In December 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Kiev to consult with the leaders of newly independent Ukraine. Nuclear weapons figured prominently in these discussions. President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine agreed that the withdrawal of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil would commence immediately; and he assured Secretary of State Baker that Ukraine was firmly committed to becoming a non-nuclear weapon state. The American delegation left Ukraine feeling that the visit had been a success and that the nuclear weapons issue had been addressed in a satisfactory fashion. After this relatively promising beginning, however, the road has been far from smooth. To be sure, Ukrainian leaders have on numerous occasions reiterated the pledge to denuclearize. But the period since December 1991 has not witnessed the final resolution of the denuclearization issue in Ukraine, and Kiev’s ultimate nuclear status remains in doubt.

From the American perspective, Ukraine’s behavior on the nuclear issue has been evasive, ambiguous, and frustrating. Thus, the U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations to reach an umbrella agreement that would permit the provision of U.S. denuclearization assistance dragged on for more than a year, and agreement was not reached until October 1993; Kiev’s delaying tactics, which blocked the provision of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, appeared to Washington to reflect a desire to stall the denuclearization process. Similarly, the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 made Ukraine a party to the START I agreement, but it was not until November 1993 that the Ukrainian Rada, under strong international pressure, finally ratified START. Even then, it did so in a conditional manner that both Russia and the United States found unacceptable. Only in February of 1994 did Ukraine finally pass an acceptable START instrument of ratification. Meanwhile, Ukraine has yet to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its failure to do so prevents the entry into force of START I. In short, Ukraine has combined the rhetoric of denuclearization with behavior that has raised doubts about the sincerity of its commitment to become a non-nuclear state.

There are a number of plausible explanations for Ukraine’s ambiguous nuclear policy. One is that its commitment to denuclearize is sincere, but implementation of this commitment is hindered by a variety of practical and political difficulties. A second interpretation suggests that Ukraine has not made a firm and final decision to become a nuclear weapon state, but for the time being does not wish to foreclose the option to do so. A third possible explanation of Ukraine’s ambiguous nuclear behavior is that Ukraine wishes to become a nuclear-armed power but is not yet prepared to face the international consequences of unambiguously embracing the nuclear option. Finally, a fourth argument is that the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory constitute potent bargaining chips, and that Kiev has understandably sought, in its nuclear diplomacy, to get as much as possible for these weapons before it gives them up. This approach is all the more irresistible—and all the more comprehensible—because Ukraine has few other sources of leverage in its interactions with Moscow and the West.

Doubts about Ukraine’s nuclear intentions derive from the fact that the evidence so far does not exclude any of these interpretations. Further, all four of these approaches are represented in the Ukrainian debate on nuclear policy. This essay assesses the merits of the “bargaining chip” explanation, the one most often cited in the West to explain Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy.

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ASSESSING UKRAINE’S BARGAINING CHIP STRATEGY

According to a bargaining chip explanation, Ukraine’s behavior has represented a natural and sensible effort to make the best possible trade with one of its few diplomatic assets—nuclear weapons. The preoccupation of the United States and its industrial allies with the nuclear issue, it is often argued, promoted this approach by making it clear that they attached a high value to denuclearization. Following this logic, eventually Kiev will conclude that it obtained all that it can get for its nuclear weapons, and denuclearization will proceed more smoothly.

If this has in fact been Ukraine’s policy, how well has it served Kiev’s interests? This question can only be answered by weighing the costs of the policy against the benefits sought and gained. The cost side of the ledger is not inconsiderable. Ukraine’s nuclear policy has inhibited the development of good and close relations with the United States and the West. It has delayed the provision of assistance and the development of cooperative programs. It has drained the reservoir of good will toward Ukraine and, indeed, generated exasperation and even ill will among those in the West charged with negotiating with Kiev on the nuclear issue. It has called into question Ukraine’s reliability as a negotiating partner. It has complicated Ukraine’s relations with Western capitals and institutions. It has given the United States and Russia a powerful common interest (in Ukraine’s denuclearization) and provided Moscow with a lever that it has not been shy about using against Kiev. And it has caused Ukraine to be perceived as a potential nuclear proliferation trouble spot, joining an unattractive club that includes North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. All told, Ukraine’s relations with the West have been less good, its isolation has been greater, its coffers have been poorer, and its international political position vis-a-vis Russia has been weaker, as a result of Kiev’s nuclear policy. This is the price that Ukraine has paid for its bargaining chip strategy.

On the other side of the ledger, Ukraine has pursued three main benefits: attention, money, and security guarantees. The decisive issue in assessing Ukraine’s bargaining chip strategy is whether it has gained sufficiently in these three areas to warrant the price it has paid. Close examination suggests that Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy has not paid great dividends.

