Between August 20 and 22, 1995, officials and technical experts from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States gathered at a conference sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, in cooperation with Harvard University’s Center for Science and International Affairs, to assess the accomplishments, shortcomings, and future prospects of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The following narrative briefly describes the origin of the CTR program, summarizes the key points of discussion at the conference, and notes principal areas of consensus and disagreement. It concludes with a synopsis of participant views on the future of the CTR and the means to enhance its effectiveness.

**PROGRAM ORIGIN**

The U.S. Congress initiated the Nunn-Lugar program in November 1991, in response to the disintegrating political and military situation in the Soviet Union and the threat of potential diversions of unsecured nuclear weapons and material. This legislative initiative provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with the authority to fund assistance to the Soviet Union (and subsequently, to eligible post-Soviet states) to dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction; to strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in connection with dismantlement; to prevent proliferation; and to help demilitarize the industrial and scientific infrastructure which supported weapons of mass destruction in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). CTR program activities are grouped into three broad categories: 1) destruction and dismantlement; 2) chain of custody activities; and 3) demilitarization. Specific program objectives, as established by Congress, are to cooperate with CIS republics to:

- destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
- transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction;
- establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of such weapons;
- prevent diversion of weapons-related expertise;
facilitate demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military capabilities and technologies;
expand defense and military contacts between the United States and CIS states;
convert defense industrial facilities to commercial uses; and
facilitate environmental cleanup in the Arctic Ocean.

The CTR program provides services, tools, and technology required to assist CIS states with the elimination or reduction of weapons of mass destruction and to modernize and expand safeguards against proliferation within the CIS.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CTR PROGRAM

There was wide agreement among conference participants that the CTR program, despite its slow start, had been responsible for or had helped to facilitate several remarkable achievements in the three and a half years of its existence. The CTR’s more tangible accomplishments include the facilitation of the return to Russia of more than 1,000 warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the removal to secure storage of more than 2,500 warheads from missile and bomber bases; the deactivation of four regiments of SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine; the removal of 750 missiles from their launchers; and the elimination of approximately 630 strategic launchers and bombers throughout the CIS. Representatives from the U.S. Defense Department and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) lauded the technical cooperation to transport, secure, and dismantle Russian nuclear weapons as nothing less than a tour de force. (See the report by General Evgeniy Maslin in this issue.)

Conference presentations provided details of some additional CTR “success stories.” Under Project Sapphire, for example, the United States and Kazakhstan, in consultation with Russia, cooperated in the removal of 600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from Kazakhstan to more secure storage in the United States. (See the report on Kazakhstan by Murat Laumulin in this issue.) Project Sapphire was partially financed with CTR funds. Participants also praised the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) lab-to-lab program between DOE laboratories and equivalent research facilities in the CIS to pursue civilian and commercial scientific enterprises jointly. A principal focus of the lab-to-lab program has been to institute improvements in fissile material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) in CIS facilities. While representing a relatively small amount of resources, the lab-to-lab program was widely seen as an important threat reduction effort instituted at the grass roots.

There was less agreement among participants as to the achievements to date and the future prospects for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), a larger project aimed at redirecting former weapons scientists to commercial and civilian ventures. While some believed that the success of the lab-to-lab program could be duplicated on a larger scale, many felt that it was simply too early to tell. Moreover, some participants, particularly certain CIS representatives, were discouraged by what they described as bureaucratic delays in implementing the ISTC program. (See the report on the ISTC by Ildar Akhtamzian, also in this issue).

Apart from the specific accomplishments of the CTR program, conference participants also noted the important ancillary achievements of the CTR. A major accomplishment in this regard was that it provided incentives to CIS states to accede to arms reduction and non-proliferation agreements. The CTR program provided additional incentives to Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to relinquish control of nuclear weapons residing on their territory and to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. Moreover, the CTR provided some assurance to all four recipient states that they would be able to meet the technical and resource requirements of transporting, dismantling, and/or securing strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, thus facilitating their signature and ratification of the START agreements.

Several U.S. participants, particularly officials from non-DOD agencies, added that another benefit of the CTR was that it had acted as a catalyst for other U.S. assistance programs in the areas of MPC&A, defense conversion, export control, and personnel retraining, among other activities. The CTR has provided the seed money for other agency programs, many of which have begun or are about to begin. Several participants were optimistic that the CTR would continue to act as a catalyst for other initiatives from private industry, universities, and foreign governments to sponsor joint ventures with CIS states and provide technical assistance for demilitarization. More broadly, participants also acknowl-
edged that CTR had been a key mechanism for deepening bilateral relations between the United States and Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In the midst of political and military upheaval in the former Soviet Union, the program provided an important channel for communication and improved understanding between the United States and emerging CIS states.

