

A 1994 study by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) identified three main approaches on how to control the export of dual-use items (goods, technologies, and services with primarily commercial but also military applications) in accordance with U.S. strategy regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).² Supporters of an “export enhancement” approach argued that increased U.S. exports are vital to the economy, including the defense sector, and that export controls of all sorts, including those for nonproliferation,

should be reduced to a minimum. In contrast, those supporting a “strict nonproliferation” approach called for much tighter export controls on a wide range of items, even on a unilateral basis if necessary, with little regard to their impact on the domestic economy. Finally, proponents of a “rogue nation” approach concentrated most forms of nonproliferation export controls on a few countries that stand at the edges of the international community. These handful of rogue nations are allegedly seeking WMD in the face of international pressure and norms; they often are engaged in the widespread suppression of human rights and encouragement of international terrorist activities.

In comparing the three approaches—export enhancement, strict nonproliferation, and rogue nation—the OTA clearly identified what makes the rogue nation approach so persuasive to many in the U.S. policymaking community: the approach limits the economic burden on exporters by targeting controls against only the countries that present the most worrisome proliferation concerns. However, as with most compromise positions, there are some obvious problems. The rogue nation approach does little to address how export control policy can be modified to diminish the threat from terrorists or other radical groups that wish to acquire WMD. For example, it is not entirely clear how export controls based on the rogue nation approach might have prevented the gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system or the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in the spring of 1995. Nor is it entirely clear how effective existing modes of export control are in deterring smuggling and other

illicit means of transferring sensitive goods or technologies that may be emanating from unstable countries undergoing dramatic economic and political transformations. Even in the area of nuclear materials, export

controls are not completely successful. German authorities identified hundreds of cases of smuggled nuclear items from former communist states, though only a handful of those appear to involve highly-enriched substances.

But the major difficulty with the rogue nation approach is definitional. How does one define a rogue nation? Countries that have attempted to define rogue nations reach

varying conclusions. According to a recent study of the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, of the 72 countries that these four governments designate as “sensitive” and subject to special procedures or the total embargo of certain items, only 38 countries appear on the lists of more than two of the four governments.³ This confusion only reinforces the widely-held perception that the Western powers maintain a double standard regarding proliferation. Indeed, Glenn Chafetz demonstrates that of 36 violations or presumed violations of multilateral nonproliferation norms and rules committed by members of the “liberal security community” (i.e., the West), only four resulted in sanctions, whereas 38 of 42 similar incidences by states not members of the same Western community attracted sanctions.⁴

In the discussion that follows, the problems inherent in implementing a rogue nation approach—without well-defined criteria—will be explored. The essay then examines existing multilateral arrangements and the formal criteria used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to identify behavior that is unacceptable to these regimes. A similar approach will be used in considering likely arrangements for the post-COCOM regime. After this review, other criteria that might be used to identify potential targets of nonprolif-

**VIEWPOINT:
TARGET ROGUE
BEHAVIOR, NOT
ROGUE STATES**

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eration export controls are considered. The essay concludes with a call for regulations that distinguish between *supply* violations and *acquisition* violations and between proscribed *countries* and proscribed *behaviors*.

IDENTIFYING ROGUE NATIONS

At the moment, there is a general consensus in the United States that North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran fall into the category of rogue states.⁵ Outside of the cost of denying itself access to oil from Libya, Iraq, and Iran, the West's economic burden from the strict export controls on these states is low—a few billion dollars at most—relative to the costs of military action.⁶ Most policy-makers in the United States accept evidence, such as Iranian purchasing activities, that indicates these states are attempting to acquire WMD and pose a military threat to their neighbors.

Concerns within the U.S. government, however, about the degree of threat—especially about the threat posed by Iran—have proven less than convincing to other governments. Even when other governments share U.S. views on the Iranian threat, they often disagree about the appropriate response. Consequently, reaching a multilateral consensus on treating Iran as a rogue nation has been much more difficult.⁷

Without agreed criteria on what constitutes a rogue nation, private firms and government agencies may well engage in activities that others will define as rogue behavior *ex post facto*, as happened to the many Western firms that assisted unwittingly in Iraqi WMD-related and other military programs. While the anti-communist emphasis in the control of high-technology during the Cold War may be less appropriate to the emerging situation, the absence of any agreed criteria threatens to create several new rogue nations.

