

# POLITICAL ASPECTS OF KAZAKHSTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICIES

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Nuclear issues in Kazakhstan continue to attract the attention of the public, experts, and politicians. Fortunately, today this attention comes without the hysteria that had surrounded the problem of the former Soviet nuclear weapons left on Kazakhstani soil. There has also been a shift of emphasis. This is a sign of the times, of changes that have accompanied the "maturing" of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. The evolving nature of Kazakhstan's nuclear policy—from a passive to an active stage—lies at the root of this process.<sup>1</sup> This change would have been impossible without the creation of the legal basis provided by the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as without the greater experience the country has gained in international politics and economics. As far as the fate of the Soviet missiles in the republic goes, the government maintained throughout 1994 that the decision was already a *fait accompli* and, accordingly, attempted to project this impression on public opinion. This report examines the recent history of nuclear developments in Kazakhstan, the nature of the current national debate on various issues, and the problems facing implementation of government policies, including those associated with the Nunn-Lugar program.

## OPERATION SAPPHIRE

The most convincing proof of the changing nature of Kazakhstan's nuclear policy towards a more pro-active direction was Operation Sapphire. Like a bolt of lightning, it unexpectedly illuminated for a moment the complex system of political, economic, and possibly military interests surrounding the nuclear complex in Kazakhstan. As we know, on December 23, 1994, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Meyers announced that the United States and Republic of Kazakhstan had successfully completed the transfer of nuclear materials for safe storage in the United States. But the history of Operation Sapphire was already at least a year old.<sup>2</sup> Kazakhstan's accession to the NPT and introduction of the criteria of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1993 made the presence of these materials in the republic inappropriate. In early 1994, the government of Kazakhstan asked the United States to help solve the problem of about 600 kilograms (kg) of highly-enriched uranium that had been stored at the enrichment facility of the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant in East Kazakhstan Oblast since the Soviet period.

On November 24, 1994, Deputy Prime Minister of

Kazakhstan Vitaly Mette and Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev confirmed this information in a press conference. The ministers drew public attention to the following details: the highly-enriched material had been located at the Ulbinsk plant since at least 1976, where it was being stored mostly in composite materials, part of it in a semi-processed form. The Kazakh side also noted that the existence of the deal with the United States was not a secret from Russia; Moscow, however, had refused to purchase the material, using the excuse that it was “nuclear waste.”

Later, one of the high-ranking Kazakh officials involved admitted that the specific details on Operation Sapphire were conceived and executed in an atmosphere of high secrecy. In spite of the fact that the operation was accompanied by multiple negotiations, expert exchanges, and trips that involved many ministries, most of the participants knew only about their part of the operation. All information was held in secret until the plane carrying the cargo landed in the United States. This, as well as the fact that the exact value of the deal is still undisclosed, indicates that the two main players—the United States and Kazakhstan—had been trying to leave Russia as uninformed as possible. Obviously, Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union in the nuclear sphere (and therefore responsible for these materials), should have possessed full information about the Ulbinsk uranium. Russian specialists, however, maintained that there should not have been that much uranium there. According to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), there should have been only 167 kg of beryllium alloy and 27.5 kg of U<sup>235</sup> dioxide in powder form. Furthermore, this material was not believed to be capable of producing a nuclear device. The United States, however, acquired 558 kg of U<sup>235</sup> in Operation Sapphire, enough to produce 20 to 50 bombs. Most likely, Moscow was simply trying to save face in a situation that it did not control. Yet, if the people in Moscow did possess sufficient information but refused to acquire these highly-enriched materials, this is a matter of a serious concern, for it puts into question Russia's capability to perform its obligations to the international nonproliferation regime.

Naturally, each party to the operation tried to gain maximum advantage from the events, each pursuing its own goals. The United States, according to Defense Secretary William Perry, made an outstanding contribution to saving mankind from nuclear disaster; President Clinton called it “a historic step in the field of

nuclear nonproliferation.” Washington thus needed Operation Sapphire to demonstrate to the world American determination to combat the nuclear threat, as well as to strengthen the image of the administration domestically. We can only guess how useful these materials will be for American nuclear scientists and the military in determining the source of possible earlier diversions from former Soviet nuclear facilities.