Ukraine on the Agenda?

With respect to attention, the supposition is that the United States and other Western powers would have taken little note of Ukraine and paid little heed to its interests and perceptions were it not for the continuing presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. The on-going nuclear issue has required outside powers to interact with Ukraine and compelled them to take account of Ukraine’s interests.

It is certainly true that Ukraine has attracted a lot of international attention by its nuclear diplomacy. But there are several problems with this argument. First, much of the attention Ukraine has received has been negative, damaging its reputation and making it the target of international pressure. It is hard to see why this is desirable. Second, it is far from clear that outside powers are more understanding of or more sympathetic towards Ukrainian interests just because Kiev has been difficult on the nuclear question. It seems at least equally likely that Kiev’s nuclear policy has made Western elites more suspicious of Ukraine’s designs and more doubtful of Ukraine’s attractiveness as a potential friend and partner. Lastly, it seems implausible that Ukraine would have been ignored were it not for the nuclear issue. It is one of the largest states in Europe; it is rich in resources and potentially wealthy; it occupies a strategically important geographic position; and Ukraine’s fate and its relations with Russia are widely understood to be major factors determining the security order in the former Soviet Union—and hence, in Europe. Even without nuclear weapons, Ukraine would command attention. In short, using nuclear diplomacy to gain attention seems a dubious policy: it is neither necessary (because Ukraine is in any case too important to ignore) nor desirable (because there is little profit in attracting negative attention).

Warheads for Dollars?

Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy also seems to have been motivated by a desire to maximize the financial benefit derived from the elimination of the nuclear weapons on its territory. This, it is often suggested, is a perfectly natural desire, especially given Ukraine’s widely advertised and severe economic difficulties; it has a desperate need for Western financial help. Thus, by adopting a bargaining chip strategy, Kiev hopes to drive up the
financial price that outside powers will pay for denuclearization.

Certainly, this is a defensible line of policy. But the key issue in not whether the policy makes sense in the abstract, but whether it has paid off in practice. Here again, a negative verdict seems warranted. Nearly three years of bargaining chip diplomacy have not produced enormous financial benefits for Ukraine. Indeed, in some respects, it has reduced the amount of assistance available to Ukraine during its first years of independence.

Thus, for example, Ukraine has sought to maximize the denuclearization assistance to be provided by the United States and other Western powers. The problem with Kiev’s approach is that bargaining was unnecessary to achieve this result. The United States was eager to provide denuclearization assistance. (The initial Nunn-Lugar funding for denuclearization, for instance, was authorized in November 1991, before Ukraine even formally attained its independence). Kiev could count on the fact that the United States and other advanced industrial states have a strong interest in the success of denuclearization and have no interest whatsoever in seeing denuclearization delayed or prevented by lack of financial resources. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that they would have been willing to bear the full costs of denuclearization, even if Kiev engaged in no bargaining at all. In truth, the primary effect of Ukraine’s bargaining chip strategy so far has been to delay the provision of denuclearization assistance that was already on offer from the United States and others.

Nor is there much evidence to suggest that the amount of denuclearization assistance available, in general or in the specific case of Ukraine, is dramatically larger because of Ukraine’s diplomacy. Indeed, the belief that Kiev’s behavior could increase available assistance rests on the mistaken presumption that Ukraine’s diplomacy is a major determinant of levels of Western assistance. The amount of U.S. assistance provided is much more a result of concerns about the budget deficit and economic performance, domestic and legislative politics, and lack of public support for foreign aid. Thus, the U.S. Congress, which authorized $400 million in Nunn-Lugar denuclearization assistance in 1991, has continued in subsequent years to authorize $400 million annually for this purpose, suggesting that Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy had no impact on the aggregate level of U.S. denuclearization assistance. Similarly, the amounts earmarked for Ukraine were allocated early on and have not increased substantially as a consequence of Ukraine’s delaying tactics.

A parallel situation exists with respect to economic assistance. Any realistic assessment of the ability and willingness of the West to provide such assistance would have led to the conclusion that the sums likely to be available under any circumstances would be modest. Moreover, while it is undoubtedly better to have more aid than less, the amounts available—measured so far in the low hundreds of millions of dollars—are not very significant relative to the size of the Ukrainian economy and the scale of its economic problems. It is true that, as part of the package of arrangements associated with the Trilateral Agreement of January 1994, the United States agreed to provide Ukraine with $155 million in economic assistance in response to Kiev’s reiteration of its pledge to denuclearize. But the amount of money is modest, some such level of aid would probably have been made available even if Ukraine had not attempted a nuclear bargaining chip strategy, and aid would probably have come a year or two earlier had the nuclear issue not been an obstacle in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Interestingly, the United States linked a further expansion of its economic assistance to Ukraine, not to Kiev’s nuclear policy, but to its economic reform efforts.

