DOMESTIC-INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES: INDIA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

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In May 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests. Not only did this jolt the nonproliferation regime, the tests also broke a global moratorium on nuclear testing that had been in existence since July 1996, a moratorium that had been reinforced by the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. For India, the tests were the culmination of a major turnaround in policy. When the negotiations that led to the CTBT commenced in 1994, India in fact displayed enthusiasm for the treaty. However, by the time negotiations concluded in 1996, India had emerged as the treaty’s strongest opponent. On June 20, 1996, India declared its unwillingness to sign the CTBT, stating that because the treaty “is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament ... [India] cannot subscribe to it in its present form.” On September 10, 1996, when the CTBT was adopted at the United Nations, India stated that it would “never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, nor later.”

In hindsight, if India’s initial enthusiasm had been sustained over the course of the negotiations, so that India had in fact signed the CTBT, then India’s 1998 nuclear tests might not have taken place. Although no treaty provides an ironclad guarantee, the diplomatic consequences of violating a treaty obligation would have raised the inhibitions against testing by India. Since Pakistan’s tests were clearly triggered by India’s, the recent round of testing in South Asia might have been prevented if India could have been persuaded to sign the CTBT earlier. This article examines India’s approach to the CTBT in 1994-96, exploring why it reversed its initial support for the treaty by 1996.

Analysts of international relations often dispute whether domestic or international factors better explain dramatic changes in policy. This article will demonstrate that neither of these “levels of analysis” is by itself adequate to explain Indian policy. India’s CTBT policy between 1994 and 1996 was influenced not solely by domestic factors nor solely by...
external factors, but rather by a combination of both. International factors such as the perception of a security threat from China are important considerations in Indian nuclear decisionmaking. But an exclusive focus on external threats would suggest that India would have continued the policy of nuclear restraint in place since its 1974 nuclear explosion, because Sino-Indian relations had been improving. China and India signed bilateral confidence-building accords in 1993 and 1996, and China began distancing itself from Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs in the mid-1990s, especially after 1997. Yet India’s nuclear restraint did not deepen during this period of improving Sino-Indian relations. Instead, India’s nuclear policy moved in a direction contrary to trends in India’s security environment.

Do domestic politics then account for Indian nuclear decisionmaking? Domestic political explanations would suggest that India’s 1998 nuclear tests were inevitable once the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a long-standing proponent of nuclearization, held the reins of government. Yet the same line of explanation cannot account for the fact that India first started to oppose the CTBT in 1995-96, when the Congress party and then the United Front coalition, both of whose leaders had long supported the CTBT, were in power.

Ultimately, a nation’s foreign and security policies may be best understood by examining both international and domestic factors. The ways in which these factors interact has emerged as an important theme in some recent international relations literature. For example, Robert Putnam’s concept of “two-level games” notes that international negotiations go beyond the bargaining between states, to involve a second level of bargaining between national leaders and domestic constituents whose support may be required for a country’s acquiescence to an international agreement. Another body of literature notes how international events can influence domestic support for national policies. For example, Jack Snyder and others have shown that threatening international events can undermine domestic support for accommodating or liberal security and economic policies, and instead promote the cause of militarist, nationalist, and protectionist coalitions. Because of this, outside pressure can backfire, increasing domestic opposition to a government’s policy, a process Putnam calls “negative reverberation.” Finally, domestic political circumstances such as election year politics and the stability or fragility of ruling coalitions can also influence foreign policy.

In this article, I use these ideas about how domestic and international factors interact to help understand a region (South Asia) and topic (proliferation) that are not typically explained from this perspective. A number of international events influenced Indian CTBT policy. The most significant were the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 1995, subsequent nuclear testing by China and France, and the entry-into-force clause adopted in the CTBT negotiations on June 28, 1996. Many of these events did not appear to increase the military threats facing India, so it is not obvious that they called for a hardline response—yet they resulted in the mobilization of Indian lobbies against the CTBT. This mobilization then constrained the maneuvering room that Indian governments enjoyed on the treaty, particularly because these developments took place during a time of domestic political uncertainty in the period around India’s May 1996 elections. India’s rejection of the CTBT ultimately had wider ramifications—it kept open the opportunity for the BJP government to authorize India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, an action that has shaken the nonproliferation regime.

This article begins with a discussion of the significance of the CTBT. It then traces New Delhi’s diplomatic shift from a pro-CTBT position before the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) to opposition to the treaty thereafter. The article next examines how international factors were related to domestic politics in influencing India’s stand on the CTBT. It concludes by summarizing the key findings and their policy implications, especially concerning India’s ability to sustain its apparent return to a pro-CTBT position, in declarations it made at the United Nations in September 1998. In general, I conclude, before applying pressure tactics on a negotiating partner, countries need to consider how their actions will affect domestic politics in that state.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CTBT

The attainment of the CTBT in 1996 marked the culmination of four decades of effort on behalf of such a treaty. Calls for a test ban were first made in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and other prominent world leaders, following a U.S. thermonuclear test on March
1 that exposed a Japanese fishing trawler and more than 200 Marshall Islanders to radioactive fallout. A Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 outlawed testing in all environments except underground (thus ending the problem of fallout), but, despite recurring efforts, a comprehensive test ban treaty remained elusive and the nuclear weapon states (NWS) continued nuclear testing during the Cold War. Successful negotiations to draft a CTBT finally began in January 1994 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The negotiating mandate for the CTBT noted that treaty should contribute both to “the prevention of proliferation in all its aspects, [and] to the process of nuclear disarmament.”

