At the end of the Cold War, North Korea changed its approach to negotiations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had used negotiations solely to advance its political and propaganda aims. Yet, in December 1991, the North agreed to sign two documents with South Korea: an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereafter, Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (hereafter, Denuclearization Agreement). Thereafter, the two Koreas entered a difficult negotiation to implement a nuclear inspection regime, which broke down without agreement.

A nuclear crisis ensued as a result of the impasse in the inter-Korean nuclear talks. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and requested direct talks with the United States. The United States and North Korea then had a series of negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994.

Following this progression in negotiating partners, many experts suggested that North Korea would only be willing to resolve the nuclear issue with the United States, not with South Korea, because North Korea did not recognize South Korea as a legitimate negotiation partner. This view implies that the South-North nuclear talks were not a “true” negotiation, involving genuine give-and-take in an effort to reach agreement. However, this argument neglects the fact that the two Koreas did strike a deal. In December 1991, North Korea agreed to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections on its nuclear sites in return for South Korea’s cancellation of the annual Korea-US joint “Team Spirit” military exercises.

The issue of “true” negotiation or “pseudo” negotiation aside, North Korea did demonstrate different strategies and tactics in the two different negotiations with South Korea and with the United States. Those who do not distinguish North Korean behavior in the two sets of talks cannot understand North Korean behavior fully and are likely to predict inaccurately the DPRK’s next move in negotiations. For example, most South Korean negotiators predicted the DPRK would return to inter-Korean talks even after Team Spirit exercises were conducted again in early 1993. In contrast, some US officials considered the DPRK’s resolve to develop nuclear weapons to be so strong that they did not expect
any agreement would be possible. These predictions turned out to be incorrect. Needless to say, incorrect expectations about DPRK behavior have made it harder to reach agreements with North Korea, sometimes completely disrupting negotiations.

This article will first review North Korea’s behavior in nuclear negotiations with South Korea from December 1991 to January 1993 and with the United States from June 1993 to October 1994. Next, it will analyze how differences in situational variables affected the outcomes of the two negotiations. Then, it will briefly describe how North Korea’s negotiating strategies and tactics differed depending on its negotiation partners. Lastly, the article will draw implications for future nonproliferation negotiations with North Korea. It will suggest that the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) should, until relations between the North and the South improve considerably, make sure talks take place outside of the Korean Peninsula; that they should not attempt to reverse or re-open positions they have previously agreed to; and that they should balance carrots offered in the negotiations with appropriate sticks.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

South-North Nuclear Negotiations

In fall 1991, the United States provided inducements to bring North Korea to the negotiation table with the South to resolve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. US President George Bush announced the withdrawal of all overseas ground- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons on September 27. Though primarily designed to invite the former Soviet Union to follow suit, the initiative also meant US tactical weapons would be removed from Korea.

In consultation with the United States, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced principles for ensuring the peace and non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula on November 8, 1991. They included a South Korean decision not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities, in addition to pledges not to manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. The South requested that the North accept the same principles of a non-nuclear peninsula and agree to IAEA inspections on North Korean nuclear facilities.

These two unilateral initiatives were designed by the United States and South Korea to elicit North Korea’s cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation. Although it joined the NPT in 1985, North Korea had refused to sign and ratify a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as required by the NPT. The North had made an IAEA safeguards agreement conditional on US withdrawal of nuclear weapons as well as the removal of nuclear threats from the Korean Peninsula.

Welcoming these two initiatives, North Korea announced its readiness to engage in separate nuclear talks with the United States and South Korea, respectively. The two Koreas had negotiations first. The two Koreans convened nuclear talks on December 26, following the signing of the Basic Agreement on December 13, 1991.

The inter-Korean nuclear negotiations can be divided into two periods: the first one between December 26, 1991, and March 13, 1992, prior to the start of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) meeting; the second one between March 14, 1992, and January 1993 (when the JNCC ceased to function).

During the first period, the two Koreas agreed on the Denuclearization Agreement not to test, produce, manufacture, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment. Bilateral inspections were to be conducted on objects selected by the other side and agreed upon by the two sides according to procedures and methods that would be prescribed by the JNCC, which was supposed to begin functioning within one month after the Denuclearization Agreement entered into force.

South Korea’s top priorities during the first period were to persuade North Korea to abandon its reprocessing plant, to sign and ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement, and to accept IAEA inspections, thus leaving the issue of bilateral inspections to the JNCC in the second period. North Korea’s goal in the first period was to confirm US withdrawal of nuclear weapons in accordance with President Bush’s announcement of September 1991. North Korea also wanted to achieve cancellation of the Team Spirit exercises that it claimed had been posing nuclear threats to North Korea. North Korea’s ultimate goal was also to dismantle the US nuclear umbrella provided to South Korea by seeking the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula that would prevent the transit and landing of US strategic bombers and ships with nuclear weapons.
In the negotiation, South Korea agreed to cancel the Team Spirit exercises in return for North Korea’s prompt acceptance of an IAEA safeguards agreement and ensuing inspections. To the South Korean negotiators’ surprise, North Korea made a concession: it no longer sought to prohibit the transit and visits of ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons (except that the South and the North agreed that they would not receive nuclear weapons on the Peninsula), and no longer insisted on the elimination of treaties providing a nuclear umbrella (i.e., US-ROK security treaties) or the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. More surprisingly, North Korea agreed not to possess nuclear reprocessing plants, which South Korea and the United States suspected that North Korea had been building.

During the second period, in the JNCC meeting, the two Koreas continued talks to establish a bilateral inspection regime. South Korea’s objective was to establish a more intrusive bilateral inspection regime, given the inherent limitations of IAEA safeguards under which special inspections have to be approved by the recipient country. South Korea proposed 40 challenge inspections on military sites and 16 regular inspections on civilian sites per year. North Korea’s goal was to delay the more intrusive and controversial challenge inspections that South Korea was demanding by emphasizing the peacefulness of its nuclear program as proved by IAEA inspections. If bilateral inspections were to be established, North Korea wanted inspections of all American military bases in the South and IAEA inspections in the North to take place at the same time.