In June 1992, for example, the Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce issued a list of missile projects in Brazil, China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa, along with a broad category with no associated projects entitled “Middle East.” Allegedly, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department had been concerned about naming certain countries and projects and, therefore, excluded them from the final draft. Later, in August 1992, Washington-based proliferation analyst Gary Milhollin claimed that pressure from various lobbies had reduced the number of projects included in the draft from 38 to 21. The exclusion of

Israel's Jericho I and II projects, Argentina's Condor I and II, and others, raised questions about what criteria were being used to define rogue states.⁸

While there will continue to be considerable disagreement on whether Israel, India, Pakistan, and other countries are rogue nations, two states are likely to prove the most problematic in defining rogue states in the late 1990s—Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Both possess vast amounts of WMD technologies and materials. If either government chose to challenge the prevailing norms, it could seriously undermine the entire nonproliferation effort. While both governments lend nominal support to some nonproliferation export controls, their exclusion from most export control arrangements has proven problematic. Officials from the PRC argue that they would not have developed missile systems with the export market as a consideration, nor subsequently transferred certain missile technology to Pakistan, if they had been aware of and participated in the formation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).⁹ While perhaps self-serving, the Chinese also note that they are condemned for violating MTCR guidelines while, in their view, the United States abets equally destabilizing missile programs in Israel and South Korea (as well as agreeing to sell fighter-bombers capable of delivering WMD to Taiwan).

An even more distressing case concerns the January 1995 contract between the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the government of Iran for construction of an unfinished nuclear reactor in Bushehr and other nuclear services.¹⁰ In the absence of agreed criteria for categorizing Iran as a rogue nation, Russia is proceeding with the sale despite intense U.S. pressure.¹¹ The Russians argue that while Iran may engage in military research on nuclear items, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor Russian intelligence have found evidence of a nuclear weapon program. They make several additional points in justifying their behavior: that the transfer fulfills the letter and spirit of Article Four of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regarding access to civilian nuclear technology; that the light water VVER reactors—coupled with the additional precaution of returning the spent fuel to Russia for processing—will not allow Iran access to weapons-grade material; and that the United States is providing similar technology to North Korea, a known violator of the NPT.¹² In contrast, under similar pressure from the United States, the Czech government reportedly refused to allow the Skoda-built items

involved in the Bushehr reactors to be re-exported.¹³ Minatom has branded U.S. pressure to stop the multi-billion dollar transfer as an attempt to expand U.S. commercial interests in Iran, paralleling a common view in Russian defense industry circles about Western export control policies in general. While the recent U.S. decision to expand its embargo belies this charge, the lack of Russian support for the U.S. hard-line against Iran will serve some political entrepreneurs in the United States who wish to define Russia as a rogue nation. For example, U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee and a skeptic regarding U.S. aid to Russia generally,¹⁴ stated that “this deal threatens Russian aid, period.... This could really be a deal breaker.”¹⁵

Meanwhile, similar sentiments can be heard from Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms about both Russia and China. But no matter how reasonable these sentiments, defining Russia and the PRC as rogue nations and implementing sanctions on the basis of something other than a nonproliferation rationale will have at least two detrimental effects on efforts to limit the proliferation of WMD.

Within the United States, tighter export controls on trade with the PRC and Russia will be much more divisive than sanctions on trade with Iran, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea. Efforts to define these two countries as rogue nations (especially China) will face massive opposition from U.S. commercial interests. In the first half of the 1990s, the value of U.S. exports to the PRC has varied between \$7 to 10 billion a year, while exports to Russia were between \$2 to 3 billion a year. Moreover, both countries appear to have a growing appetite for U.S. goods.¹⁶ The potential economic costs and tension with U.S. allies would escalate significantly if the United States were to impose sanctions on foreign firms that do business with the PRC and Russia, a tactic tried in the past. Once begun, the battle between commercial interests and political entrepreneurs is not likely to be a conducive environment for producing a reasoned definition of rogue nations.

More importantly, the effort will almost certainly damage any attempt to harmonize and coordinate Russian and PRC nonproliferation policies with those of the United States. For example, Russia’s participation as a founding member will be an enormous boost to the proposed arrangement to replace the late Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), while adherence by the PRC would also be welcome.¹⁷

Their participation is important because states excluded from making international rules have less stake, and may have little interest, in abiding by those rules.¹⁸ If the rules are perceived as “coordination by the powerful” or lacking some degree of reciprocity, then they are likely to be seen as unfair, generating incentives for uncooperative behavior.¹⁹

MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND ROGUE NATIONS

In addition to national law, states apply *de facto* embargoes on a number of states for nonproliferation purposes through a variety of formal and informal multilateral arrangements. Compared to the programs of individual states, multilateral nonproliferation treaties and arrangements tend to be more specific in defining conditions for restricting access to goods, technologies, and other benefits from cooperation. While these arrangements share a number of common targets across different kinds of WMD (including advanced conventional weapons), much less harmonious standards apply for defining a country as militarily “sensitive.”

