The success of the current nonproliferation regimes covering nuclear, missile, and advanced dual-use technologies depends greatly on continued cooperation between Russia and the United States. In the mid-1990s, these remain the two strongest military powers and the two countries with the broadest range of geopolitical interests. Within this context, debates over theater missile defense (TMD) have become an important part of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. Although the two nations have agreed in principle that missile defense is needed to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles, they have not agreed as to which specific weapons can legitimately be deployed under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It is possible that differences over theater missile defenses could sour Russian-U.S. relations sufficiently to undermine cooperation on a range of proliferation issues.

This essay first presents arguments supporting a link between nonproliferation policies and theater defenses. It then analyzes evolving Russian views on the subject, which have at times agreed with and at times clashed with official U.S. policies. The essay concludes with some cautions about the possible implications for non-proliferation policy if a wider rift develops on theater defenses.

NONPROLIFERATION AND GREAT POWER MILITARY RIVALRY

Today, multinational nonproliferation efforts rest on the assumption that the successors of the Cold War superpowers (United States, Russia) and the other nuclear powers (Britain, France, and China) share an interest in preventing the spread of weapons that could upset regional or global stability. The great powers are expected to abide by multinational export control arrangements and encourage other nations to support them. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were original signatories of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. France acceded to the NPT in 1992. All four countries are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—including Russia since August 1995—and of the December 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (the COCOM-successor regime). China has acceded to the NPT and has stated that it abides by the MTCR, although it is not clear how Beijing interprets these obligations.¹

National military considerations, however, have always influenced how the great powers approach the nonproliferation regimes. For example, the Soviet Union supported the NPT and its implementing organizations at least in part because several potential nuclear weapon states were Western-oriented nations ranged around Soviet borders. They included Israel, Pakistan, Taiwan, and South Korea as well as (in the Soviet view) Germany and Japan. One could also argue that the consistent U.S. effort to limit nuclear weapons in the Middle East and South Asia has been intended to support long-standing U.S. security interests in those areas, as well as to strengthen regional and international stability.

More recently, U.S. and Russian disagreement over Russia’s export of ballistic missile technology to India (prohibited by the MTCR) grew out of Washington’s desire to preserve at least a tenuous military balance between India and Pakistan, which conflicted with Moscow’s wish to maintain close military relations with New Delhi (as well as to profit from the sale of advanced weapons). There have been U.S.-Russian differences over Russian sale of conventional arms and nuclear technology to Iran and over the degree to which

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the North Korean nuclear weapon program threatens stability in Northeast Asia. At the April 1996 meeting of members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Russia disagreed sharply and unexpectedly with its fellow members about procedures for mutual notification of proposed arms sales. Similar tensions have arisen between Russia and the United States over theater missile defenses. Nonproliferation analysts and policymakers have a stake in this issue because—if effective—theater missile defenses could help bolster multinational nonproliferation efforts (as well as to protect troops in the field). At the same time, however, future U.S.-Russian disagreements in this sphere could undercut cooperation on a range of nonproliferation issues.

**DEVELOPMENT OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES**

Like the MTCR, theater missile defenses can be seen as a response to the global proliferation of increasingly capable missile systems. These defenses are intended both to deter the further acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles and to protect U.S., NATO, and potentially Russian forces in regional security operations that are threatened by such weapons.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union transferred Scud-Bs (with a range of 280 kilometers) to Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. When the Soviets restricted their sales in the 1980s, China and North Korea began to export Scuds and longer-range missiles and helped establish missile manufacturing lines in Egypt, Iran, and Iraq. Iraq modified the Scuds it received from the Soviet Union and North Korea to produce the 600-kilometer range Al-Hussein, used against Tehran in the Iran-Iraq War and against Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf War. North Korea is developing the No-dong and Taepo-dong series, with ranges from 1,000 to a possible 3,500 kilometers. These missiles can be made more accurate by incorporating digitized maps based on data gathered by Western commercial satellites, as well as by using real-time guidance from civilian signals of the U.S. Global Positioning System and the Russian GLONASS satellite system. According to the March 1996 Department of Defense (DOD) annual report, theater missile defense is an “essential element of DOD’s approach to countering risks posed by NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons delivered by cruise and ballistic missiles.” The report states that missile defense programs “complement and strengthen the prevention and deterrence” provided by nonproliferation arrangements such as the NPT and MTCR. It argued furthermore that these programs “reduce the incentives for proliferators to develop, acquire, or use ballistic missiles and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] by reducing the chances that an attack would inflict serious damage on U.S. or allied targets.” Theater missile defenses are also mentioned in the section on “combating the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction and missiles” in President Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy. According to that document, the United States has “vigorous and highly effective theater missile defense development programs designed to protect against conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”