However, there were limitations on South Korea’s request for special inspections, because Article IV of the Denuclearization Agreement stipulates that inspections will be conducted on objects that one party selects and the two parties agree on. This is the very clause that North Korea quoted to dispute the legitimacy of the challenge inspections.

To overcome the limitations in the Denuclearization Agreement and bring about bilateral inspections, South Korea tried to condition its suspension of Team Spirit exercises for 1993 upon North Korea’s acceptance of challenge inspections, a linkage North Korea strongly opposed. When South Korea and the United States made a joint statement that they would resume Team Spirit exercises in 1993 unless the North agreed to bilateral inspections, the North demanded that the South withdraw the statement before it would agree to further talks. South Korea made it clear that if the North would agree to the inspections, the Team Spirit matter could be resolved. However, neither side would yield first. When South Korea and the United States jointly announced resumption of the 1993 Team Spirit exercises on January 26, 1993, the inter-Korean nuclear talks broke down.

Soon after, the IAEA’s inspections also reached an impasse. After discovering major discrepancies between Pyongyang’s declared nuclear activities and its own findings, the IAEA requested special inspections on two North Korean nuclear-waste storage sites. North Korea refused the IAEA’s request for special inspections. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would pull out from the NPT and suspend even IAEA routine inspections.

**US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations**

The US-DPRK nuclear talks started after North Korea announced its intended pullout from the NPT. North Korea claimed that the IAEA was not impartial, and it objected to being the target of the first-ever special inspection requested by the IAEA. (After the 1991 Gulf War led to the discovery of Iraq’s cheating on the NPT, the IAEA was attempting to strengthen its inspection system. North Korea became its first test case.) North Korea also claimed that its supreme national interests were challenged because South Korea and the United States had resumed the Team Spirit exercises that they had cancelled in 1992. Pyongyang calculated that such an extreme reaction would enable it to have negotiations directly with the United States, which was Pyongyang’s long-held goal.

The United States and the DPRK held three rounds of nuclear talks: the first round on June 2-11, 1993, in New York; the second round on July 14-19, 1993, in Geneva; the third round on August 8-13 and September 23-October 17, 1994, in Geneva. However, the US-DPRK talks can be divided into two periods depending on the nature of their agenda. The first period covers the first round of talks, which focused on bringing North Korea back into the NPT; the second period covers the second and third rounds of talks, which dealt with improving relations between the two countries and working out a deal to freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities.

During the first period, the US goal was obviously to bring North Korea back into the NPT and have the North fulfill its nuclear safeguards commitments with the
IAEA. The secondary goal was to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula through diplomacy. North Korea’s goal in this period was to establish high-level political talks with the United States, with the ultimate goal of concluding a peace treaty with the United States to facilitate troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula as well as to achieve permanent cancellation of the Team Spirit military exercises. North Korea’s other objectives were to obtain US assurances that it accepted the North Korean regime’s survival and would not pose a nuclear or military threat to North Korea. Also, the North wanted to use US-DPRK talks to marginalize South Korea while providing minimum transparency about its own nuclear program.

Given the importance it attached to getting North Korea to return to the NPT, the United States decided to hold high-level talks with North Korea in New York in June 1993. In the first round of talks, the United States and North Korea agreed to certain principles: assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and impartial application of full-scope safeguards. In conjunction with this agreement, North Korea said it would suspend, for as long as it deemed necessary, its withdrawal from the NPT.

In the first round of talks, the two sides succeeded in establishing negotiation as a means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea gained the symbolic advantage of a joint statement resulting from direct negotiation as an equal partner to the United States. The United States secured the suspension of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. Among the agreed points, the principle of impartial application of full-scope safeguards agreements was the most controversial concession on the US side. It seemed to vindicate Pyongyang’s justification for its withdrawal from the NPT. Pyongyang had accused the IAEA of partiality after the United States had initiated the request for special inspections by showing satellite photos of North Korea’s possible concealment of nuclear waste sites to the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in February 1993. Moreover, the United States did not succeed in persuading North Korea to accept the special inspections that the IAEA had requested. However, North Korea did not attain its goal of concluding a peace treaty with the United States.

During the second period, the negotiating objectives of the two countries changed, as the North revealed its willingness to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with light-water moderated reactors. The US goal became to freeze North Korea’s current and future nuclear weapons-related programs and facilities. Thus, it became willing to allow a grace period for North Korea to provide full information about its past nuclear activities. The United States narrowed the scope of the verification it sought to IAEA regular and ad hoc inspections, while postponing the special inspection issue to a later stage. The United States no longer requested that the North accept challenge or special inspections because it feared such a strong demand might imperil negotiations entirely. One year earlier, the United States had demanded that the South pursue these inspections at the inter-Korean negotiation.

North Korea’s objectives also became more concrete. It called for the United States to normalize relations with the North and to guarantee it an alternative energy supply to compensate for the North’s suspension of operations at its existing nuclear reactors. There was a gap of 13 months between the second and third rounds of US-DPRK talks. On the North Korean side, the gap stemmed from reluctance to bring all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards or to permit IAEA access to its nuclear facilities. On the US side, the gap was inevitable not only because it took time for Ambassador Robert Gallucci to get sponsorship for the light-water reactor project, but also because the United States was stuck between North Korea’s strong objection to special inspections by the IAEA and South Korea’s strong demand for the resumption of inter-Korean talks.

Before the resumption of US-DPRK talks, North Korea generated a nuclear crisis. In May 1994, it started to remove spent fuel rods from the reactor at Yongbyon. The United States and the international community tried to impose sanctions on North Korea to force it to accept IAEA inspections to determine the balance of the nuclear materials in the reactor and the history of the reactor’s operation. The situation escalated to a crisis where war or peace was at stake.