For Kazakhstan, Operation Sapphire had two sides: economic and political. As far as the economic side of the deal, we may say it was relatively small. The exact sum of the deal is being kept in secret, but it is estimated at between \$15 to \$30 million.<sup>3</sup> This money, however, will be used for specific purposes. These funds will be used to ship U.S. equipment necessary to improve the environmental situation in the East Kazakhstan Oblast, particularly in the territories around the uranium enrichment facilities. The Kazakhstani side was also pursuing political goals—trying to prove that the Republic of Kazakhstan is a dedicated proponent of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to elevate its cooperation with the United States to a new level. The curator of Kazakhstan's nuclear industry, Minister of Science and New Technologies Vladimir Shkolnik, summed up the essence of the event in a January 1995 press interview. He emphasized that the operation was not a random, one-time occurrence. Rather, it is part of a broader Kazakhstani policy, which is being pursued on multiple levels. As far as Russia goes, its losses are evident in politics, propaganda, and, perhaps, in the military-technological field.

## COMPETING POLITICAL INTERESTS

The active phase that Kazakhstan's nuclear policy is currently undergoing suggests the existence of different sides and interests groups, each of which is interested in certain outcomes. Their voices are now distinctly heard in three main arenas where stormy discussions around nuclear issues are unfolding: among political groupings from the former parliament (which was dissolved by the president in March 1995), within the scientific-industrial complex, and among government ministries (including defense, foreign policy, and financial circles).

In 1994, different viewpoints crystallized in Kazakhstan's Parliament regarding two major issues—the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and the ratification of the agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia regard-

ing the strategic nuclear forces temporarily located on the territory of Republic of Kazakhstan. This happened at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan on November 9, 1994. Two parties formed among the legislators, one of which was lobbying for the governmental measures already proposed on these issues, while the other one, which we may tentatively characterize as “nationalists,” mounted an active attack on these policies.

In this struggle, the nationalists demanded a radical widening of the borders of the geographical zone implied under the term “Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.” Furthermore, some deputies drew the attention of their colleagues to the fact that similar test sites at Naryn and Azgyr are not receiving similar kinds of environmental protection or medical programs. On the same day, the nationalist deputies attacked Kazakhstan’s deputy minister of defense,<sup>4</sup> who had been the leading government spokesman in advancing the following concept for the Agreement on Strategic Nuclear Forces with Russia: 1) that the agreement would provide military security to Kazakhstan on the basis of the forces and means of the Russian Federation; 2) that the agreement would create the necessary conditions for the normal functioning and reduction of strategic nuclear forces; and 3) that the agreement would provide for the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by Kazakhstan under START I.

Despite the turbulent debate and the claims made by the deputies against virtually every article, their resistance was overcome with the help of the Parliament’s speaker and some procedural maneuvers, which allowed the agreement to be ratified. The last time the legislators attempted to interfere in the process of making political decisions was on January 31, 1995. The issue was silo number 108-K on the Semipalatinsk test site, which had held a nuclear charge inside it since May 1991. The government maintained that the dismantling of the nuclear warhead would be finished by April 1995. However, some Russian experts (cited by Kazakhstani parliamentarians) deemed the extraction of the warhead from the shaft to be extremely dangerous under existing conditions on the test site, making its full dismantlement impossible.<sup>5</sup> As it actually occurred in May 1995, the destruction of the test round only succeeded in rendering the chemical explosive ineffective, while the nuclear materials remain intact deep underground, posing possible future environmental hazards (such as groundwater contamination). Moreover, a number of Kazakh experts, in their turn, think that there are in fact

a few other unexploded warheads in the silos of the test site. If this turns out to be true, this will turn into a real “bomb” in the hands of the nationalists. Apparently, the weakest spot of the legislators was and still is their lack of complete and full information.