The CTBT contributes to the above goals because, although nuclear testing is not absolutely required for the development or modernization of nuclear weapons, these activities become harder if states cannot test and have confidence in their nuclear weapon designs. Thus, under a CTBT, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are restrained from advancing their nuclear aspirations, while NWS are constrained from significantly modernizing their programs. This potential to restrict modernization caused the CTBT to assume particular prominence in the context of NPT Article VI, which commits the nuclear weapon states to pursue “effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” At the NPT Review Conferences of 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, NNWS made it clear they expected this disarmament process to begin through a CTBT.

At the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference, support for the NPT’s indefinite extension increased because of commitments made by the NWS to a set of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” These called for the attainment of the CTBT “no later than 1996,” to be followed by negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), positive and negative security guarantees for NNWS, and further nuclear force reductions. The CTBT’s adoption in September 1996 and eventual entry into force (EIF) (if this occurs) are particularly significant because they would mark the beginning of the series of initiatives outlined in the “Principles and Objectives.” They are thus crucial to advance the global nuclear arms control agenda.

INDIA AND THE CTBT

India’s interest in a test ban was first outlined in an April 1954 speech to the Indian Parliament, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for an end to nuclear testing as a stepping stone towards nuclear disarmament. Nehru stated that, “Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, the Government of India would consider, some sort of what may be called [a] standstill agreement” on ending nuclear testing. In the following decades, New Delhi remained enthusiastic about a CTBT. But it simultaneously opposed the NPT for ideological and security reasons. On ideological grounds, New Delhi objected to the NPT for being based on “discriminatory” principles that “legitimized the division of the world into nuclear havens and have nots” (this view was also held by Argentina, Brazil, France, and China, which therefore did not sign the treaty until the 1990s). India’s remaining outside the NPT also enabled it to maintain a nuclear option to counter security threats from China, which were greater in the 1960s and 1970s, in the aftermath of a 1962 border war, but diminished in the 1990s.

New Delhi was particularly active in promoting a test ban during the 1950s and early 1960s under Prime Minister Nehru’s leadership. New Delhi’s enthusiasm for a CTBT was again strongly manifest in the mid- and late 1980s, when it promoted the treaty as part of a six-nation initiative on nuclear arms control (begun in May 1984 by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania). In 1985, the six countries called upon the NWS to “conclude at an early date a treaty on a nuclear test ban ... [which] would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernization of nuclear weapons.” New Delhi’s support for the CTBT continued to be reflected in the early 1990s. In 1993, New Delhi co-sponsored U.N. General Assembly resolution 48/70 seeking a test ban (New Delhi’s sponsorship only partly reflected actual enthusiasm for a CTBT—it was also undertaken to ease U.S. pressure on India to join a five-nation conference to discuss the nuclear situation in South Asia). In 1994, when negotiations on the CTBT began at the CD in Geneva, New Delhi continued to express support for the CTBT.

New Delhi’s CTBT Stand Prior to the NPT’s Extension

New Delhi’s CTBT-related statements of 1993–94 focused on early
issues on the CD agenda—those of the treaty’s duration, verification, and scope. India’s opening positions on these issues differed from those of the NWS, but not in ways that precluded possible agreement, because India and other states did not wish to derail progress on a CTBT. In fact, the first stages of the negotiations in 1994 were described as taking place in “a cozy atmosphere, reflecting the necessity in the first stage of negotiations for all states to listen to each other’s concerns and take them into account.”

New Delhi’s primary initial concerns were that the CTBT should be indefinite, covering “all States including the five nuclear weapon states ... for all time,” with a verification system that was “non-discriminatory in character.” On the issue of the CTBT’s scope, New Delhi sought a treaty that would be “comprehensive and not establish thresholds,” meaning “there should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances.” These positions were similar to those of most non-aligned states and indeed simply reiterated language already in use in the disarmament community. They were aimed at changing the existing stands of the five nuclear weapon states (also referred to as the P-5, i.e., the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council). Thus, the call for a treaty of indefinite duration was directed at Washington’s early preference for a CTBT limited to a 10-year duration. The call for a zero-yield treaty was aimed at NWS interest in provisions for a small number of tests having very low yields or conducted for safety purposes. In 1994, New Delhi did not seek more than a zero-yield treaty and did not insist on prohibition of sub-critical testing, nor did it strongly insist on the closing of test sites. These were provisions that other non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Iran, and Nigeria sought to include in the CTBT.

While maintaining that disarmament was an important issue, New Delhi did not initially make its acceptance of the CTBT conditional upon P-5 commitments to disarmament. New Delhi instead emphasized how a CTBT fit into its own earlier suggestions for how to make progress towards disarmament. A June 1994 Indian statement thus noted that the CTBT “has a very important place in the context of nuclear disarmament. It finds a place in the first stage of India’s [1988] Action Plan for achieving the goal of a nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order.” This statement also recognized the fact that significant strides had been made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaties, and therefore “many of the targets of the Indian Action Plan envisaged during the first phase ... have been achieved.” As a further sign that India did not require a disarmament commitment, New Delhi noted that negative security assurances could serve as a short-term alternative in the run-up to disarmament. It recognized that: complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue. Therefore, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is for the nuclear weapon states to provide all security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally binding form, i.e. without any qualification or discrimination.

New Delhi’s opening position on entry into force, the issue that later became the most contentious, is best indicated in its September 1994 statement at the CD:

Different views have been expressed for EIF, from a limited requirement of ratification by the five declared nuclear weapon states to the expanded membership of the CD. Our view has been that while the former is too limited, the latter would unnecessarily delay the EIF of a CTBT. Certain other countries which are key to the success of a universal and nondiscriminatory CTBT must be included at the outset. We therefore believe that EIF should be based on ratification by a reasonable and representative group of countries.

