I would like to speak to you today about an issue at the very top of President Clinton’s agenda: reducing the threat of nuclear weapons.

1995 is a year of decision. This year presents more than opportunity—it’s a moment of choice. In the coming months, we can turn a corner in our efforts to combat the spread of these and other weapons of mass destruction. And I am here to tell you that we in this room have an obligation to work together and get things done. Now.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a world transformed. Today, the American people worry less about nuclear war than at any time in a generation. But the weapons still exist, and they still can destroy our nation. That’s why you are here. You have devoted your lives to making people safer. As we move into the year ahead, let’s not forget what is at the heart of our efforts: ensuring that when all of our families turn out the lights at night, they can sleep in greater safety than ever before in their lives. This is not ultimately about the intricacies of missile throw-weights or the half-life of fissile materials. This is about protecting people.

That’s why President Clinton vowed when he took office to do everything in his power to reduce the danger posed by these weapons. And we have come a long way toward this goal. We have begun dismantling a huge part of the global nuclear arsenal. At the same time, we have maintained the strategic nuclear forces necessary to protect our most vital interests.

We are now at a crossroads—a point where some of the most important arms control goals we set during the Cold War can be formally realized. That is why today I want to issue a call to arms—or to arms control. We have a new and ambitious agenda. It will require a vast amount of work from all of us: educating the public, pushing for action on Capitol Hill and lining up support in the international community. You and I are bound to disagree on individual points, and should. But we must also keep our eyes on what’s most important—on our fundamental goals. Because if we let our differences dominate the headlines, we will fail. That won’t be just an embarrassment—it will gravely weaken the safety we want for our families and for our country.

Because of the strides we’ve made, we are in a position to make tremendous progress. Consider this: in 1995, in this year of decision, we must gain ratification of START II by the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma, so that—as Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed—the treaty can be entered into force at their next summit. The presidents also agreed we can then begin warhead removal immediately and ahead of schedule. This year, as President Clinton said in the State of the Union Address, America also will lead the charge to extend indefinitely the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is absolutely crucial. In addition, we must pursue a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as a convention cutting off production of fissile material and more measures to safeguard nuclear materials in Russia and the other Newly-Independent States. We will push for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. And we should aim to complete the ABM treaty talks on the demarcation between theater and strategic missile defenses. We should take all of these steps this year.

We have an agenda like this because we have made real progress on these issues over the past two years, as we worked to reduce existing weapons and to prevent nations or groups from acquiring nuclear weapons or...
Anthony Lake

the materials to make them. Let’s look at where we stand.

A couple of years ago, some doubted that the START I treaty negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush could ever be brought into force. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a genuine danger that several nuclear powers would emerge in its place.

Today, our diplomacy has overcome that danger. The determined efforts of President Clinton and Vice President Gore, as well as those of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, culminated in the ceremony last month in Budapest at which START I entered into force. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all put their signatures on the dotted line: they all agreed to forewear nuclear weapons entirely and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. START I will eliminate delivery systems that carry 9,000 nuclear warheads. We are currently dismantling these nuclear weapons literally as fast as we can—in all, 2,000 nuclear weapons a year—and the Russians are also deactivating their weapons years ahead of schedule.

The ceremony in Budapest was one sign of just how much the end of the Cold War has created new opportunities to make us safer. We are striving to take the fullest advantage of that change.

President Clinton reached an agreement last year with President Yeltsin to stop targeting each other’s territories. For the first time in a generation, Russian missiles are not aimed at our cities and our citizens. If a Russian missile were accidentally launched, it would not hit our country.

Our new partnership with Russia and our arms control progress over the past six years also served our security interests in allowing reduction in our strategic programs. To mention a few:

- For every 10 U.S. military personnel whose duty just a few years ago was working on strategic forces, today there are only three.
- The development of such programs as the Midgetman, the MX Rail Garrison basing system and the Lance follow-on nuclear missile could safely be terminated.
- We have cut U.S. defense budget expenditures for strategic weapons by almost two-thirds.

Pulling back from the Cold War nuclear precipice in this way helps our citizens in their daily lives. It allows us to save some $20 billion a year on strategic nuclear forces alone. So now we can shift resources to needs like getting our economic house in order by paying down the deficit, boosting the readiness of our conventional forces, and putting more police on our streets. Our success in reducing nuclear arms means a stronger, safer America.