In the field of nuclear weapons, the 1978 London Guidelines targeted direct transfers to any non-nuclear weapon state or retransfers to any state. The 1992 London Guidelines expanded this to restrict transfers to states that are potential proliferators (i.e., that might use items to develop nuclear weapons) or that pose an unacceptable risk of diversion.

NSG members are asked to take a number of “relevant factors” into consideration when evaluating a prospective recipient, from acceptance of full-scope safeguards to ratification of the NPT to whether “governmental actions, statements, and policies” support nuclear nonproliferation.²⁰ If rogue nations are states that fail to meet these relevant factors, then states that assist other states in acquiring nuclear weapons, particularly if the latter violate their international obligations under the NPT or a similar agreement, would be rogue nations. Conceivably, this definition would include states with poor export control systems, even if they did not intend to abet the efforts of others to obtain nuclear weapons.

Since 1985, the Australia Group has developed a list of controlled items in the area of chemical and biological weapons. This list now includes chemicals, biological agents, and research and production equipment. The guidelines of the Australia Group do not prohibit the export of items on the list, but refer to licensing and

monitoring. Members are asked to deny exports to non-members only if those states are known to have critical elements for chemical-biological weapon systems *and* there is real concern that the export might be used or diverted for purposes of developing or enhancing a chemical or biological weapon capability.²¹

Australia Group members work in coordination with the strictures of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), which strive to prevent the development, production, stockpiling, or use of such weapons.²² Iran, a CWC signatory, leads a small group of states that contend that the Australia Group guidelines violate Article XI of the CWC because they restrict trade with CWC parties. The CWC in two schedules dictates sharp limits on the production or transfer of known toxic chemicals or chemical weapon precursors. It also creates an intrusive monitoring and inspection system for these substances and a third schedule of chemicals widely used for commercial purposes.²³ Indeed, after the CWC enters into force, exports of Schedule 1 items will be prohibited to non-parties, exports of Schedule 2 items to non-parties will be prohibited after three years, and exports of Schedule 3 items (which include widely used dual-use chemicals) will only be allowed to non-parties that offer assurances of non-prohibited end-uses.

Australia Group members maintain, however, that their guidelines are not “incompatible” with CWC obligations, and, indeed, complement the objectives of that treaty. Australia Group members will not offer reciprocal exemptions from export controls to a variety of states, even if these states sign the CWC.²⁴ These include states with weak export controls (e.g., Russia), states with poor controls on the domestic aspects of the chemical industry, or states that Australia Group members fear are developing chemical or biological weapons programs.

The MTCR targets specific end-users—missile projects of concern as defined by national legislation or regulation—rather than countries of destination for restricting access to controlled items. For Category I items (i.e., complete missile systems capable of delivering 500 kilograms (kg) over 300 kilometers (km) and major subsystems, production equipment and related technology), MTCR adherents are asked to prohibit transfers of production capabilities and to maintain a presumption of denial for the other items listed in the two-part annex to the MTCR guidelines. Since January 1993, MTCR adherents are to maintain a presumption of denial for

any missile, even those not found anywhere in the annex.²⁵ Transfers to other MTCR members or prospective members may be considered with binding government-to-government assurances about end-use and retransfer, though the supplier is responsible for ensuring peaceful end-use.²⁶ For the related materials, components, production, and test equipment found among the 18 Category II items (including all WMD missiles with a range of 300 km not covered by Category I), MTCR members review proposed transfers on a case-by-case basis, particularly for exports to states known to have an active missile program or poor export controls. End-use assurances, including a government-to-government end-use assurance, are required if the export can contribute to nuclear-capable missiles.

Substantial multilateral disagreement has arisen about the nature of the items controlled by the MTCR, the secrecy of the MTCR, and the list of projects of concern. More importantly, the United States and other governments refuse to support civilian space-launch programs in non-member states because such programs have easily transferable military applications. However, non-members seeking a civilian space-launch capability, characterize the guidelines as impeding their entrance into an important commercial market.²⁷ Unlike the Australia Group and the NSG, the MTCR essentially treats all non-members as rogues.