#### **KAZAKHSTAN’S NUCLEAR BUREAUCRACY AND ITS PLANS**

The people associated with the interests of the scientific-industrial complex possess the most complete information. They are also connected with the government through their high-ranking representatives (heads of ministries, agencies, and centers), who, in spite of their status as senior governmental bureaucrats, directly represent the interests of the scientific-industrial complex. These are pragmatists and intellectuals, who are attempting to preserve the scientific potential of Kazakhstan, despite the general economic decline, political intrigues, and the struggle of interests around the Soviet nuclear legacy. Their conception was fully demonstrated to the public during the parliamentary hearings on the problems of the nuclear scientific-industrial complex and the use of nuclear energy on January 31, 1995. Four speakers representing the top leadership of Kazakh nuclear-scientific complex—Science and New Technologies Minister Shkolnik, General Director of Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency E. Bayadilov, General Director of the National Nuclear Center G. Badybekov, and President V. Yazikov of the Kazakhstan State Corporation for Atomic Power and Industry (KATEP)—attempted to present the future possibilities of development in the nuclear field in the most optimistic light. According to them, the plan for nuclear industry development will unfold in the following way. Kazakhstan’s uranium industry extracts 80 percent of all CIS uranium, and it therefore has future profit-making potential. Besides the 600 kg of HEU purchased by the United States in Operation Sapphire, the United States may buy additional uranium in the future. Moreover, its five nuclear reactors will allow it to maintain an appropriate level of nuclear research. In fact, Kazakhstan’s nuclear complex will remain closely connected with that of Russia’s through a system of agreements on cooperation in transportation, disposal of nuclear materials from warheads, liquidation of the consequences of nuclear tests, as well as through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), headquartered in Moscow. Financing for the peaceful nuclear

program of Kazakhstan will come through the ISTC (which will establish a branch in Almaty), the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, and the IAEA.

In the final analysis, the basic goal of the nuclear industrialists is accelerated development of the nuclear energy system in Kazakhstan in order to achieve capabilities of a minimum of four to six gigawatts, and a maximum of 18 to 20 gigawatts, by the year 2030.<sup>6</sup> The leaders of the nuclear industry have simultaneously criticized the insufficient exploitation of the Semipalatinsk test site for radiological research and former Soviet policies of converting facilities to civilian uses, due to which the volume of uranium extraction in the republic has dropped more than twice since 1986.

Thus, the nuclear scientific-industrial group has developed a program for further expansion of the energy-producing sector in the republic. It puts the main emphasis on nuclear reactors (up to 40 reactors of 500 megawatts). Its demands to the government include the following measures: 1) the adoption of legislation that would promote the development of the nuclear energy sector and systems of control over nuclear materials, as well as over exporting and licensing; and 2) a liberation from taxes for all financing received from the ISTC, the IAEA, and other international organizations and foreign partners for these purposes.

## GOVERNMENT POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Meanwhile, the government has its own circle of interests, problems, and obligations in the nuclear sphere. If one is to believe the *pia desideria* that the government of Kazakhstan has proclaimed since 1991, its main goals are providing security for Kazakhstan and fulfilling its international obligations. In late 1994 to early 1995, the government could tell the public that it had fulfilled its goals. In February 1994, the transfer of ratified documents on Kazakhstan's accession to the NPT to the United States concluded the long evolution of Kazakhstan towards a nuclear-free status. In December 1994 at the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the three nuclear powers reaffirmed their security guarantees to Kazakhstan in a special memorandum. China did this separately on January 1, 1995. In some sense, the Memorandum on Security Guarantees<sup>7</sup> is a unique document, deserving some discussion here.

In its six articles, the United States, Great Britain,

and Russia are obliged—in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act and the principles of the NPT—to respect the sovereignty and borders of Kazakhstan, to refrain from the threat of force, economic coercion, and use of nuclear weapons or *any other kinds of weapons* against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This latter point is extremely important because the opponents of START I and of the Lisbon Protocol have criticized the security guarantees from the nuclear powers because of the fact that they offered protection only in case of a nuclear attack. The final element of this policy was the signing of the packet of 17 documents on January 20, 1995, in Moscow. A number of these documents were directly related to issues of Kazakhstan's security, namely: the lease of four important sites in Western Kazakhstan to Russia, steps towards the creation of a joint armed forces, Kazakhstan's support for Russia's suggestion of establishing (or re-establishing) a single air defense system under the command of the Russian military, and the development of a security concept for the protection of the external boundaries of the CIS.

## CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT

The government of Kazakhstan confidently considers its efforts of the last year in the field of national security a success. During this time, however, criticism of the government's policies in missile/space technology, nuclear energy, the environment, foreign policy, and national security has been mounting.

One issue of debate has been Russia's lease of the Baikonur space launch site, which supposedly had been settled at the end of 1994. Despite all the preparation to implement the lease, however, certain representatives of Kazakhstan's National Aerospace Agency<sup>8</sup> have publicly admitted that Russia (even together with Kazakhstan) no longer has the potential to maintain the cosmodrome on the same level as before. Most likely, Moscow will aim for increasing the commercialization of Baikonur, while Almaty counts on strengthening cooperation in military space programs. Simultaneously, Koskom, a government/public stock company was disbanded. With this, the idea of a number of prominent Russian specialists to destroy SS-20 missiles through space launches also died. The concept had been supported by the American company, Aerojet. In connection with this, accusations against the top political leadership were made,<sup>9</sup> pointing to the fact that the concrete economic interests of Kazakhstan had been sacrificed for the sake of the

“higher” goal of integration with Russia.

The fact that environmentalists from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk environmental movement are holding their second conference in the capital of neighboring Kyrgyzstan also illustrates the disturbing symptoms of distrust of the government on the part of the anti-nuclear movement.<sup>10</sup> Possibly, this has to do with the personal ambitions of the local leader of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement Olzhas Suleimenov, whose political party—the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan—has recently proclaimed itself to be in “constructive opposition” to the government. Other explanations involve distrust of the government’s environmental policy in Semipalatinsk and its lack of influence in trying to stop China’s on-going program of nuclear testing.

Besides the specialists from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, representatives of other international organizations acknowledge that the environmental rehabilitation program initiated in the Soviet period and continued after independence has been a complete failure. This is also the opinion of the Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources, which vehemently opposes the interests of the nuclear complex. The IAEA commission, which officially inspected the territory of the test site, deemed that control over the contaminated lands was absolutely insufficient.<sup>11</sup> The Ministry of Ecology has channeled new criticism against the National Nuclear Center and its Institute of Radiological Security. Thus, a bureaucratic struggle is growing against the background of real and serious problems in the zone of the Semipalatinsk test site. Attacks against the nuclear complex are also accompanied by hostile publications in the press, both in Moscow and in Kazakhstan. The former question the overall security of the whole Soviet nuclear complex<sup>12</sup>; the latter direct their criticism against the nuclear complex of the republic.<sup>13</sup>

### RECENT AGREEMENTS WITH RUSSIA

Analyzing recent political events, one should not overlook the Russian-Kazakh agreements of January 1995 and the results of the Almaty summit of the CIS leaders in February 1995. The results of these meetings, assuming that the agreements are implemented, will have a number of specific consequences. The first is serious changes in the export-licensing regime for the uranium trade in Kazakhstan. The agreements effectively terminate the current regime. Second is the intensification of military-strategic contacts with Russia, particularly the

reconstruction of a unified air defense system.<sup>14</sup> We are thus on the verge of a radical change of relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the direction of a military-strategic alliance. Nazarbayev’s idea of the Eurasian Union should be examined in the same context.

It should be mentioned that changes in Kazakhstan’s policy did not go unnoticed abroad. Washington expressed its concern over the Moscow agreements during the visit of the head of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry at the end of January 1995, particularly in connection with the merging of the armed forces of the two states.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously, the Muslim world (through Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to Egypt) implied that Kazakhstan has been ignoring its obligations to the Islamic community and that its policy has been following too pro-Western a direction.<sup>16</sup> This criticism corresponds with the intensification of anti-Russian tendencies in the Organization of Islamic Conferences in the course of the Chechnya crisis and the calls for creation of an “Islamic nuclear bomb,” originating from Islamabad.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the current policies of the Kazakh government have plenty of critics both at home and abroad, including the nuclear and national security fields.