The above EIF proposal—calling for key countries to be included in the EIF—would have clearly bound India to the CTBT, suggesting that, in 1994, New Delhi would have been willing to sign the CTBT.

As late as April 1995, just before the NPTREC, a statement made by New Delhi in its capacity as a coordinator for the G-21 (a group of 21 non-aligned or neutral states) concluded with the hope that “the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, especially on the [treaty’s] Scope, so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995.” Thereafter, speaking on behalf of India alone, the Indian delegate reiterated India’s earlier position that “complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue ... [and] pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the nuclear weapon states provide unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear weapon states.” Thus, until April 1995, India did not make its acceptance of the CTBT condi-
New Delhi’s Change of Position after the NPT Review and Extension Conference

The indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995 was accompanied by a set of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” This document did not contain as strong a commitment to disarmament as had been desired by many NNWS—not just the non-aligned, but also Western states such as Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and New Zealand. For this reason, following the NPTREC, New Delhi’s position on the CTBT began to shift. New Delhi took the stand that, because the NPT Extension Conference had not adequately addressed the disarmament issue, the CTBT now represented the next, and perhaps only remaining, opportunity for extracting a stronger disarmament commitment.

A second change in India’s CTBT position also emerged in 1995-96. India now sought a broader scope, going beyond the zero-yield treaty that New Delhi had called for in 1993-94, to include a (difficult to verify) prohibition on laboratory testing and computer simulations. New Delhi’s calls for a ban on all nuclear-weapon-related testing and for a commitment to time-bound disarmament were both aimed at comprehensively halting the further development of the nuclear arsenals of the P-5, thereby enhancing the process of their elimination. New Delhi ultimately explained these shifts on its approach to the CTBT in terms of both national security concerns and the way the CD handled the treaty’s EIF provisions.

New Delhi announced its desire for a stronger link between the CTBT and disarmament in the fall of 1995. In an October 1995 statement at the United Nations, New Delhi declared that indefinite extension of the NPT “legitimized for all time” the “division of the world into nuclear haves and have nots;” this was therefore a “serious development that is bound to impact on all disarmament negotiations, unless the nuclear weapon states commit themselves to further measures towards the elimination of their nuclear weapons within a time-bound phased program.”

That same month, at a non-aligned summit, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao deplored the fact that the extension of the NPT was undertaken “without even obtaining an expression of intent to eventually abolish all nuclear weapons” and added that, while the goals of achieving a CTBT and FMCT were “laudable,” these treaties were also “an opportunity to obtain a commitment to universal and comprehensive nuclear disarmament.” In addition, in a statement at the CD, New Delhi noted that “the Preamble of the [CTB] treaty will have to clearly define the linkage of the CTBT to the overall framework of nuclear disarmament.”

In January 1996, because little progress had been made on placing the disarmament issue into the CTBT text under negotiation, New Delhi brought its concerns more directly into consideration at the CD. New Delhi also began indicating that, if the CTBT did not contain a time-bound commitment to nuclear disarmament, then it would stay out of the treaty or oppose it altogether. Indian officials clarified, however, that New Delhi remained serious about negotiations on the CTBT, otherwise India would have withdrawn from the negotiations in late 1995.

In its January 1996 CD statement, New Delhi emphasized that, “to be meaningful, the Treaty should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.” In March 1996, New Delhi noted that the objective for the CD was not “the mere mechanical task of completing a [treaty] text but the need to place the CTBT ... in its proper context of [eliminating] nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.”

Eventually, the preamble of the chair’s draft treaty of May 28, 1996, incorporated some of the Indian concerns on disarmament, but not the time-bound aspects. This draft declared that “the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects.” This language was retained in the final CTBT.

On June 20, 1996, New Delhi finally rejected the existing chair’s draft and stepped away from the CTBT because the treaty did not contain more concrete disarmament commitments. New Delhi stated that it was concerned that any attempt to introduce substantive disarmament provisions in the treaty have been blocked by some delegations. Weak and woefully inadequate
preambular references to nuclear disarmament ... [such as those] in other treaties have been treated with complete disregard. How can we escape the conclusion that the nuclear weapon states are determined to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and visualize the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation?\(^3\)

In a plenary statement at the CD on August 20, 1996, New Delhi made clearer the kind of measure it had desired. “We were not seeking to prescribe a rigid time frame, which we realize requires detailed consideration. What we were seeking was a commitment which could have acted as a catalyst for multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable span of time.”\(^3\)

**The Introduction of National Security Concerns**

In 1995 and early 1996, New Delhi did not suggest it might have national security reasons to stay out of the CTBT (which by implication would keep open the option of conducting nuclear tests). In March 1996, New Delhi explicitly stated that “we do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for [India’s] national security” and added that “we are also convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security.”\(^3\) In June 1996, however, New Delhi specifically linked the issue of disarmament to its national security concerns, citing these as reasons for its decision to step away from the CTBT. New Delhi’s CD statement on June 20, 1996 noted that both within and outside the framework of the CTBT, the P-5 had not committed to eliminating their nuclear weapons, and therefore:

under such circumstances, it is natural that our national security considerations become a key factor in our decision-making.... Countries around us continue their weapon programs, either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons.... [The CTBT] is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not in India’s national security interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form.\(^3\)

In summary, New Delhi cited two national security reasons for not signing the CTBT. First, its neighbors (a reference to China and Pakistan, although New Delhi did not directly specify these countries) continued their nuclear programs. Second, the CTBT was not a disarmament measure, and it thus permitted the declared nuclear powers to retain and make qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons. This implied that India saw these countries too as a source of security concern.