**SHORTFALLS IN THE PROGRAM TO DATE**

Despite the success of many of these activities, particularly the transport and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the CTR program in some respects has fallen short of early expectations. Of particular concern was the slow pace of three key CTR activities: improvements in MPC&A at CIS nuclear facilities; destruction of Russian chemical weapons stockpiles; and establishment of more effective export controls in CIS republics.

Regarding the first of these areas, participants remarked that while DOE-sponsored lab-to-lab efforts to improve MPC&A had been very successful (albeit on a smaller scale), government-to-government activities had been marked by delays and missteps. DOD representatives, for example, acknowledged that, in contrast to their experience with the Russian MOD, they had experienced significant difficulties working with the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to determine Russian requirements and needs for MPC&A, establish and oversee subcontractors to construct a fissile material storage facility in Russia, and organize other activities.

Although DOD representatives noted that the department had taken steps to rectify these problems, participants recognized the need to improve the U.S. relationship with MINATOM, particularly as that agency will be the major recipient of CTR funds in future years to oversee fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons. One Russian observer familiar with MINATOM cautioned that it was important not to treat MINATOM simply as an inscrutable monolith. Noting the number of bureaucratic and other pressures at work in that ministry, this analyst went on to argue that it was important to differentiate among various organizations within MINATOM and to identify organizations and individuals that had been more helpful in the past and with which the United States could work more productively.

U.S. DOE representatives added that increased DOE resources would be devoted to improving fissile material controls at CIS facilities in the near term. While acknowledging that DOE programs to improve MPC&A had a finite end date, one DOE representative expressed confidence that the department now had a firm “target set” of CIS facilities requiring improvement and a good idea of the resources and time required to execute improvements.

In a final note on MPC&A, some participants also expressed great concern that the success of CTR’s weapons dismantlement activities has in some ways aggravated the present shortfalls in MPC&A, creating an enormous backlog of materials requiring secure storage and control. Specifically, these participants were concerned that in the intervening years before improved MPC&A measures are in place, as weapons materials are moved through the Russian chain of custody from a relatively more secure zone in the MOD to a relatively less secure zone under MINATOM, there may be increasing opportunities for diversion of weapons materials to third parties for clandestine weapons programs.

Regarding chemical demilitarization, participants detailed several problems in getting chemical weapons destruction underway, among them disagreements between the United States and Russia on the technical means of destroying chemical weapons stocks, disagreements over proposed work plans and contracting mechanisms to oversee destruction, and a lack of clear bureaucratic lines of responsibility for chemical weapons destruction in the Russian government. These disagreements and delays also have broader implications for the success or failure of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As the two largest chemical weapon states, the United States and Russia must reach an agreement on the destruction issue or risk jeopardizing a global agreement on chemical weapons disarmament.

There was also general dissatisfaction with the level of progress in establishing more robust export control mechanisms over weapons-related equipment and materials from CIS states. Russia, by virtue of its size and its large number of defense industrial facilities, was thought to have the greatest need for a robust regime of export controls. However, Russia also has relatively more expertise in this area, as a consequence of export controls established during the Soviet era. Russian representatives asserted that the country already had an effective set of export control measures in place, but other participants were unsure as to whether Russia has instituted clear bureaucratic lines of control over arms and technology exports. It is also unclear whether Russia possesses adequate support infrastructure (e.g., com-
puters) for monitoring and controlling exports. Although some useful exchanges of information between the United States and Russia were described, as well as continued discussions and forums on export controls, more technical assistance has been held hostage to a lack of agreement on the scope and mechanisms of a Russian export control regime, particularly on the procedures for auditing exports. Export controls in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were described as even more lax, given that such controls are a relatively new phenomenon for these states. Moreover, as one participant noted, there is a lack of understanding of the nature and effectiveness of export controls among CIS republics.

