The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed in four of the 15 newly-independent states: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were strewn across an even wider swath of territory, encompassing most of the 15 new states. While Soviet forces had already begun the process of withdrawing the tactical weapons to the Russian republic prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic nuclear withdrawal and dismantlement process had not yet begun.

The following Chronology traces the process of post-Soviet nuclear disarmament from 1991 to 1994, highlighting the key developments in all of the four Soviet nuclear successor states and their relations with the United States. Each of the entries is referenced with appropriate endnotes for analysts wishing to investigate these sources further. The purpose of this Chronology—coming so soon after these events have occurred—is not to provide a detailed analysis of their significance, which, at this point, would undoubtedly be premature. Instead, its aim is to present post-Soviet nuclear negotiations and developments in a concise, informational format for use as a reference for scholars, government analysts, journalists, and other researchers working on these problems.

The difficulties of the disarmament process stemmed from the fact that the July 31, 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) envisioned a bilateral, not a multilateral disarmament process. Thus, the challenge consisted in ensuring that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and, especially, Ukraine lived up to their disarmament commitments outlined in the founding documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, later, in the Lisbon Protocol of May 23, 1992. In each of these three nuclear successor states, this process took place in the midst of tremendous domestic turmoil resulting from the new tasks of nation-building, converting to some form of market-based economy, and defining post-Soviet national security doctrines.

Even after the Russian ratification of START I on November 4, 1992, the Russian government stated that it would not exchange its instruments of ratification with the United States until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. This process took until the end of 1994 and involved a series of missteps, misunderstandings, and problems.

As the Chronology shows, from 1991 to 1994, three issues in particular emerged to become barriers to the successful implementation of START I: compensation, security guarantees, and disarmament assistance. The difficulty of finding solutions to these three problems slowed multilateral negotiations and prevented START I’s entry into force until December 5, 1994. But with Ukraine’s final ratification of START I and accession to the NPT, major reductions in the former Soviet nuclear arsenal can now move forward.

While significant progress has been made toward destroying the Soviet Union’s vast nuclear arsenal to achieve the levels permitted under START I, much is still left to be done. START II also must be ratified by Russia and the United States before it enters into force. Thus, the next several years will involve a gradual process of nuclear disarmament and dismantlement according to the agreements completed in the 1991 to 1994 period.

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* The author would like to thank Dunbar Lockwood and George Bunn for their assistance with an earlier draft.
ACRONYMS IN CHRONOLOGY

ALCM  air-launched cruise missile  
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)  
CIS   Commonwealth of Independent States  
COCOM Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls  
CTR   Cooperative Threat Reduction program (U.S.)  
DOD   Department of Defense (U.S.)  
FSU   former Soviet Union  
HEU   highly-enriched uranium  
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICBM  intercontinental ballistic missile  
IRBM  intermediate-range ballistic missile  
JCOI  Joint Commission for Observation and Inspections  
LEU   low-enriched uranium  
MC&A  material control and accounting  
Minatom Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia)  
MIRV  multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle  
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding  
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime  
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NPT   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
RV    reentry vehicle  
SLBM  submarine-launched ballistic missile  
SRF   Strategic Rocket Forces  
SSBN  nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine  
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
TEL   transporter-erector-launcher  
U.N.  United Nations  
USEC  United States Enrichment Corporation  
UNKP  Ukrainian National Conservative Party  
WEU   Western European Union

CIS MISSILE DESIGNATIONS

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(Dates in parentheses are publication dates when exact event dates were not available.)

#### 1991

**7/31/91 [SOVIET UNION AND U.S. — START I]**

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Under START I, both countries are to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 “accountable” warheads, of which no more than 4,900 can be ballistic missile warheads. Also, no more than 1,100 warheads are permitted on mobile missiles. The cuts called for in START I will occur in three stages over seven years. The treaty will be in force for 15 years and can be extended for successive five-year periods.1

**8/29/91 [KAZAKHSTAN]**

The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan A. Nazarbayev closes the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test facility.2

**9/5/91 [SOVIET UNION]**

The Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, with the support of President Gorbachev and the presidents of the republics, passes a resolution stating that central command over the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal will be maintained, and any republic desiring independence must join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.3

**9/16/91 [KAZAKHSTAN]**

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev states during a news conference with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that Kazakhstan will not renounce nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory. Additionally, Nazarbayev states that the states that have nuclear weapons on their territory should control them and that they should not be controlled by any one state. According to Nazarbayev, the decision to use the nuclear weapons should be made by Russia and Kazakhstan.4

**9/16/91 [ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, LATVIA, AND IAEA]**

At its annual conference, the IAEA admits Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia as full member states.5

**9/23/91 [LITHUANIA — NPT]**

Lithuania joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.7

**9/25/91 [UKRAINE]**

Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, states, “Our position is that Ukraine should have the status of a non-nuclear state.” Furthermore, Kravchuk states, “Ukraine is in favor of central control over nuclear weapons, and we think it impossible that on the map of the world there should appear new nuclear states which might destabilize the civilization of the world. Ukraine is against transferring nuclear weapons from one republic to another.” Kravchuk also stated that Ukraine would abide by the arms control treaties that were signed by the Soviet Union.8

**9/27/91 [U.S.]**

U.S. President George Bush announces that the U.S. will unilaterally withdraw and destroy all its theater nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads from around the world. The U.S. will also withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface vessels, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Many of these weapons will be destroyed, while others will be placed into storage. Bush also announces that the U.S. will remove from alert status all strategic bombers and the ICBMs scheduled to be destroyed under the terms of START I. Furthermore, Bush stops the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM, the mobile portions of the small ICBM program, and the replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for strategic bombers. Bush also proposes that the U.S. and Soviet Union agree to destroy all MIRVed ICBMs. Bush requests that the Soviet Union adopt the measures outlined in his speech for the U.S.9