Finally, the former members of COCOM along with Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, New Zealand, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland have agreed to form a new arrangement called the “New Forum” to manage the export or transshipment of military and dual-use items.²⁸ The members of the New Forum will adopt lists of basic, sensitive, and very sensitive dual-use items that, along with munitions items, will guide trade relations between members and countries of concern (e.g., rogue states) and states with a record of insufficient transshipment controls. By mutual agreement (though the New Forum has no official list), the countries of concern include Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. As of late 1995, the criteria for identifying the countries of concern had not been specified and remain under discussion. Depending on the lists and items involved, embargoes, special procedures, or monitoring will be in place for a host of other categories of countries. These will include states subject to United Nations or other multilateral arms embargoes, governments involved in systematic abuses of human rights, countries at war,

countries with internal instability, states with excessive military spending, states in regions of tension, and, in some cases, all non-members or prospective members.²⁹ This dramatic expansion in the list of states that potentially could be treated like rogues is sure to be controversial.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION OF ROGUE NATIONS

Some pressures to define nations as rogues will always be idiosyncratic. In the 1950s and 1960s, the “China lobby” ensured that the United States imposed stricter controls than its allies did on the PRC. Similarly, pro-Israeli forces have made it very difficult for the U.S. government to challenge publicly-suspected Israeli WMD programs and practices, while making it easier to criticize Iraq and Iran on nonproliferation grounds. Conventional theories of international relations, however, might provide a better understanding of which states are or should be classified as rogues.

Within the conceptual framework of realist and neorealist theories, the world is seen as an anarchic and usually hostile environment, forcing states to use unilateral and multilateral export controls against other states with the industrial might to acquire or expand WMD arsenals.³⁰ As both realists and neorealists are most concerned with maintaining a balance of military capabilities that deters aggressors, proliferation of WMDs to some states might rapidly change the existing balance of power. These shifts are seen as having disastrous consequences for the prospects of peace. Together, these theories imply that the focus of U.S. export controls should be not only on those states with WMDs that may not be satisfied with the status quo—such as Russia, the PRC, India, and even France—but also on powerful industrial states like Germany and Japan and challenging periphery states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

A serious disadvantage of using military capabilities to identify potential rogue nations is that it ignores the crucial role of intent. Despite Lord Grey’s classic admonition to defend against capabilities since intent can change, no government has the resources to defend against all potential threats equally well. Moreover, such a strategy can induce a security dilemma, where two states not hostile to one another engage in an expensive arms race.³¹

Building on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and

pioneering work by Karl Deutsch and Emanuel Adler in the 1960s on the transformation of Western European security, Michael Doyle and others use social identity theory to indicate that states that are both economically and politically liberal have come to view the joint military security of their community of nations as nearly indivisible with their individual national security concerns.³² Because democratic capitalist states share a number of characteristics that make it much less likely that they would fight each other, proponents of this view argue that the military security of liberal nations and of the liberal community as a whole depends primarily on thwarting challenges from undemocratic states. From this perspective, the more liberal, both economically and politically, a state is, the less of a threat it poses for the United States and its allies.

While this approach addresses the issue of intent much more directly than a realist or neorealist view, it understates the role of capabilities. Though rare, capable liberal states can become anti-democratic (i.e., Weimar Germany), a concern in the case of modern Russia. Other states with substantial military capabilities, such as India and the PRC, have either relatively liberal economic or political aspects of their society, but not both. Do these states pose more or less danger to the community than undemocratic states such as Iran with fewer military capabilities?

While synthesizing realism with research on liberal security communities is beyond the scope of this article, this brief discussion does indicate the need to combine capabilities with community identification when discussing rogue states. Rapid acquisition of WMD items by undemocratic states would be of concern to advocates of both views, because it would threaten the liberal community and disturb current regional and global balances of power. This implies that undemocratic states attempting to develop WMDs should be targets of nonproliferation export controls.

ROGUE NATIONS: SUPPLIERS, RECIPIENTS, OR BOTH?