**Entry into Force and Sovereignty**

India’s strongest objections to the CTBT, however, were related to Article XIV, the EIF clause. New Delhi noted that the CTBT “not only ignores our substantive objections [concerning disarmament] but also contains an article, Article XIV, to which we have the strongest objections” (emphasis added).\(^3\) In its final form, this article required 44 nuclear-capable states (defined as states participating in the CTBT having nuclear reactors) to ratify the treaty before it entered into force. This EIF formula was a follow-up to one in the May 28 CTBT draft, which made EIF contingent upon ratification by the 37 states that would host facilities for the CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS). Both EIF provisions were intended to include all eight nuclear capable states (the five NPT-defined NWS and the three threshold states of India, Israel, and Pakistan) in the CTBT. Yet, an all-encompassing EIF that requires particular states to sign a treaty is generally adopted only if all the affected parties agree to the formula. Such a formula has the drawback of enabling entry into force to be held hostage by, or delayed, because of the non-signature of any particular state whose signature is required. For these reasons, a majority of states in the CD (including the United States, most European Union states, Japan, Canada, and most of the G-21) preferred a flexible EIF.

The 44-state EIF formula was emphatically supported by five states however—the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Egypt, and Pakistan. On June 20, 1996, New Delhi had announced that it would not subscribe to the CTBT, and, on June 26, New Delhi withdrew its monitoring stations from the IMS network. Based on the May 28 draft, this would have removed India from the list of states whose signature was required for EIF. This would allow the treaty to enter into force—which India desired—but would not require India to sign the CTBT. The 44-state EIF formula then appeared in the final chair’s draft, a “take it or leave it” draft on which no fur-
ther negotiations were to be conducted, on June 28. This move appeared to force New Delhi back into a treaty which it had clearly indicated (on June 20) that it would not sign, and was therefore viewed as an unwarranted act of external pressure and a violation of Indian sovereignty. Spelling out why Article XIV violated its sovereignty, New Delhi noted that:

after the Indian decision to not subscribe to the CTBT draft was announced on June 20, the article on entry into force was modified . . . apparently at the insistence of a small number of countries with the clear aim of imposing obligations on India and placing it in a position in which it did not wish to be. Such a provision has no parallel. This procedure . . . has been perceived very negatively in our capital.... It is unprecedented in multilateral negotiations and international law that any sovereign country should be denied its right of voluntary consent on adherence to an international treaty.

New Delhi proposed an amendment to Article XIV that “would follow the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” with EIF upon “ratification by 65 states,” and stated that if Article XIV were not modified, New Delhi “would be reluctantly obliged to oppose” the adoption of the treaty at the CD. Besides the position that Article XIV violated its sovereignty, India also expressed concern that this article seemed to suggest the possible use of sanctions or other coercive measures against states not signing the treaty.

Several states made moves to assuage India’s concerns regarding sovereignty and sanctions. Their statements reflected themes raised by the CD chair, who noted that Article XIV “did not impinge on the sovereign right of any State to take its own decision about whether or not to sign and ratify the treaty” and that “Article XIV, paragraph 2, did not refer to United Nations Security Council measures [such as sanctions] in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”

Washington also attempted to address Indian concerns. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in an August 8 letter to Indian External Affairs Minister Inder Gujral, clarified that the United States “does not interpret Article XIV as providing for the possibility of international sanctions against India,” and added that these assurances could be formalized through an exchange of notes. Gujral replied that a bilateral assurance (given by the United States to India) could not address New Delhi’s concerns because the CTBT was a multilaterally negotiated treaty. Gujral also noted that, although the June 28 CTBT text was considered to be a final draft, it had been modified to accommodate China’s position on the issue of on-site inspections, and yet no consideration was given to modifying the CTBT text to meet India’s concerns on the EIF issue.

When the CD finally sought to adopt the treaty in August 1996, New Delhi blocked the treaty mainly because of its opposition to the EIF clause. The treaty was then forwarded to the United Nations, where it was adopted on September 10, 1996. India did not seek to disrupt U.N. adoption of the treaty. New Delhi also emphasized in its U.N. statement that, despite its June 20 decision not to subscribe to the treaty, it would have let the treaty go forward at the CD if the EIF provision, which it perceived as an “attempt to restrain a voluntary sovereign right and enforce obligations on India without its consent,” had been excluded from the treaty.

PUTTING DIPLOMACY IN ITS DOMESTIC CONTEXT

The dynamics of the negotiations described in the preceding section would appear to provide a convincing explanation of India’s rejection of the CTBT. But India’s substantive objections to the CTBT were not very different from those of many other non-aligned and non-nuclear states. For example, Colombia expressed reservations that “the Preamble to the treaty seems weak and not to reflect the importance attached by all parties to having a world free of nuclear weapons,” and that “the operative part mentions no definite time-frame to achieving that aim. It is not clear to us whether the treaty is to form part of a set of international norms leading to the total elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.” Canada stated that “we strongly believe a more progressive and dynamic reference to nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation should have been included in the preamble,” and added, “we are even more concerned over the draft EIF provisions. Those provisions may result in a prolonged and serious delay in the treaty’s entry into force.”

