The relationship between comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) negotiations and international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament has been long-standing and complex. As the current CTBT negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva draw to a close, a new conflict has emerged between the nuclear weapon states (which were recently converted to the cause of a CTBT as a non-proliferation measure) and the non-aligned countries (which have traditionally regarded a test ban treaty as a step towards nuclear disarmament). This disagreement on the meaning of the CTBT has persisted through the final weeks of negotiations at the CD and will have profound implications for its future role within the broader nonproliferation regime. In particular, the outcome of the CTBT negotiations is likely to condition the approach—whether positive or negative—of many governments towards the new “strengthened review” process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed to at the Extension Conference in New York in May 1995.

Cynics fear that the nuclear weapon states intend to eviscerate the review process from the beginning, turning it into a “talk shop” or bogging it down in procedural complexities. For those states that tacitly opposed indefinite extension of the NPT in New York, the strengthened review process is a weaker lever on the nuclear weapon states than they had hoped to wield had the extension decision been a limited or renewable one.

Other states that had accepted the indefinite extension as necessary to underpin a stable nonproliferation regime hoped that, by locking the nuclear weapon states into a more frequent review process, they would gain greater oversight and accountability. South Africa, Sri Lanka, and others at the forefront of negotiating the strengthened review want to ensure that the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting set for 1997 establishes a substantive role in monitoring and maintaining pressure for full implementation of the Treaty, particularly Article VI on nuclear disarmament. Already, the depository governments of the NPT have been meeting to discuss procedures for the first PrepCom of the enhanced review process. Thus, the outcome of the CTBT negotiations—and the type of CTBT reached (if one is reached)—will help determine whether non-nuclear states will be satisfied with the strengthened review process and how they might behave at the 1997 PrepCom. Recent changes in position at the CD (especially by China) suggest that the nuclear weapon states are beginning to realize that lack of progress in this important area will be costly.

This essay first provides a brief history of the relationship of CTBT efforts to the broader nonproliferation regime. It than analyzes the outstanding issues and dynamics among the key players in the final negotiations at the CD. Finally, it considers the likely implications of the success or failure of the CTBT deliberations on the strengthened NPT review process, as well as on other future nuclear arms control efforts.


A ban on nuclear weapon tests was first put on the international disarmament agenda in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. However, multilateral talks in Geneva during the 1950s deadlocked over the competing security demands of the United States and the Soviet Union and the practical problems of establishing an intrusive monitoring and inspection system for the treaty. Aided by the recent advent of satellite monitoring capabilities, U.S. President John Kennedy, Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan finally concluded the tripartite Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. Abandoning the attempt to establish an intrusive and mutually-acceptable verification regime, the three nuclear weapon states settled for a ban that covered only nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and...
under water, leaving verification to their national intelligence means.

By 1968, the great powers (excepting France and China) had agreed in the preamble of the NPT to “seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.” But little progress was achieved in this direction due to the continued arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. The exception was the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (which proposed that the two states limit test yields), but it was never ratified.

In 1990, a group of non-aligned states, headed by Mexico, refused to endorse the final declaration of the Fourth NPT Review Conference, unless the nuclear weapon states committed themselves to a timetable for negotiation of a CTBT. The United States and Britain refused, and the meeting collapsed amid acrimony and mutual recriminations. With only five years until the states parties to the NPT had to decide for how long the Treaty should be extended, pressures for a CTBT began to mount. Non-aligned states demanded this step as the very least indicator of progress towards the Article VI obligations undertaken by the declared nuclear weapon states. In the meantime, positive security developments related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the implementation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the negotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (I and II) began to influence the willingness of the nuclear powers to consider a CTBT seriously.

As the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by “rogue” states in unstable regions came to be perceived as a greater threat than the nuclear build-up of a rival superpower, some of the major powers became converted to the cause of a test ban treaty. They viewed it as simultaneously performing a nonproliferation function, appealing the non-nuclear weapon states in the run-up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and lending political capital to domestic moves to cut post-Cold War defense budgets, while providing some satisfaction to certain public opinion groups. First Russia, then France, and finally the United States undertook moratoria on their nuclear testing programs. The United Kingdom, interrupted in the middle of a significant nuclear warhead refinement program, remained opposed. However, given its dependence on the Nevada Test Site, the British had little choice but to fall in with the U.S. moratorium. China continued testing, but joined consensus on a U.N. General Assembly resolution in December 1993 calling for negotiations on a CTBT to begin at the CD.