Interestingly, classifying rogues on the basis of the rules of current supply-side export control arrangements or on capabilities alone would treat both states supplying and acquiring WMDs, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons as potential rogue states. In practice, however, sanctions are rarely applied against a supplier. Using the same data developed by Chafetz,

but focusing on supply and receipt violations instead of membership in the liberal security community, recipient violations are punished in 35 of 42 cases, while supply violations are sanctioned in only four of 32 incidences. While the correspondence between membership in a liberal (i.e., Western) security community and the incidence of supply violations compared to recipient violations is virtually identical, the difference in the type of violation appears to be a confounding factor. For example, in all four cases in which members of the liberal security community were sanctioned, the violation involved either weapons development or insufficient export controls, not the supply of a sensitive state with controlled items.³³

While sanctions against suppliers may be appropriate, the type of behavior and the nature of the proliferation concern at stake differ fundamentally from those involving actions of recipients. In the cases of Russia and the PRC, neither state has had much input into the creation of export control norms, rules, and procedures. Even the most diverse approaches to international relations all suggest that if critical states are excluded from the community but subject to its rules and sanctions, cooperation will be hard to achieve. As long as neither the Russian nor Chinese government appears set to make an immediate challenge against the basic principles or norms of the current international system and as long as their compliance is essential for an effective nonproliferation export control system, excluding these states from negotiating the rules and procedures of nonproliferation export controls will surely produce acrimony and little interest in abiding by those rules and procedures.

In addition, some interest exists in applying a metanorm in dealing with rogue nations, such as the proposed U.S. legislation regarding trade with Iran. The expectation that participants in any community, including states in a nonproliferation export control community, will be punished for not punishing violators, such as rogue nations, constitutes a metanorm. Robert Axelrod asserts metanorms are important for the maintenance of specific community norms. However, if no agreement exists on which states are rogue nations (much less agreement on what punishment should be exercised if any), then attempts to punish community members will divide the community instead of uniting the community to support specific norms.³⁴

In previous cases where the United States imposed metanorms without multilateral agreement—from threats to cut aid to other members of COCOM in the early

1950s to the attempt to impose U.S. export control law on firms from other COCOM states in the 1980s—the efforts proved counterproductive (at least in achieving the expressed objectives of those actions). Punishing European, Japanese, Russian, or Chinese enterprises or governments for pursuing commercial activities seen by many as legitimate (especially when Russia and China have had no say in developing the norms and rules) will result in less coordination on nonproliferation export controls, not more.

While WMD acquisition by dedicated proliferators is very difficult to prevent, it is rapid proliferation of these items by undemocratic states that is the most destabilizing in both a military and political sense (from both a realist and liberal security community approach). This suggests that delaying the acquisition of WMDs, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons remains an important policy objective. Furthermore, although the acquisition of WMDs by undemocratic states is the most serious proliferation threat, violations of the norms and rules of supply-side arrangements like the NSG or MTCR increase the risk of rapid destabilization of regional and global balances of military power, and should be rectified even when committed by member states.

The causal factors behind supply behavior often differ from the determinants of acquisition behavior, so the appropriate incentives and disincentives are likely to differ as well. However, supplier violations by members of the liberal community should not be ignored as, in practice, they are now; such violations can have a considerable impact (see, for example, Western support for Iraqi weapons programs). Instead, the policy tools used to respond to supplier violations should differ from the set of policy tools employed in responding to acquisition violations. As many of these states are enmeshed in a complex web of economic relationships, attempts to limit this trade can have perverse effects. Indeed, since many of these technologies are produced by a host of member states, these sorts of sanctions would provide an economic windfall for producers in the target state, perhaps even for the offending companies. In such cases, quiet diplomatic initiatives, the arousal of public opinion (among voters or consumers), creation of economic alternatives, and other measures may prove more effective than economic sanctions.

CONCLUSION: TARGET ROGUE *BEHAVIOR*, NOT ROGUE NATIONS

Social identity theory indicates that states, like people, treat friends differently than adversaries. State leaders will deny or discount information that does not fit the view of another country as a rogue. They will be unable to empathize with rogue nation leaders and will attribute negative motives to most rogue state actions. The behavior of friends, though the results in some cases may be more detrimental than the action of rogue states, will often be ignored or rationalized. Establishing clear criteria of rogue *behavior* in the area of nonproliferation would limit some of the detrimental consequences of these kinds of bias, even though political leaders might still define states either as rogues or as compatriots in a liberal community.