### RECENT U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI RELATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM

The main question in the realization of the Nunn-Lugar program in Kazakhstan concerns its financial aspect. Neither the general public nor specialists have enough of a clear sense about the complete system of financing for the process of disarmament and conversion in Kazakhstan and about the role to be played by Nunn-Lugar funds. In fact, the information available for 1994 to 1995 allows for differing interpretations and, at times, contains contradictions. This results from the constantly shifting politics of the American side; the fate of this very important program depends on the developing situation in the U.S. Congress. Relying on the numerical outlays also does not always give a clear picture of the actual implementation of the program. Thus, the original sum promised to Kazakhstan for disarmament measures related to START I has been valued at from \$70 million to up to \$150 million. Russian experts put the sum last year at \$99,960,000, including \$5 million for control of nuclear materials.<sup>18</sup> Alongside this central fund, aid to Kazakhstan for preventing the leakage of nuclear technologies will be realized through

other channels. In particular, the ISTC is devoting \$11 million specifically for the support of Kazakhstani nuclear nonproliferation efforts, according to the spirit and goals of the Nunn-Lugar program.<sup>19</sup>

Local programs for financing the process of denuclearization and the protection of nuclear materials are also attracting outside interest: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency is devoting \$160,000 for a study of the radiological situation at the Semipalatinsk test site, while the IAEA intends to provide \$800,000 in financial aid for the creation of a system of export controls.<sup>20</sup>

For the realization of the agreement between MINATOM and the Kazakh-Japanese Committee for Cooperation in the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Japan is earmarking \$11 million.<sup>21</sup>

The financial means for the realization of the Nunn-Lugar program received new support after the visit by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry to Kazakhstan. He affirmed the American commitment to providing a sum of \$37 million in this field.<sup>22</sup> How is this sum to be divided? The U.S. Defense Department is putting \$14.7 million into the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and four American companies included in these projects will put up \$21.2 million<sup>23</sup>:

- \$3.9 million has been earmarked for the creation of a joint venture to convert a portion of a nuclear test facility into a plant for the manufacture of industrial stamping equipment. KRAS Corporation will invest another \$3.7 million in this project, bringing the total cost for this conversion project to \$7.6 million.
- \$3 million is to be set aside for the Buelocorp Scientific Company for the creation of a joint venture to manufacture missile and airplane systems and for an enterprise for the manufacturing and distribution of valves and canisters for cryogenic materials and gases.
- \$2.7 million is set aside for Allen and Associates International for the conversion of a biological weapons plant into a production association for the manufacture of vitamins, antibiotics, and other pharmaceutical preparations.
- \$5 million from AT&T, Inc. for the transformation of the military-industrial company Kazinformtelekom into an international telecommunications company and the transformation of a testing range and an early warning station in Sary Shagan into a space monitoring station. In addition, 25 ground-based monitoring stations will be

re-equipped as transfer stations for wireless connections among 11 Kazakhstani cities.

Besides these activities, a Kazakh-American joint venture Sentek has been created at the Institute of Atomic Energy in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, for the conversion and use of the institute's experimental facilities.<sup>24</sup> It is expected that in 1995 the Defense Ministry will provide \$10 million to a fund for defense enterprises, which will be used for a program of industrial partnership in Kazakhstan (if the U.S. Congress approves these expenditures).<sup>25</sup> There also exists an agreement with the U.S. Trade and Development Agency on the allocation of \$2.5 million in grants to finance conversion projects.<sup>26</sup> In this way, the current total resources that have been raised from international and national organizations already exceeds \$60 million. However, the key to the entire system of investment remains the realization of the Nunn-Lugar program.

In connection with this, there are serious doubts as to how fast, how effective, and to what extent the investment marked for the realization of the Nunn-Lugar program will work. Practically, all areas of financing granted to Kazakhstan for conversion can be categorized as either confirmed or unconfirmed. The confirmed sources include all the resources that have been earmarked for concrete tasks in the liquidation of military strategic objects and that have been guaranteed by international organizations and foreign governments (i.e., the IAEA and Japan). Unconfirmed resources are those that have been earmarked for the conversion of defense enterprises in Kazakhstan, based on the creation of joint ventures. These unconfirmed resources will make up the core of the financial side of the Nunn-Lugar program. These resources are questionable because the scope of help from the Nunn-Lugar program depends on votes in the U.S. Congress.