Operationally, the highest U.S. priority in 1996 has been stated as meeting “the here-and-now threat of theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles against U.S. forward-deployed troops and bases.” Among Western systems, the most important “lower tier” programs, which defend small areas or “critical assets,” are the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3, an advanced version of the Patriot that saw service in Desert Storm, and the projected U.S.-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The U.S. military services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) also are working on three “upper tier” systems that are necessary to defend wide areas and to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. But these systems raise potential difficulties for international cooperation in nonproliferation because they are provoking disagreement between the United States and Russia over compliance with the ABM Treaty.

The first upper tier system—the Army’s Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)—is intended to protect an area several hundred kilometers across against a missile with a range of 600 kilometers (like the Al-Husseins used by Iraq in the Gulf War). Farther in the future, the Navy’s Sea-Based Upper Tier Defense (also known as Wide Area Defense) would allow warships in the eastern Mediterranean Sea or the southern Persian Gulf to protect cities in Israel or in Saudi Arabia against similar strikes. Finally, the Air Force’s programs for Boost Phase Interceptors would place weapons on aircraft or on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from which they would be fired to stop enemy missiles shortly after launch. (These weapons might be pow-
ered by advanced liquid fueled thrust-on-demand propulsion technology.) Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall has said with respect to one of these prospective systems: “Some have called the airborne laser the most revolutionary advance in warfighting technology in 40 years.” Secretary Widnall notes the airborne laser’s implications for missile proliferation by stating that the “potential of a silent, very long-range, speed-of-light weapon in the theater air defense environment is staggering.”

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

The United States also has discussed common theater missile defense strategies and embarked on cooperative theater missile defense programs with allied and friendly nations in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. NATO’s “new strategic concept” of November 1991 declares that “the buildup of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies” in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East includes “weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the alliance.” The strategic concept states that combating such weapons will require “complementary approaches, including, for example, export control and missile defenses.” The U.S. DOD and the British Ministry of Defence have been examining whether the British Starstreak missile can be fired from fighter aircraft or UAVs to attack hostile ballistic missiles just after launch. A November 1994 report of the Western European Union (WEU) states that Europe “must acquire an anti-missile defense system as soon as possible” and urges “a clear policy on the part of the WEU for the antimissile defense of Europe with the help of the United States.”

In March 1996, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said the proliferation of WMD and missiles to the Middle East and North Africa will soon threaten Europe and, a few years later, the United States. She stated that NATO provided the “best available mechanism for coordinating the contribution of America’s allies to a global system of ballistic missile defense.”

Henri Conze, Director of France’s Defense Procurement Agency from mid-1993 until March 1996, wrote in 1995 that in the future Europe could be threatened by nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles based in Russia (“should political power fall into hostile hands”) and in several countries that are not declared nuclear powers. Conze called upon the European nations to increase their present military cooperation, press forward with joint European-U.S. programs like MEADS, and develop “antimissile defense systems” that are “interoperable” with those of the United States. MEADS is the largest U.S.-European program to address post-Cold War dangers.

The United States funds most of Israel’s Arrow missile defense system, which is designed to protect cities. Moreover, Israel (like Britain) is working with the BMDO on using UAVs to fire missiles to destroy enemy weapons in their boost phase. The United States is discussing Patriot, THAAD, and sea-based defenses with Japan and a series of missile defense issues with South Korea and Taiwan.

Some nonproliferation analysts see the emphasis on theater missile defenses as part of a disturbing trend. For instance, Leonard Spector is troubled by what he calls “neo-nonproliferation,” which assumes that the “diffusion of technology has made it increasingly difficult to arrest proliferation” and therefore that “military planning must be undertaken now to meet the all-too-possible emergence of new nuclear foes (and to deal with potential adversaries already possessing other advanced weapons).” In Spector’s judgment, these assumptions tend to minimize the proven successes of the “traditional concept of nonproliferation” and hence threaten to discourage diplomatic efforts to slow proliferation.