How fair, and at least to some degree how legitimate, these criteria might be perceived by leaders inside and outside of the community depends on many factors. For some leaders, any action that limits their ability to impose their will on others will be considered unfair. For others, not having a say in their creation or letting violators escape without consequence simply because they are inside the community will undermine the legitimacy of these criteria. In the absence of even rudimentary criteria, however, it is hard to see how the basis for a dialogue (rather than competing monologues) about what is fair can emerge.

It is important to remember that foreign firms, not national governments, are the frontline in an effective export control system. A weak national export control system may not be important if a strong commitment to nonproliferation exists and local industry in critical items is dominated by foreign firms that maintain comprehensive internal compliance programs. Under the current multilateral guidelines, the community may punish states or firms that are weak on administering export controls without reference to the underlying cause of the violation (such as inadequate information). Such punishment may undermine long-term nonproliferation objectives.

States should establish lists of both positive and negative nonproliferation behaviors. A list of positive nonproliferation export control behaviors, such as establishing an import certificate/delivery verification (IC/DV) program or cooperating with end-use verification inspections, might be created to convey a more positive vision of the community's overall approach. This would increase regular discussion and interaction on appro-

priate policy goals (helping to keep nonproliferation on the political agenda) and help assistance programs target the most important areas for improving export control systems. Like any list of rogue behaviors, this would also deter political entrepreneurs from linking nonproliferation policies to lesser objectives. At the same time, the negative list should be explicit and brief so that governments and enterprises within and without the liberal community can easily understand their obligations and incentives.

The lists of behaviors could be harmonized with the guidelines of the NSG, the Australia Group, the MTCR, and the post-COCOM arrangement, but with at least two differences:

- the list should help restrain *rapid* proliferation of WMDs, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons; and
- the list should distinguish between *supply* violations and *acquisition* violations, and recommend steps to reduce supply-violations rather than ignore them (even though acquisition violations remain the most serious).

Associated with these lists could be sets of sanctions and rewards, based on performance more than attribution of liberal or illiberal status.

Finally, current and future arrangements should provide opportunities for prior consultation and consideration of the views of Russia, the PRC, and second-tier supplier states (such as Brazil) in developing nonproliferation export control norms, rules, and procedures. Excluding or ignoring Russian and Chinese voices, will make any subsequent metanorm sanctions by the U.S. or Japan appear discriminatory, arbitrary, and unfair. Noncompliant behavior by these states stemming from a lack of consultation and consideration, even if done in complete ignorance, will be used by political entrepreneurs in the United States to label these states as rogue nations. Including these states in the multilateral policy process should promote compliance and provide opportunities for discussion and demonstration that the behaviors of these states are in compliance with multilateral norms.

Export controls will not be reduced to an unacceptable lowest-common denominator by these expanded consultations if two conditions are observed. These supplier states should not be treated as if they were inside the liberal security community until they are economically and politically liberal states (in stable form). While even completely illiberal states can have effective non-

proliferation export control systems, and liberal states can violate nonproliferation norms, Russia, the PRC, and most second-tier supplier states are not fully liberal states, which means that they are not inside the “zone of peace” that is associated with politically and economically liberal states. Treating these states as liberal is not only imprudent in a realist sense, it might threaten the social identity of the community, which rests on the notion that community members settle disputes between themselves in a peaceful manner.

Certainly, there will be charges that this treatment is unfair, biased, and discriminatory. Such charges are hard to avoid in virtually any regulatory system imaginable in which those affected by the system do not have equal access to resources and power. If Russia, the PRC, and a number of other second-tier supplier states are treated as fully illiberal states (when they are not), however, then they will be prompted to exit the nonproliferation regime altogether. While export controls (though less restrictive than those used in relations with illiberal states) and, in extreme circumstances, clearly drawn and limited economic sanctions may be applied, dialogue and incentives should dominate the interaction between these states and members of the liberal community on nonproliferation issues. For example, officials designated by the NSG, Australia Group, MTCR, and the New Forum might brief officials of these states in a timely fashion before plenary meetings on the agenda in order to incorporate their concerns in the discussion. In many instances, this may simply be a matter of showing respect for the views of others. In others, it may involve providing information or technical and financial assistance to elicit compliance.

Certainly, governments need to maintain some flexibility regarding the use of punishments and rewards. Even export control policies that are mainly symbolic regarding a specific objective will have broad, and often important, domestic and foreign political consequences. Thus, clearly defining rogue behavior will help make export controls more effective and efficient in achieving the overall objectives for the nonproliferation of WMDs, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons.

trols and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).

