded to the original request. In its response, Iran proposed the creation of a panel of governmental experts to study missile related issues, which could include the following:

- a general assessment of existing development and production programs of various types of missiles worldwide;
- overall scientific and technical research regarding the quantitative development of missiles already deployed and plans for the development of new generations of missiles;
- efforts by states or groups of states to address the question of missiles, at both the regional and international levels;
- a study of state military doctrines and threat perceptions, and the role of missiles therein as a deterrent;
- a study of the views of civil society on the practicality of missiles; and
- the creation of possible general principles to govern voluntary confidence-building measures at the regional and global levels.31

Resolution 55/33A was passed in November 2000 by a margin of 97 to 0, with 65 member states abstaining, including the United States and all other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The first session of this panel is set to convene in New York from July 30 to August 3, 2001.

Notwithstanding U.S. abstention, the passage of Resolution 55/33A might contribute to stronger international efforts to curb the use of ballistic missiles. Iran, however, is an unlikely candidate to lead any missile control efforts. The political rather than the practical nature of this resolution is evident, as Tehran was careful not to suggest limiting research and development of missile technologies, a capability of which Iran is unabashedly proud. In expressing its views concerning missiles in response to a request of all member states by the U.N. Secretary General, Iran stated: “[i]t might not be necessary to automatically take the stereotypical path of negotiating a convention banning missile development and proliferation.”32

Given Iran’s increasing reliance on missiles as both an offensive weapon and a primary deterrent, it is unlikely that Tehran would sign on to any missile control treaty proposed by a panel of experts at the United Nations or any other international attempt to promote a comprehensive missile control regime. Coming on the heels of Iran’s test of its 1,300-kilometer-range Shehab-3 missile, Resolution 55/33A seems little more than an Iranian attempt to deflect mounting criticism over its own ballistic missile program. Paired with the use (or at the very least, no denial of the use) of Scud missiles to attack the MKO, Iran’s calls for an international panel to assess the missile issue are all the more dubious.

Iran’s response to the U.N. Secretary General’s call also included an oblique reference to theater and national missile defense systems: “[t]he recent ambitious and yet defying programmes, such as anti-satellite and/or anti-ballistic systems, have introduced new and emerging challenges. These would but instigate a new arms race, in particular in outer space, and as such could certainly be regarded as a disservice to the long-standing and arduous disarmament
efforts.” With missile defense becoming an increasingly polemic issue, Iran’s suggestion to include the item on the panel’s agenda is valid and clearly a barely veiled criticism of the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) plans. Again, however, Iran’s actions against the MKO undercut its suggestions to the United Nations. The missile attacks on the MKO reflect part of Iran’s ever-increasing reliance on missiles as a means of solving crises. Consequently, other countries in the region may see the growing threat of Iran’s missiles as fuel for increasing their own missile arsenals and/or opting for various means of missile defense systems.

Washington has consistently deemed Iran to be one of the most significant ballistic missile threats warranting the development of NMD. Thus far, the U.S. defense establishment has not linked the MKO attack to the broader threat of ballistic missiles. However, in her letter to President Bush, Congresswoman Myrick does just that: “[w]hile missile defense is in the forefront, I am requesting that you support the condemnation of the Iranian government’s recent acts of terrorism and intimidation.”

In maintaining its silence on this attack, Washington may view the use of missiles against a terrorist organization as a legitimate act of self-defense. However, by not responding, the United States is conspicuously refraining from discouraging Iran from using and developing these weapons—a scenario that has obvious implications for the U.S. rationale for missile defense.

Whether Iran used 77 Scud-Bs to attack MKO bases in Iraq or not, the world—with the exception of limited protests by some lawmakers and human rights figures—appears to have accepted Iran’s right to confront MKO terrorists in the same manner that the United States has at times dealt with suspected terrorist camps in the region. If the international community is serious about controlling the spread of missiles as a tool for settling political disputes, a reevaluation of how these weapons are used and classified must be made.