Although there was disappointment in the lack of progress in these critical areas, participants also acknowledged that delays in chemical weapons demilitarization, MPC&A, and export control were to be expected, given the complex nature of these issues and the difficulties that arise when unfamiliar partners are engaged in addressing a novel set of problems. There also was encouraging evidence that progress in these areas may be forthcoming. DOD officials stated that MPC&A and chemical weapons destruction are currently the top two priorities in their near-term CTR planning. Moreover, agencies other than DOD have recently become more closely engaged in assisting CIS states in these areas, particularly DOE in the area of MPC&A and the Department of Commerce in export control improvements. However, there was wide consensus that important work in these and other critical areas was still in the very early stages. While current activities were promising, participants remarked that there were several problems emerging on the horizon that threatened to delay and possibly derail this work before it had gained the necessary momentum.

KEY IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

The conference provided an important forum for representatives from the recipient countries to air their concerns and questions as to the management and implementation of the CTR program. There were some sharp disagreements between these CIS representatives and their U.S. counterparts as to the extent of some of these problems. In some cases, U.S. representatives acknowledged that problems did exist but were being corrected. Key concerns among CIS participants vis-a-vis CTR implementation included:

- the slow pace of implementation by DOD and other U.S. agencies, both at the top decisionmaking levels and between DOD and contractors on the ground in the CIS;
- the lack of timely and consistent information from the United States about current funding obligations and schedules for delivery of goods and services under the CTR;
- a lack of management flexibility on the part of the United States, and the imposition of U.S. accounting rules, work plans, and schedules on CIS participants;
- the use of mostly U.S. contractors and U.S.-supplied equipment to perform CTR tasks, often at higher cost and with longer delays than equally qualified CIS contractors and suppliers;
- the high level of bureaucracy on the U.S. side, including multiple or redundant points of contact for CTR activities and the large number of “consultants” who consumed CTR resources but contributed little to specific projects; and
- the amount of “nuclear tourism” by U.S. officials and others around CIS facilities that did not seem to result in any real improvements subsequently.

In response to these concerns, U.S. representatives remarked that the slow pace early in the program was warranted to watch closely how money was spent, even at the risk of losing some funds that were not obligated. Some delays also were simply to be expected, given the complexity of the program. However, they also argued that some delays in CTR assistance could be attributed to delays by CIS states in signing CTR umbrella agreements. After these initial delays, however, the pace of activity increased dramatically. Moreover, improvements are now being implemented to fix residual problems. For example, DOD is planning to streamline contractor oversight of projects in the CIS, giving contractors on the ground greater autonomy to make and execute decisions.

In a rejoinder to a key CIS complaint, U.S. representatives argued that in many cases the United States had been extremely flexible in accommodating CIS wishes in implementing CTR projects. One U.S. participant offered as an example U.S.-Russian plans for chemical weapons destruction: despite a strong U.S. preference for destruction of air-delivered chemical munitions in western Russia first, using an incineration method, the U.S. bowed to Russian preferences for destroying artillery shells stored in eastern depots first, using a different method of destruction.
U.S. officials also disputed claims that there were "buy American" provisions—designed to keep most CTR funds in the United States—in CTR projects and that CIS states were seldom consulted or included as contractors. They argued that CIS representatives were closely consulted in all phases of CTR projects, down to selection of the type and brand of equipment purchased for specific projects. Other participants observed that, despite the delays and higher costs of using American contractors and suppliers, without such "buy American" provisions the CTR program would be politically untenable in the U.S. Congress and would likely be eliminated.

There was general agreement that budget processes in the United States and the CIS remain badly coordinated, a problem aggravated by the mutual lack of information and understanding of each other’s system. One U.S. participant noted that there were few, if any, identifiable documents from participating CIS governments detailing CIS weapons destruction and demilitarization objectives, schedules, and needs in a way that reciprocated comparable U.S. planning documents and briefing materials. Without such documentation, it was extremely difficult to understand CIS requirements, match CTR resources or budget requests to specific CIS needs, or to make an effective case to Congress for additional funds. However, for their part, several CIS participants also complained of a lack of transparency on the part of the United States, arguing that there were very few official sources of information on what CTR funds had been spent on which projects. To dramatize this point, more than one CIS participant noted that the Status Report, published jointly by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was one of their few reliable sources of information on current CTR funding and activities.