**10/5/91 [SOVIET UNION]**

President Mikhail Gorbachev announces that the Soviet Union will unilaterally remove 503 ICBMs, including 134 MIRVed ICBMs from alert status. The Soviet Union will also return all rail-based ICBMs to their permanent bases and will not
increase the number of rail-based ICBMs beyond their current number. Gorbachev also states that all Soviet heavy bombers will be removed from alert status and their nuclear weapons will be placed into central storage. Additionally, the Soviet Union will stop the development of the modified nuclear short-range missile for its heavy bombers and the development of a small, mobile ICBM. Three submarines with 48 SLBM launchers will be decommissioned in addition to the three that have already been decommissioned. According to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union will also destroy all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear mines, and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles. Tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from all surface vessels, multi-purpose submarines, and naval aviation and placed into central storage, with a portion to be destroyed. Gorbachev states that by the end of START I reductions, the Soviet Union will have reduced warheads to 5,000, 1,000 fewer than required by the treaty. Gorbachev also announces a one-year moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing.10

10/24/91 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian parliament reaffirms the pledge it made in its 7/90 declaration of sovereignty that Ukraine will not use, have, or make nuclear weapons.11

Note: The Ukrainian parliament will again make this pledge on 4/9/92.

10/26/91 [RUSSIA]
The President of the Russian Republic Boris Yeltsin states that Novaya Zemlya would no longer be used as a nuclear test facility.12

10/30/91 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko sign a protocol under which Ukraine states that the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory should be controlled and dismantled by a central authority.13

10/31/91 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko issues a statement that says that Ukraine wants the nuclear weapons on its territory not only to be moved but also destroyed and that Ukraine wants “full guarantees” that the weapons will not be used before their destruction.14

11/91 [RUSSIA]
A Russian news report indicates that one of Krasnoyarsk’s plutonium producing reactors will be shut down in 7/92.15

11/25/91 [U.S. AND CIS]
The U.S. Senate passes, in an 88 to 8 vote, the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (“Nunn-Lugar” legislation). The Act will provide $500 million in aid to Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus for destroying nuclear and chemical weapons, the transportation, storage, disabling, and safeguarding of weapons to be destroyed, and the creation of verifiable safeguards to prevent the proliferation of the weapons to be dismantled.16

11/26/91 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
The U.S. House of Representatives concurs with the Senate’s provisions for Nunn-Lugar assistance, but lowers the amount of aid to $400 million. The Senate agrees to the House’s changes on the following day.17

Note: The $400 million is based on transfer authority and must come from other existing programs.

12/91 [RUSSIA]
Russia tests the third stage of an SS-19 ICBM at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Russia believes that the SS-19 could be converted into a space-launch vehicle. Several Russian firms have proposed using converted SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, and SS-25 ICBMs as space-launch vehicles.18

Note: START I does allow the conversion of some ICBMs into space-launch vehicles.

12/91 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
Ukraine and Russia sign an agreement concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia for destruction by 7/1/92.19

Note: Also see 2/92 and 4/16/92.

12/8/91 [BELARUS, RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND CIS]
The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the CIS meet in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan and state their desire to join the CIS as co-founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States with its capital in Minsk, Belarus.20

12/12/91 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
The Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act becomes law. The Department of Defense can now use $400 million from monies already appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 1992 to fulfill Nunn-Lugar obligations.21

12/13/91 [KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN AND CIS]
The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan meet in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan and state their desire to join the CIS as co-founders of the Commonwealth.22

12/18/91 [ESTONIA — NPT]
The Estonian parliament ratifies the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.23

12/20/91 [Russia]

An SS-19 ICBM is test launched in Kazakhstan. An SS-18 ICBM is also test launched. The Russians later tell the U.S. that the missiles were being tested as possible space-launch vehicles and not as weapons. The missile’s flight information is encoded, which is in violation of START 1.24 Russia acknowledges that the Soviet Union, by encrypting the flight telemetry, had “deviated” from its commitment not to encrypt telemetry of ICBMs and SLBMs after 11/29/91. In response, Russia promises that the occurrence will not be repeated and provides the U.S. with acceleration profiles and technical data from the test. Following dialogue between the two countries, the U.S. is satisfied that the test was not part of a weapons modernization program and considers the occurrence to be a closed issue.25

12/21/91 [CIS]

At a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, the leaders of the former Soviet republics, except for Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, join Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine as members of the CIS. In a separate agreement, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine agree that the four countries’ leaders should concur on the use of CIS nuclear weapons and that all tactical nuclear weapons will be withdrawn to Russia by 7/1/92.26

12/30/91 [CIS]

In Minsk, Belarus, the CIS member states sign the “Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces” that creates a joint-CIS command over the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal. Under the agreement, Russia will decide on the use of nuclear weapons with the consultation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Furthermore, the strategic nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory will be under the control of the Combined Strategic Forces Command and will be destroyed by the end of 1994. The tactical nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory will be destroyed by 7/1/92.27

1992

(1/7/92) [Ukraine]

The leader of the Ukrainian officers’ association Major General Vladimir Muliava states, “We don’t seek to join any bloc or to have any nuclear weapons; we’ll never attack anyone. But the time has come for the world to look at Ukraine’s position. For too long, the world has neither seen nor heard Ukraine.”29

(1/17/92) [Ukraine]

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states, “The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union envisages the elimination of 130 nuclear warheads in Ukraine. But we have counted 176 of them. We want to include another 46 warheads into the agreement and hope to get rid of the most part our nuclear weapons by 2000. I said the most part because technical problems remain. There is only one specialised centre to destroy nuclear missiles in the former Soviet Union, in the Urals.”30

1/21/92 [Latvia — NPT]

Latvia’s Supreme Council ratifies the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.31

1/28/92 [U.S.]