Ukraine has also sought financial compensation for the nuclear weapons removed from its soil. Here it has fared somewhat better than in the other two cases, although it is unclear what role its nuclear diplomacy has played in promoting this outcome; the principle of compensation for Ukraine was accepted fairly early in the process and the rate of compensation appears to have been worked out in the context of the U.S.-Russia deal on highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Ukraine’s share of the proceeds has been reported as $1 billion, to be provided by Russia over the coming years in the form of nuclear fuel rods. Additional compensation (for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine in 1992) remains to be worked out, perhaps in the form of debt relief from Russia. Because Ukraine has an ongoing need for supplies of nuclear fuel rods and because its mounting debt to Russia is a major problem, these are useful benefits. But it should be kept in mind that even if Ukraine gains several billion dollars over the 20-year life of the HEU deal, this will constitute a minute fraction of its gross domestic product over that period.

In sum, Ukraine has used its nuclear diplomacy to seek financial reward of three sorts: denuclearization
assistance, economic aid, and compensation for eliminated warheads. Its gains in these areas, while useful, are modest at best, it is unclear whether nuclear bargaining was necessary or productive in achieving these gains, and in the cases of denuclearization assistance and economic aid Ukraine’s policy probably slowed rather than hastened the transfer of help to Kiev.

Trading for Security Guarantees?

Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy has had a third broad objective: to gain security guarantees from other major powers, particularly the United States and Russia. Again, the logic of this approach is clear and understandable. If Ukraine is going to give up weapons that can contribute to its security, it should obtain in return assurances that its security will be safeguarded. Accordingly, Ukraine has sought promises that it will not be subjected to nuclear or conventional attacks or threats, or even to economic pressure; and it has insisted on pledges to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

From Ukraine’s perspective, the ideal solution would be an alliance with a major power—preferably the United States—or membership in NATO. Neither appears to be an attainable objective for the foreseeable future. As far as the United States is concerned, many analysts would argue that it is as likely to retreat from existing security commitments in Europe as to take on additional commitments. NATO is, for the time being, unwilling to accept any new members, and, in any case, the states of East Central Europe seem clearly to be first in line. So, essentially, Ukraine is left seeking the reinforcement of political promises and legalistic reassurances that do not differ greatly, if at all, from existing canons of international law and existing treaty commitments and obligations.

Viewed from the outside, it is puzzling that Ukraine has attached such importance to this objective in its nuclear diplomacy, for at least three reasons. First, security guarantees of a general nature are not reliable protectors of a state’s security. Absent a genuine commitment to mutual or collective defense, coupled with both the ability and willingness to employ military forces to these ends, security guarantees are simply political gestures—not without value, but ultimately insufficient. As is often noted, for example, Poland had security guarantees from Britain and France in 1939, but this was irrelevant to Poland’s fate when Germany attacked.

Second, Ukraine has no need to bargain for the types of security assurances it is likely to obtain; these are readily accessible as part of regimes that Ukraine is free to join (such as the NPT) or that it has already joined (such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)). There are, for example, positive and negative security assurances associated with the NPT regime. Similarly, the CSCE Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States commits members to respect the equality, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all members, and to refrain from the use or threat of force. As noted, at least in the near-term, these represent about as much as Ukraine is likely to get in the way of security assurances.

This leads to the third point: the main effect of Ukraine’s nuclear bargaining chip strategy has been to force the reiteration of those assurances already available to Ukraine in these other contexts. This can be seen clearly and unambiguously in the Trilateral Statement of January 1994, in which the United States and Russia explicitly “reaffirm” to Ukraine their CSCE and NPT security assurances. In fact, the promises made in the Trilateral Statement are conditional on the entry into force of START I and the accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-weapon state. In the CSCE context, this amounts to a retreat from assurances that are already Ukraine’s by virtue of its CSCE membership. In the NPT context, it amounts to saying that when Ukraine joins the NPT it will gain the benefits of NPT membership. These do not seem to be enormous gains for Ukraine’s bargaining chip strategy.

Success or Failure for the Bargaining Chip Strategy?