Most Western governments, however, maintain that nonproliferation diplomacy and military planning reinforce one another. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration has seen any contradiction between strengthening the nonproliferation regimes (by updating control lists, for example) and deploying the military systems needed to protect Western forces against weapons and technologies that may evade export controls, or that may be developed indigenously in certain Third World countries. The NATO strategic concept and the increasing number of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and programs on theater missile defense show that U.S. allies and friends tend to agree.
HISTORIC U.S. AND RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES OVER MISSILE DEFENSE

A few nations do not accept the position of the U.S and Western governments on theater missile defense. These nations include Russia, China, and North Korea.

China and North Korea have both criticized U.S. proposals to deploy missile defenses to protect Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. North Korea’s objections must be taken in the context of Pyongyang’s consistent challenges to international norms on nuclear and missile proliferation. The irony of this position has been captured by Fred Ikle, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former Under Secretary of Defense. In his recent warning of the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation, Ikle notes: “Perhaps a nuclear-armed North Korea or some other aficionado of strategic stability will soon claim an entitlement under the ABM Treaty to unobstructed flight paths for its missiles.” China’s position on theater missile defenses should be taken more seriously. China may come to rival the United States and Russia in military strength, and it has moved somewhat closer to the Western view of nonproliferation in the past 10 years. Hence Beijing’s entire approach to strategic offensive and defensive weapons (not just to possible U.S. deployments in Asia) deserves careful analysis. The present essay, however, is limited to the differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches to theater missile defenses because in the mid-1990s, these are the two most important states for the creation of a post-Cold War international security system and for the success of multinational nonproliferation efforts.

During the arms control negotiations of the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union opposed deployment of significant ballistic missile defenses. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I (1969-1972) the Soviets accepted the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, which placed some limits on the Soviet buildup of intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), in exchange for U.S. approval of the ABM Treaty. A decade later, the Soviet Union consistently criticized the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). For example, Pravda responded to President Ronald Reagan’s March 1983 announcement of the SDI by stating that this U.S. defensive program was being “coordinated” with a buildup of offensive weapons with the goal of “completing the deployment of the so-called first-strike potential in the 1980s.”

At the beginning of the 1990s, however, both superpowers appeared to shift their strategic perspectives in a way that afforded a role to missile defenses. During the Persian Gulf crisis of late 1990, Soviet analyst Sergei Blagovolin of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations distinguished between two types of strategic defenses. Blagovolin restated the Soviet government’s long-term position that “creation of an SDI system designed for use in a superpower conflict will undermine strategic stability.” But he added: “On the other hand, I do not think that an SDI system designed exclusively to guard against the threat of nuclear blackmail by other regimes would have even the slightest negative effect on the superpower strategic balance.” After the Gulf War Soviet (and then Russian) commentators acknowledged the United States’ right to use Patriot missiles to protect coalition forces against Iraqi Scuds.

The apparent change in Soviet perspective coincided with the Bush administration’s decision to replace plans to defend the United States against a large-scale Soviet missile attack (SDI) with the concept of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The new approach was intended to protect the United States, U.S. forces abroad, and U.S. allies in case of an accidental launch by a major nuclear power or a deliberate strike (or threat of a strike) by a potential rogue state. The proposal was meant to recognize the reduced Soviet threat and the possibility of moving towards a more cooperative relationship with Moscow on future efforts to deal with missile proliferation threats.

In January 1992, at the United Nations, Russian President Yeltsin called for a multinational Global Protection System (GPS). At the Washington Summit of June 1992, Yeltsin and Bush discussed the “potential benefits of a Global Protection System (GPS) against ballistic missiles,” particularly for protection against “limited ballistic missile attacks.” The two presidents stated that their nations “should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.”

