With the end of Cold War, China’s position in the international system has changed. Now, China’s strategic missile program is beginning to receive considerable attention, as it plays a new role in international relations. One recent study analyzing these trends, Alastair Iain Johnston’s article “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” makes the argument that China may be adopting a new nuclear strategy. He argues that certain Chinese military strategists have recently elaborated a doctrine of “limited deterrence,” which would require “the development of a greater number of tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear weapons.” If these concepts are implemented, Johnston concludes, “we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift...forces away from a minimum strike...posture...toward limited war-fighting.” Given the importance of this debate to future international security and to Chinese-U.S. relations, it is worthwhile exploring Johnston’s conclusions more carefully and probing whether these views are representative or not of general Chinese views on these issues.

The purpose of this essay is to provide a history and general outline of China’s strategic missile program and its underlying strategic rationale, tracing the various changes that have occurred in this strategy over time. Clearly, China’s strategic missile program has aimed at serving the country’s security interests. Therefore, its development, production, and deployment have been closely related to its foreign policy. But China’s foreign policy has changed dramatically over the past five decades. The influences of these changes, in turn, have had a major impact on the development of Chinese missile programs. The argument presented here is that Johnston exaggerates the importance of the “limited deterrence” school. Instead, I argue that a more comprehensive analysis of these issues must include greater consideration of China’s limited economic and technological capabilities, as well as the new directions of its foreign policy.

Since 1980, China has sought to improve its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union (and Russia), and other neighboring countries. China has also adopted new policies aimed at promoting regional peace and stability. Most recently, China has taken an active and cooperative attitude towards international arms control regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Based on these changes and an examination of the historical evidence, my findings argue that China’s missile strategy is most accurately characterized as one of “limited development,” rather than of “limited deterrence.” In this regard, my conclusion discusses the relationship between China and the United States and examines the feasibility of bilateral cooperation in missile nonproliferation efforts.

MAO’S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INITIATION OF A STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAM

China’s initial nuclear weapons and strategic missile programs were closely related to the foreign policy doctrines of Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong. At the end of 1940s, with the Cold War just beginning, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led by Mao and the Communist Party, occupied nearly the whole of mainland China. At that time, China was at an important turning point in its historical development.

Mao was an idealist. He wanted China to become the nucleus for realizing his goal of world revolution. In his...
view, the people would launch armed revolution and seize state power in all the countries still not under the control of the Communist Party. To support this cause, Mao demanded enormous sacrifices from the Chinese government and its people for the success of this revolution. At same time, Mao demanded that Chinese foreign policy serve this goal of world revolution.

Mao’s theory of world revolution not only aggravated the original contradictions between China and the United States, but also produced many new enemies for China. China’s neighboring countries in East Asia felt particularly threatened. Then, the Korean War began in 1950. These events extended the Cold War from Europe to Asia. During the Korean War, the leaders of U.S. government threatened to use nuclear weapons to attack China. At various times during the 1950s, the U.S. government seriously considered using nuclear weapons against China and also deployed nuclear-capable weapons systems on Taiwan. Subsequently, the United States organized its friends in the region into a military alliance oriented largely against China. In response to these threats, Mao decided that China needed to develop nuclear weapons.

Given China’s difficult economic conditions, China’s governmental leaders decided that China could only develop a very small number of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. In June 1958, Mao explained that if China did not have nuclear weapons, it would be subject to possible nuclear blackmail. He therefore argued that “…we have no other choice, we should build some. To develop some atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs and ICBMs, I estimate that 10 years are enough.” Mao also noted that “We…need fewer nuclear weapons in quantity but [they must be] better in [terms of] quality.”

Some Chinese scholars argue that China has undertaken the smallest number of nuclear tests and has used these “few” atomic and hydrogen bombs to demonstrate its peaceful shield. They point out that China never took part in the nuclear arms race or any other kind of arms race. Evidence for this argument can be seen in the fact that China never dramatically increased the number of its nuclear weapons.

Because the leaders of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’s communist governments of the late 1950s and early 1960s did not support Mao’s theory of world revolution, Mao launched the Movement of Anti-Revisionism in the 1960s. It met with strong opposition from the Soviet Union. The already critical situation between China and the Soviet Union became even more serious. Finally, war broke out in the border territory between China and the Soviet Union in 1968. At that time, nuclear war threatened to break out between the two countries.

By adopting a foreign policy based on the necessity of world revolution, China under Mao became the only country in the world that was the enemy of both superpowers simultaneously. In order to follow Mao’s principles, Chinese security interests had been ignored, putting China under the serious threat of nuclear attack.