³ Deltac Limited and Saferworld, *Proliferation and Export Controls: An Analysis of Sensitive Technologies and Countries of Concern* (Surrey: Deltac Limited, 1995), pp. 107-181.

⁴ Glenn Chafetz, “The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *The Journal of Politics* 57 (August 1995), pp. 743-775. Countries that are part of the liberal security community include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey (after 1984), and the United States.

⁵ United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, p. 13.

⁶ J. David Richardson, *Sizing Up US Export Disincentives* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993).

⁷ “G-7 Focuses on Iran, Other Rogue Countries,” *Export Control News* 7 (January 1993), p. 2; and “Iran has ‘No Program to Produce Fissile Material’ US Envoy Says,” *Nucleonics Week*, February 2, 1995, p. 7.

⁸ “Wisconsin Project Bashes Missile Controls,” *Export Control News* 6 (August 1992), pp. 4-5.

⁹ For a Chinese perspective on these issues, see Yanping Chen, “The Need for a Greater Chinese Role in Missile Nonproliferation Issues,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 1 (Spring-Summer 1994).

¹⁰ Stuart D. Goldman, Kenneth Katzman, and Zachary S. Davis, *Russian Nuclear Reactor and Conventional Arms Transfers to Iran*, 95-641 F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1995).

¹¹ In light of U.S. concerns, however, President Yeltsin agreed not to transfer gas centrifuge technology. See Federal Information Systems Corporation, “Foreign Press Briefing,” *Federal News Service*, May 17, 1995, in Lexis.

¹² Goldman, *et al.*, pp. 12-13.

¹³ “Countering US Claims, Moscow Says Iran Nuclear Program is Peaceful,” *Nucleonics Week*, February 9, 1995, p. 4.

¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of McConnell’s views towards Russia, see Carla Anne Robbins, “Kentucky Senator, Handed Keys to Foreign Aid, To Be Most Potent Foe of Clinton’s Russia Policy,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 1994, p. A20.

¹⁵ Goldman, *et al.*, p. 17.

¹⁶ United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *National Trade Data Bank*, Merchandise Trade-Exports by Country, CN TRADCX 4621, March 30, 1995.

¹⁷ David Fairhall, “Russia Joins Club to Curb Arms Sales to Pariahs,” *The Guardian*, June 15, 1995, p. 16; also Marcel Michelson, “Creation of ‘Son of COCOM’ Set for September,” *The Reuter European Business Report*, June 1, 1995, in Lexis.

¹⁸ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939* (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbook edition, 1964), p. 263.

¹⁹ Robert O. Keohane, “Empathy and International Regimes,” in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., *Beyond Self-Interest* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 227-236 and Duncan Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” *The American Political Science Review* 79 (December 1985), pp. 923-942.

²⁰ Deltac Limited and Saferworld, pp. 197-236 and International Atomic Energy Agency, “Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology,” INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 2 Annex, p. 2.

²¹ Zachary S. Davis, Steven R. Bowman, Robert D. Shuey, and Theodor W. Galdi, *Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status*, 95-547 F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1995).

²² “Commerce to Administer CWC Requirements,” *Export Control News*, May 31, 1994, pp. 8-9.

²³ *Ibid.*, and United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry*, OTA-BP-ISC-106 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented for discussion at the “Nonproliferation Export Controls: U.S. and Japanese Interests and Initiatives Workshop,” University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, March 27-28, 1995.

² United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Export Con-*

1993).

²⁴ Davis, *et al.*, p. 14; and Deltac and Saferworld, pp. 102-105.

²⁵ Davis, *et al.*, pp. 18-19.

²⁶ United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Fact Sheet," presented at the annual update meeting, Washington, D.C., April 11-12, 1995.

²⁷ This despite evidence that the costs generally exceed the benefits of entry into this market. See Brian Chow, *Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993).

²⁸ "Allies Agree on New Export Control Regime," *The Export Practitioner* (September, 30, 1995), pp. 2-3; Fairhall, p. 16; and Michelson, in Lexis.

²⁹ Deltac and Saferworld, pp. 102-105.

³⁰ For examples of realist thought, see Carr (note 18) or Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edition, revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978). For a recent neorealist work, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 (Fall, 1993), pp. 44-79.

³¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³² See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Michael W. Doyle, "An International Liberal Community," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), pp. 307-333, and Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, "Security Communities," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 1-4, 1994.

³³ Chafetz, pp. 765-768.

³⁴ Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), pp. 1095-1111.