Negotiations on a CTBT opened in the shadow of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The non-aligned states called for a treaty to be ready by the time the NPT conference opened in April 1995. Ostensibly, they argued that this would demonstrate the good faith commitment of the nuclear weapon states to their Article VI obligations. In fact, many believed that the enthusiasm for a CTBT exhibited by the P-5 (permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council) might wane once indefinite extension of the NPT was safely accomplished. The chair of the negotiations, Mexico’s Miguel Marin Bosch, attempted to speed up negotiations with a “vision” draft of a CTBT in August 1994, but was thwarted by the French, who wanted to keep all their options open before the May 1995 presidential elections.

The first 15 months of negotiations moved slowly, with emphasis on technical questions and monitoring techniques. France and the United Kingdom reversed the linkage implicit in the non-aligned states’ calls for a CTBT before the NPT, arguing that a permanent NPT would make them more positively inclined towards a permanent test ban. Having resisted non-aligned calls for a speedy conclusion, the nuclear weapon states timed their concessions for maximum impact in the run-up to the NPT Extension Conference. In January 1995, the United States dropped its proposal for a 10-year “opt out” clause in the proposed treaty, and, in April 1995, France and Britain gave up their demand for so-called “safety and reliability” tests.

At the NPT Extension Conference, the CTBT played little role, with two significant exceptions. During the negotiations on the South African-inspired “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” Mexico and other non-aligned states pressed hard for an explicit timetable for achieving a CTBT. As 1996 was already a target date imposed by the U.S. Congress, the United States put pressure on its allies to fall into line. The non-nuclear weapon states, headed by Australia, also used NPT discussions in Main Committee III to put pressure on China’s demand for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), eventually getting consensus that the “potential benefits” (noted in the NPT’s preamble) had not been demonstrated and that there were serious concerns about the environmental consequences and implications for nuclear nonproliferation. However, the lack of agreement on a final declaration from the conference robbed this consensus in Main Committee III of any real authority.
When China conducted a nuclear explosion less than three days after the NPT Extension Conference concluded, closely followed by an announcement from newly-elected French President Jacques Chirac that his country would conduct up to eight nuclear tests between September 1995 and May 1996, negotiations at the CD became paralyzed. One ambassador underlined this interrelationship by commenting that the NPT Extension Conference seemed to have served as the prime deterrent to nuclear testing. Communication among test ban negotiators deteriorated further when it was revealed that the U.S. Pentagon had revived its push for a 500-ton test threshold, having reportedly been told that it could do so once the NPT was out of the way. The CTBT began to look doomed.

Among the P-5, differences abounded: the United States considered that any explosion below 1.8 kilograms was equivalent to a “zero yield”; Britain stated that it would settle for 40 to 50 kilograms; Russia favored 10 tons; France wanted an exemption up to 200 to 300 tons; and China kept quiet, with an official position that there should be no release of nuclear energy whatsoever. The first breakthrough came in August 1995, when the United States and France committed themselves to a “true zero yield” ban, followed by Britain in September. Finally, the CTBT began to look like a worthwhile objective again and negotiations began in earnest.

In the pre-NPT Extension Conference phase, there had been a general P-4 alliance, with China on its own advocating a range of isolated positions on PNEs, security assurances, no-first-use, opposition to national technical means of verification, and so on. Among the P-4, the United States and Russia often appeared closest, with France and Britain supporting each other on issues such as safety tests, entry into force and verification, “reverse linkage” with the NPT, and working to a slower timetable than the United States appeared to want.

After the 1995 NPT Extension Conference—and particularly following the August decision by the United States to adopt the “zero yield” concept—Russia seemed to pull away from the P-4, while France, having achieved its objective on testing and timing, moved much closer to the United States, showing more flexibility than any of the other nuclear weapon states (although continuing with its final nuclear tests). The shift reflected the importance of a CTBT to France once it had completed its testing program and the announced closure of its Pacific test sites. The Russian delegation at the CD, by contrast, did not formally accept the “zero yield” position until May 1996, under pressure from the G-7 states at the nuclear safety summit in Moscow in April.

In the final weeks before the CD’s deadline for concluding a CTBT, it appeared that the P-5 has split into two camps: the Western P-3 confronting China, which is increasingly backed by Russia on a PNE window and verification, including restrictive inspection procedures.