It is hard to see how Ukraine’s interests have been well served by its nuclear diplomacy, if the bargaining chip strategy has really been the foundation of its policy. It has traded more than two years of difficult diplomacy and stalling tactics for lots of bad publicity and negative attention, modest sums of money that would probably have been available anyway (and would probably have been provided sooner but for Ukraine’s nuclear policy), and for the restatement of existing security assurances that do not in any event ultimately safeguard Ukraine’s security. It is doubtful whether Ukraine has gained much more in the way of positive attention, money, and security assurances than if it had never attempted a bargaining chip strategy.
Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, some Ukrainian critics of Kiev’s nuclear diplomacy have been bitterly critical of the government for settling for too little. But these criticisms are also off the mark. By now it should be clear what Ukraine can and cannot hope to get from the West as a consequence of its nuclear diplomacy. It is not an improvement on the current Ukrainian bargaining chip policy to hold out for sums of money or types of security guarantees that are not going to be forthcoming. Such an approach will only produce stalemate, causing Ukraine to continue paying the price of its stalling tactics but denying it whatever benefits might be gained. This makes sense only if the goal of the policy is not bargaining but to delay denuclearization for the sake of keeping open the nuclear option.

In sum, nothing Ukraine is likely to gain from its current nuclear bargaining chip policy seems worth the cost of holding its entire foreign policy toward the United States and the West hostage.

WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE HAVE ASKED FOR?

The conclusion that Ukraine’s nuclear bargaining chip policy has been ineffective is directly linked to the fact that the objectives it sought in this policy were destined to provide quite limited benefits for Ukraine: an extra few hundred million dollars--or, for that matter, even an extra few billion dollars--were not going to make a decisive difference to Ukraine, nor were more strongly-worded security assurances going to redress its security problem in any meaningful way. But could Kiev have crafted a more effective bargaining chip strategy? It might have been able to do so had it sought objectives that would have more tangibly reduced Ukraine’s near-term vulnerabilities.

An alternative bargaining chip strategy might, for example, have focused on security assistance rather than on security assurances--seeking not promises that others would protect Ukraine but rather defense assets that would increase Ukraine’s ability to protect itself. Although Ukraine inherited a substantial quantity of military equipment from the Soviet Union, and has been relatively successful in fashioning a national military, it nevertheless has numerous defense needs. Its eastern frontier with Russia is not well-protected, for the obvious reason that Soviet deployments in Ukraine were conceived to support military operations to the west in central Europe, not to guard what was then an internal administrative border. Ukraine lacks a coherent national air defense capability. Its conventional arsenal reflects the preferences and strategic conceptions of the Soviet General Staff rather than any clear strategy for defending Ukraine.

Instead, Ukraine might have attempted to trade its nuclear assets for military assistance meant to strengthen its conventional defenses. It could have sought air defense radars and other early warning capabilities. It might have asked for help in reorienting some of its military infrastructure eastwards and in fortifying its eastern frontier. It might have requested the provision of defensive armaments, such as anti-armor and air defense missiles. Such requests would not have been extraordinarily out of line with what has already been under discussion in NATO. Nor would it necessarily have been exorbitantly expensive for the West to help Ukraine via military assistance. With post-Cold War defense cuts and reductions mandated by the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, there is a considerable amount of surplus equipment in Europe, much of which is in any case being transferred from one country to another. And so long as the emphasis is on enhancing Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, Russia would have no legitimate grounds for objecting to such measures. Any practical improvement in Ukraine’s defenses would have done more to strengthen its security than additional restatements of legalistic security assurances.

Ukraine could also have insisted that denuclearization be accompanied by extensive programs of military-to-military relations. This would provide a double benefit. Ukrainian officers would profit from exposure to Western militaries. Kiev should want to see ample contingents of its officer corps studying at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., and at other like institutions in the United States and elsewhere. This will give them contact with non-Soviet approaches to strategy, planning, budgeting, and (not least significant) civil-military relations. Equally important, Kiev should desire that officers from abroad serve and study in Ukraine. Participants in such programs will go home with a much better appreciation of Ukraine’s needs, problems, perceptions, options, and world view. Ironically, the United States itself has been eager to initiate such programs with Ukraine, but it has been stymied by the nuclear issue. This objective would have been easy to achieve.

Another objective Ukraine might have sought is help in exploiting the transparency measures in place as a result of the CFE Treaty and the CSCE confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs). Because Ukraine lacks extensive national intelligence capabilities, the information provided by these transparency measures (data transfers, notifications, on-site inspections, overflight rights, etc.) is potentially very beneficial. But Ukraine cannot reap this benefit if it lacks the data management capabilities to cope with the information provided or if it lacks the finances to take advantage of inspection rights. For the West, helping Ukraine in this way would be low cost and would contribute to confidence-building. For Ukraine, this could help compensate for the absence of intelligence and warning capabilities along its frontiers.