U.S. President George Bush proposes a 4,700-warhead limit for the U.S. and Russia.32 Bush also announces the cancellation of the Midgetman missile the W-88 warhead, and the B-2 bomber program (once 20 bombers are built). Furthermore, Bush states that the production of the advanced cruise missile will stop at 640, and that additional MX test missiles will not be produced.33

1/29/92 [Russia]

Russian President Boris Yeltsin calls for the U.S. and Russia to decrease their nuclear arsenals to 2,000 to 2,500 “strategic nuclear devices.” Yeltsin also states that Russia will stop producing Blackjack and Bear-H bombers, and long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.34 Reportedly, 600 strategic land- and sea-based missiles, totaling 1,250 warheads, have been taken off alert status.35

(1/31/92) [Estonia and IAEA]

Estonia deposits its instruments of ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA.36

Late-2/92 [Russia]

During a visit to Washington D.C., an official from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry Boris Nikopelov states that Chelyabinsk and Tomsk are two Russian facilities involved in dismantling nuclear weapons. Nikopelov also states that about 100 tons of plutonium and between 400 to 500 tons of HEU will be extracted from dismantled tactical and strategic nuclear warheads.37
2/6/92 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states that about half of the 2,200 tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine have been transferred to Russia.38

(2/19/92) [RUSSIA]
Russia’s military-industrial complex will cancel most development and modernization projects in accordance with Russia’s plan for decreasing its strategic nuclear forces. From 1992 to 1993, Russia will continue to develop its SS-18 and SS-25 ICBMs. Work on the SS-X-26 SLBM and the AS-17 ALCM will be halted.39

2/25/92 [RUSSIA AND BELARUS]
U.S. CIA Director Robert Gates states, “As of earlier this month, road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs continued to be produced in Russia. Some were deployed in Russia and Belarus as late as last December.”40

Note: Gates’ statement could indicate when Russia increased the number of SS-25s in Belarus to 81 from the declared amount in the 9/1/90 Memorandum of Understanding of 54.

2/27/92 [RUSSIA]
Senior Russian nuclear weapons specialists state that the withdrawal of about 6,500 tactical warheads to Russia could end two months ahead of schedule. The Russian Defense Ministry official in charge of transferring tactical warheads from the former republics to Russia General Sergei Zelentsov states that the Russian government wants to speed up the schedule so that the withdrawal will be completed by 5/92 instead of 7/92. According to Zelentsov, tactical nuclear warheads only remain in Ukraine and Belarus.41

3/11/9 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
During a joint news conference following a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, both men agree that they want to decrease the number of their countries’ nuclear weapons, but could not agree on the schedule or whether or not to prohibit MIRVed ICBMs.42

3/13/92 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
Ukraine halts its withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia. Ukrainian President Kravchuk states that the withdrawal of tactical warheads has been suspended because Ukraine has not been given adequate assurances that the weapons will be destroyed.43

3/17/92 [CIS AND KAZAKHSTAN]
The deputy chief of the main directorate of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command concerned with nuclear warheads Lieutenant General Sergei Zelentsov denies that Kazakhstan is missing any tactical nuclear warheads. This denial follows reports that Kazakh tactical nuclear warheads have been delivered to Iran.45

(3/20/92) [GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA]
British Secretary of Defense Tom King states Britain’s desire to aid Russia in dismantling its nuclear weapons. Britain is ready to give Russia armored vehicles and 250 containers for transporting dismantled nuclear warheads.46

(4/92) [U.S. AND CIS]
The CIA believes that the former Soviet Union has stopped manufacturing ballistic missile submarines and will not construct more “before the end of the decade.”47

4/9/92 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian parliament passes a resolution on “Additional Measures for Ensuring Ukraine’s Acquisition of Non-Nuclear Status,” which again reaffirms its commitment that Ukraine will not use, have, or make nuclear weapons. The resolution declares “Ukraine’s right to control the nonuse of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.”48

4/16/92 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk sign a second agreement concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia for destruction. Under the treaty, the nuclear weapons will be removed from Ukraine by 7/1/92.49

Note: The original deal was signed in 12/91. Ukraine suspended the first transportation agreement on 3/13/92.

(4/23/92) [RUSSIA]
Russian Minatom officials admit that Russia has 100 metric tons of separated plutonium in military stockpiles.50

5/5/92 [UKRAINE]
The last of Ukraine’s tactical nuclear weapons [about 2,000] are shipped to Russia, including gravity bombs, nuclear anti-aircraft missile pods, sea-launched nuclear torpedoes, sea-launched tactical cruise missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles.51

5/6/92 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
U.S. President George Bush and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk announce that they have reached an agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Ukraine’s adherence to START I.52
5/7/92 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
In a letter to U.S. President George Bush, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk writes, “In accordance with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, and with the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine adopted on October 24, 1991, Ukraine shall have a non-nuclear status, will abide by the three non-nuclear principles in the future, and emphasizes its right to control over the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.” Kravchuk also writes that Ukraine will ensure the destruction of all nuclear weapons deployed on its territory in accordance with all relevant agreements and within the seven-year timeframe set by START I.53

5/8/92 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Bizhan announces that “not a single tactical nuclear weapon remains on Ukrainian territory.”54

5/9/92 [CIS]
The CIS Joint Armed Forces Command announces that the Black Sea Fleet is not armed with nuclear weapons.55

5/19/92 [KAZAKHSTAN AND U.S.]
In a letter to U.S. President George Bush, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev writes that “Kazakhstan shall guarantee the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory during the seven-year period of time as provided by the START Treaty.”56

5/20/92 [BELARUS AND U.S.]
In a letter to U.S. President Bush, the Chairman of the Belarusian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich writes that once Belarus ratifies START, it will guarantee “the elimination of all nuclear strategic offensive arms located on its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements concluded by Byelarus and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty, on condition that the Russian Federation will be prepared to receive the nuclear strategic offensive arms removed from the territory of Byelarus during this period of time.”57

5/23/92 [LISBON PROTOCOL]
The U.S., Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus sign the Lisbon Protocol, which is a protocol to START I. Under the Lisbon Protocol, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus will assume the Soviet Union’s obligations to START I. Article V of the Lisbon Protocol requires that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states “in the shortest possible time.”58

6/92 [RUSSIA]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that he has started removing SS-18 ICBMs from alert status.59

6/92 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
Russia tells the U.S. in London that if it were to agree to a warhead limit of 3,500 and both countries deMIRVed, Russia would not be able to have 3,500 warheads. Russia wants between 900 to 1,000 ICBMs, but believes that their mobile missile forces could not number more than 600. For this reason, Russia wants an additional 154 SS-18 silos and the 170 downloaded SS-19s.60