Finally, former US President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to resolve the crisis in June 1994. DPRK leader Kim Il-sung told Carter of North Korea’s intention to freeze its nuclear program as of that time. Furthermore, Kim Il-sung proposed the first-ever summit meeting with the South Korean president. These events provided the momentum for beginning the third round of the US-North Korean talks in Geneva on August 4, 1994.
On August 13, 1994, the two sides agreed to the outline of a deal. North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear activities, and the United States would make sure it received new light-water reactors. As part of the package, the two sides agreed to establish diplomatic representation in each other’s capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. The United States agreed to provide assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the DPRK agreed to implement the Denuclearization Agreement with South Korea.

Following the August joint statement, the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was completed in Geneva in October 1994. According to the Agreed Framework, the North would freeze its graphite reactors and related nuclear facilities and have the IAEA monitor its freeze. The North would also remain a party to the NPT and allow implementation of an IAEA safeguards agreement. The North agreed to deliver light-water reactors to the North, capable of producing approximately 2,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity. The United States also agreed to deliver heavy fuel oil in the interim to compensate for North Korea’s energy loss due to its halting operation of its graphite reactors. The most important component of the Agreed Framework specified that before the delivery of key light-water reactor components, North Korea would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in respect to the two nuclear waste sites that the IAEA had requested special inspections of in February 1993.

In return for making commitments to improve relations with Pyongyang, the United States succeeded in persuading North Korea to freeze its nuclear program. Yet it did not succeed in persuading North Korea to make the past history of its nuclear weapons development program transparent. Despite benefits generated by the Agreed Framework, it failed to foreclose North Korea’s nuclear ambition entirely. It allowed a grace period of more than five years before full disclosure of North Korea’s past nuclear activities.16

The US-DPRK talks also provided the North with an excuse for avoiding talks with the South for as long as possible. North Korea’s original objective in the talks with the United States was to sideline the South as a means to escape diplomatic isolation and to make up for strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the South. After the US-DPRK talks, the North continuously rejected talks with the South.

North Korea’s Goals in the Two Negotiations

North Korea had different goals in the two nuclear negotiations. North Korea’s dominant goals in its negotiations with South Korea were military concerns such as confirming US withdrawal of nuclear weapons, canceling US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises, and establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula as a way to dismantle the US nuclear umbrella. In contrast, the most significant goals in North Korea’s negotiation with the United States were political and economic, for example, establishing political contacts at high levels, sidelining South Korea, and securing alternative energy supplies.

However, North Korea remained consistent on the issue of the inspection regime. North Korea strongly opposed the concept of an intrusive inspection regime such as the challenge inspections requested by the South in the inter-Korean nuclear talks and the special inspections requested by the IAEA. North Korea especially disliked inspections of its military bases, but it demanded inspections of US bases in the South, charging that the United States had stationed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.17

Nevertheless, it is not clear whether North Korea might have accepted some types of special inspections if the South had provided as many positive incentives as the United States did in the US-DPRK talks. Because the US government changed its position on challenge inspections drastically from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration, North Korea was more willing to negotiate with the Clinton administration than with South Korea. The Clinton administration only requested regular IAEA inspections for North Korea.

The different goals uppermost in the DPRK-ROK talks versus the DPRK-US talks help account for the relatively more successful outcome of the latter. However, the negotiating goals alone did not determine the outcomes; eventual agreement or stalemate was possible in both sets of talks. In addition, situational variables—details of the context, format, and process of the negotiations—also had a significant effect.
IMPACT OF DIFFERENT NEGOTIATION SITUATIONS

There are many variables that affected the two negotiations differently. Among them are variables that have to do with negotiation structures and situations, rather than with strategy, tactics, and the specific positions adopted by the two sides. Comparing these negotiation situation variables in the two nuclear negotiations involving North Korea helps explain the different outcomes of the two negotiations. There are eight relevant situational variables: place of negotiation, language used in the negotiation, negotiation atmosphere, delegation interaction within and between the two parties, negotiation deadlines, negotiation agenda, the political situation within each country, and North Korea’s organization in charge of negotiation. This section explains the different impact of each variable on the outcomes of the two nuclear negotiations.

Place

The South-North nuclear talks convened in the Panmunjom area. During the Korean War Armistice negotiations, the two Koreas had fought here over every inch of territory, and the Military Demarcation Line passes through Panmunjom. In the nuclear talks, the North always sat on the northern side of the table and the South sat on the southern side of the table. The two sides did not easily make concessions to the other side because, in this physical location, a concession tended to be regarded psychologically as a loss of territory. At Panmunjom, what negotiators said at each meeting was relayed to each side’s leadership in Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively. Thus, each side’s central authorities directed its negotiators to correct some of their statements and even dictated responses to the other side through sending faxes or making telephone calls to the meeting place. The meeting setting was therefore very tense, and the negotiators did not have any flexibility. This caused the negotiators to be in a warrior mode rather than in a cooperative mode.18

In contrast, the US-DPRK talks convened in New York and Geneva, where it was not as easy for Pyongyang to monitor and relay instructions to the North Korean negotiators. Since these sites also had less psychological symbolism, the North Korean negotiators were more flexible and relaxed compared with those at the Panmunjom area. Also, because of North Korea’s dire economic situation, the high cost of hotels and meals for North Korean negotiators helped shorten North Korea’s delaying tactics.

Language

Using a common language in negotiation can help negotiators to reach agreement speedily in cooperative environments, but the contrary is true in very hostile environments. In the South-North talks to negotiate the Denuclearization Agreement, speaking Korean helped them reach the agreements very quickly. However, in the lengthy and failed negotiation on bilateral inspection agreements, speaking Korean added emotional and ideological content that increased the confrontation and hostility.