Despite sharing many of the same substantive objections to the CTBT as India, however, most non-aligned and non-nuclear states joined the treaty. The question therefore is why only India turned against the treaty in response to these shortcomings. To understand this, the negotiating
developments discussed so far must now be related to domestic political factors, especially the mobilization of domestic lobbies precipitated by the May 1995 NPT extension. In general, mobilization in Indian politics against nuclear arms control involves a pattern of interaction among four key domestic groups—the foreign policy bureaucracy, a defense lobby or security community, the press, and political parties.43

The Indian foreign policy bureaucracy—the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)—has a long tradition of emphasizing issues of principle, such as India’s commitment to disarmament and its related opposition to the “discriminatory” nature of the NPT. This bureaucracy, therefore, expresses concern about moves that may alter or weaken these positions. India’s remaining outside nuclear arms control treaties, even if it is for disarmament-related reasons, coincides with the agenda of a domestic defense lobby. This lobby consists of the pro-nuclear sections of a security community—analysts, academics, strategic thinkers—who oppose treaty constraints on India’s nuclear and missile programs, in part because of (real and imagined) security concerns about China. The defense lobby may also criticize the foreign policy bureaucracy for over-emphasizing issues of principle at the expense of practical benefits or national security considerations.44

The Indian press serves to carry the voices of the security community, often at the instigation of the bureaucracy, and selectively frames the nuclear debate in order to protect the status quo. Thus, any concession or minor reversal on India’s long-standing nuclear policy by the government becomes criticized in the press, and political parties then make hawkish declarations, often citing these same press reports. This puts Indian governments on the defensive and restrains them from making concessions on nuclear issues.

Internal opposition to the CTBT had a greater impact because the treaty negotiations coincided with an election year. In the run-up to India’s May 1996 elections, the domestic political compulsion not to appear weak made it harder for the Indian government to take a conciliatory stand on the CTBT. Furthermore, India’s domestic political situation in mid-1996 was characterized by uncertainty about the nature and duration of governments, uncertainty resulting from rapid transitions between three governments: a government led by the Congress party before the May 1996 elections, a minority BJP government between May 18 and May 31, and then a minority United Front (UF) coalition from June 1 onwards. The election-year vulnerability of the Congress government and the weakness of the post-election UF government made both susceptible to domestic pressure, and during a time of changing governments the bureaucracy assumed greater prominence in shaping India’s stand against the CTBT.

The following discussion traces these effects of Indian domestic politics. It begins by examining India’s somewhat accommodating nuclear policy of 1993-94, then analyzes the domestic impact of the NPT’s extension, then reviews the positions adopted by the Indian press and political parties, and concludes with an examination of the domestic impact of the CTBT’s EIF clause. This analysis will show that India’s turn against the CTBT was not foreordained, but was instead contingent on how international developments affected domestic politics. Recent ideas about domestic-international linkage put forward by scholars like Putnam and Snyder, as discussed above, prove valuable in explaining the increased influence of anti-CTBT forces in India.

Nuclear Moderation, 1993-94

In 1993-94, New Delhi was enthusiastic about the CTBT, was considering attending the NPTREC as an observer, and by mid-1994 had halted Agni and Prithvi missile tests. Each of these three policies of nuclear moderation encountered domestic opposition. However, at this time, India had a stable government as the Congress party had a near majority in Parliament and elections were two years off. This stability enabled New Delhi to maintain an overall moderate policy.

The CTBT was actually the least politicized of the above three issue in 1993-94. There was more domestic opposition to the freeze in Indian missile activity, a freeze that the press argued had an “adverse effect on the morale of our defense scientists and created an impression in the public that our political leadership could not withstand pressure from Western powers”46. However, the greatest domestic opposition arose regarding New Delhi’s plan to attend the NPTREC as an observer state (the larger issue of India’s giving up its nuclear option and joining the NPT was never in the cards). Attendance at the NPT Conference was perceived by domestic groups as granting legitimacy to the NPT, which was contrary to India’s long-standing ideological opposition to the treaty. For these reasons, the In-
Dinan press carried a large number of articles against the NPT in 1994-95. This campaign sought, first, to dissuade the Indian government from sending observers to the NPTREC, and then, after the government reversed itself, to provide intellectual justification for the policy of abstaining from the conference.

Some anti-NPT arguments were based on issues of principle. For example, one commentator argued, “Let us not spoil our unique record of unrelenting opposition to nuclear weapons by even giving an iota of our recognition to the NPT by sending an official observer.”47 Others made the case that the regime was not worth subscribing to because it was ineffective, since it had not stopped nuclear programs in South Africa, Iraq, North Korea, or Pakistan.48 A related theme popular in the Indian press was the apparent inadequacy of safeguards. Commenting on April 1995 news reports of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan, the Indian press noted that “India has time and again cautioned against the inadequacy of NPT safeguards” and added that “the fact that the U.S. administration was not unaware of the exchange of atoms [between China and Pakistan] ... makes a mockery of the U.S. efforts to end horizontal proliferation and on that pretext perpetuates a flawed regime through unconditional and indefinite extension.”49 Only an isolated article in the Indian press highlighted the merits of the NPT, observing that “India’s security interests are served by the number of nuclear weapon states being small, seven or eight, and by countries prone to nuclear adventurism, notably Iran and Iraq, not gaining access to dual use fission technology,” and that therefore the NPT remained important because “the NPT is the only hedge against the spread of nuclear weapons.”50

The above anti-NPT campaign put India’s government on the defensive, prompting it to declare in Parliament that it would not make any compromise on nuclear issues under external pressure.51 The Indian government eventually backed down to domestic opponents and did not send official observers to the NPT Extension Conference; however, New Delhi still did not strongly mobilize the non-aligned countries to oppose the treaty’s indefinite extension. Further, despite going on the defensive on the NPT issue, the Indian government maintained its policy of restraint on missile tests, and it also continued to support the effort to achieve a CTBT.