6/17/92 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin conclude their first summit meeting by signing an agreement to slash their country’s nuclear arsenals to 3,000 to 3,500 deployed strategic warheads each by the year 2003. This number of warheads is 25 to 30 percent lower than called for by START I.61 Both presidents also agree to destroy all MIRVed ICBMs and agree to a 1,750 SLBM warhead limit.62 The U.S. and Russia also sign an “umbrella” agreement creating the legal framework for providing Nunn-Lugar funds.63 Following the signing of the umbrella agreement, the U.S. and Russia sign three Nunn-Lugar project agreements, under which the U.S. will supply Russia with armored blankets, nuclear accident response equipment, and storage containers for fissile material.64

Note: The agreement to slash the U.S.’s and Russia’s nuclear forces to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads is the basis for START II.

7/2/92 [KAZAKHSTAN — START I]
Kazakhstan’s parliament ratifies START I.65

8/4/92 [AZERBAIJAN — NPT]
Azerbaijan ratifies the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.66

8/28/92 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
The U.S. and Russia agree that the U.S. will supply Russia with conversion kits for the railroad cars that will transport nuclear weapons and fissile materials.67

8/28/92 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
Russia and the U.S. sign an agreement under which the U.S. will help fund the design of a plutonium and HEU storage facility. Possible sites are Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk.68

9/21/92 [UKRAINE]
The Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Georgiy Zhivitsa states, “Administratively, strategic forces (located on Ukrainian territory) are under Ukrainian control although, operationally, they are subordinated to the CIS.”69
(9/23/92) [Uzbekistan and IAEA]
During the first day of the IAEA’s 36th general conference in Vienna, Uzbekistan is admitted as a member.70

9/25/92 [CIS]
The Commander-in-Chief of CIS Joint Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov states that CIS missiles continue to be aimed at the West, although many have been removed from alert status.71

10/92 [U.S.—Nunn-Lugar]
The U.S. Congress passes the “Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act,” which provides $400 million out of the Defense Department’s budget to “Nunn-Lugar” projects for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This Act also provides funds for defense conversion, and military-to-military contacts.72 The Nunn-Lugar funds, to be used in Fiscal Year 1993, can also be used to create science and technology centers in the former Soviet Union to provide work for scientists and engineers who have worked on nuclear and chemical weapons. Furthermore, unspent funding from Fiscal Year 1992 can be carried over to Fiscal Year 1993.73

10/15/92 [Russia]
Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev states that missiles have been removed from alert status and that those missiles still on alert status have “no specific targets.”74

10/15/92 [Ukraine and IAEA]
Ukrainian Minister of Energy Leonas Asmantas and the IAEA’s Director General Hans Blix sign a safeguards agreement titled “On the Making of Guarantees by the Republic of Lithuania Based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”75

10/22/92 [Belarus and U.S.]
Belarus signs an umbrella agreement with the U.S. providing the legal framework for receiving Nunn-Lugar funds.76 Belarus and the U.S. also sign five other agreements, which cover the provision of disaster equipment worth $5 million, the creation of a communications link between the two countries, the creation of export controls (worth about $10 million) conversion and demilitarization, and the provisions of $25 million for environmental problems.77

10/23/92 [Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and U.S.]
Delegates from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S. sign an agreement regulating the work to be done by the Joint Commission for Observation and Inspections (JCOI) that was created by START I. JCOI will enable the treaty members to meet and resolve issues pertaining to their obligations to START I.78

10/26/92 [Belarus to Russia]
A schedule for the withdrawal to Russia of 81 SS-25s from Belarus has been drawn up and approved by both countries. The withdrawal will be completed by 12/30/94, which will make Belarus a non-nuclear state.79

11/4/92 [Russia — START I]
The Supreme Soviet of Russia ratifies START I in an 157 to 1 vote with 26 abstentions.80

11/5/92 [Russia]
According to Russian defense sources, Russia’s Pacific Fleet is no longer armed with tactical nuclear weapons, including SS-N-22 cruise missiles.81

11/12/92 [Ukraine]
The Commander-in-Chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov states that because of Ukraine’s deficiency in nuclear experts, Ukraine only has a limited ability to maintain its nuclear weapons.82

11/13/92 [Russia]
Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin states in an interview that the RS-16 (SS-17) ICBM will be retired over the next two years and will be replaced with mobile SS-25 ICBMs.83

12/12/92 [Ukraine — START I and NPT]
Ukraine’s Supreme Council begins debating ratification of START I and the NPT.84
12/17/92 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
The U.S. agrees to allow Russia to re-use 90 of its SS-18 silos.85

(12/28/92) [UKRAINE]
According to senior Russian military officers, Ukraine is attempting to break the launch codes for the nuclear weapons located on its territory. The Russian officers believe that Ukraine could succeed in breaking the codes in six months to a year.86

12/29/92 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
The U.S. and Russia announce that they have agreed on the text of START II.87

1993

1/3/93 [U.S. AND RUSSIA — START II]
U.S. President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin sign START II. Once the treaty is ratified, both Russia and the U.S. will be required to decrease their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads each. START II permits only single-warhead, land-based ICBMs. START II also permits Russia and the U.S. to have only 1,700 to 1,750 SLBM warheads. START II cannot go into force before START I, and once it enters into force, it will remain in force throughout the 15-year period of START I. Russia is allowed to keep 90 SS-18 silos, although they will be made incapable of launching SS-18 ICBMs. Russia will also be able to convert 105 of its six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs into single-warhead missiles. START II also allows Russia to use a number of ICBMs as space-launch vehicles.88 Under the terms of START II, Russia will have to eliminate about 40 submarines, 1,500 ballistic missiles, and 7,000 warheads.89 Although Ukraine views START II favorably, the head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s press service Yuriy Sergeyev states, “However it should not be forgotten that this [START II] involves a bilateral agreement signed between Russia and the USA. To link Ukrainian missiles to a treaty Ukraine has not signed is unjustifiable and senseless.”90 Sergeyev states that Ukraine’s missiles will be considered within the context of START I.90

Note: As of the end of 1994, neither the U.S. nor Russia had ratified START II.