Speaking English in the US-DPRK negotiation helped the process proceed more smoothly. Propaganda, insults, and slander used by the North Korean side could be deleted and gradually disappear in the translation process. Kenneth Quinones, the US interpreter, did not translate North Korea’s insults and blackmail threats on purpose, to save time and to make North Korean negotiators realize that those words were wasting time instead of outraging US negotiators.19 The filtering out of North Korea’s emotional and ideological expression worked through two stages. In the first stage, North Korean negotiators had to pause for an interpreter on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis. North Korean negotiators cooled down to some extent because of these intermittent pauses. At the second stage, the US interpreter did not translate the North Koreans’ more extreme accusations and threats. Gradually, North Korean negotiators became focused on the real agenda.

Negotiation Atmosphere

The atmosphere was cooperative during the first period of the inter-Korean nuclear negotiation when the two sides engaged in a give-and-take. But in subsequent periods, the negotiation atmosphere of the South-North nuclear talks was so hostile that negotiators on each side felt extreme pressure not to lose any time responding to the other side’s offensive words or actions. As the two sides traded ever more extreme charges and countercharges, Scott Snyder points out, the negotiation became a striking example of one-upmanship in a zero-sum game.20

In the US-DPRK talks, the negotiation atmosphere was not as hostile as in the South-North talks. North
Korea came to the negotiation table with pride and satisfaction because meeting high-level US negotiators meant success to the North. The United States also designed the negotiation to provide some quid pro quo for North Korea’s return to the NPT. The second and third rounds of talks were run as an exercise in solving a common problem: producing a reactor replacement deal to the two sides’ mutual satisfaction. The negotiations did not take on the attributes of a zero-sum game because North Korea’s return to the NPT did not seem like a major loss to North Korea. At the same time, the United States did not feel it was losing ground by offering political and economic benefits.

Delegation Interaction

In the inter-Korean talks, only the head of each side’s delegation was supposed to speak in the negotiation. Thus, the two Koreas did not utilize all the group members in the negotiation except when the delegation members participated in the preparatory meetings held in each side’s capital. Moreover, the head negotiator on each side was usually the most senior and high-ranking, so other members could not submit their individual opinions or impromptu responses to the other side. There were no break times or meal sharing at Panmunjom during the second period of talks, which removed a forum for exploring possible compromises. By contrast, during the first period, there were breaks and time for private chats between the two sides. In fact, the compromise was struck during private chats on New Year’s Eve in 1991, after the plenary session.21

In the US-DPRK talks, the United States utilized all members of its delegation, reflecting the fact that each member represented his or her own government agency and his or her own expertise. North Korean negotiators were not accustomed to such a style of delegation interaction but soon followed the US lead. Also, the United States requested at a later stage that the two sides divide into small groups and discuss different specific issues.22 In this way, group dynamics were created among the North Korean negotiators to allow more discussion within the North Korean delegation. During the US-DPRK talks, there were breaks and meals at which informal discussion could take place. Through these unofficial conversations, negotiators could improve personal relationships and probe for further compromise.

Negotiation Deadlines

The North was more willing to negotiate when it could set the deadlines for the other side. However, South Korea always set the deadline for the South-North talks because the South thought it was critical to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapon development program at the earliest possible moment. The US demand for an intrusive inspection regime reinforced South Korea’s determination to set early deadlines for the negotiation. The first deadline for the South-North talks on a bilateral inspection regime that South Korea set was just two months after the JNCC was organized and convened. The deadline was too short to work out details for the most intrusive inspection regime ever. The second deadline that the South set for the negotiations was the end of the year, because the South intended to create linkage between the cancellation of the next year’s Team Spirit exercises and North Korea’s acceptance of bilateral inspections. North Korea’s resistance to South Korea’s linkage was so strong that the negotiation itself came to an impasse.

In the US-DPRK talks, the first deadline stemmed from the date when the North’s announced pullout from the NPT would become effective, i.e., three months after the announcement. The United States invited North Korea to the negotiation table so as to bring it back to the NPT. North Korea tried to get the maximum benefits from the United States by using the impending deadline. The second deadline that the United States kept in mind was the 1995 NPT Review Conference, because the international nonproliferation regime would have faced a serious challenge if the United States had failed to persuade the North to return to the NPT. Therefore, the United States was under greater pressure to meet certain deadlines. North Korea took advantage of such time pressures to extract greater concessions.

Negotiating Agenda

For South-North talks, the negotiating agenda included efforts to create a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, to persuade North Korea to forego its nuclear reprocessing plant, and to establish a challenge inspection regime. Challenge inspections, however, were not only difficult to persuade North Korea to accept, but also controversial because of their apparent conflict with Article IV of the Denuclearization Agreement, as North Korea claimed.
On the contrary, the US-DPRK talks had North Korea’s continued membership in the NPT and its acceptance of IAEA inspections as their agenda. This was a relatively easier set of items than those for the South-North talks. In their later stages, the US-DPRK talks had additional items on the agenda, such as alternative energy supplies for the North and possible steps to improve political relations. With many topics on the agenda, it was possible for each side to get what it cared about most by giving concessions on the items it cared about less. Also, the United States simplified the agenda by not revisiting the challenge inspections that it had asked the South to pursue in the inter-Korean talks. It thus eliminated the agenda item that had caused a stalemate in the inter-Korean talks.23

Political Situations

The inter-Korean nuclear talks reached their peak shortly before a South Korean presidential election. There is a tendency in South Korea for the political atmosphere to become more conservative during an election period. In October 1992, South Korea’s National Security Planning Board disclosed large-scale North Korean espionage activities to overthrow the South Korean government, and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced a plan to prepare resumption of Team Spirit exercises as a means to urge North Korea to be forthcoming on bilateral inspections. However, North Korea did not have any incentive to help the South Korean governing party win the election by giving it a breakthrough on the nuclear inspections issue. Thus, the political situation within each country in the last two months of 1992 became a contributing factor to the stalemate between the two Koreas.