CHINA’S POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION FROM MAO TO DENG

In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Beijing. This trip went a long way towards relieving the tension in relations between China and the United States. China’s major enemies had been reduced from two to one, leaving only the Soviet Union. This shift marked a significant improvement in China’s security situation.

Following Mao’s death in September 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged in 1977 to take over the leadership of China. One of his most important historical contributions was the great strategic transformation he undertook to change the foreign policy he had inherited from Mao.

On May 31, 1980, Deng gave an important speech on the basic principles that should underlie relations between different communist parties. He stated:

When a (communist) party comments on the rights and wrongs of brother parties in other countries […] this does not lead to a good result. Different countries face different situations. […] Therefore, a rigid formula cannot be applied mechanically. Even if you are using the Marxist formula, you may still make mistakes, because you are not taking into consideration the actualities of the different countries.

Although the victory of the Chinese revolution was won by applying the universal principle of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete state of affairs in China, we should not demand that other developing countries adopt the Chinese model in their revolutionary struggles. We should not demand other industrialized capi-
talist countries to adopt the Chinese model. It should be left to the party and people in that country to decide whether the party’s domestic policies and line are right or wrong. After all, only the comrades in that country know the situation there best.

[...]

No party should be the Father Party to boss another around. We object to others who issue orders to us. And we should never issue orders to others. This should become an important principle.7

Although this speech was talking about the guidelines for Chinese Communist Party relations with different communist parties it is, in fact, an important critique of Mao’s 30 years of following a policy of “world revolution.” This speech was very important for the strategic transformation of Chinese foreign policy. Certain other points are worth highlighting.

In his speech, Deng recognized that the results of Mao’s revolutionary theories over 30 years had not been entirely positive. Indeed, Deng pointed out that Mao’s theory of world revolution was not a “truth, which is universally applicable.”

Related to this point, Deng recognized that China did not have the ability to play a role in the revolutionary affairs of other countries. Thus, from that time on, the Chinese Communist Party began to act on the thesis that it did not represent the center of world revolution. Similarly, Deng argued that the Chinese Communist Party had no right to lead any foreign communist party. He acknowledged that the Chinese Communist Party had made many serious mistakes in this respect.

Instead of achieving world revolution, the Chinese people had suffered untold pain, enormous financial losses, and 30 years of possible progress in overall development. In the author’s view, this new understanding is best illustrated by the Chinese idiom: wu ji bi fan (things can turn into their opposite, when they reach the extreme). Through this popular reevaluation, therefore, China arrived at a new turning point in its history.

The logic of Deng’s arguments in discarding Mao’s theory of world revolution brought out the realization that Chinese-U.S. antagonisms could be avoided. Similarly, the rejection by the Soviet Union and the East European communist states of Mao’s theories meant that China could now move beyond its hostile relations with these states as well. Relations between China and its East Asian neighbors could also be improved.

THE NEW STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION UNDER DENG

Based on his new analysis of the international situation, Deng made some important decisions in late 1977 in regards to China’s foreign policy.8

First, he argued that world war was not likely to break out for a fairly long time. Thus, China could adopt a strategic shift from a guiding military ideology based on preparing the armed forces for an imminent war, possibly involving nuclear weapons, to one oriented towards military modernization under peacetime conditions.

Second, Deng stressed the need to promote military modernization within the context of the overall interests of economic development. This could be achieved through step-by-step progress, following the principle of liang li er xing (acting according to one’s ability).

Third, Deng posited that reforms could be made by reforming military structures, reorganizing the troops, cutting the size of the army by one million men, merging large military regions, and organizing combined operations as the best means of achieving military progress.

Finally, fourth, Deng focused on reducing the production of military industries through the practice of the principles of: jun min jie he (developing dual-use technology and products); ping zhan jiehe (giving attention to the requirements in peace and war); junping you xian (giving military products priority); and yi min yang jun (supporting military production by means of civilian production). These concepts were aimed at improving the Chinese military’s weapons and equipment under existing conditions.