1/4/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states, “The Russian-U.S. Start-2 Treaty does not assign any commitments to Ukraine and does not cover its territory. At the same time, Ukraine is moving consistently towards the goal of becoming a nuclear-free state which was proclaimed by its Supreme Soviet.”92

1/5/93 [RUSSIA]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov states that START II includes provisions for the “real count” of strategic bomber armaments. START II provisions include the display of strategic bombers and on-site inspections. According to Berdennikov, Russia will be allowed to convert, rather than destroy, 90 heavy-missile silos for use with single-warhead missiles. Berdennikov also states that should the Russian Supreme Soviet not ratify START II, it “will strike a blow to Russia’s national interests.”93

1/6/93 [BELARUS]
Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko states, “Nuclear tactical weapons have been completely withdrawn from Belarus. Having become a member of the START-I Agreement and the Lisbon Protocol, the Republic has committed itself to withdraw strategic arms within seven years; although, this may happen sooner.”94 Kravchenko also states that Belarus wants to become a neutral, non-nuclear weapon state and approves of the signing of START II between the U.S. and Russia.95

Note: The tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus and Ukraine were withdrawn by the end of 5/92.

(1/6/93) [KAZAKHSTAN]
Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Tuleutai Suleymenov states that START II “guarantees stable peace in the future and poses a constructive contribution to the efforts to ensure security on the part of the Russian and American presidents.”96

(1/6/93) [BELARUS]
According to Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, Belarus is not looking for any special benefits in return for its nuclear weapons.97

(1/6/93) [UKRAINE]
Chairman of the Ukrainian National Committee for Disarmament Boris Tarasyuk states Ukraine’s conditions for ratifying START. According to Tarasyuk, Ukraine requires security guarantees from the nuclear powers, dismantlement assistance, and compensation for the nuclear weapons.98
1/15/93 [U.S.]
U.S. President Bush submits START II to the Senate for advice and consent.99

1/21/93 [RUSSIA, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS]
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, at a meeting of CIS defense ministers in Minsk, demands that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus place their nuclear weapons, early warning systems, anti-missile and anti-aircraft units under Russian control. The Chief of Staff of CIS Armed Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov states, "Nuclear weapons have to belong to a state. At present they are controlled by me and I am not a state." Ukraine and Kazakhstan disagree with the Russian demand. Following the meeting, Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Bizhan tells reporters, "Ukraine considers all component parts of strategic weapons on Ukrainian territory are the property of Ukraine." Bizhan also states, "Administrative control of strategic nuclear forces on our territory must belong to Ukraine and operational control to the unified strategic command,” not Russia.101

1/22/93 [RUSSIA, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS]
At a CIS summit in Minsk, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus fail to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia.102

1/22/93 [UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND U.S.]
U.S. sources state that Ukraine has rejected U.S. and Russian security guarantees that were to be provided in return for transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia. According to the U.S. sources, Ukraine wants Russia to promise not to use economic coercion against Ukraine or to terminate the energy supplies Russia sends Ukraine.103

1/26/93 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and U.S. President Bill Clinton hold a telephone conversation during which Kravchuk describes Ukraine’s progress toward the ratification of START and Clinton promises $175 million in dismantlement aid.104

2/93 [RUSSIA]
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, as of 2/93, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from Russian naval surface-vessels, submarines, and aircraft and put into storage.105

2/93 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
As of 2/93, the U.S. executive branch has proposed spending $303.54 million of the $800 million allocated to the Nunn-Lugar fund. Of the $303.54 million, $133.3 million has been earmarked for programs through signed agreements. As of 12/92, the U.S. had spent less than $22 million of the Nunn-Lugar aid.106

2/1/93 [BELARUS]
Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich states that Belarus is distinct because it wants non-nuclear status. According to Shushkevich, Belarus is not destroying the weapons stationed in Belarus, but is withdrawing the weapons to Russia, the owner of the nuclear weapons. Shushkevich states that the high cost of withdrawing the weapons to Russia is an obstacle.107

2/2/93 [UKRAINE]
During a meeting with Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiwicz, the head of Ukraine’s parliament, Ivan Plyushch, states that Ukraine’s goal is to become a non-nuclear state, although that goal is, at present, impossible.108

2/3/93 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
The CIA’s intelligence officer for strategic programs Lawrence K. Gershwin reports to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is expected to deploy three new missile systems sometime in the 1990s. The three new systems include a road-mobile, single-warhead SS-25, a silo-based SS-25, and a follow-on to the SLBM fired from Typhoon-class submarines. Gershwin also reports that Russia would prefer to decrease its nuclear arsenal to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads by the year 2003. This number of warheads is lower than the START II limit of 3,500.109

Note: Russia already has road-mobile, single-warhead SS-25 ICBMs. This is the type of missile that Russia is withdrawing from Belarus for redeployment on Russian territory. Silo-based SS-25s would be a new launch variant for the missile. The SS-25, a single-warhead missile, falls within the limitations set by START II.

2/3/93 [KAZAKHSTAN]
Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev states that the nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan are secure and that they are controlled by the unified CIS command. Nazarbayev also states that he can veto the use of the nuclear weapons located in Kazakhstan.110

2/4/93 [BELARUS — START I]
The Belarusian Supreme Council ratifies START I in a 218 to 1 vote.111 On this date, the Belarusian Supreme Council also votes to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

2/5/93 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew states that of the 600 Russian strategic missiles taken off of alert status, about 220 of the missiles and their warheads have been removed from their launchers.112

Note: These missiles refer to Yeltsin’s 1/29/92 announcement concerning 600 missiles reportedly taken off of alert.
2/5/93 [CIS]
U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew states that the entire arsenal of the former Soviet Union’s short-range nuclear missiles has been transferred to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.113