By contrast, the advent of a new administration in the United States became a catalyst to finding a new approach. The Clinton election led the United States to abandon the outgoing Bush administration’s demand for a system of challenge inspections in favor of simply seeking renewed IAEA inspections. This domestic political change in the United States resulted in a new approach to negotiations that was more enticing to the DPRK.

North Korea’s Agency in Charge of Negotiation

North Korea negotiated more flexibly when a government ministry, rather than a ruling party organ, was in charge. However, in the inter-Korean talks, the Department of Unification Front in the Workers’ Party was in charge of the negotiation strategy and tightly controlled all the DPRK’s negotiations with South Korea. In the DPRK delegation to the nuclear talks, there were a few people from the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, a subsidiary organ of the Department of Unification Front, and a few other members from government agencies. People from the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland maintained an upper hand over the rest of the delegation. Since the tone and actual contents of the negotiation were so tightly monitored by the Department of Unification Front, the North Korean head negotiator had to spend 10 to 15 minutes at each session expounding North Korea’s Juche ideology to show his loyalty. This activity was cumbersome and counterproductive to the negotiation.

In contrast, in the US-DPRK nuclear talks, most of North Korea’s delegation came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-Ju and his deputies such as Kim Kye-Kwan and Lee Gun were the main actors in the negotiation. Since they were career diplomats, they knew how international relationships work and how a negotiation should be conducted. This helped the negotiation process get going more smoothly than in the inter-Korean nuclear talks.

Overall Effects of the Situational Variables

During the first period of the inter-Korean nuclear negotiations, compromise was reached speedily when the negotiation atmosphere was cooperative, the agenda items were diverse, domestic political situations were not especially constraining, break times and private contacts were available for probing the other party’s maneuverability, and delegation interaction was lively. These positive developments occurred despite the facts that the agency controlling the DPRK negotiators and the meeting place were the same as in the later period. However, during the second period of the inter-Korean nuclear negotiation, the majority of time was spent on a propaganda war against each other. The North repeatedly attacked the South verbally with propaganda, and the ROK negotiator felt it necessary to respond so as not to appear weak to North Korea or to his superiors in Seoul. During the second period of the South-North talks, progress was hindered by a hostile atmosphere, the inflexibility of each party’s positions, a difficult agenda on which to strike compromise, the lack of breaks or meals for private contacts, and an inappropriate meeting place, Panmunjom. Thus, negotiation situation vari-
ables can partly explain the failure of the South-North talks during the second period.

Certain negotiation situation variables also contributed to the progress in the US-DPRK talks. The US negotiators did not need to know about the history of the inter-Korean rivalry, making them less likely to get drawn into a propaganda war. The only interest for US negotiators was to bring North Korea back to the NPT regime; thus nonproliferation experts, rather than Korea specialists, took charge of the negotiations. Moreover, North Korea did not attack the United States verbally as often as it had South Korea in the inter-Korean talks, and the US interpreter selectively translated North Korea’s insults to focus the time and energy on the true negotiation agenda. After Clinton took office, the negotiation agenda was not focused on challenge inspections, but on IAEA inspections, which were more acceptable to the DPRK. In addition, after it agreed to replace the North Korean graphite-moderated reactor, the United States had a more varied set of agenda items to address, enabling it to pursue the negotiation with flexibility. Since the negotiation was conducted in English, ideological sentiments were diluted. Holding meetings in Geneva gave North Korean negotiators more freedom because the North Korean authorities did not closely monitor the negotiations on a daily basis. The United States also managed the negotiations by dividing the entire delegation into small groups, which not only enhanced personal relationships with the North Koreans but also maximized group dynamics among the North Koreans. This contributed a lot to the progress in the negotiation because the North Koreans tended to take a more hard-line approach when they were in a big group.24

The fact that the majority of North Korean negotiators were career diplomats also helped the negotiation to run more smoothly than had the inter-Korean nuclear talks.

NORTH KOREA’S NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

North Korea employed different strategies and tactics to achieve its goals in the two negotiations. The inter-Korean negotiations were more like bargaining between equals. In them, North Korea adopted a mixed strategy of compromise and toughness:25 North Korea tried to split South Korea and the United States and concentrated on reducing US military threats. In contrast, with the United States, North Korea employed a strategy useful for a weak nation in a negotiation with a powerful nation: North Korea conducted brinkmanship diplomacy to draw the United States to the negotiation table and extract concessions. North Korea sought to broaden the negotiations to involve improved relations with the United States. In both settings, however, North Korea tried to maximize its negotiation gains, while minimizing its concessions. As I illustrate these points below, unless otherwise credited, any quotes are drawn from the author’s personal observations as a participant in the JNCC talks.

North Korea’s Strategy and Tactics Vis-à-Vis South Korea

North Korea had several strategic aims in its negotiations with the South. First, North Korea pursued a strategy of splitting the ROK-US security alliance and reducing US military threats on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea used two tactics in pursuit of this negotiation strategy:

- **Putting the spotlight on the other side**: North Korea repeatedly argued that the source of the nuclear problem was US nuclear weapons located on its bases in the South. By doing so, Pyongyang was able to claim it should be able to inspect all US bases in Korea, whereas it was willing to show only Yongbyon to South Korea.
- **Changing the negotiating agenda**: In a related tactic, North Korea insisted that South Korea should verify the non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula by giving North Korea free access to US nuclear bases in South Korea. Pyongyang showed no interest in inspecting any South Korean military bases or civilian facilities. In this way, North Koreans tried to defer an inter-Korean inspection regime. The DPRK also promoted the principle of resolving all nuclear suspicion at the same time, which was not clear to South Korean negotiators at first. If South Korea had accepted the principle, it would have meant that North Korea could inspect all US bases and South Korea could inspect nuclear sites at Yongbyon. Together with the preceding tactic, this tended to shift the agenda away from the inter-Korean inspection regime.