A number of these implementation problems, most participants agreed, could be addressed or were being addressed through improved management practices, improved communication between the United States and CTR recipient countries, more transparency in the decisionmaking processes of each, as well as other measures. A much more significant problem, as demonstrated in discussions during the conference, concerned the scope of the CTR program as a whole and competing U.S. and CIS expectations about the program. For example, several CIS participants were adamant in the belief that CTR assistance should encompass not only military-technical tasks, such as weapons destruction and material control, but also economic and "social" issues in demilitarization, such as conversion of defense production plants and retraining and housing of former strategic weapons officers and defense industrial personnel. Others suggested that more attention be paid by CTR planners to environmental issues, such as cleaning up former weapons production facilities. The CTR, some of these participants felt, should take a more holistic approach to demilitarization, assisting CIS transitions from command economies heavily oriented toward defense production to commercial, civilian structures. Such an approach, it was argued, would also ease the political liability of perceptions in the CIS that the CTR is simply a means for the United States to disarm CIS states and erode their scientific and industrial infrastructures.

Belarus was cited as an example where such a holistic approach had been attempted, apparently with great success. In that country, a comprehensive package of measures was used to demilitarize selected SS-25 garrisons; CTR funds were used to convert entire bases, including factory retooling, equipment conversion, personnel retraining, and housing construction. Such a site-wide approach was suggested as a way to repackage "social" issues, integrating them into more technical threat reduction activities and making them more palatable to Congressional critics.

Opposing this view, at least one CIS participant suggested that CTR’s scope was too wide and noted that, in real terms, CTR funding levels for several activities were a small fraction of the resources already being devoted by CIS state budgets (particularly in Russia). Rather than spread limited CTR resources across too many activities that were already well-financed in the CIS, this observer argued, the CTR program should instead be focused on a limited number of relatively underfunded projects (such as chemical weapons destruction), where it could make a greater contribution.

For their part, U.S. representatives repeatedly stressed that, although there may be other vehicles to address "social" issues and other areas of CIS concern, CTR itself had a limited mandate, with a specific beginning and end. Moreover, given the current political mood in Congress, there was little chance that such additional activities would be funded. As one U.S. participant explained, at its inception, the CTR was designed with a very narrow scope, which in the intervening years had been broadened to other purposes and other activities. Its initial purpose was to provide the Soviet Union
with selected technical assistance to overcome key bottle-
neces in meeting its weapons dismantlement obligations. 
In the years after its inception, the program was ex-
and to provide more comprehensive assistance to 
expanded to provide more comprehensive assistance to 
CIS states to support the safe, secure transport and dis-
position of nuclear weapons and material. According 
to one former U.S. official, the CTR became a “cash 
that could be used to address environmental cleanup, military housing, retraining, defense conver-
ion, and a host of other problems in CIS republics.

Other participants noted that, although the program’s 
expanding scope was largely a Democratic initiative in 
the Congress, the Bush administration also began to 
use the CTR as a means of providing incentives to CIS 
states, notably Ukraine, to accede to the NPT. Similar-
ly, the CTR evolved into a means of providing incen-
tives and rewards to CIS states to sign and ratify a num-er of arms reduction measures. Now, after years of 
this “mission creep,” as one observer described this evo-
lution, the program was under tremendous political pres-
sure in the United States to revert to its original, much 
narrower scope. The political revolution in the Con-
gress has brought to power a Republican majority which 
never agreed to an expansion of the CTR and is now 
moving to cut back its scope dramatically. At the same 
time, CIS states have come to have expanded expecta-
tions of the program, to the extent where some may see 
the CTR as a “rewards system” for compliance with vari-
ous arms control agreements. Thus, there is a widen-
ing gap between U.S. and CIS expectations and assump-
tions as to the purpose and scope of the program. Par-
ticipants agreed that a new consensus is required, not 
only among U.S. policymakers but between the United 
States and recipient countries in the CIS, as to what is 
required and what is possible to achieve under the CTR.

EMERGING TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE CTR PROGRAM

Conference attendees agreed that the change in the 
U.S. political climate poses a fundamental challenge to 
the success of the CTR program. In the United States, 
the dominant trend is anti-foreign, anti-aid, anti-Rus-
sian, and anti-Clinton. But such change is not limited 
to the United States. In many respects, the CTR is in 
danger of becoming a political liability in both donor 
and recipient countries. In the CIS, early expectations 
and perceptions of the program have been disappointed, 
not only because of exaggerated expectations and imple-
mation problems early on, but because of the 
program’s “failure” to address the tremendous social and 
economic dislocation arising from demilitarization. 
Several CIS participants remarked that, to the extent 
popular political opinion in the CIS was aware of the 
CTR, the dominant mood was one of cynicism. In-
creasingly, the CTR program was perceived as a means 
for the United States to disarm CIS states militarily and 
erode their technological and industrial base. Just as 
the CTR has become more and more of a political li-
ability for U.S. politicians, some CIS participants at the 
conference testified that CTR had become increasingly 
difficult to defend at home.