2/5/93 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian Congress of National and Democratic Movements, a faction within the parliament, states that “nuclear weapons are a key factor of restraint when almost all neighboring states, especially Russia, are making territorial claims on Ukraine.” Although the Congress believes that Ukraine should keep the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, it may allow the withdrawal of some of the weapons.114

(2/8/93) [BELARUS]
Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko states that Belarus does not claim ownership of the uranium in the nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus. Belarus is planning to begin talks with Russia this month on compensation for the uranium.115

2/9/93 [RUSSIA]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin submits the START II Treaty to the parliament for ratification.116

2/18/93 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
The U.S. and Russia agree on a 20 year contract in which Russia will sell the U.S. 500 tons of weapons-grade nuclear material. The 500 tons of HEU will be blended down from 93 percent enriched to 3.6 percent for use in nuclear power reactors. Another contract, still being negotiated, will provide the details of the uranium contract. The HEU is to come from dismantled nuclear weapons.117 Russia will blend down the HEU before sending it to the U.S.118 Russia could earn $12 billion and Ukraine $1 billion over 20 years by selling HEU from dismantled warheads to the U.S.119

(2/18/93) [U.S. AND BELARUS]
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher reportedly says that the U.S. will grant Belarus $65 million in dismantlement assistance.128

4/93 [UKRAINE]
A working group composed of members of Ukraine’s parliament, technical experts, and specialists holds closed hearings on Ukraine’s ratification of START I. The working group is chaired by Ukrainian Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko. Kostenko states that no agreement has been reached among the members of the group and that more meetings are required. In Kostenko’s opinion, Ukraine should be declared a nuclear state. Kostenko also states that Ukrainian specialists believe that Ukraine can prohibit the launch of the missiles located on its territory.126

4/27/93 [UKRAINE]
A statement signed by 162 deputies in Ukraine’s Rada declares that Ukraine’s Supreme Council must “confirm its right of ownership of the nuclear weapons that are located on its territory” before ratification of START I can be discussed.
The statement also says, “Attempts on the part of some states
to force Ukraine to immediately ratify START I, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Lisbon Protocol and to give
up the status of a power that is, de facto and de jure, an owner
of nuclear weapons are inadmissible from the point of view
of international law.” According to the statement, Ukraine
should receive compensation for the materials removed from
the warheads of the tactical weapons Ukraine had already
transferred to Russia.130

5/18/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
The chairman of the Committee for Defense and Security of
the Russian Parliament, Sergei Stepashin, tells Segodnya that
Ukraine is attempting to gain operational control of the nuclear
weapons stationed on its territory. Stepashin states that
Ukraine is attempting to retarget the nuclear missiles, most
likely at Russia. Stepashin says that experts from the Russian
Ministry of Defense believe that Ukraine could retarget the
strategic missiles in eight months to one year.131

Summer 1993 [BELARUS TO RUSSIA]
Nine SS-25 “Sickle” road-mobile ICBMs (1 regiment) are
transferred from Belarus to Russia.132

6/93 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
By 6/93, $800 million has been allocated to the U.S. Nunn-
Lugar program to spend on dismantlement in the former So-
viet Union. Less than $50 million have been contracted to
specific projects.133

6/3/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma states, “Ukraine
must confirm itself temporarily as a nuclear state.”134

6/9/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
An anonymous senior U.S. intelligence analyst says that
Ukraine is secretly attempting to break the security codes of
the ICBMs on its territory and will be able to launch the
missiles within months. Moscow currently controls the codes
to the nuclear missiles. 135

6/9/93 [GERMANY AND UKRAINE]
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, during a visit to Kiev, of-
ers Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk German assistance
with the disposal of the toxic fuel from the missiles deployed
in Ukraine.136

6/15/93 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
The U.S. embassy in Moscow states that the U.S. provided
Russia with 23 sets of “Violinist-3” high-precision equipment
and 50 calibrators, worth $15 million, for detecting radioac-
tivity during the transportation of nuclear weapons.137

6/23/93 [RUSSIA]
A spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
states that scientists at Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70, and two
other unnamed nuclear weapon dismantlement facilities were
threatening to go on strike unless they were paid and safety
conditions were improved. The scientists are concerned about
the safety of nuclear weapons being shipped by train to the
facilities. The Ministry of Atomic Energy states that it has
no money to pay the scientists.138

7/2/93 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian Rada passes a new defense doctrine in which
the strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory are con-
sidered Ukrainian property. The vote is 226 to 15.139

7/7/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Kravchuk states, “Ukraine must be the
owner of nuclear weapons on its territory pending their de-
struction.”140

Note: Kravchuk could be responding to the defense doctrine
passed by the Ukrainian parliament on 7/2/93.

7/13/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
The Russian government approves a draft agreement with
Ukraine in which Russia will convert HEU from dismantled
warheads to LEU for Ukrainian nuclear reactors. Russia will
also store nuclear components from the warheads and attach
Ukrainian nuclear-engineering troops to the Russian Minis-
try of Defense.141

7/15/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukraine starts removing one regiment of SS-19s (10 ICBMs)
from their silos at Pervomaysk. Ukrainian Defense Minister
Konstantin Morozov states that the regiment will be “deacti-
vated” by late-9/93 when work on a second regiment could
begin. Russian and Ukrainian engineers and scientists will
cooperate on deactivating the SS-19 ICBMs. The warheads
will remain in Ukraine under Russian supervision and main-
tenance until the Ukrainian Rada makes a decision concern-
ing START. Under agreement with Russia, the rocket fuel
will remain in Ukraine.142

Note: For more information concerning the dismantlement
of these SS-19s, see the entry on 8/2/93.

