In February 1994, the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies published the *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*. The objective of the *Inventory* is to provide a comprehensive source of general information on the most important international organizations with responsibilities for nonproliferation. The *Inventory* covers a wide diversity of nonproliferation organizations and regimes, including formal organizations, non-charter regimes, multi-lateral groupings of states, and regional and bilateral arrangements. The Program for Nonproliferation Studies intends to publish the *Inventory* on an annual basis.

In view of the wide interest that the *Inventory* has generated among policy-makers in many national governments, in international organizations, as well as among political analysts in nongovernmental organizations, universities, and research institutions, *The Nonproliferation Review* plans to provide updates of major developments in international nonproliferation organizations. Since the publication of the 1994 edition of the *Inventory*, the following events of significance have taken place in international organizations and regimes.

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

The NPT was acceded to by Kazakhstan on February 14 and by Georgia on March 7, 1994, which brings the total membership of the treaty to 164.

**International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**

The Marshall Islands and Uzbekistan became members of the IAEA on January 26, 1994, and Kazakhstan became a member on February 14. The membership of the organization totals 121 countries.

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)**

The following states became signatories of the CWC: United Republic of Tanzania on February 25, 1994, the Bahamas on March 2, 1994, and Saint Kitts and Nevis on March 16, 1994, bringing the number of signatories of the CWC to 157. The number of parties to the convention reached eight when Norway, Australia, Albania, and Maldives deposited their instruments of ratification on April 7, May 6, May 11, and May 31, 1994, respectively.

On January 14, 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed on the implementation arrangements for Phase II of the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum, which provides for a detailed exchange of information on chemical weapons capabilities and for a number of on-site inspections.

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Reduction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)**

The majority of the parties to the BWC agreed to convene on September 19 - October 7, 1994, in Geneva at a conference to examine the report of the Ad Hoc Group Of Governmental Experts (VEREX), established by the BWC Third Review Conference in 1991, to identify and examine potential verification measures. On April 11-15, 1994, a session of a Preparatory Committee was held in Geneva to consider organizational arrangements for the conference.

In accordance with the U.K.-U.S.-Russian agreement reached in 1992, the Russian team visited three U.S. biological research centers in February 1994. This visit followed the western countries’ November 1993 visit to Russian facilities. The objective for the visits was reciprocal checking on each country’s compliance with the BWC.
Events in International Organizations Concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

In conformity with the agreement between the IAEA and DPRK, on March 1-15, 1994, an IAEA inspection took place in the DPRK. The results of the inspection activities were considered by the Board of Governors on March 21, 1994. The Board adopted a resolution in which it expressed grave concern and found the DPRK in further non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, called upon the DPRK immediately to allow the IAEA to complete all required inspection activities and to comply fully with its Safeguards Agreement, and requested the Director General to submit the resolution to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly.

On March 31, 1994, the President of the U.N. Security Council made a statement on behalf of the Council in which the Council affirmed the critical importance of the IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the NPT, took note that the DPRK had accepted in principle IAEA inspections at its seven declared sites, expressed the Council’s concern that the IAEA was unable to draw conclusions as to whether there had been either diversion of nuclear material, or reprocessing, or other operations, called upon the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors to complete their inspection activities, invited the Director General of the IAEA to report further to the Security Council on the question of completion of inspection activities, appealed to those member states engaged in dialogue with the DPRK to continue that dialogue, and decided to remain actively seized of the matter.

In May 1994, the IAEA conducted another inspection in the DPRK. On May 27, the IAEA Director General addressed a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General in which he stated that the fuel discharge operation in the DPRK’s five megawatt experimental nuclear power reactor was proceeding at a very fast pace, and if it continued at the same rate, the Agency’s opportunity to select, segregate, and secure rods for later measurements would be lost. Should this occur, the Agency would not be in a position to verify that all nuclear material in the DPRK, subject to safeguards, was in fact under safeguards.