Participants noted several events on the horizon that 
may worsen this climate. First, upcoming presidential 
elections in the United States and Russia and parlia-
mentary elections in CIS republics threaten to oversim-
plify and antagonize political debates on the CTR, as 
well as U.S.-CIS relations generally, even as they re-
duce the amount of high-level political attention avail-
able to be directed at specific CTR problems. Second, 
the CTR is likely to be affected by several strains that 
have emerged in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations. Dis-
putes over Russian military intervention in Chechnya, 
western intervention in the Bosnian conflict, Russian 
sales of reactor technology to Iran, and allegations of 
continued Russian biological weapons research could 
potentially derail continued assistance to Russia and may 
affect assistance to all CIS states. Third, approaching 
arms control compliance schedules represent additional 
milestones for the CTR program. The inability or un-
willingness of some CIS states to meet their obliga-
tions, particularly those for the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty, could further erode political support for 
the CTR in the United States.

The worsening political mood toward the program is 
manifest in several recent Congressional initiatives to 
pose conditions on further CTR assistance. CIS par-
ticipants, particularly those from Russia, were espe-
cially concerned about recent Congressional moves to 
link the CTR to Russian discontinuance of the Iranian 
nuclear deal, assurances that the Russian biological 
weapons program has been halted, and other actions. 
While many of the participants from the United States 
and elsewhere were sympathetic to this point of view 
and attributed these actions to “politics,” they also ac-
knowledge that some of these problems were more 
substantial and would not be solved without serious, 
high-level attention. As one participant observed, the
allegations of continued biological weapons research in Russia were not simply the product of a hostile media or some other “sinister forces” (as one CIS participant believed), but were instead the official position of the U.S. intelligence community. This, he observed, was a problem that could not be finessed and would not simply go away, but instead must be resolved quickly through official channels before it further erodes bilateral relations in general and the CTR program specifically.

In considering the milestones and potential political pitfalls on the horizon, several participants painted a stark picture of what might happen if these problems were allowed to derail the CTR program entirely. It was noted that many CTR activities, particularly fissile material control, chemical weapons stockpile destruction, and export control development, are at critical stages of development after overcoming a number of prior obstacles. The immediate impact of reductions or elimination of CTR assistance would be to dramatically increase the danger that nuclear and other weapons materials, technologies, and expertise would be diverted to the global arms market. It would also have a direct impact on the ability of these countries to complete fledgling political, military, and economic reforms.

Moreover, as a Ukrainian representative suggested, cuts or elimination of the CTR program could threaten the special relationship that Ukraine felt it had with the United States. This official went on to observe that reaching a consensus in Ukraine on many defense and foreign policy issues, particularly nuclear issues, had been a long, arduous road. He warned that if CTR were cancelled, there were political forces in Ukraine that would seize on this event to reopen debate on Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, its adherence to START, and other issues. A Belarusian participant echoed this warning, and a Kazakhstani representative pointed out that it was not altruism that led Kazakhstan to forswear possession of nuclear weapons, but instead was the result of several political factors, including the CTR. Russian representatives reminded those assembled of the tremendous social and economic dislocations that have come with the end of the Cold War. They warned that cuts or elimination of CTR assistance would only further erode this situation, creating more disarray and emboldening those in Russia who are suspicious of the West and wish to reverse the course of disarmament and reform.

Other conference participants attested to the problems that would emerge unless at least some level of assistance were continued under the CTR or some alternative mechanism. Multilateral agreements, particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be jeopardized by the failure of the United States and Russia to come to terms on destruction of their respective chemical weapons stockpiles. Likewise, other countries, it was argued, may reconsider their commitments to the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention, and other agreements if U.S.-CIS arms reductions are stalled.

THE WAY AHEAD: FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE CIS

With these stakes and risks in mind, conference participants devoted considerable thought to possible improvements to the CTR program in the near term and to potential strategies for carrying out the program’s objectives in the long term. Discussions touched on improvements at several levels. At the “micro level,” several U.S. representatives remarked that a number of managerial improvements had already been put in place.