As evidenced by his military strategy, Deng believed that the Cold War could be ended through peaceful means. Therefore, China seized this chance early, and shifted its official policy from one of preparing for war to one of economic development. The de facto impact of this decision was to end China’s policy of combat readiness and to transfer its priorities to peaceful construction 10 years before such reforms were undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The new policy of the Chinese government placed the importance of modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) below that of economic construction. Military
spending decreased to pre-1980’s levels. Based on the new calculation that world war would not occur for a long time and the gradualist policy of liang li er xing, the developmental program for nuclear weapons and strategic missiles now was listed as a lower priority than that of developing conventional tactical weapons. While China’s nuclear weapons and strategic missiles were far behind the times, they achieved only very limited progress over their original levels. Thus, at least in the area of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, China began to practice a “limited development” policy.

According to Deng’s strategy, the Chinese government adjusted its relations with neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union. In May 1989, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visited China. This summit meeting resulted in the full normalization of relations between Beijing and Moscow. Thus, due to Deng’s new guidelines, the last major enemy of China had disappeared. As a result, one can say that after the 1980s, China’s security situation had entered its best period since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949.

CHINA’S CURRENT SECURITY STRATEGY

In August 1993, Vice-Chairman of Central Military Commission of Chinese Communist Party General Liu Huaqing (China’s highest ranking military officer) issued a document called “The Strategic Guideline for the New Era.”9 The “new era” referred to the post-Cold War era and the period of China under the leadership of Jiang Zemin.

Liu’s statement noted that the purpose of the strategic guideline is to maintain the peaceful environment in which China is living as long as possible, which will enable China to reap the benefits of concentrating wholly on efforts to carry out economic construction.

The strategic guideline analyzed the current world situation in the following manner. It said that the international system is currently in a period of great historical change, one moving towards greater relaxation. Yet, it noted that while world war now appears avoidable, the world is still not without turmoil. Ethnic problems, territorial disputes, religious conflicts, and other problems that were covered up during the Cold War have sharpened and even led to bloodshed and limited war.

Liu argued that China’s external environment is one of the most favorable since 1949. China is capable of handling whatever contradictions might crop up in the course of the formation of a new, post-Cold War system through peaceful political and diplomatic channels.

But the document also made more specific points on the military situation facing China, arguing that, since the Gulf War, the existence of many new military technologies has made some traditional concepts and methods of war-fighting out-of-date. In the past, the PLA, although poorly equipped, was still able to triumph over better-equipped enemies. Liu argued that this tradition would still play a role in future high-tech war. However, he also noted that one of the principal contradictions facing the PLA was that its weapons systems could not adapt to the requirements of fighting a modern war. The main reason was the lack of military funding. Liu made the case that inflation has rendered the funding increases provided to cover living expenses, equipment purchases, capital construction, education, and training inadequate. Under these conditions, he argued that the leaders of the PLA must make the best possible use of their limited funds, taking into account the state’s difficulties and assisting in the central national task of economic development.

Liu made the case that there is a direct relationship between the type of military strategy a country pursues and the type of army it creates. The modernization of armies in the countries that pursue hegemony is based mainly on the development of long-range offensive weapons and aimed at carrying out global combat operations. Some regional powers have built modern armed forces that far exceed their defense needs, as a result of their expansionist strategies in their regions. Liu pointed out that since China is a socialist country, it must consistently oppose hegemony and power politics. Even if China becomes strong in the future, he argued, China will not pursue hegemony. Therefore, he observed that China adheres to a military strategy of active defense, meaning that the modernization of the PLA will be consistent with the need to defend the Chinese homeland and adjacent seas and to improve defense and combat abilities under modern conditions.

These strategic guidelines also emphasized that the modernization of weapons and equipment is determined by a country’s economic strength and scientific and technological level. With this in mind, Liu argued that China must proceed from its national conditions and cannot compare everything with advanced international standards, nor pursue an unrealistic pace or unrealistically high goals. The PLA’s principles for weapons develop-
ment: liang li er xing (acting according to one’s ability), and jin li er wei (doing everything to the best of one’s abilities).

Liu concluded that China needs a powerful defense capability. Without it, he argued that it will be impossible for a country as large as China to gain a foothold in the international arena. With a strong national defense, however, China both can win and prevent wars, thus discouraging any enemy from taking reckless action. According to this strategy, China will face new problems in this transition period between the Cold War and the as-yet-unformed new system of international relations. In order to avoid a new war, China must carefully handle these problems through political and diplomatic channels. This suggests that China will not pursue hegemony or practice an expansionist strategy in Asia, but rather put a premium on national defense only. In other words, China will only mainly develop the weapons for defending the native country and nearby seas, shunning involvement outside of its native country and nearby seas. Therefore, China will defend its legitimate interests, but not enter into conflicts with other countries, especially with the United States and Russia. China will avoid these conflicts by means of political and diplomatic approaches.