During the first 18 months of negotiations, China played a back-seat role. Although wanting to continue testing until at least 1996, China was somewhat shielded from criticism by the more obvious French delaying tactics up to May 1995 and then the more provocative number and location of France’s resumed testing program. Based on China’s negotiating posture, it would seem that Beijing may have initially entered the CD talks with the hope that they would fall apart. Certainly, it appeared that China tabled a number of mere “place-holding” proposals in the early phase of negotiations and did not politically commit to a test ban treaty or fully address the security and technical implications of the treaty’s options on vital provisions (such as scope and verification) until early in 1996. In the final months, China seemed more engaged in the negotiations, fighting for its positions with greater openness and seeking to win allies and specific concessions.

But while China continued testing at a rate of two explosions per year and discussed CTBT packages behind closed doors with the P-5, India came under increasing pressure from two sides. First, a highly-charged pre-election debate at home pushed for a harder line, while a second force was that of the major nuclear powers, which wanted to bring the non-NPT states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—into multilateral nuclear arms control for the first time. India has been a public advocate of a CTBT since 1954. While it has a nuclear weapon capability, it has held back from major weaponization, despite India’s continued testing and development of a range of nuclear delivery options, including a MIRVing capability. Its 1974 so-called “peaceful” test demonstrated India’s nuclear status to China, Pakistan, and the rest of the world. To maintain this status, it has had to stay out of the NPT, and it has continued to argue against the Treaty on the grounds that it is inherently discriminatory. Nevertheless, it has sought to maintain a leadership position among the non-aligned, especially the Group of 21 at the CD, advocating a nuclear test ban and disarmament. Under pressure from the largest party in its newly-elected parliament, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to declare itself a nuclear power and even to test, the coalition government of H.D. Deve Gowda was torn between a range of policy options. Briefly summarized, India faced the fol-
allowing choices: to bargain for the strongest possible language on qualitative development and nuclear disarmament, then sign and accede; to block consensus on the treaty’s conclusion; to withdraw from the negotiations (thereby permitting consensus but making clear its non-participation and refusal to sign); to participate in negotiations until the treaty is finalized but refuse to sign; to sign but never ratify. If India choose not to sign or ratify it was certain that Pakistan would also stay out, an important factor in Pakistan’s insistence that entry into force should be made conditional on accession by all the eight de facto nuclear states.

SHAPING A TREATY: THE FINAL MOVES IN GENEVA

By May 1996, the CD remained deadlocked over several key issues, including: PNEs, inspections, entry into force, and the treaty’s role in curbing qualitative developments and new weapons designs. Underlying these disagreements was the broader question of India’s intentions, which were framed in terms of the treaty’s role in achieving eventual nuclear disarmament, not merely curbing horizontal proliferation. As the CTBT negotiations entered their final phase, India has issued an ultimatum, requiring that the treaty include a commitment to nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework.

In late May, Russia proposed watering down provisions for “managed access” to suspected test sites, whereby an inspected state would have wide powers to prevent inspection of any sensitive areas. U.S. officials complained that Russia was trying to have it both ways: if a violation were committed or suspected at a particular site, then by definition that site could be deemed sensitive, in which case an inspected state could claim the right to exclude it from inspection. Further departing from the Western P-3, Russia has long advocated that only a positive vote by the Executive Council can approve an on-site inspection, where the United States, Britain, and France preferred the procedure to be automatic unless the Executive Council voted to countermand the inspection request. Russia shares this view with several other countries, including China, Pakistan, India and Israel.

With only one month to go before the CD’s self-imposed deadline of June 28, the Nuclear Test Ban Committee Chair Jaap Ramaker (the Netherlands) tabled a chair’s draft text in order to focus attention on the main areas of disagreement: the preamble, on-site inspections and entry into force. On scope, there was now almost universal support for the Australian formulation, which would ban “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” The majority of non-nuclear weapon states accepted this text, together with the “zero yield” understanding. A major exception was India, which continued to press for a definition that would prevent subcritical tests and some laboratory activities. However, with a weak government following its elections, a hung parliament, and a maelstrom of opinion in the Indian media that New Delhi should walk out of the talks and/or refuse to sign, such positions were no longer being taken by other countries as serious negotiating demands. Other non-aligned countries, including Indonesia and Egypt, which proposed that the ban should cover all nuclear tests and not just nuclear explosions, indicated a willingness to back the general scope if the nuclear weapon states would accept language relating to the prevention of qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons in the preamble, but there has been continuing debate over the strength and implications of such a text. Russia belatedly accepted the Australian scope text in May, just prior to its inclusion in the chair’s draft treaty. China, which had been pushing for PNEs with vigor (and growing desperation), finally conceded to the majority will. Announcing its 44th nuclear explosion on June 8, China said it would conduct only one further test, after which it would undertake a testing moratorium no later than September 1996. Most importantly, it dropped its objections to the general scope proposed in the chair’s draft treaty, pushing instead for text instituting a review on PNEs in 10 years, with the possibility of amending the ban if all states parties agreed (a likelihood so remote as to be discountable). However, although China’s announced moratorium and flexibility on PNEs has been welcomed, Beijing’s greater involvement in the negotiations has exposed more clearly than ever the gulf between China’s positions and those of the United States, Britain, and France, especially over inspections and the admissibility of national technical means of monitoring. As the endgame squeezed the final ounces of concessions from the negotiators, it seemed possible that PNEs were always intended to provide a grand smokescreen and a dramatic flourish of flexibility so that China could avoid giving in too far on the issues it regarded as fundamental to its national security, such as monitoring and inspections.