A key theme of the conference in this regard was the need for greater coordination: within the respective U.S. and Russian interagency processes; between the United States and its individual CTR partners; and among CTR recipient countries as a group. As to the first area, there was some disagreement whether activities of different U.S. agencies were adequately coordinated. While some argued that there was a great deal of interagency coordination, others complained of a “balkanization” of the program among different agencies, despite the good work that was being done individually. According to this perspective, it was increasingly difficult for the White House to utilize the CTR program in pursuit of broad U.S. policy interests. This dispute aside, U.S. representatives disclosed that a number of steps are under way to further coordinate U.S. CTR and CTR-type activities, principally by way of a coordinating office at the State Department. At the contractor level, DOD representatives disclosed several changes now being put in place to give contractors on the ground in CIS states greater decisionmaking autonomy over individual projects and to employ CIS contractors and technologies.

As to improving bilateral coordination, several participants suggested developing a joint framework for
tracking the level and schedule of CTR funding disbursements and the delivery of goods and services to recipient states. At a minimum, this would require a common understanding of accounting rules for tracking these disbursements. U.S. participants added that coordination would be greatly improved by more systematic reporting of current activities, requirements, and needs by CTR recipient countries. CTR documentation that reciprocated U.S. planning documents, it was argued, would greatly improve coordination between U.S. and CIS budget processes and schedules, helping U.S. officials to match CIS needs to available resources and to make a stronger programmatic case to Congress for future funding. For their part, CIS officials urged U.S. representatives to make the U.S. decisionmaking process more transparent and to develop more rigorous procedures for reporting funding decisions, contract announcements and awards, and delivery of goods and services to recipient states.

An important initiative suggested at the conference by several CIS representatives was to improve coordination and communication among CIS states on CTR issues, which at present have few means of comparing experiences, airing grievances, and sharing information. As one Kazakhstani representative observed, bilateral discussions are useful but are too often held hostage to bumps in bilateral relations between the United States and individual countries. Establishing a multilateral forum, such as a “group of four” or “four plus one” arrangement, would assist CTR recipient states to work jointly on a common set of problems.

At the broader level of strategy, there was nearly universal agreement that the political focus of the CTR had been lost and must be rebuilt, and that a new consensus was required on the goals and scope of the CTR and assistance to the CIS generally. One CIS participant observed that the United States must first reach a consensus internally as to what type of assistance it is willing to offer; recipient countries, for their part, then need to work with the United States to develop realistic goals, given the political dynamics at work in Washington.

Conference participants differed widely as to the specifics of what such a new consensus might resemble in the current political climate: for example, whether “social” programs should be integrated into demilitarization efforts, or whether the CTR should be recast to focus more directly on a smaller set of issues. Some believed that in order to survive, the CTR and programs like it would have to adopt a lower profile and might have to be reborn as smaller, less ambitious programs. Some participants were also more pessimistic than others as to whether Congressional and other political leaders could be “brought up the learning curve” and convinced of the importance of the program. Others were more optimistic, arguing that with more energetic lobbying on the part of those gathered, particularly by CIS recipient states, the CTR would continue to be a robust program for enhancing mutual security.

In this vein, there was considerable enthusiasm among conference participants for improving the level of public and legislative outreach to develop domestic support for the program and others like it in both the United States and CIS states. Although it was noted that some programs, such as DOE’s lab-to-lab venture, seem to have thrived in spite of (or perhaps because of) a lack of publicity, participants repeatedly complained of the lack of effective “public relations” for the CTR. As one participant remarked, there is something very wrong with the fact that Congressional leaders can vote down CTR spending and then argue that none of their cuts have affected “U.S. national security.” The only explanation for this, he maintained, is that there are many individuals who simply do not understand the program. There was wide agreement that efforts to educate key legislators and the public at large as to the facts and the benefits of the CTR program should be a top priority.

Several CIS representatives, noting that those gathered at the conference were generally supportive of the CTR, argued that they needed to find new channels of communication to those who oppose assistance to the CIS. Specifically, these participants suggested a series of public or private meetings or hearings between high-level CIS representatives and Congressional leaders, particularly those not favorably disposed toward the program. Such a dialogue would allow CIS states to make their case more directly to those controlling the CTR’s purse strings. These CIS participants added that non-governmental organizations, such as the conference sponsors, could play a key role in establishing contacts and brokering a dialogue between CIS officials and the U.S. Congress. Other participants suggested that similar contacts be established between U.S. officials and national legislatures in the CIS republics and perhaps also with local legislatures and governmental bodies in CIS regions directly involved in CTR projects. Similarly, it was suggested that both sides should be more willing to use the media to improve public awareness of the goals,
private investment in the CIS. Private capital, it was observed that CTR had already acted as a catalyst for demilitarization of CIS military industries. Several participants with CIS concerns, was the key to successful conversion activities in CIS states. One non-U.S. conference participant reminded the gathering that demilitarization was the only way to arbitrate bureaucratic turf wars that had delayed the program and wasted resources and to re-build legislative and public support for the CTR and programs of this kind. More importantly, high-level political contacts, between the United States and Russia particularly, are essential to resolving several key issues, such as Russian compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and alleged Russian biological weapons activity, that threaten to derail the program entirely.