Finally, China recognizes that its military systems are not up to global standards. It is well known that a poorly equipped army can defeat enemies with superior equipment only under conditions of protracted war when it is fighting on its native soil. Therefore, this strategy is only applicable for defensive purposes.

In the 1980s, Chinese military funds increased, but at less than the rate of inflation. This resulted in a failure to provide real increases for spending on nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. Today, some Chinese strategists have published differing perspectives on this situation. In fact, there are some Chinese strategists who still hold to the Cold War-mode of thinking. They wish to augment the strength of Chinese nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. Johnston’s article highlights some of these authors.

However, there are many other Chinese strategists who hold different opinions. Regrettably, Johnston’s study neglects many of these sources, as well as the speech of Liu Huaqing enunciating China’s new military strategy. The authors cited by Johnston do not reflect the accepted views of the PLA, and, indeed, they are criticized implicitly in Liu Huaqing’s speech. Therefore, it is important for U.S. policymakers and analysts to be exposed to the other side of the story and views that more accurately reflect Chinese opinion.

Let us examine, for example, the views of Cao Lugong, a military strategist who published a commentary on Liu Huaqing’s strategy for the new era. According to Cao’s critique, a new era has begun with the end of the Cold War. Whereas before China faced a life-and-death-struggle for survival, during the new era, China must be concerned with its rise and possible decline. That is, China must not compete with the superpowers, because it will fall into the Cold War trap that caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union. China must avoid this path.

In the future, conflicts will be characterized by high technology warfare, with the soldiers requiring advanced technical degrees. China will not necessarily enjoy superiority in these wars. Because China will encounter stronger adversaries, the gaps in the training possessed by Chinese officers will be greater than those in the area of technology alone.

Cao argues that China’s national interests should focus on dealing with local wars. He separates these conflicts into two types:

1) wars to defend the unity of the motherland; and
2) wars to recover lost territories.

He states that China’s defense strategy will not imitate that of the United States. Yet, if the United States goes too far in bullying China, it will respond through other means. Because the United States enjoys superiority in the fields of space and nuclear weapons, China will not compete with the United States in these respects. In the near term, China will deal with more limited, conventional wars. So the emphasis for missile development will be on conventional and tactical missiles.

Cao points out that the inertia of history is great. The ideas and the mode of thinking that formed during the almost 50 years of Cold War will not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, he argues, China must focus its conscious attention on getting out of these patterns of thinking. This has been key to the cognitive shift China has already achieved since 1977, where it has changed from a focus on imminent nuclear war preparations to the task of economic construction.

It is also worth pointing out that China recognizes U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons and space technology. Therefore, it makes no senses, according to Cao, to try
to compete with the United States as the Soviet Union tried to. China never took part in the nuclear arms race of the 1960s. Similarly, there are no signs that China intends to take part in a nuclear weapon and space race with the United States in the future.

In the context of this and other arguments from Chinese security experts, the potential major build-up and estimates suggested by Johnston appear to be unfounded. Indeed, it is difficult to find any evidence of a shift in Chinese nuclear strategy in the past 10 years. To the contrary, as will be shown in the next section, a careful analysis of Chinese strategic missile developments shows that there have been at best limited upgrades of Chinese strategic missiles since the 1980s.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAM

China’s strategic force—the Second Artillery Corps—was founded on July 1, 1966. In recent years, the Second Artillery Corps has developed a plan for strategic missile modernization in some fields. This plan includes some of the following guidelines.

First, the plan calls for reducing the vulnerability of strategic missiles. Survivability is a crucial factor in the ability of China to deliver a nuclear second-strike. In these respects, the Second Artillery has taken a number of measures. China aims first at reducing the size of its strategic missiles and transferring the propellant used from liquid to solid fuel. Another goal is to increase the mobility of China’s strategic forces, while also adding to their stealthiness during launch and flight. Other planned improvements include methods for hardening missiles to survive a nuclear attack and to reduce the pre-launch and mid-course vulnerability. Another key task for China’s missile forces is to increase their accuracy, as well as their ability to penetrate strategic defenses.

However, despite these plans, efforts in the past 10 years to develop solid propellant and to convert existing missiles are still in the developmental stages. This work may be completed at the end of the 1990s or in the early 21st century. Meanwhile, efforts to increase the striking accuracy of strategic missiles have made some progress. As for other modernization efforts, no reports on progress have been made.