Inspections, the issue on which previous attempts at a CTBT have foundered, have again been described as a “treaty-breaking” issue. The United States, supported by France and Britain, wants to be able to use any kind of

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evidence to support a request for an on-site inspection. Concerned that too great a delay could prevent the collection of time-critical evidence, the three states also argue for a simplified decisionmaking procedure, enabling quick and almost automatic access to the suspected site, subject to restrictions on “sensitive facilities” unconnected with a possible treaty violation (managed access). China, together with Pakistan and India, desires a much stricter procedure, requiring the vote of two-thirds of the Executive Council before an inspection can go ahead. Wanting to prevent the United States from making use of its national technical means, China, Pakistan and India originally opposed any use of national means, but modified this position to allow some use of surveillance data, subject to strict controls and corroboration by the international verification regime. The United States refuses to accept the level of restriction imposed by these countries, although it will reportedly accept the conditions on national technical means provided in the chair’s draft text. This issue is difficult to resolve because it affects not only national security, but also ratification.

During the first six months of 1996, U.S. media had successively accused India, China, Pakistan, and Russia of suspicious activities connected with nuclear testing or violation of other treaty commitments. The stories were reportedly based on U.S. intelligence sources, which were never publicly corroborated. This led China and some of the key states among the non-aligned to argue that such evidence is biased and, since it is not equally available to all states, should be excluded from the CTBT inspection regime.

For the United States, the right to back up an inspection request or accusation with any relevant evidence is fundamental to the credibility of the verification regime. Its general position has been backed by Britain, France, and the majority of Western and Eastern European negotiators, but many were afraid that U.S. intransigence on positions that its allies regard as extreme could prevent conclusion of the treaty. In this, the United States seemed to be responding to political pressure back home.

Sectors of the intelligence and defense agencies are reportedly threatening to prevent ratification if the U.S. delegation compromised on inspections. Since a report on the verifiability of the treaty from such agencies is essential for eventual Senate ratification, such threats cannot be taken lightly. Clearly, the United States is concerned about verification, but, in the view of many of its own delegation, the verification provisions in Ramaker’s chair’s text would provide adequate reassurance if that were the only issue. There is deep concern in Geneva that political opponents of a comprehensive test ban in the United States may be inflating verification requirements to wreck the treaty by the back door. This is counterproductive, for in bargaining with China and Russia to get them to accept the U.S. demands, the United States has been perceived to be willing to sacrifice other key provisions, arguably of more immediate importance to a workable CTBT, such as a comprehensive ban on PNEs and credible conditions for entry into force.

With the exception of a proposal by India to link the treaty’s implementation with a commitment to nuclear disarmament in 10 years, the negotiations on entry into force have focused on the number of ratifications required, and whether all the states capable of conducting a nuclear test (generally viewed as the P-5 plus India, Israel and Pakistan) should be explicitly included. Everyone agrees that the treaty should aim to include these eight declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states, but Russia, Britain, China, and France went further, wanting to make implementation of the treaty conditional upon their accession. With India teetering on the brink of withdrawal, other states are worried that this could result in an indefinite delay before the treaty comes into effect, which would undermine its credibility and cause problems for the verification regime. However, Russia and Britain have turned the issue into a “treaty-breaker,” arguing that without all eight a CTBT would be pointless.