The Domestic Impact of NPT Extension

The NPTREC had domestic ramifications that explain domestic opposition to and subsequent politicization of the CTBT in 1995-96. New Delhi’s foreign policy and security establishment had assumed that their opposition to the NPT would be vindicated at the NPTREC. Their assessment in March 1995 was that “fewer and fewer people are talking of unconditional extension” and therefore “[t]he U.S. may settle for twenty-five year extension in line with this reality.”52 India’s foreign policy community was therefore stunned by the NPT’s indefinite extension. What was particularly disconcerting was that India’s non-aligned partners did not put up a stronger fight and some, such as post-apartheid South Africa, with which India had strong ties, actively promoted a consensus on indefinite extension. This blow in the NPT context then caused New Delhi’s long-standing opposition to the NPT to be directed towards the CTBT.

Immediately following the NPTREC, nuclear tests by China and the announcement of renewed testing by France provided India’s security community and bureaucracy with the means to recover lost ground. On the Chinese test, an editorial in the Indian press noted that:

The test underlines the hypocrisy of the nuclear powers ... [and] lends credence to this country’s oft repeated stand that the treaty would remain discriminatory.... Under the circumstances, those who participated at the recent NPT conference have little moral authority to give lectures to this country about an international imperative to fall in line with the treaty.53

A second commentary stated:

The NPT conference was only a sideshow or at best a public relations exercise in as much as [China’s and France’s] hard decisions had already been taken to carry on with testing. This fully justifies India’s decision not to participate in the NPT Extension Conference. India’s opposition is not to the nonproliferation clauses of the NPT but its discriminatory character. India favors a time-bound nondiscriminatory disarmament agreement.54

In mid- and late 1995, seminars held in the Indian capital also began advocating that, in the post-NPT extension situation, India should oppose the CTBT and FMCT unless they were part of a time-bound framework for disarmament.55 In subsequent months, three domestic factors led to a hardening Indian
stand on the CTBT—hostile press coverage, attacks on the treaty by political parties, and unfortunate timing in which the issue arose during an election year.

First, elite opinion against the CTBT increasingly found its way into the Indian press. Here, the only arguments pointing out the CTBT’s merits were relegated to the fine print and editorial pages, while most articles, and especially article titles and headlines, emphasized how external pressure and blackmail threatened Indian sovereignty. On the pro-CTBT side, a letter in the Indian press stated that New Delhi “must firmly resist hawkish pressure to move toward exercising the nuclear option” and that “New Delhi must discharge the moral and political responsibility it assumed in 1954 by securing a good CTBT through a constructive, consensual approach.”56 A deeper reading of some articles even suggested that the CTBT might benefit rather than jeopardize India’s security, by freezing the nuclear programs of “China, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Central Asian states, and North Korea.”57

However, it was the front pages and headlines that largely framed the issue for the broader public and political community. These featured more populist themes that reflected prominent rallying points among anti-CTBT opinion. Many headlines suggested that the CTBT was a measure of U.S. pressure on India or a contest between India and the United States; examples include the headlines “U.S. Will Not Allow India to Block Test Ban Treaty,”58 and “Victory for U.S., Splendid Isolation for India.”59 A further set of article titles suggested that India was being blackmailed and highlighted the need to preserve sovereignty—as in “CTBT: Can India Resist the Blackmail?”60 and “Sovereignty Assailed: Moment of Truth for Independent India.”61 Thus, the media emphasized the more populist anti-U.S. and national independence themes, rather than criticizing the actual proponents of the EIF clause, such as Russia, the United Kingdom, and China.

Second, hostile press coverage against the CTBT was complemented by attacks on the treaty by Indian political parties. In late 1995, the BJP had tabled a resolution in Parliament against the CTBT, and in the 1996 election campaign, the BJP prominently raised the CTBT issue. In its pre-election manifesto of April 7, the BJP declared that it supported the Congress government’s attempts to link the CTBT with firm and detailed disarmament commitments. On April 20, BJP leader Atal Behari Vajpayee stated that “the BJP stands committed to a nuclear-free world but it rejects the very concept of nuclear apartheid. In fact, my government will exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons as a deterrent.”62

After the election, a short-lived BJP government collapsed before it could implement this pledge. However, when the United Front took over, it showed that it would not be outdone by the BJP’s rhetoric. The UF government’s first general policy statement, on June 5, 1996, noted that it would continue to work for universal disarmament, but added that India had the right to retain the nuclear option until that goal is achieved.63 Ultimately, all political parties jumped on the anti-CTBT bandwagon and thus appeared unified, at least in their opposition to a treaty that did not go far enough on the disarmament issue.64 Once the CTBT became politicized, no party without a firm majority could afford to support the treaty. The weak post-election UF government clearly risked political losses if it went against the grain of prevailing domestic opposition to the CTBT. It actually benefited from public and parliamentary support when it was seen as opposing an unpopular treaty and thereby upholding Indian security and sovereignty.

Third, the timing of the CTBT issue is also important in understanding India’s opposition to the treaty. External events such as the NPT’s extension, Chinese nuclear tests, and external diplomatic pressure had “negative reverberation,” in Putnam’s terms, on India’s support for a CTBT. This occurred because of how these events aligned in time with domestic developments inside India. Specifically, India’s stronger stance against the CTBT coincided with the run-up to its May 1996 elections. New Delhi’s CD statements reflecting a tougher stand were largely focused on the specifics of the CTBT text. They nevertheless (especially with the introduction of national security concerns) conveyed the message domestically that the Indian government was standing firmly against the CTBT. And Indian nuclear test preparations, reported in The New York Times in December 199565 (the article was itself perceived as a form of external pressure and caused a toughening Indian stand at the CD) also signaled to domestic constituencies that New Delhi was not conceding ground on India’s nuclear option.
Assessing Domestic Politics

New Delhi had substantive complaints about disarmament and EIF at the CD talks, but the broader domestic criticism by the press and political parties, especially during an election year and a period of transition between governments, surely did not allow further flexibility on these issues. These factors then led India to reject the CTBT, rather than choose to accept the treaty with reservations, as did the other nonaligned states.