On May 30, 1994, the President of the U.N. Security Council made a statement on behalf of the Council in which the Council strongly urged the DPRK to proceed with the discharge operations at the five megawatt reactor in a manner which preserved the technical possibility of fuel measurements in accordance with the IAEA’s requirements in this regard. The Council decided to remain actively seized of the matter and that further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The CD held its first session of 1994 from January 25-March 31. The Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban started negotiations on a universal, multilateral, and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). It elected as its chair Ambassador of Mexico Miguel Marin-Bosch. The Ad Hoc Committee established two working groups—on legal and institutional issues and on verification.

The Ad Hoc Committee has before it two draft treaties submitted by Sweden and Australia. The Swedish draft would entrust the implementation of the treaty to the IAEA. The Australian draft provides for the establishment of a separate international organization for this purpose, co-located in Vienna with the IAEA, which would be able to contract out certain technical, administrative, and conference support tasks to the Agency.

On February 16, 1994, a representative of the IAEA (Mohamed ElBaradei, Assistant Director General) made a presentation at the Ad Hoc Committee on a possible role for the IAEA under a CTBT.

On March 31, 1994, the special coordinator on the initiative to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices Ambassador of Canada Gerald E. Shannon reported that a preponderant majority view was that the CD was the most appropriate international forum to negotiate a cut-off treaty. He stated that a substantial number of states believed that the process of negotiation of such a treaty could be launched through the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Shannon noted that it would be advisable to decide early on how the Conference wished to use the expertise of the IAEA because any role of the IAEA during negotiations would be distinct from any possible function that it might have in a permanent verification regime established under a treaty.

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

Since January 1, 1994, UNSCOM has conducted seven inspections in Iraq: two nuclear, one chemical, one biological, and three ballistic missile. Two special missions were also conducted. On January 18, 1994, Security Council members held informal consultations pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991). Upon hearing all the opinions expressed during the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that “there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regime established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687, as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution.” On March 18, 1994, the Security Council decided during a closed meeting to continue implementation of its resolution 687.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The 1994 meeting of the NSG took place in Madrid on April 12-14. Argentina joined the Group as a new member, thus bringing the total membership of the group to 29. New Zealand, South Africa, and the European Commission attended as observers.

On the basis of recommendations by the Working Group on Conditions of Supply, the NSG reviewed the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Mod. 1, Part 1) and adopted several changes in order to respond to new concerns in the field of nuclear proliferation. The Group agreed to strengthen the retransfer provisions of the Guidelines and to incorporate a new provision underlining the importance of members’ satisfying themselves that their transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Technical Working Group was mandated to continue reviewing the nuclear-related items included in the Annex to Part 1 of the Guidelines. A new Technical Working Group was created to review the Annex to Part 2 of the Guidelines. The Group decided to restructure its arrangements for exchanging information on proliferation threats with the objective of further enhancing the members’ ability to respond to these threats. The Group affirmed the principle of transparency and agreed that members should continue their efforts to brief non-members on the aims and activities of the Group.

The next plenary meeting will be held in Helsinki April 5-7, 1995.

Current Chairman of the NSG - Ambassador José Antonio de Yturriaga, Permanent Mission of Spain, Gonzagagasse 15, A-1010 Vienna, AUSTRIA. Tel. 43 1 535 98 89, FAX 43 1 535 98 87.

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)

On March 31, 1994, the members of COCOM agreed to dissolve the organization as of April 1 and to establish a new, more broadly based arrangement designed to enhance transparency and restraint in conventional weapons and sophisticated technology exports to countries whose behavior is cause for serious concern, and to regions of potential instability. The specific procedures of the new regime are to be developed. The target date for completion of this work is October 1994.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

On May 30, 1994, Brazil deposited its instrument of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty adopted on August 26, 1992, and declared that Brazil waived the requirements for the Treaty’s entry into force contained in its Article 28 (a) and (d), thus giving effect to the Treaty in Brazil.

Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)

On February 9, 1994, Brazil ratified the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement signed by Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA on comprehensive safeguards. The Quadripartite Agreement entered into force on March 4, 1994.

International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs)

The ISTC in Moscow began operations on March 3, 1994. At meetings on March 17 and 18 in Moscow, the ISTC Board of Governors approved 23 projects involving an initial funding of $11.9 million.

Compiled by Roland Timerbaev and Deborah Ozga