While the post-Cold War era has opened new arms control possibilities, in some ways it has made our work harder on the nonproliferation front. Thanks to technology and the collapse of the Soviet Union, nations and even terrorist groups have a better shot today than during the Cold War at getting the materials they need to build a bomb. Ironically, the very reductions in nuclear arsenals increase the risk that dismantled warhead materials will be diverted. We see this in a new and deeply disturbing phenomenon: nuclear smuggling—with the greatest threat coming from the theft of bomb materials in the stockpiles of the former Soviet Union. Now, we face the danger that states and terrorists could try to become nuclear powers without investing in expensive development programs. One arrest has followed another, and the weight of the seized materials has climbed ominously from ounces into pounds.

That is one reason why President Clinton has given nonproliferation such a high priority, and why the United States has proposed a comprehensive approach to fissile material control.

We have agreed with Russia on the shutdown of its remaining plutonium production reactors by the year 2000, and verification measures will ensure that none of the spent fuel from these reactors is used for weapons purposes.

Thanks to the farsighted legislation by Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are helping Russia and the Newly-Independent States transport, safeguard, and destroy nuclear weapons. Nunn-Lugar also employs nuclear scientists in nonmilitary projects. And our nuclear labs have worked directly with their Russian counterparts to upgrade security at the Kurchatov Institute, in a program that we will be expanding further.

At the same time, we reduced the total amount of material needing protection. Under an agreement we reached last year with Russia, 500 tons of highly-enriched uranium will be converted to low-enriched reactor fuel that cannot be used for nuclear weapons.

In a major operation, called “Sapphire,” we also arranged for the airlift of nearly 600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to secure storage in the United States. That would have been enough to make dozens of nuclear weapons.

For the first time ever, we have also moved beyond
the elimination of thousands of nuclear delivery vehicles to eliminating the nuclear warheads that have been deployed on those systems. And Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to pursue measures to ensure that the process is irreversible, including steps to exchange data and conduct reciprocal inspections of nuclear material storage facilities.

To help make the weapons dismantlement process irreversible, we have begun the process of placing nuclear material from the U.S. military stockpile under IAEA safeguards. President Clinton remains committed to strong support for the IAEA, including its vital safeguards function. The success of the regime and the adherence of additional countries to the NPT places new responsibilities on the agency. It needs our support, and we have provided this year an additional $10 million in our voluntary contribution.

Even as we seek to put in place arms control and nonproliferation measures that make the world safer and more stable, we must deal with some serious regional proliferation problems. We will continue to integrate nonproliferation concerns into our regional strategies in South Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere.

Over the past two years, we have put our bilateral relationships, including those with Moscow and Beijing, on the line in order to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime. We now have commitments from four key potential missile suppliers—Russia, Ukraine, China, and South Africa—to control the transfer of ballistic missiles and related technology.

We have also confronted the North Korean nuclear threat and we have stopped it in its tracks. Our agreement with Pyongyang freezes and will dismantle their nuclear program. It is not built on trust. Instead, the framework agreement sets up a system of international monitoring—and the monitors have already confirmed that the North Koreans have frozen their program.

Plutonium that could have been processed into weapons materials will be put under IAEA supervision. Construction on reactors that would have produced more such material has ended. If at any time North Korea fails to meet its obligations, we will withdraw the benefits of the agreement. This is a deal that is good for America and good for the region—which is why our allies in Japan and South Korea are committed to support it financially as well as politically.

These are solid achievements. But they will mean little if we don’t build on them in 1995. It is the year of decision. Let me outline for you the extraordinary and necessary agenda before us.

First, this year we hope to raise the barrier against developing new generations of nuclear weapons by negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Second, we will continue work to prevent more nations from building their own nuclear weapons by pressing for an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Third, but by no means less important, we will also work to cut even deeper into the global arsenal by pushing to ratify START II. And fourth, we will work on a number of other efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including a fissile material cut-off convention. Let me discuss each of these briefly.

One of the Administration’s foremost goals is completing the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. When President Clinton arrived in office, he declared a moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing and, in a major reversal of the policy of Presidents Reagan and Bush, instructed U.S. delegates to take the lead in negotiating a CTB.