Second, North Korea employed a strategy of one-upmanship to try to isolate and embarrass South Korea. This involved several tactics:

- **Insisting upon the principle of independence**: From the beginning, North Korean negotiators insisted that South Korea should stand independent from the
United States. North Korea also tried to disconnect policy coordination between South Korea and the United States. North Korean negotiators often ridiculed South Korea by asking, “Can’t you make a decision on your own?” or saying, “Ask the United States government what to do next.” This enabled the North to pose as the true Korean nationalists, thereby putting pressure on the South.

- **Defying international pressure with blackmail:** When South Korea mentioned that the international community would not tolerate North Korea’s obstruction of a bilateral nuclear inspection regime, North Koreans responded by saying, “If South Korea presses us, we will die and you will die. Then, unify Korea with the remaining twenty million South Koreans.”

- **Humiliating South Korean negotiators:** Whenever North Koreans encountered a new South Korean negotiator, a North Korean negotiator said, “Mr. X, you are a newcomer who does not know anything about our talks. Study hard to catch up with us.” The North Korean head negotiator often did not use honorifics to his counterpart. A dramatic example happened in the South-North Military Committee meeting, a component of the talks to implement the Basic Agreement. When South Korea’s head negotiator was a one-star general (“Junjang,” in South Korean terms) and the North Korean head negotiator was also a one-star general (“Sojang” in North Korean, which means two-star general in South Korean terms), the North Korean head negotiator always called his South Korean counterpart “Junjang” instead of “Mr. Head Negotiator” to gain the upper hand in the negotiation.

- **Insulting and slandering South Korean negotiators:** North Koreans insulted South Koreans, even picking on their physical appearances. For example, a North Korean head negotiator once found fault with a South Korean head negotiator for being bald. They used this tactic to raise the South Koreans’ temper in hopes of getting them to say things that the North could then exploit.

- **Waging a propaganda war:** In the South-North talks, the North used propaganda to advance its legitimacy and status by accusing South Korea of being a puppet of the United States. They accused the South of not being a sovereign state because of its lack of knowledge of where and how many nuclear weapons the United States had stationed in the South. Similarly, whenever a South Korean negotiator used English terminology, the North Koreans were quick to accuse that person of being a betrayer of the nation.

Third, North Korea maintained a strategy of maximizing negotiation gains and minimizing its concessions. Once North Koreans envisioned obvious gains from a negotiation, they were very quick at seizing them. When South Korea hinted at the possibility of canceling Team Spirit exercises in the first period of the inter-Korean nuclear negotiation, North Korea agreed on the Denuclearization Agreement within three days. When North Koreans envisioned no more gains, they delayed until South Koreans submitted more concessions. Finally they tried to find excuses to walk away from the table after confirming that no more gains were available. In addition to delaying tactics, the North used other tactics as part of this strategy:

- **Announcing its negotiation positions before negotiations began and showing its positions were nonnegotiable:** North Korea announced its negotiation position before it even came to the negotiation table. North Korea stated, “If the United States withdraws nuclear weapons from Korea, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.” At the same time, North Korea provided clear warning on its bottom line. For example, a North Korean head negotiator made it clear that if South Korea resumed Team Spirit exercises, it would mean the end of the negotiation. On the day of South Korea’s announcement that it would resume Team Spirit exercises, North Korea stated, “We will refuse IAEA inspections.” By doing so, North Korean negotiators showed that they were boxed into their stated positions so firmly that they did not have any room for concession.

- **Splitting the counterpart’s team and exploiting the division:** North Korean negotiators often praised those whom they saw as amenable to compromise and criticized the hardliners, in particular, people from South Korea’s National Security Planning Board. They would suggest that if the person from the National Security Planning Board was not present, it would be possible to strike a deal.
North Korea’s Strategy and Tactics in the US-DPRK Talks

North Korea utilized some different strategies with the United States. First, North Korea used a strategy of brinkmanship diplomacy to draw the United States to the negotiation table and extract maximum concessions from the United States.

In order to conduct this strategy, North Korea created a crisis in the NPT regime. North Korea abrogated its commitment to the NPT, as a way to extract gains from the United States if the United States wanted a return to normalcy. A weaker negotiation partner often employs this tactic. North Korea used this tactic in its negotiation with the United States, but rarely in its nuclear negotiations with South Korea. In this strategy, North Korea habitually violated its agreements and made its return to its previous commitment a negotiation agenda item.28

There were two essential tactics in this strategy:

• Creating a crisis in the international regime: By creating a crisis in an international regime in which the United States had high stakes, North Korea put itself onto the US agenda and gained bargaining leverage that it did not have before.29 By breaking international norms, North Korea could not only achieve its long-standing goal of direct high-level talks with the United States but also draw high-level policy attention from the United States. This crisis-generating tactic caused the United States to drop its demand for challenge inspections entirely.

• Reaching the brink first and threatening the counterpart: North Korea created crises several times. These include its announcement that it would pull out from the NPT in March 1993; its threat to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire” in March 1994; and its extraction of spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor in May 1994. Then, North Korea declared a semi-war status domestically and showed its readiness to fight if the United States were to impose sanctions or take a tough approach vis-à-vis North Korea. North Korea stood on the brink first and threatened to destroy South Korea. The United States had to back off before reaching the brink because it had more to lose than North Korea.

Second, North Korea pursued a strategy of expanding the negotiation’s scope to include improvement of its relationship with the United States, and economic issues related to the delivery of light-water reactors and energy replacement supplies. This strategy also entailed specific tactics:

• Forcing the United States to the negotiating table: After announcing the pullout from the NPT, North Korea repeatedly said that the nuclear issue can only be resolved through dialogue with the United States.30 It linked its return to the NPT with the improvement of relations with the United States. It succeeded in getting a series of high-level talks with the United States, whereas it had had only one high-level talk with the United States in 1992 under the Bush administration. This tactic resulted in marginalizing South Korea in the matter of the Korean Peninsula, which was one of North Korea’s long-term goals.