In January 1993, the Bush administration proposed a follow-on plan to the GPS agreement reached at the Washington summit. The proposal was designed to engage U.S. allies by sharing U.S. technology, exper-
tise, and early warning data, while working to build an international, anti-missile system. Following George Bush’s defeat in the November presidential election, however, U.S. policy shifted with the incoming Clinton administration from global missile defenses to an emphasis on regional threats and stand-alone theater systems. As Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated in early 1993, the United States was moving its missile defense emphasis “away from space-based, exotic technology weapons” to the more pressing mission of acquiring “land-based missile defense systems.” In late 1993, a nongovernmental U.S.-Russian report prepared “in close and frequent consultation with senior officials and military officers” in both defense establishments said: “It makes sense to explore in common the interests of the United States and Russia in the possible development of, and cooperation on, future air and missile defenses and associated warning systems.”

This evolving joint concern about missile proliferation has led Russia and the United States to try to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between theater-range missile defenses (which are permitted) and strategic-range missile defenses (which are not permitted). The negotiations have shown that even though the two nations agree that missile proliferation justifies missile defense, they disagree over which weapons should be allowed. The United States and Russia have different views about theater missile defense because they have different views about the military challenges that they face.

DIFFERENT U.S. AND RUSSIAN APPROACHES TO ABM TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

The United States maintains that it needs theater missile defenses primarily to protect U.S. and NATO peacekeeping forces. In late 1993, the Clinton administration proposed to the Russian side a definition for missile defense that would have allowed development and deployment of the THAAD, Sea-Based Upper Tier Defense, and Boost Phase Interceptors (described above). Defense Department statements have indicated that the United States believes that proper combinations of such systems would allow NATO peacekeeping forces to defeat any foreseeable attack by ballistic missiles from a Third World nation.

Throughout the negotiations, the United States has argued that theater missile defense must be understood primarily in terms of the post-Cold War problem of proliferation. According to press reports, for instance, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch signed an internal memorandum in February 1995 which stated: “The 1972 ABM Treaty does not conform with either the changed geopolitical circumstances or the new technological opportunities of today.” In terms similar to those of the Soviet analyst Blagovolin, the Deutch memorandum also said: “We should not be reluctant to negotiate treaty modifications that acknowledge the new realities, provided we retain the essential stabilizing purpose of the treaty.”

Russia, by contrast, seems to approach the negotiations primarily from the standpoint of its strategic nuclear posture vis-a-vis the United States. The programs that Washington has presented as necessary to defend U.S. and NATO forces involved in regional conflicts apparently are perceived by important groups in Moscow as unilateral attempts to tilt the U.S.-Russian nuclear balance toward the United States. From this point of view, loosening the currently observed constraints of the ABM Treaty would permit the United States to exploit its advantages in dual-use technologies critical to missile defense. Advanced theater missile defenses could contribute to a national missile defense system that would strengthen Washington’s overall strategic position.

Under the most pessimistic Russian assumptions, the Sea-Based Upper Tier Defense (if assisted by space-based sensors) might be used to detect and destroy strategic, as well as theater-range missiles. Boost Phase Interceptors might be used to strike Russian missiles in their silos.

This suspicious Russian attitude toward theater missile defenses mirrors the increasingly uneasy nature of Russian-U.S. relations since the early hopes of 1992. It has been reinforced by growing national assertiveness within Russia and, to a degree, by the U.S. Congress’s efforts to speed deployment of upper tier theater missile defenses and of national missile defenses. In May 1995, Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe and an advisor to Yeltsin, stated that the U.S. proposal to deploy theater missile defenses may lead to another technological arms race and that “like NATO [expansion], it feels destabilizing.” According to an unofficial but widely noted “alternative” military doctrine developed within the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense in 1995, “U.S. plans to create a ‘tactical antiballistic missile defense system’” were “essentially yet another attempt to slip in the Strategic
Defense Initiative idea through the back door”; this “constitute[d] a significant threat to strategic stability in the world....”27 Several members of the Russian Duma have said that the body will not ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, which was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996, until the question of deployments under the ABM Treaty is solved satisfactorily for Russia. For example, Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to the United States and chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, said in January 1996 that Russia would insist on “an undeviating and strict observance” of the ABM Treaty.28 It is clear that there will be no vote on ratification of START II until after the presidential elections of June-July 1996.

A second factor influencing Moscow’s approach to theater missile defense is that Russian military writings increasingly indicate the belief that Russia and the West are engaged in an inevitable and long-term competition in military technology.