A further practical objective might have been to seek the introduction of international peacekeeping forces along the Russian-Ukrainian border. It is commonly asserted that preventive diplomacy is best done early rather than late, that crises and conflicts are better avoided than managed. Kiev could argue that its eastern frontier is a potential flashpoint, that time is required for it to establish its independent identity and to put its relations with Russia on a stable footing, and that the emplacement of peacekeeping forces could both prevent problems and provide reassuring international shelter behind which Ukraine could develop. Obviously, this would not represent a military solution to Ukraine’s security, but it would internationalize Ukraine’s security concerns and serve as a confidence-building device.

One of Ukraine’s most immediate vulnerabilities is its substantial dependence on Russia for supplies of energy. Kiev might therefore have sought to reduce this vulnerability via its nuclear diplomacy. There are several measures that could serve this end. For example, Ukraine might have sought an arrangement whereby the United States, instead of Russia, provides it with nuclear fuel rods. At present, Ukraine is wholly dependent on Russia for nuclear fuel. The United States is the world’s largest supplier of nuclear fuel, so it is certainly in a position to help Ukraine. In the current arrangement, Ukraine gives Russia warheads, the United States gives Russia money, and Russia gives Ukraine fuel rods. In an alternative configuration, Ukraine could give Russia warheads, Russia could give the United States enriched uranium, and the United States would give Ukraine fuel rods.

Ukraine might also have sought integration into the West European electricity grid and asked for donations of surplus electricity to help it through its near-term economic difficulties and to reduce its vulnerability to Russian manipulation of its energy supplies. And more generally, Ukraine could have asked for help in diversifying its near-term energy supplies. The United States, for example, has close relations with countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and might be able to arrange donations or credit lines that could ease Ukraine’s present energy predicament.

CONCLUSION

In short, Ukraine could have pursued a bargaining chip strategy different from the one it adopted. As the ideas offered above indicate, there are a variety of practical objectives that Ukraine might have pursued in its nuclear diplomacy other than financial assistance and security guarantees. Obviously, it cannot be assumed that Ukraine would have gained all of these objectives. Some are more feasible than others. Some would have been met in the West with enthusiasm and others with hesitation or rejection. But whatever Ukraine gained along these lines would have produced more tangible improvement in Ukraine’s position than the policy pursued over the past several years.

At this point, however, it would be disastrous for Ukraine to change course in its nuclear diplomacy. It has staked out its positions through months of intense diplomacy, and these cannot be abandoned without inflicting further serious damage to its relations with the United States and the West. Ukraine’s best course now is to pocket what is has gained from its existing bargaining chip strategy, resolve the nuclear issue once and for all, and then pursue further measures as part of a sensible agenda for developing broader and more cooperative relations with the West.

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3 Indicative of this approach is President Kravchuk’s June 1, 1994 speech to the Rada, in which he urged moving forward with denuclearization but warned that Ukraine would have to reconsider its promise to denuclearize if its territorial integrity was violated in Crimea. See “Ukraine Presses Forward on Non-Proliferation, But With a Warning,” Update on Ukraine, No. 16 (June 22, 1994), p. 5.
See, for example, Dmitri Vydrin, “Ukraine on the Nuclear See-Saw,” Political Thought: Ukraine Political Science Journal, No. 2, 1994, pp. 184-191, for evidence of the range of Ukrainian views on nuclear weapons.

Note, for example, that even Ukraine’s trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union, signed in June 1994, was made conditional on Ukraine’s denuclearization. See “Ukraine Signs EU Trade Treaty: Nuclear Weapons a Stumbling Block,” The Washington Times, June 15, 1994.

This no doubt helps to explain why the West is, as one prominent journal puts it, “torn between worrying how to prop up Ukraine and wishing that it would disappear...” “Ukraine: An Ugly Choice,” The Economist, June 18, 1994, p. 59.

The denuclearization funds made available by the United States and other industrial states have never reached levels commensurate with their stake in the outcome. They should have been willing to pay much more to ensure the success of denuclearization. But the political reality is that there are major internal obstacles to the provision of aid, no matter how self-interested that aid may be.


For a useful and detailed discussion, see Michael Wheeler, “Positive and Negative Security Assurances,” PRAC Paper, No. 9 (February 1994), Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland.

The text can be found in “Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine,” Arms Control Today 24 (January/February 1994), p. 21. See also the discussion in Lepingwell, op. cit., p. 17, which concludes that the guarantees contained in the Trilateral Statement “do not appear to go much beyond those previously offered by the United States and other states.”


On this issue, see Richard Falkenrath, “Ukrainian Security and Arms Control,” draft manuscript, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, June 1994, pp. 7-11.