When introducing the draft of what became Resolution 55/33A, Mohammad Hassan Fadaifard, Iran’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, stated that the question of missiles is a global issue and, therefore, must have a global answer. The 2001 summer panel may be the first step in this process. Iran, as the sponsor of Resolution 55/33A, must answer for this attack against the MKO. The facts must be clarified. Otherwise, the implicit approval of this substantial missile strike could erode the panel’s credibility and weaken international efforts to control these weapons. If not addressed, the likelihood increases that the indiscriminate missile attacks that took place during the Iran-Iraq War will be repeated with much ferocity in future conflicts in the Middle East.


15 Letter dated May 2, 2001, from Congressman Nick Lampson to President George W. Bush [authors’ files].


19 “Details of Iran’s Missile Attack,” Kayhan.


23 “Iran Impresses Neighbors With Missile Capability.”

24 Specific Iranian doctrine concerning missile launches, proximity of fueling, warhead mating, launching and other sites is not available publicly.

25 Note that “fueled” does not include Tonka loading, which occurs at a certain point during erection of the missile.

26 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, “Statement No. 5: Final Count of Missiles Fired.”
27 “Iraq Will Not Attend Islamic Conference in Iran,” *Gulf News*.
29 See *Missile Systems of the World* (Bremerton, WA: AMI International, 1999), p. 426. The Neza’at-6 has a range of 115 km and the Neza’at-10 has a range of 150 km.
31 United Nations General Assembly, “General and Complete Disarmament: Missiles, Addendum,” A/55/116/Add.1, August 11, 2000, p. 3. In the original report of the U.N. Secretary General on Item 74(h) dated July 6, 2000, only five states had responded. Addendum 1 includes responses from Bangladesh and Iran.
33 Ibid.
34 Letter from Congresswoman Sue Myrick to President George W. Bush [authors’ files].
Appendix 1: Chronology of Previous Iranian Missile Attacks on MKO Bases in Iraq

November 6, 1994
The MKO reports that at least three Scuds hit Camp Ashraf in eastern Iraq, and that Iran has nine more missiles ready for launch. In addition, the MKO claims that at least eight explosions were heard coming from the camp. U.S. officials assert that Iran fired at least one Scud, but are skeptical of the MKO report. According to the MKO, the U.S. State Department gave the green light for the missile attack.1

November 9, 1994
According to the MKO, Iran fired at least three more Scuds at unnamed MKO bases, the second attack in four days. The MKO reports that the missiles were launched from sites near Kermanshah, Iran, and that nine missiles remain ready to be fired.2

June 10, 1999
Iraq and the MKO claim that at around 8:30 p.m., three Scud-B missiles landed on Camp Ashraf, 110 km northeast of Baghdad. One other Scud allegedly exploded in mid-air. The MKO states that Iran launched the Scuds from the western city of Bakhtaran, approximately 700 km away. No fatalities are reported, but the MKO declares that some Iraqi civilians were injured. Iran denied launching the missiles, but reliable sources say the attacks were likely to avenge the recent MKO assassination of the Deputy Commander in Chief of Iran’s Armed Forces. Middle East International reported, experts say that Iran probably used a home-made Scud-type missile against the Ashraf camp.3

November 2, 1999
The MKO alleges that Iran fired an undisclosed number of Scuds at Camp Habib, 45 km north of Basra. One report claims that five people were killed. Another reported that seven were killed, including one Iraqi soldier; and 78 were injured, including 24 Iraqi soldiers. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the attacks, saying, no missile was fired from Iranian soil to Iraq.4

November 9, 1999
The MKO asserts that Iraq launched an undisclosed number of Scuds on Camp Habib, and that five were killed and 78 wounded. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated, Iran has not executed any military operations on Iraqi soil. [Note: this may be the same attack that was reported on November 2, 1999].5

5 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), November 11, 1999.