For instance, the official military doctrine that was adopted in November 1993 contains at least two references to the capability of long-range conventional weapons to attack Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, early warning system, and command and control system.29 Sergei Rogov, director of the United States and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, states that one of these scenarios implies the “possibility of a [Russian] clash against a coalition of the strongest and industrially most developed states” and shows that “the West is still considered to be the most dangerous opponent [protivnik].”30 Moreover, Viktor Glukhikh, then-chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Sector of Industry, stated in 1994 that a Russian “military-technical and technological lag behind the developed nations of the world must not be permitted....”31 Finally, the broad Duma and governmental opposition to NATO expansion in 1996 presupposes a continuing military rivalry between Russia and the West.

These Russian concerns help explain why by early 1996 the two nations apparently had agreed that THAAD (as well as Patriot and MEADS) was compliant with the ABM Treaty but had not reached agreement on the more advanced sea-based and air-based U.S. systems.32 In addition, they help us understand several sections of the Joint Statement on theater missile defenses issued at the May 1995 Moscow Summit. In that document, the United States and Russia found it necessary to affirm that theater missile defense activity “must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.”33 The two governments also stated that theater missile defense systems “will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.” Lastly, they pledged that each side’s “scale of deployment—in number and geographic scope” would be “consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.”

The statement about the “number and geographic scope” of deployment moves away from the earlier assumption that both “sides” would feel “confronted” by any ballistic missile program that threatened regional or global stability. The cautious and somewhat distrustful tone of the document contrasts with the optimism of the Russian-U.S. statements on proliferation and missile defense during the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin years.

IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS

Russian-American disagreements over permissible theater missile defenses seem to be deepened by different views of where each nation’s peacekeeping forces are likely to be deployed.

Russia has sought U.N. sanction for peacekeeping missions on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Drastic decreases in military spending and unexpected military difficulties in Chechnya also suggest that Moscow will be cautious in projecting its power much beyond the CIS. Lest we view Russia’s interests too narrowly, however, we must note that Moscow has deployed troops with the United Nations in Bosnia and that recently appointed Foreign Minister Evgeniy Primakov has been reestablishing the active diplomatic relations with Iraq, Iran, and Libya that he promoted in the Soviet period.

The Western powers foresee possible missions much farther from their borders. According to the 1993 DOD Bottom-Up Review, for instance, the United States is organizing its military forces with an eye to defending South Korea against attack by North Korea and to defending U.S. friends in the Persian Gulf region against attack by Iraq or Iran.34 In late 1995, moreover, an Army task force was reportedly studying how the United States would react to a war between China and Taiwan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs stated in December 1995: “Nobody knows the answer to the danger of escalation in the Taiwan Straits.”35 These nations and regions are
located near major bodies of water that Western forces would expect to control, and from which a sea-based missile defense umbrella could protect ground operations along the shore and inland.

This difference between possible deployments of Russian and Western forces helps explain why Moscow has conceded that the U.S. Army’s missile defense systems comply with the ABM Treaty but has not made this concession for the more advanced U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force systems. Ground-based area defenses would help guard Russian troops operating around Russia’s borders; Moscow’s Patriot and THAAD will be the SA-12 surface-to-air missile and its successors, such as the S-300. Russia will not need, and probably could not readily develop, sea-based systems to protect large areas. Russia probably also would find it much harder than the United States to develop the technologies needed for Boost Phase Interceptors. In a separate consideration, Russia will be able to compete far more effectively for global arms sales in ground-based and lower tier weapons than in more advanced systems.

Several Russian defense experts have recently stated that ballistic missile proliferation threatens Russia less than it does the United States. In their view, the United States is more likely to be attacked because it is more likely to be involved in regional conflicts and peacekeeping efforts. The official government position, however, remains that proliferation is a global problem.

U.S.-allied cooperation in theater missile defense could bring further differences with Russia. U.S. talks with Britain and Israel on Boost Phase Interceptors and with Japan on sea-based area defenses involve weapons that Russia has not acknowledged to be compliant with the ABM Treaty. The Israeli Arrow presumably will comply with the treaty because it will be ground-based and will have a shorter range than THAAD. Under some political circumstances, however, Russia might question the U.S. transfer of technology for this system. Washington and Moscow apparently have not yet resolved the complicated issue of space-based sensors, which American allies might consider necessary to effective population defense but which Russia might see as contributing to defense against strategic missiles. More broadly, Russia’s belief that it is engaged in a technological competition with NATO could lead Moscow to view the NATO/U.S. deployment of advanced theater missile defenses in Europe as an effort to help tip the military balance toward the West.