The United States prefers to base entry into force on ratification by 40 states, including the P-5, but late in the still on-going negotiations indicated that it would adopt the position of the other four if it can get China and Russia to concede some of their positions on inspections. Japan has taken the lead among the large number of non-nuclear weapon states that viewed with dismay any entry into force condition that would have given the nuclear or threshold states a veto on implementation. But its practical proposals for combining a certain number or list of states with political pressure or a waiver mechanism are ignored by Russia and Britain. Ostensibly a requirement to ensure India’s accession, this intransigence on entry into force could be self-defeating, with the risk of precipitating India’s withdrawal before negotiations are concluded. With India threatening to walk out of negotiations if its accession is a treaty condition for implementation, and Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom claiming that they could not sign the treaty without this condition, Ramaker introduced a compli-
cated proposal in the penultimate week of June. In the first instance, the specified condition would be a list of 37 countries with either seismic stations or radionuclide laboratories—which includes the eight de facto nuclear states. Intended to mollify Russia and the United Kingdom, this condition would apply for the first five years after signature. If all 37 states ratify during that time, the treaty would be immediately implemented. If not, the treaty would be given a second chance: providing that at least 75 countries have ratified, the treaty would enter into force automatically after the five-year time limit, unless one of the states which had ratified calls for a conference on entry into force. This conference, open to all states that have ratified, could decide by a two-thirds majority to implement the CTBT. In order to meet Pakistan’s particular concerns, Ramaker’s formula also allows an opt out for any state that has already ratified but that has national security conditions relating to a country outside the treaty. Although the delay of five rather than two years is more than most CD members want, it would be better than an open-ended block on implementation. A moratorium on testing would be expected to be agreed among at least the P-5 after signature, but before entry into force. Russia and Britain would have five years to make their formula work, but the second part of the provision would provide a way of bypassing the veto of one or a few states on the list of 37. With this issue so polarized among key states, such a clumsy and complicated formula will either have to provide the solution or precipitate a rethinking, thereby enabling the negotiators to draw back from the brink and institute a simple number or less restrictive list/waiver formula.

In late June, India continues to argue that it would sign a “good” treaty, and in that respect has made proposals on scope, entry into force, and the preamble. On the preamble, many non-aligned countries support India’s intention (if not its exact text) to provide a stronger interpretation of the treaty’s political context and function, by reference to the prevention of qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament in an (unspecified) time-bound framework. This would gain the support of the majority of non-nuclear weapon states but is opposed by the United States, Britain, and France, with China and Russia officially more flexible. Ramaker’s chair’s draft addresses these issues, but in weaker language, leaving non-aligned states that have compromised on scope feeling that they have given up their interests without an adequate gain in return. The P-3 have ruled out any negotiations on preambular language that goes beyond the chair’s draft, but were India to bargain on the basis of a commitment to sign in exchange for acceptance of its proposals on qualitative developments and nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon states would find it difficult to refuse. However, with India’s coalition government dithering about its strategy, and unable to decide whether to walk away, sign, or stay but not sign, it is squandering what little leverage might have remained for the non-aligned states to strengthen the treaty.

Complaining that—as currently envisaged—the CTBT would freeze the nuclear status quo, India is now bringing its arguments against the NPT to bear on the emerging CTBT. In a statement to the CD on June 20, Arundhati Ghose underlined that “India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons.” She accused the P-5 of continuing to rely on nuclear weapons themselves, visualizing the CTBT as merely an “instrument against horizontal proliferation,” shaped to the “technological preferences of the nuclear weapon states rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament.” Despite speculation that India would announce its withdrawal from the talks, this statement was couched instead in the terms of an ultimatum. However, in backing away from Group of 21 attempts to develop a stronger collective position on nuclear disarmament in the preamble, India has left the impression that it is not so much interested in strengthening the treaty as in providing grounds for not signing.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ON-GOING DEBATES

As negotiations reach their final, critical phase, two questions are uppermost: whether the treaty text can be agreed to in time (with particular pressure on the P-5 to resolve their differences on inspection procedures) and the effect of India’s ultimatum (and the impact on the CTBT and nonproliferation regime if India carries out its threatened refusal to sign).

The first question depends on P-5 politics, and, in the final analysis, will probably hinge on whether Clinton can exert his authority on Russia and the United Kingdom to obtain agreement on entry into force and on his own defense and intelligence departments to acquiesce in Ramaker’s verification and inspection provisions. Exag-
gerated evasion scenarios and inflated verification requirements have frequently provided a mechanism for the military and intelligence communities to defeat arms control initiatives, and the inter-agency process in the United States is especially vulnerable to such ploys. Prolonging the debate gives China, Pakistan, and India greater opportunities for leverage and obstruction.