India’s encounter with the CTBT might well have ended after it stepped away from the CD negotiations on June 20, 1996; instead, it was compelled to remain engaged in the CTBT process due to the introduction of the 44-state EIF clause. This caused the Indian government to seek greater domestic support in the face of external pressure by further mobilizing public opinion against the CTBT. In turn, this led to populist anti-CTBT sentiments taking firmer root and being largely unchallenged throughout 1996 to 1998. A typical anti-CTBT editorial, which actually cautioned against nuclear testing, nevertheless claimed that “rejecting the NPT, CTBT, FMCT and any other treaty that focuses entirely on nonproliferation in a discriminatory fashion, has countrywide support.” As a result, while, by early 1996, India had already indicated it was unlikely to sign the CTBT, the more pervasive domestic mobilization during mid-1996 further constrained any room to maneuver that Indian governments may have had on the treaty, both during the final stages of negotiations as well as in subsequent months. New Delhi thus remained adamantly opposed to the CTBT and also stalled movement on the FMCT at the CD during 1997 and early 1998.

Under calmer domestic political circumstances, statements by the international community aimed at assuaging Indian fears on the CTBT, which were eventually acknowledged (but only in the fine print) of the Indian press, could have carried greater weight. Such positive moves may have kept open the possibility for Indian governments to show support for the CTBT at a later date, especially if Indian governments had countered nuclear lobbies on the security issue. Such efforts might have found domestic support because the security concerns introduced in India’s June 20, 1996, CD statement did not widely resonate domestically (it was the sovereignty issue that caused the greatest mobilization). Further, in 1998, Indian centrist and leftist parties actually noted that there were no threats to Indian security that justified India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. Ultimately, reassuring statements by other countries, as well as pro-CTBT opinion in the fine print of the Indian press, were simply drowned out by the torrent of populist anti-treaty rhetoric. By triggering a series of adverse domestic reactions, international diplomacy in 1996 made India into a stauncher opponent of the existing arms control and nonproliferation agendas than one would have predicted from its moderate positions of 1993 to 1994.

CONCLUSIONS

This study of domestic-international influences on India’s approach to the CTBT raises three issues having policy relevance. First, the significance of procedural issues is worth noting—even these may be perceived negatively and stimulate a hostile domestic reaction that leads to a harder line against arms control. Thus, New Delhi’s strongest opposition to the CTBT was not on the substantive issue of disarmament, but rather on procedural issues surrounding the treaty’s EIF clause. After the September 1996 U.N. vote adopting the CTBT, India’s then External Affairs Minister Inder Gujral stated in Parliament, “We have the distinct impression that even after the adoption of the text, there is an uneasiness on the part of many delegations about what had really been achieved by the CTBT and the manner in which it had been brought about” (emphasis added).

Second, the prominence of domestic politics in changing India’s stand on the CTBT highlights the importance of recognizing windows of opportunity. Domestic political circumstances such as electoral politics and the presence of weak governments do not always allow national leaders to make concessions on nuclear arms control. Therefore, whenever a government is in a position to accept (or displays an inclination towards) nuclear accommodation, the opportunity for nonproliferation success should be recognized and consolidated by positive international endeavors.

Third, external initiatives can both facilitate support for and create national opposition to arms control treaties, depending on whether they help or hurt the cause of domestic groups that favor adherence to arms control. In 1996, New Delhi was (and prominently made the case domestically that it was) subject to diplomatic isolation and external pressure through the CTBT’s EIF
clause. This then caused many domestic groups to “rally around the flag”; even some pro-treaty lobbies objected to the EIF clause (and by implication the entire treaty). Thus, although external pressure may, under certain circumstances, force governments to make concessions, pressure may also cause the unification of all internal factions against external forces and lead to a harder national stand against the nonproliferation regime. This case supports Jack Snyder’s earlier analysis, which found that taking a hard line against a weak, moderate government tends only to bolster hawks inside the target country.

In conclusion, this review of India’s shifting attitude towards the CTBT has yielded important lessons on how the process of arms control can accommodate or alienate states. New Delhi had once been an ardent supporter of disarmament, and most Indians would support international movement in this direction. Yet, paradoxically, New Delhi’s major nuclear policies in recent years have been those of nuclear escalation rather than continued nuclear restraint, as manifest in its tests of May 1998. The years 1993-94 thus represent an important lost opportunity for the consolidation of India’s nuclear restraint. Although the BJP government entered office in 1998 with a strong commitment to nuclearization, it would have faced greater inhibitions against testing if its predecessors had been accommodated and brought into a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In May 1998, following its nuclear tests, New Delhi noted that it “would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” and added, “We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.” In September 1998 at the United Nations, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee reiterated this position, stating that India was prepared to bring negotiations on India’s joining the CTBT to a “successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999,” and added that New Delhi would participate in FMCT negotiations “in good faith.” These positions supportive of the CTBT and FMCT are similar to India’s pro-treaty stand of 1994. Yet India’s enthusiasm for nuclear arms control in 1994 did not translate into participation in the CTBT because of the way external and internal events—such as the NPT Extension Conference, pressure from the CTBT’s EIF clause, and election-year politics—interacted to result in opposition to the CTBT. A similar set of events loom on the horizon: a CTBT conference in September 1999 and an NPT Review Conference in the year 2000; CTBT ratification by other required states; external pressure on New Delhi to curb nuclear and missile activity in exchange for the lifting of sanctions; and the presence of an unstable coalition government and possibility of Indian elections in the period 1999-2000. These developments may well influence India’s ability to sustain its revived support for the CTBT and FMCT. The international community needs to acquire a better understanding of the way in which India’s turbulent domestic political situation interacts with external events and India’s substantive foreign policy concerns if that community wants its actions to support a possible commitment by New Delhi to enter firmly into collaborative arms control.