• Proposing a comprehensive deal: North Korea proposed a comprehensive deal by persuading the United States to broaden the negotiation agenda. Kim Il-sung conveyed his message to Peter Hayes as early as May 1993 via Kim Yong Soon, saying that without building trust and confidence with the United States, the nuclear issue would never be resolved. Without such trust, the United States would not believe North Korea even if North Korea allowed inspections of all its nuclear facilities.31

Third, North Korea again pursued a strategy of maximizing gains, while minimizing concessions. However, tactics to support this strategy were largely different from those it employed in the inter-Korean nuclear talks. The DPRK did not use delaying tactics or engage in insulting the US delegation as often as it did with South Korea. Other tactics were more common:

• Blackmailing the United States in conjunction with the brinkmanship strategy: Despite Kim Il-sung’s repeated assertions in the first round of talks with the United States that North Korea had neither the intention nor the ability to make nuclear weapons, the North Korean head negotiator once told his US counterpart that North Korea was able to make nuclear weapons. Similarly, by threatening to destroy Seoul, North Korea sent a strong signal to the United States.32

• Taking the initiative: North Korea tried to control the negotiation process by manipulating the agenda throughout the talks with the United States. By announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, Pyongyang succeeded in transforming a defensive position vis-à-vis IAEA special inspections into an offensive posi-
tion forcing the United States to choose one of two outcomes: facing a major blow to the NPT regime or providing benefits to obtain North Korea’s return to the NPT. Pyongyang also proposed the deal to replace its graphite reactors with light-water reactors to create an entirely different negotiation agenda. This changed the situation to one where without a commitment to replacing the reactors, it would be difficult for the United States to convince the North Koreans to accept ad hoc and routine inspections, never mind special inspections. From this time on, the nuclear deal changed from an inspection issue to a reactor-replacement issue.

• Dividing issues into pieces and making use of each piece: North Korea divided the negotiation agenda into pieces and used each piece to get the maximum benefits from the United States. For example, the North divided the issue of its return to the NPT into a complete return to the NPT, a temporary return to the NPT as long as the North deemed necessary, or a complete withdrawal from the NPT. Regarding its own nuclear activities, the North divided the issue into pieces such as selective permission for inspection of its nuclear facilities, the question of extraction of spent fuel rods, a threat to reload fuel rods, a threat to reprocess spent fuels, a concession to allow the canning of extracted fuel rods, etc. North Korea used each separate piece to try to extract concessions.

• Feigning internal struggle: In the US-DPRK talks, North Korea claimed that there are two distinctive camps in North Korea—the military and the diplomats. They suggested that the military hardliners might disrupt the negotiation if they were pushed too hard. According to North Korean negotiators, if the United States and the international community exerted pressure on the military, the hardliners would purge the negotiators from their domestic positions. In this way, North Korea tried to project a mirror image of the US decisionmaking process to extract more benefits from American negotiators. In the South-North talks, North Korea did not make claims about the existence of an internal split.

Summary of Strategies and Tactics

North Korea used largely different strategies and tactics vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States despite some commonalities in its strategies and tactics. North Korea did not use the strategy of brinkmanship diplomacy with South Korea whereas it frequently used it with the United States. However, North Korea used a lot of tactics exclusively vis-à-vis South Korea, for example, insults and slander, propaganda wars, and delay. These differences reflect the contrast in national power between South Korea and the United States, the nature of the relationship between North Korea and South Korea, and North Korea’s different objectives in the two negotiations.

There were also some commonalities in North Korea’s tactics. These included the use of blackmail and extortion to coerce its counterpart to make more concessions. North Korea also tried to generate issues and manipulate the agenda to maximize its negotiation gains.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Analysis of North Korea’s behavior in the two discrete negotiations with South Korea and the United States reveals that North Korea had different objectives, strategies, and tactics. Moreover, differences in situational variables affected the negotiation outcomes to a significant degree. In the inter-Korean negotiation, there was a negotiated settlement during the first period but an irreversible impasse during the second period. In the US-DPRK talks, there was a grand bargain and a detailed agreement concerning its implementation. Comparing North Korean negotiating behavior in the two talks provides useful lessons that negotiators should bear in mind in dealing with North Korea on nonproliferation and arms control matters in the future.

With regard to the South-North talks, South Korea will be much better off if future talks are held outside the Korean Peninsula to prevent the negative psychological effects and the reduced flexibility of North Korean negotiators. In managing negotiations, South Korea should completely disregard North Korea’s propaganda war, insults, and slander, and focus solely on the main agenda. This will, in turn, make North Korean negotiators realize that they are only wasting time. The South Korean government has to improve its negotiating ability with North Korea by developing and packaging more incentives to keep North Korea in the inter-Korean talks. In doing so, South Korea should be careful that US demands for the inter-Korean negotiation are within the negotiable range with North Korea, instead of accepting them at their face value. South Korea should try to keep the inter-Korean negotiation insulated from domestic
political pressure and maintain consistency in its policy toward North Korea. South Korea does not need to hurry to resume inter-Korean talks as long as North Korea sees more benefits in engaging the United States than South Korea. In this connection, South Korea can let the United States take the initiative in nuclear and missile talks with North Korea.

With regard to the US-DPRK talks, the United States should use a balanced “carrot and stick” approach towards North Korea as long as North Korea sees further benefits in engaging the United States. To correct for North Korea’s misperception that its brinkmanship and development of weapons of mass destruction will always benefit North Korea, the United States needs to design more effective and varied sticks. At the same time, the United States should incorporate South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” which seeks reconciliation with the North, in its engagement policy. This will prevent North Korea from thinking it can divide the two countries or exploit differences between them. Finally, US nonproliferation experts and relevant policymakers need better knowledge and understanding of conditions in different regions. The failed effort to apply to North Korea the very challenge inspections that had been placed on Iraq suggests a need for more discretion before attempting to apply one country-specific policy to another country or region.