The second question addresses the nature and universality of the CTBT and the effect of these negotiations on future nuclear arms control, including the NPT review process. While it is clear that one important objective of these negotiations was to involve the threshold states in multilateral arms control, states join treaties for reasons of national self-interest. It was to India’s advantage to halt China’s testing and modernization, but with Beijing’s current program close to completion and the rest of the P-5 test programs largely abandoned, that incentive is diminished. It may be that the P-5 expected too much of the role of peer pressure among the non-aligned, where both India and Pakistan play important roles in the CD. Pressure by means of public accusations and threats, such as the United States has attempted in recent months, have seldom worked with India. It appears now that there is only a slim chance to salvage the CTBT as a universally credible measure. Given that it is unlikely to test in any case, India’s accession could be bought by a combination of economic and political incentives, together with agreement on stronger language in the preamble and/or establishment of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD. Hostility to a CTBT in India is now so great, whipped up by local media and electoral politics, that the treaty concessions would be needed for any government to present the accession as a victory, even while the real sweeteners were provided behind the scenes. At present, there is no sign that such deals are being worked on, and time is running out.

If a text acceptable to the majority of states is finalized, it could be sent to the U.N. General Assembly and signed, even without India’s agreement, although this would lack the authority of the CD as a whole, since decisionmaking relies on consensus. If India does not sign, however, taking Pakistan with it, then the treaty will begin its life with its credibility seriously impaired. Depending on whether there is no treaty or a treaty without the threshold states, the international community is faced with the possibility of a total or partial failure of the CTBT. The non-aligned states would be likely to blame the western nuclear powers for their intransigence in refusing a timetable for nuclear disarmament despite their obligations to Article VI of the NPT. The nuclear weapon states would view the CTBT’s failure as justification for resisting multilateral initiatives and would blame India for pursuing its nuclear ambitions over the necessity for international security. Although India’s decision is unlikely to delay China’s signature, it is certain to be taken into account when Beijing considers ratification, potentially holding up ratification by all five declared nuclear weapon states. Since bringing the threshold states into international nuclear arms control was a central objective of a CTBT for some of the nuclear weapon states, the treaty’s failure to include such states would be likely to stall hopes of a follow-on U.S.-Russian initiative for a START III. It could also fuel the drive in some U.S. circles for further developments on theater and ballistic missile defenses.

The NPT review PrepCom would take place, but under the shadow of mutual recriminations at the failure of the first concrete objective in the principles and objectives decision. In those circumstances, it is likely that discussions on disarmament will degenerate into the kind of polarized and futile debates that characterized the proceedings of Main Committee I at the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. The effect of failure to achieve a credible CTBT on the CD would be no less significant. Having recently expanded to include 61 members, the CD has been deadlocked over its agenda and future role for over two years. It achieved a mandate to negotiate fissile materials production ban in 1995, but many members consider that the arguments over whether fissile stocks should be included are so fundamental that this negotiation will never get off the ground, with or without a successfully concluded CTBT. Failure on a CTBT will almost certainly block all attempts by the non-aligned to get a nuclear disarmament committee and could be used to undermine the concept of multilateral negotiations altogether, consigning the CD to a role as yet another toothless discussion forum.

A successfully concluded CTBT will provide a useful springboard for the NPT strengthened review process, validating the decisions taken in 1995. While it might be expected that the non-aligned would argue for the next step identified in the program of action, the call for a fissile cut-off is more likely to come from the Western countries, including the nuclear weapon states. Even if the CTBT is regarded as essentially successful, many non-aligned states will be disappointed that the scope is not as
comprehensive as they wanted. This feeling, in turn, is likely to fuel calls for additional measures to prevent nuclear weapons-related testing in laboratories, including possibly a revival of New Zealand’s proposal at the 1995 NPT Extension Conference for negotiating a ban on nuclear weapon production. As these measures are being discussed, and even as the nuclear weapon states pull back from multilateral treaty negotiations, the longer-term demand for a convention to ban nuclear weapons is likely to come more to the fore of debates in the U.N. General Assembly, the CD, and the NPT reviews.

2 Sirous Nasseri, Ambassador of Iran, to the CD plenary, June 15, 1995, CD/PV.708.
3 Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India, to the CD plenary, June 20, 1996, CD/PV.740.
4 Ibid.