7/22/93 [BELARUS — NPT]
Belarus joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.143

7/22/93 [BELARUS AND U.S.]
U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Belarusian Supreme
Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich sign three agreements
providing Belarus $59 million in aid for denuclearization and
demilitarization.144
The general director of the Ukrainian Hartron Institute, Yakov Eisenberg, states that Ukraine could develop independently of Russia the means to launch the nuclear missiles stationed on its territory.\(^\text{145}\)

**7/27/93 [UKRAINE]**

Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov states that Ukraine will not begin dismantling its SS-24 ICBMs until its SS-19 ICBMs have been eliminated.\(^\text{146}\)

**7/27/93 [UKRAINE & U.S.]**

U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin tells Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov in Washington, D.C., that the U.S. will release a portion of the $135 million in Nunn-Lugar funds allocated to assist Ukraine’s dismantlement of ICBMs.\(^\text{147}\)

**7/28/93 [UKRAINE]**

During an Atlantic Council speech, Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov states that Ukraine requires at least $3 billion in aid and that $135 million is not nearly enough assistance. Morozov also admits that the deactivation of the SS-19 ICBMs, which began on 7/15/93, was being done without approval from the Ukrainian parliament.\(^\text{148}\)

**7/30/93 [UKRAINE]**

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states that START I does not include Ukraine’s 46 SS-24 ICBMs and that Ukraine will keep them following its ratification of the treaty. Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee Dmytro Pavlychko states that Ukraine will not ratify the Lisbon Protocol unless Article V is deleted.\(^\text{149}\) Pavlychko also states that the 46 SS-24s “must remain in Ukraine until 1995, when as planned, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is revised. But even after that, taking into account the complicated process of the destruction of warheads and missiles, some part of the nuclear weapons will remain on our territory.” Pavlychko also states that Ukraine would most likely ratify START I in 9/93 or 10/93, although the Lisbon Protocol will not be ratified until Article V is deleted.\(^\text{150}\)

**8/9/93 [UKRAINE]**

Chairman of the Ukrainian Rada’s Foreign Relations Committee Dmytro Pavlychko states in an interview with a Czech newspaper, “We now have 176 nuclear intercontinental missiles, 46 of which were made in Ukraine. The rest, made in Russia, will be handed over to Moscow for destruction within the framework of the START I Treaty. We will keep the 46 missiles until a decision is made about them on the basis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The codes enabling direct use of these missiles are in the possession of the Russians; we have technical control over them. The strategic weapons on our territory are administratively incorporated into the 43rd Ukrainian Army. They formally belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States, but the CIS does not actually have any military forces.”\(^\text{154}\)

**8/11/93 [UKRAINE]**

The head of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Mr. Grishchenko, states that SS-24 ICBMs are not included in START I and, therefore, Ukraine legally is able to keep them.\(^\text{155}\)

**8/14/93 [BELARUS & RUSSIA]**

Colonel General Pavel Kozlovskiy, the Minister of Defense of Belarus, states that Belarus could completely withdraw its nuclear weapons to Russia by 1996.\(^\text{156}\)

**8/15/93 [RUSSIA & UKRAINE]**

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev states that a breakthrough has occurred in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine over the dismantlement of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. According to Kozyrev, an agreement may be signed within the next few days. Ukraine has not confirmed Kozyrev’s statements.\(^\text{157}\)

**8/16/93 [UKRAINE & RUSSIA]**

Ukrainian Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov denies Russian Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s statements that Ukraine and Russia are about to sign an agreement. Morozov states that, while Russia did make a proposal concerning the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, “there have
so far been no talks with Russia.158

8/16/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
The U.S. Department of Defense informs Congress of a proposed strategic offensive arms elimination program with Ukraine worth $135 million.159

(8/16/93) [UKRAINE]
Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Ivan Bizhan reportedly states in an interview that Ukraine can block Russian control of the strategic missiles based in Ukraine and that Ukraine has almost broken the ICBM launch codes, which would give Ukraine operational control over the missiles.160

8/17/93 [RUSSIA]
The Russian delegate to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Valerii Zemskov calls for an end to the production of HEU and states that existing stockpiles of the material should be placed under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).161

(8/18/93) [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announces that Russia and Ukraine will sign an agreement on dismantling the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov denies Kozyrev’s announcement.162

8/18/93 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s press service denies that Colonel General Ivan Bizhan made the reported statements of 8/16/93. The statements concerned Ukraine’s ability to block Russian control over the ICBMs in Ukraine and Ukraine’s attempts at breaking the ICBM’s launch codes.163

8/19/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukraine issues a statement denying that it aspires to control the nuclear missiles on its territory.164

8/26/93 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
The U.S. agrees to provide Russia with $130 million worth of equipment used for dismantling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.165

9/9/93 [RUSSIA]
According to Russian officials, Russia is dismantling 1,500 to 2,500 warheads per year. The U.S. has not verified these dismantlement rates.166

9/2/93 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
Russian Minister for Nuclear Power Engineering Viktor Mikhailov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Political Issues Frank Wisner sign an agreement to provide Russia with $85 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance toward the country’s nuclear dismantlement;167 $75 million will go toward the design and construction of a fissile materials storage facility. The remaining $10 million will be for fissile materials control.168

9/3/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin tells reporters before leaving for a summit with Ukraine in the Crimea that, “We can not allow Ukraine to be a nuclear power.”169

9/3/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
At a summit in Massandra between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, agreements are signed providing for the transfer of warheads stationed in Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement. The dismantlement is to occur within one year of the Ukrainian Rada’s ratification of the agreement.170 Russia will compensate Ukraine with LEU for its civilian nuclear reactors.171 At the summit, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma sign three agreements on the use and control of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine and Russia.172

Note: The accord collapses after Russia and Ukraine accuse each other of altering the terms of the agreement once it had been signed. The Massandra accord is also effectively negated by the Ukrainian parliament on 11/18/93, when it conditionally ratifies START I and does not include the destruction of all ICBMs in the vote.

9/9/93 [RUSSIA]
The Russian television news program “Vesti” reports that SS-20 intermediate-range missiles are on display in Grozny, the capital of the Chechen Republic, located in the North Caucasian military district. The SS-20s were nuclear missiles that the Russian Ministry of Defense believes were destroyed under conditions set by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed with the U.S. on 12/8/87.173 According to the Chechen presidential press service, only one SS-20 launcher was on display during a parade commemorating the second anniversary of Chechnya’s independence.174

9/14/93 [U.S.]
Scientific Ecology Inc., a subsidiary of Westinghouse, wins a $39.9 million contract with the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency to supply 32,968 containers for Russian plutonium and HEU recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons.175

(9/15/93) [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Colonel-General Yevgenyi Maslin, the Russian Defense Ministry’s Chief Directorate for Nuclear Munitions, states that Russia has lost “de facto” control over the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Reportedly, over the last 18 months, strategic nuclear bomber crews and other strategic nuclear units have been incorporated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Russia, at this time, still has operational control over the strategic missile troops. Maslin also states that Ukraine has “full control” over the nuclear weapons on its territory, although it cannot launch them.