This weekend, the President made three decisions that underscore his determination to achieve as much progress as possible before the NPT Extension Conference convenes in April.

First, on the assumption that a treaty will be signed before September 30, 1996, and subject to the same understandings that govern our current moratorium, the President has decided to extend the moratorium on its nuclear tests until a CTB Treaty enters into force.

Second, the President has directed our CTB negotiator, Ambassador Ledogar, to propose that the Conference on Disarmament remain in session through August if the negotiation is not concluded during the round now scheduled to end in April.

Third, the President has directed that at tomorrow’s session of the Geneva negotiations, the United States will withdraw its proposal for a special “right to withdraw” from the CTB Treaty 10 years after it enters into force. Let me also note that the CTB will contain a traditional “supreme national interest” clause. In articulating his National Security Strategy last July, President Clinton declared that the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, the President considers the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.
One of the most complicated and challenging issues in the CTB negotiations is the question of what kinds of experiments and other stockpile stewardship activities will be permitted under the treaty—what our negotiators call “treaty compliant activities.” The U.S. position with regard to these activities is determined on the basis of three criteria:

- The CTB Treaty must be comprehensive and promote our vital national interest in curbing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- The CTB Treaty must not prohibit activities required to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile; and
- The CTB Treaty must be signed by all declared nuclear states and by as many other nations as possible.

As the negotiations proceed, the United States will continue to review its position on this issue to ensure it meets these criteria.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a key reason why there are not scores of nations armed with nuclear weapons—as many in the past imagined there would be. But if we want to keep it that way, this year we must focus our efforts on permanently extending this treaty. The President, Vice President, and Cabinet are committed to this necessary work. There are no more important negotiations before us.

Failure to secure permanent extension would open a Pandora’s box of nuclear trouble. Such a failure would help backlash states—isolated nations with rigid ideologies and expansionist aims—that are bent on acquiring the most dangerous of weapons. And other countries might seriously reconsider their own decisions to forego the nuclear option.

Anything less than permanent extension will leave doubts about the international community’s resolve. NPT extension is in our deepest security interest and in the interest of all nations. Non-nuclear weapons states should vote for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT not as a gift to the declared nuclear powers, but because it is fundamentally important to their own security. The truth is that the NPT is not only the cornerstone of our strategy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation but also the foundation of our efforts to prevent proliferation of all other weapons of mass destruction. Remove it and the architecture collapses.

I know you all agree with that. But let me also raise an issue of disagreement between us and some of you. Some of you accuse us of being disingenuous, of moving too slowly away from the Cold War while demand-
• We will negotiate legally-binding measures to strengthen compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
• We will continue to work for strengthened export controls including a new regime to succeed COCOM.
• And we will push for ratification of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which will advance President Clinton’s initiative to eliminate the most deadly of landmines. I want to make a plea that even as we are working hard to reduce the threat posed by the very largest weapons, we must not forget the terrible toll now being taken by some of the smallest. I was reminded of this on a recent trip to Africa, particularly when I visited Angola—which has more mines than people. I was outraged by what I saw around the once beautiful town of Kuito, which now lies in near-rubble. It was not only the children I saw who had lost limbs, terrible as that is. It seemed to me a metaphor for the terrible waste of this war in Angola that I could see, across the fields outside town, mangoes in the trees that no one could pick for fear of the minefields.

Time *is* of the essence. The achievements of the past two years are truly remarkable—if not always remarked upon. But they have to be built upon—and 1995 is the year to do it. We have made real progress by weaving our goals of eliminating weapons of mass destruction into the fabric of our diplomacy. These are not separate issues any more. We tie our economic and political relations with scores of nations to progress on arms control issues.

We can help write a new set of ground rules for the post-Cold War period. We can strengthen our own security by negotiation—which is cheaper and safer than matching arms for arms. And we can work to create a world where nations depend on commitments—to each other and to their own people—no less than on arms. Or, we can undermine our own cause by forgetting the things that really count through indifference or unnecessary differences.

We *are* present at the creation of a new era in world affairs—an era that demands full American engagement. In a world with too many nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, there is also a world of opportunity to do something about it. President Clinton wants to press ahead: to extend the NPT forever. To sign a Test-Ban Treaty. To reap the benefits of START for the American people—so they may feel and be more secure.

I hope you will help us make 1995 the year of the right decisions.