In the past 30 years, the Second Artillery Corps made considerable efforts to improve its operative abilities through training and exercises. In the mid-1970s, the Corps organized a large-scale, long distance, mobile operational exercise with live munitions. In this exercise, the whole process of transporting, hiding, and launching missiles was drilled. The operators launched four missiles in a very short time and all hit the targets. Some military training experts hold that this score meant that the Corps had the ability to conduct such operations in actual combat.

In the early of 1980s, the Corps for the first time practiced large-scale combined battle exercises to evaluate its operation ability as a whole. In the winter of 1994, the Corps first practiced an exercise to test its ability to strike after a nuclear attack. After a few hours of simulated nuclear attack, the Corps performed a nuclear counterattack from an underground facility (Digong) and hit the targets.

Today, many of the missiles originally deployed in the Second Artillery Corps have already enter the later years of their service lives. Since funding for the military is limited, these missiles cannot all be replaced. Thus, an important task faced by the Corps is to extend the service life of existing missiles and to exploit all available possibilities of the aging strategic missiles.

Regarding the exercise of the Second Artillery in the Taiwan Strait in the spring of 1996, the force had only practiced four times in the past 30 years. At the same time, as described by the leaders of the Second Artillery, they had to use aging strategic missiles. If this is true, it can be deduced that the possibility for China to change its nuclear strategy simply does not yet exist.

Recently, Yang Guoliang, commander of the Second Artillery Corps, and Sui Yongji, political commissar of the Corps, said: “The purposes for which we developed our few strategic nuclear weapons were to break the nuclear monopoly, to eliminate the threat of nuclear blackmail, to reduce the possibility of a nuclear attack against China, and to gain a peaceful environment for economic construction.” They continued, “Without a nuclear capability, China would not have been involved in great power talks. Therefore, it would have lacked strength and peace would have been jeopardized.”
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHINESE-U.S. RELATIONS

Recently, the Chinese economy has made considerable progress. There are some observers who think that China will become a superpower and threaten the security of the United States in the next century. The author believes that the improvement of Chinese economic conditions is a very positive development and should be accelerated. Even if the gross national produce (GNP) of China reaches the U.S. level sometime in the next century, China’s per capita GNP will still be only one-fifth to one-seventh as large as that of the United States. Therefore, China will still be a developing country. Many Chinese scholars are confused as to why Americans do not view Japan as a threat to U.S. security today? Japan has not come to terms with its defeat in World War II and threatens the economic security of the United States on a daily basis.

Now, and in the next century, the progress of technology will determine national strength in defense and economic well-being. Today, the gaps in these field between China and the United States are very wide. These gaps will increase in the next century and be maintained for a considerable time. Thus, China will lack both a rationale and the ability to counter the superpower position of the United States.

There are no territorial conflicts or other problems that cannot be solved between China and the United States. Therefore, if difficulties are not caused by a third party, Chinese-U.S. relations should be simple and friendly in the future.

A good Chinese-U.S. relationship will promote the progress of democracy and economic development in China. At the same time, it will also benefit the interests of the United States. The period of Chinese-U.S. military confrontation has ended. This past experience should help the two governments find better approaches for the peaceful solution of any problems between them. The Chinese government has paid considerable attention to relations with the United States. On the other hand, the establishment of positive Chinese-U.S. relations requires effort from both sides.

In recent years, some U.S. politicians have become involved in Chinese domestic affairs. Because the United States is more advanced than China in many respects, some of their opinions are beneficial to the Chinese people. However, it is regrettable to point out that their opinions are not all helpful. The author believes that, after some years, they will agree that the comments of Deng Xiaoping’s speech (quoted above) are relevant to them too.

Positive Chinese-U.S. relations can only be established on the basis of adequate mutual understanding. Although the Cold War has ended, people who hold on to Cold War ways of thinking still exist in the United States and China. According to their views, China will tread in the footprint of the Soviet Union to counter the United States and begin a new round of the Cold War. The author hopes the policymakers of the two countries will reject these views.

POSSIBLE CHINESE-U.S. COOPERATION FOR NONProliferATION

In 1980, the Chinese government made a decision to decrease greatly the production of military products and to transform these plants to produce civilian goods. China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), a key producer of missiles and rockets in China, now also produces refrigerators, automobiles, washing machines, medical instruments, and other products. In recent years, the civilian output value has grown to more than 70 percent of the gross value of CASC’s output.