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3Statement by India on September 10, 1996, at the United Nations, in Statements by India, p. 144.

4The 1993 Sino-India Treaty of Peace and Tranquility notes that, pending an ultimate solution on their disputed boundary, both states will respect and observe the line of actual control. A follow-up treaty in 1996 reaffirms that both countries will not use or threaten to use force against the other or seek unilateral military superiority. These documents can be found on the Stimson Center web site (http://www.stimson.org). China’s missile technology transfers to Pakistan appear to have halted after Chinese assurances on the issue in 1993. In October 1997, China attended a Zanger Committee meeting, acknowledged some past nuclear transactions, and gave strong assurances on curbing future nuclear transfers.


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22 Statement by India on July 29, 1993, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 3.
23 Statement by India on June 2, 1994, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 12.
24 Statement by India on September 1, 1994, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 20.
25 Statement by India on October 26, 1995, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 35.
26 Statement by India on January 25, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 23.
27 Statement by India on April 6, 1995, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 35.
28 The chair’s draft essentially presented a “clean text” and was an attempt to force the pace of negotiations in order to attain the deadline of completing the treaty by 1996. The clean text sought to capture the median positions on then existing areas of disagreement.
29 Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996); CTBT Organization web site (http://www.ctbto.org).
30 Statement by India on June 20, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 103.
31 Statement by India on August 20, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 126.
32 Statement by India on March 21, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 98.
33 Statement by India on June 20, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 121.
34 Statement by India on August 20, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, p. 127.
35 Statement by India on August 8, 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, in Statements by India, pp. 121-22.
36 Article XIV, para. 2, notes that if the CTBT does not enter into force within three years of its opening for signature, “a conference of the states that have already deposited their instruments of ratification” can convene in order to “consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force” of the treaty. The treaty text is available online, on the CTBTO web site (http://www.ctbto.org) and the ACDA web site (http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctb.htm).
39 Statement by India on September 9, 1996, at the United Nations, in Statements by India, p. 139.
40 CD 1436, p. 36.
41 Ibid., p. 46.
42 These four sources are somewhat similar to what one writer describes as “the four corners of the iron quadrangle” that opposes arms control in the United States (John Isac, “Spinning to the Right,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (November-December 1997), pp. 14-15).
43 This view is reflected in an op-ed which noted that the disarmament-related “stand taken by India on the CTBT is a classic example of the traditional Indian approach to security issues, namely, to make a grand symbolic gesture meaningless in its content but one which gets substantial domestic acclaim and accolades.” It ended with the comment that if India were not going to conduct nuclear tests, then “not signing the CTBT gains India nothing except an interim period in which it loses by bearing the costs of isolation.” See “Why India Should Sign The CTBT,” The Times of India, June 26, 1996.
44 The Indian elections were held in phases beginning on April 27, 1996; results were announced on May 15, 1996. Following the elections, the BJP and its allies held approximately 190 seats, the Congress had some 140 seats, and the 13-party National United Front (UF) held 180 seats in a 540-seat legislature. India’s president first invited the BJP to form a government, but this government could not muster a Parliamentary majority—the combined strength of the UF and Congress ensured that the UF eventually formed a government which was supported by the Congress.
48 “Atoms of Hypocrisy,” The Pioneer, April 11, 1995, p. 8; in FBIS-NES (12 April 1995), pp. 74-75. In practice, the NPT regime is not at fault here because Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are not subject to international inspection, and these accusations from Indian analysts were prompted by the Reagan and early Bush administrations’ policy of not certifying Pakistan as being engaged in nuclear activity in the 1980s.
58 The Times of India, August 2, 1996.
59 Indian Express, September 12, 1996.
60 The Hindu, July 23, 1996.
61 The Times of India, August 12, 1996.
62 Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996); Disarmament Diplomacy 6 (June 1996).
63 Ibid.
64 This apparent domestic unity meant that as they pursued negotiations at the CD, the Indian bureaucracy did not encounter contradicting positions from different political parties. There were differences on the issue of weaponization and testing, however, with the BJP advocating these steps and the Congress and United Front maintaining restraint from overt nuclearization, though both the Congress and UF considered but then backed away from nuclear testing.
65 On the nuclear test preparations, see Vinip Gupta and Frank Pabian, “Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in


68 An editorial noted that “at last there is a silver lining to the dark and lingering cloud” of CTBT negotiations because the United States “has marginally distanced itself from three other nuclear powers, China, Russia and Britain, by beginning to understand the reasons for India’s firm and principled stance on the entry into force clause in the CTBT” (“Unfriendly Friends,” *The Times of India*, August 14, 1996).

69 For example an Indian newspaper reported that “The Opposition in the Lok Sabha (India’s Parliament) today accused the Government of inventing a security threat in order to justify the nuclear tests and rejected the contention that the nuclear option had been exercised in self-defense” (“Opposition mounts attack on Govt,” *The Hindu*, May 28, 1998 [http://acdsweb.acdis.uiuc.edu]).


73 “The Address of the Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to the 53rd UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998” (http://www.indianembassy.org/new/prnsspeech(UN).htm).