For these reasons, we cannot yet judge whether or not cooperative U.S.-allied programs to develop theater missile defenses will be drawn into the negotiations on the ABM Treaty. If they are, Russia and the United States will have to decide whether the two nations’ mutual opposition to missile proliferation is stronger than the memories of their Cold War military rivalry.

PROSPECTS

The success of multinational nonproliferation efforts depends greatly on cooperation between Russia and the Western powers, particularly in view of China’s ambivalence toward these regimes. That is one reason why the United States has worked hard to gain Russian adherence to (and membership in) the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is not yet clear how greatly this cooperation will be affected by differences over theater missile defense.

Russia’s reluctance to accept U.S. proposals for deployments under the ABM Treaty may reflect primarily an understandable caution by a nation trying to redefine its security goals after the largest loss of territory in its history. In this event, Russia and the United States may gradually reach a consensus on theater missile defenses that allows each side to develop and deploy those systems that it believes necessary to carry out its military responsibilities. The two nations might even try to implement their earlier vision of a global missile defense system, although for the next few years such an enterprise would depend heavily on U.S. systems and technology. The United States and Russia have scheduled joint command post and field exercises with theater missile defense systems for 1996 and 1997.

Indeed, the ABM Treaty negotiations (despite their disputes) may permit deployment of those systems that the United States now intends to field in the next few years. Russia apparently has accepted THAAD—along with Patriot and MEADS—as compliant with the ABM Treaty. The United States has not yet decided how much it wishes to invest in the technologically advanced and economically expensive programs for Sea-Based Upper Tier Defense and for Boost Phase Interceptors. According to one report, senior U.S. Navy officers believe that they will be allowed to continue to develop the Upper Tier system even though Russia has not agreed.
that this system complies with the ABM Treaty. Congress did not fund the Boost Phase Interceptor program for fiscal year 1996, although it probably will do so for 1997.

Finally, most U.S. discussions with allies about major cooperative programs are preliminary. Available funding and assessments of the ballistic missile threat may change.

One can foresee situations, however, in which theater missile defenses could sour U.S.-Russian relations sufficiently to undermine cooperation on proliferation issues. As in other areas of nonproliferation policy, negotiations over missile defense deployments have been less productive than might have been expected from the two governments’ statements of agreements in principle. The resurgence of the Communist Party in the Duma elections of December 1995, the subsequent replacement of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Primakov (head of the Foreign Intelligence Service), and the removal of most reformers in the months leading to the 1996 presidential elections have stiffened anti-Western tendencies in Moscow. In the United States, Congress has pressed the Clinton administration to develop and deploy upper tier systems more rapidly than the administration believes is justified by projected ballistic missile threats to the United States.

For all these reasons the United States might at some point decide that global missile proliferation requires it to move forward with theater missile defense programs that Russia has not specifically accepted as compliant with the ABM Treaty. Such a decision could increase East-West tensions more than other proliferation-related disagreements such as those over transfer of Russian missile technology to India and of Russian conventional arms and nuclear technology to Iran.

In this case, the United States and Russia might have difficulty working together to develop effective nonproliferation policies. It is even possible that the United States would have to choose between two unattractive options: either altering its requirements for theater missile defense (in order to assuage Russian concerns) or fulfilling its commitments to protect U.S. and NATO peacekeeping forces, but at the cost of a possible rift with Russia. For these reasons, the development of mutual understanding on these issues could be crucial for the future success of multinational nonproliferation efforts.
linton and Moscow not to weaken the [ABM] Treaty, presumably to guarantee Chinese military planners an open freeway for their missiles to inflict nuclear destruction on California or the Russian heartland.” (Ikle, pp. 125-126).


25 Aspin, quoted in Bowen and Dunn, pp. 129-130.


30 “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Rossisskije vesti, November 18, 1993, in FBIS, Daily Report (Supplement). Central Eurasia, November 19, 1993, pp. 3, 6. This is a long summary of the full version of the doctrine, which has not been released.