At the same time, China’s sales of conventional weapons have been decreasing year by year. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the value of Chinese arms exports in 1995 ($868 million) was less than one-tenth of those of the United States ($9.89 billion). In addition, over the five-year period from 1991 to 1995, China ranked only sixth among world suppliers of conventional arms, with total arms sales of only $5.2 billion (compared to U.S. sales of $61.8 billion during the same period). Nevertheless, the United States continues to make arbitrary attacks on the arms exports of China. These accusations by the U.S. government are somewhat like the Chinese saying: “The officer is free to burn down houses, while the common people are forbidden even to light lamps.” Therefore, it is very hard for China to accept these criticisms. In order to maintain good relations between China and the United States, the Chinese government has agreed to halt exporting tactical missiles to Iran. If the U.S. government hopes to solve the contradictions in arms exports completely, however, it should make a fair arrangement to protect the reasonable interests of China. Only when every member country practices the principle
of fairness will the requirements of the MTCR be accomplished effectively. In addition, in the author’s view, the sole motivation for Chinese arms exports is economic. Thus, this problem should be solvable through negotiations between two countries.

CONCLUSION

According to Mao’s theory of world revolution, China previously practiced a policy of confrontation with the United States and Soviet Union. This led to China’s development of a nuclear weapons and strategic missile program in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the result proved highly unfavorable to Chinese security interests. Since 1977, China has undertaken an important strategic transformation and shift in foreign policy. Because this transformation involves a fundamental shift in priorities and outlook, it should be viewed as irreversible.

In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping discarded Mao’s theory of world revolution. The new strategy brought an end to the policy of confrontation with the United States and Soviet Union and ended prior trends towards Cold War thinking. As a result, the nuclear weapon and strategic missile program of China lost the driving force behind its development. However, since other nuclear states continued to keep their nuclear weapons, the Chinese government implemented a limited development policy for nuclear weapons and strategic missiles.

Chinese-U.S. confrontation from the 1950s to 1970s represented a tremendous loss for both countries. This period also makes today’s Chinese-U.S. relations difficult. However, reasonable people recognize that improved Chinese-U.S. relations will promote the economic and cultural development of both countries and benefit world peace. The security interests of the Chinese people will be served as well.

Since the 1980s, China’s security situation has entered its best period since the revolution. As a result, China does not need to change its nuclear strategy out of concerns for its national security. Moreover, as Liu Huaqing noted, China has many economic and technological problems, meaning that China will lack the capability of changing its nuclear strategy. At the same time, there is no evidence to date in China’s nuclear or missile programs of efforts to move in this direction. Therefore, Johnston’s worries of a new strategy seem unfounded.

Regarding the United States, there are no territorial conflicts or other problems that cannot be solved peacefully. While China will not actively confront the United States, Washington should also recognize the reasonable interests of China. The technology gap between the two countries will likely increase into the next century, meaning that China will not be able to compete with the United States on an equal level. Given these factors, despite the claims of Johnston’s analysis, there is also no reason to say that China will threaten U.S. security in the next century.

In conclusion, China has no interest in hegemony and adheres only to a strategy of active defense. The modernization of the PLA emphasizes the need to defend Chinese soil and nearby seas and to raise defense and combat abilities to modern levels. But this does not mean that China will threaten the security of other countries. Although China will face many new problems in the future, it will carefully handle its relations with the United States and other countries in order to solve any problems by political and diplomatic means, rather than military approaches. This will allow it to focus on its main priority: national economic development. In this context, as long as the United States takes Chinese views and interests into fair consideration, cooperation on non-proliferation issues between China and the United States is probable.

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3 Ibid., p. 41.
4 The author plans to complete a thorough study of other Chinese writings on the subject as a follow on to this viewpoint.
6 Ibid., p. 41.
8 Liu Huaqing, “Jianding buyi de yanzhe jianshe you zhongguo tese xiangdaihua jundui de daolu qianjin” (Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modern Army with Chinese Characteristics), Qiushi (Seek Truth), No. 15, August 1993, p. 3. (For an English-language text of this
important article, see FBIS-CHI-93-158 (18 August 1993), pp. 15-22.)

9 Ibid., pp. 4-7.

10 Cao Lugong, “Zou qu lengzhan” (Move beyond the Cold War), Sichuan Tangshi (Sichuan Party History (magazine)), No. 1, January 19-22, 1996, pp. 38-41; abstracted from Junshi Zhanwan (Military Outlook), No. 5, 1995.

11 Yan Heng, Huigu yu Zhanwan (Retrospect and Prospect) (Beijing: Guofang Gongye Chuubanshe, September 1989), pp. 157-159.


15 Ibid.