Finally, Operation Sapphire has not been the most reassuring for the Kazakh side because, up to this point, the compensation for the highly-enriched materials—to the tune of approximately \$20 million—has not been forthcoming. But the U.S. Secretary of Defense's promise to offer additional military patrol boats to Kazakhstan for its Caspian Sea Fleet is a positive step.

## CONCLUSION

This report has tried to define the principal pro and con positions of the main decisionmakers in Kazakhstan influencing the nuclear field. In 1994, the role of the

parliament was increasing because of its attempts to convince the public that the legislature was really in control of the situation in nuclear security. Since its dissolution, political groups are still trying to affect (and limit) the plans of the professionals in the nuclear field. In particular, they support environmental programs and their financing. The nuclear scientific-industrial complex, by contrast, will continue to attempt to press for the implementation of its programs through increasing its influence in the government. It may also use the new pro-Russian policy of Kazakhstan to its advantage. The government is left in the most difficult situation, because its actions—whether competent or incompetent—will in any case be subject to criticism by the government's political opponents.

Operation Sapphire did prove, nevertheless, that in cooperation with the nuclear scientists, the government is capable of implementing professionally-organized actions in the field of nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, by the end of April 1995, Kazakhstan had fulfilled its most important requirement in relation to START I: removing all former Soviet nuclear warheads from its soil to Russia. Indeed, if we count the destruction of the nuclear test charge remaining at the Semipalatinsk test site, then we may date the completion of the denuclearization of Kazakhstan exactly to the minute: May 31, 1995, at 1:16 p.m., Almaty time.

The major remaining concern in Kazakhstan is that future problems of nuclear nonproliferation do not become hostage to political preferences, the struggle of bureaucratic interests, or drastic changes in political course. These developments merit the continued attention of both the Kazakhstani public and the outside world.

has no real meaning.

<sup>4</sup> *Panorama*, No. 44, November 1994, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ezhednevnyaya Gazeta* (Moscow), September 10, 1994, pp. 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> *Panorama*, No. 5, February 1995, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Panorama*, No. 48, December 1994, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Panorama*, No. 2, January 1995, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Panorama*, No. 5, February 1995, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Kazakhstanskije Novosti*, October 11, 1995, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Argumenti i Facty* (Kazakhstan), No. 2-3, 1995, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> See "Kakaya Yadernaya Programma Nuzhna Rossii?" (What Kind of Nuclear Program Does Russia?), *Izvestiya*, November 9, 1994, p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> *Kazakhstanskije Novosti*, No. 28, January 14, 1995, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Panorama*, No. 4, January 1995, p. 2, and No. 6, February 1995, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> *Panorama*, No. 5, February 1995, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Panorama*, No. 5, February 1995, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), January 6, 1995, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, November 24, 1994, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Panorama*, No. 5, February 1995, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Panorama*, No. 35, September 1994, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> *Panorama*, No. 35, September 1994, p. 7.

<sup>22</sup> *Panorama*, No. 14, April 1995, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> *Novoe Pokolenie*, No. 14, April 1995, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Panorama*, No. 19, May 1995, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Press Release, U.S. Information Agency, April 11, 1995.

<sup>26</sup> *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, April 4, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>1</sup> See O. Kasenov, D. Eleukenov, and M. Laumulin., "Kazakhstan and the NPT," Occasional Paper (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> This operation immediately caused exaggerated interest and was discussed on the pages of many newspapers. But because of the lack of reliable information about the operation, the attention surrounding it came to an end quickly. See *Panorama* (Almaty), No. 46, November 1994, p. 6; *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), November 25 (p. 2) and 26 (p. 2), 1994; *Vek* (Moscow), No. 45, December 2-8, 1994, p. 2; *Express* (Almaty), January 12, 1995, pp. 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> See interview with author, *Kazakhstanskije Novosti*, No. 25, December 17, 1994. While official sources are trying to raise the sum to above 25 million dollars, but, according to my estimates, the actual sum is less than \$20 million. Taking into consideration the fact that it is not real money but rather its equivalent in equipment and humanitarian aid, the exact figure