With regard to nonproliferation and arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula, the international community should step up efforts to closely monitor North Korea’s clandestine nuclear activities to prevent it from utilizing the loopholes in the Agreed Framework.

With regard to verification, South Korea and the United States should address this issue at an earlier stage when new deals are being considered. Given failed efforts to link the resumption of US-ROK Team Spirit military exercises to North Korea’s acceptance of bilateral inspections, South Korea and the United States should ensure that a verification regime is discussed at the outset of any deals to be made in future arms control talks with North Korea. South Korea and the United States should remember that a weak verification regime at the beginning is better than no regime at all. Especially in the very hostile relationship between the two Koreas, a compromise between political feasibility and technical thoroughness should be reached among policymakers and experts from South Korea and the United States before they demand intrusive verification from North Korea.

With regard to general guidelines for dealing with North Korea, concerned countries should produce more detailed, written documents on negotiated agreements with North Korea to prevent them from violating or misinterpreting them. Countries should not try to use already-ceded cards as new sources of leverage. For example, in preventing North Korea’s missile development, concerned countries should not link the provision of heavy fuel oil and light-water reactors to North Korea’s ban on missile development and exports. North Korea is very clear that if the other party transgresses previous agreements with the North, the North will go back to its original positions, as if the earlier negotiation had never taken place. Nonetheless, the United States should avoid becoming entrenched in a series of negotiations providing incentives for North Korea’s every itemized request. This just encourages North Korea’s tactic of dividing issues and using all the pieces to its advantage. Instead, a comprehensive strategy that combines all the pieces that North Korea has divided is more useful than an itemized negotiation.

In conclusion, analysis of North Korean behavior in the two nuclear negotiations with South Korea and the United States provides useful implications for future nonproliferation negotiations. Now, four-party talks and US-DPRK talks are underway regarding peace on the Korean Peninsula and the missile issue, respectively. It is to be hoped that the lessons drawn from this analysis will help to make these talks successful.

2 South Korea and the United States have conducted massive joint military exercises, known as Team Spirit, since 1976 by mobilizing US forces from Okinawa, Hawaii, and the continental United States to the Korean Peninsula. Since 1976, North Korea has criticized the Team Spirit exercises for posing nuclear threats and preparing a possible invasion by the United States and South Korea into the North. North Korea has demanded permanent cancellation of the Team Spirit exercises and other joint military exercises.
4 To emphasize the need for challenge inspections, South Korea demanded that nuclear inspections should be conducted on the objects that the other
side selects. However, North Korea demanded that nuclear inspections should be conducted "on objects that the two sides agree on. At the negotiation, the two Koreas reached a compromise by stipulating that the two sides shall conduct inspections of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon by the two sides.


6 A North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, November 25, 1991, made four points: If the United States pulls out nuclear weapons from South Korea, the North will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. Inspections on the existence of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and inspections on North Korea’s nuclear facilities will be conducted at the same time. The United States and North Korea will have negotiations on simultaneous inspections and how to remove the nuclear threat to North Korea. The two Koreas will have negotiations to realize a nuclear-weapon-free zone.


8 North Korea demanded the South should not “introduce” nuclear weapons into the South Korean soil but they agreed to accept the wording “receive” as a result of the South’s persuasion. Personal observations by the author at the inter-Korean talks, December 31, 1991. Han, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia, pp. 27-44.

9 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 273. He described South Korea’s resumption of Team Spirit exercises as “an unpleasant bolt from the blue.”

10 On January 27, 1993, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would suspend all South-North dialogue including the bilateral nuclear negotiations because South Korea had announced its plan to resume Team Spirit military exercises one day before.


14 Robert Gallucci, former Assistant Secretary of State and US representative to the US-DPRK talks, interview by author, Tokyo, December 1996. Gallucci heard from DPRK negotiator Kang Sok Ju that North Korea would never allow special inspections out of fear that once North Korea showed nuclear facilities under special inspections, the United States would end the negotiation with North Korea forever.

15 Gallucci, interview by author, Tokyo, December 1996.

16 Hwang Jang Yop, interview by author, Seoul, September 1997. Hwang, the highest-ranking North Korean defector to South Korea, said that his colleague in charge of the Military Industry Department of the Workers’ Party, Jun Byong Ho, told him that the Agreed Framework would provide a grace period to the North so that it could conceal and relocate all past nuclear activities to other places.

17 The author’s personal observation at the inter-Korean nuclear talks.


20 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, p. 98. He explains that the burdens of the history of confrontation and the “Toughness Dilemma” between the two Koreas caused the two sides to engage in matching behavior.

21 Author’s personal observation as a participant.

22 Daniel Russell, then Principal Assistant to the Undersecretary of State, interview by author, Washington, DC, November 30, 1995.


25 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, pp. 98-103.

26 Rodong Shinmun, January 3, 1993. The earliest threat to refuse IAEA inspections in relation to the resumption of Team Spirit was made by the Spokesman of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

27 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, Ch. 1. Snyder explains that these phenomena come from North Korea’s bureaucratic rigidity as part of its cultural traits.

28 Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1999), p. 181-189. Downs, however, does not fully understand the difference in North Korea’s negotiation strategy between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era. During the post-Cold War era, North Korea decided to negotiate with the United States in a give-and-take manner and even in the inter-Korean nuclear talks, North Korea was sincere in exchanging concessions and complying with its commitment to freeze reprocessing facilities according to the Denuclearization Agreement.


31 Peter Hayes, interview by author, Seoul, May 1993. Peter Hayes directs the Nautilus Institute, a non-governmental organization with projects in North Korea.