The “best guess” of several U.S. representatives was that CTR activities would be appropriated between $250 and $400 million by Congress for Fiscal Year 1996. Given the political stigma that has been attached to the CTR program and the real possibility that it may be discontinued, however, there was considerable discussion on potential means for continuing CTR-type assistance by other means. Participants were both surprised and encouraged by the success with which DOE had acquired funds from Congress to carry out MPC&A improvements and other activities. Representatives of other U.S. agencies observed that CTR had jump-started a number of activities that were likely to continue and even grow under the supervision of non-DOD agencies. Spinning off CTR activities to sponsors in agencies outside the DOD has begun in earnest, with major initiatives underway in the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce.

Several speakers commented on the potential for CTR-type support from outside the U.S. government. It was noted, for example, that although the CTR had supported several defense conversion projects in CIS countries, investment of private capital from U.S. and other foreign companies, by way of joint industrial ventures with CIS concerns, was the key to successful conversion of CIS military industries. Several participants observed that CTR had already acted as a catalyst for private investment in the CIS. Private capital, it was also noted, could eventually dwarf any potential outlays made under the CTR program. Other sources of support that were suggested included universities (which one participant observed had been “shut out” of the CTR process) as well as private philanthropy. Reaction to these suggestions was mixed. One CIS representative remarked, for example, that if it were difficult to convince the U.S. Congress to fund construction of housing for former Russian military officers, convincing individual U.S. citizens to do so would be even harder.

There was considerable discussion between U.S. and CIS participants as to whether multinational organizations, such as the World Bank, might provide appropriate vehicles to carry on CTR-related projects. Some participants, particularly those from the United States, suggested that these organizations had ongoing projects and interests that could very naturally be extended to CTR activities, albeit selectively. One participant, for example, in discussing chemical weapons demilitarization in Russia, noted that the World Bank had devoted more than $150 million to environmental cleanup in the Volga River Basin. Some of these resources, he argued, could clearly be devoted to the chemical weapons disposal problem facing this region. Other participants, including some from CIS states, were less optimistic, citing failures in the past to convince organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to fund demilitarization or conversion activities that they only vaguely understood. Moreover, it was noted that a government-to-government arrangement was the more appropriate means of addressing the most critical issues of concern to the CTR program.

Finally, in exploring potential alternative strategies to the CTR, discussion frequently returned to the possibility of engaging other nations to provide technical and financial support to demilitarization and conversion activities in CIS states. One non-U.S. conference participant reminded the gathering that demilitarization and defense conversion in the former Soviet Union was an international problem, not one limited to the United States and CIS republics. He noted that his country and many other countries were already providing technical and financial support to CIS states and had demonstrated their willingness to broaden this assistance.

Near the conclusion of the meeting, several CIS representatives reiterated their concerns about Congressional attempts to link the CTR to Russian behavior. These participants were clearly troubled by the fact that Russian “misbehavior” or noncompliance might impact
non-Russian CIS states that had no such disputes with the United States. Significantly, these representatives were not aware that current restrictions placed by Congress on CTR assistance apply only to Russia and do not affect other CIS states. This misunderstanding aside, several CIS participants remarked that they had not fully understood until now the strong political currents at work in Congress and in U.S. public opinion against the CTR. While grateful for the insights provided by U.S. officials at the conference, many CIS participants were surprised by the level of pessimism they observed. Many also expressed frustration at the lack of tools available to them to influence the situation. Although the U.S. participants could not be very encouraging in this respect, they concurred with the assessment of their CIS counterparts about the need for improved channels of communication between the U.S. Congress and CIS decisionmaking bodies. Better communications, it was agreed, were desirable not only to keep abreast of rapidly changing political moods and events, but to link more directly CIS policymakers with those in charge of funding decisions on the U.S. side.