9/21/93 [RUSSIA]
Russia annuls the Massandra accord because Ukraine added a handwritten amendment after the agreement was signed. The amendment stated that Ukraine will withdraw warheads subject to START I limits. The controversial amendment excludes Ukraine’s SS-24 missiles from being withdrawn. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry denies Russia’s allegation and states that the amendment was included before the agreement was signed.

Note: Russia and Ukraine signed the Massandra accord on 9/3/93.

9/27/93 [KAZAKHSTAN, ARMENIA, AND IAEA]
Kazakhstan and Armenia apply with the IAEA for safeguards agreements. Armenia deposits its instruments of ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA.

9/30/93 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
Authority to transfer $212 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance from Fiscal Year 1992 “expires” because the funds had not been committed to disarmament projects by the U.S. Defense Department by the conclusion of Fiscal Year 1993.

10/3/93 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
The U.S. Department of Defense comptroller informs Congress that by 10/93, proposed obligations under the Nunn-Lugar program amount to $789 million of the $800 million appropriated.

10/5/93 [KAZAKHSTAN]
Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Touleutai Suleymenov requests $2 billion for dismantling Kazakhstan’s nuclear weapons and for cleaning up Semipalatinsk.

10/5/93 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
Two Ukrainian strategic nuclear warheads await transport from the Buyan railway station, near Kiev, to Russia. The warheads are being held at the station by Ukrainian customs officials, who demand that Russian officials again fill out the documentation authorizing export because the original forms, according to the Ukrainian officials, do not include any confirmation that Russia will compensate Ukraine for the warheads. Russian officials claim that the forms do not need to be filled out again and that compensation has already been agreed upon.

10/5/93 [ARMENIA AND IAEA]
Armenia joins the IAEA.

10/13/93 [RUSSIA AND JAPAN]
Deputy Prime Minister of Japan Tsutomu Hata and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev sign an agreement providing Russia with Japanese assistance in five areas related to the dismantling of Russia’s nuclear weapons. The five fields include the storage of nuclear materials, research into the peaceful use of nuclear materials, IAEA safeguards, the disposal of liquid missile fuel, and environmental pollution.

10/14/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. officials state that Ukraine is demanding compensation for the short-range nuclear warheads it has already transferred to Russia. Ukraine wants the compensation before it withdraws any of its ICBMs to Russia.

10/19/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk tells reporters that Ukraine may keep its SS-24 ICBMs under START I and that the missiles could be “partially neutralized” by deactivating their codes. Kravchuk also states that the West is not giving Ukraine enough monetary assistance for dismantling its nuclear missiles. Kravchuk states, “After the ratification of Start, we will immediately proceed with the destruction of the 130 [SS-19s]. But we can approach the remaining 46 [SS-24s] from a different standpoint. We can only remove them from active military alert and remove the codes so that they will not be aimed at the United States.”

10/19/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukraine’s Rada approves a new military doctrine that does not include the 46 SS-24s located on Ukrainian territory in the provisions of START I. The doctrine also states that Ukraine became the “owner” of the nuclear weapons through “historical circumstances” and that Ukraine will never threaten to use or use nuclear weapons in its security policy. According to the doctrine, Ukraine will become a non-nuclear state “in the future.”

10/20/93 [RUSSIA AND FRANCE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signs a $28 million accord with France. France will supply machine tools and containers for dismantling Russia’s nuclear warheads and converting the fissile material for use in civilian reactors.

(10/20/93) [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russia is worried that radiation could leak from two warheads that have been waiting at the border between Russia and Ukraine since 10/5/93.193
Note: For an explanation of why these two warheads have not been transferred to Russia, refer to the entry on 10/5/93.

10/21/93 [UKRAINE]
Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Ivan Plyusch states that the Rada will most likely ratify START I in late 1993, once parliamentary members have received explanations of how the missiles will be dismantled and what compensation and security guarantees Ukraine will receive.194

10/22/93 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
The two warheads that have been held at the Buyan railway station in Ukraine since 10/5 are sent on to Russia for dismantlement.195
Note: Information concerning these two warheads and their detention by Ukraine can be found in the entries on 10/5/93 and 10/20/93.

10/22/93 [UKRAINE AND IAEA]
A Ukrainian official states that Ukraine would want a “comprehensive” agreement with the IAEA under INFCIRC466 (the model safeguards agreement for non-member nations of the NPT), which would not include the warhead materials.196

10/24/93 [KAZAKHSTAN AND U.S.]
According to a U.S. government spokeswoman, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev told U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that he would “introduce to parliament by the end of this year ratification documents” for the NPT.197
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the U.S. will give Kazakhstan a $140 million aid package for Fiscal Year 1994.198

10/25/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher states that the U.S. is prepared to give Ukraine $175 million once Ukraine has assured the U.S. that it will give up its nuclear weapons. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko states that Ukraine will require $2.8 billion to dismantle its nuclear weapons.199

10/25/93 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
The “Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine on the Elements of Strategic Nuclear Arms and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” commits the U.S. to give Ukraine $177 million in assistance.200

10/25/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
Ukraine signs an umbrella agreement establishing the legal framework to receive Nunn-Lugar funds.201 Ukraine could now receive $175 million in assistance from the U.S.202
Note: The diplomatic note that allowed the agreement to enter into force is not exchanged until early 1/94.

10/25/93 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk tells U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Is the executive branch committed to becoming a non-nuclear state, to ratifying START I and to signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty? The answers were yes, yes and yes.”203 Kravchuk also tells Christopher that he had been misquoted the previous week as saying that Ukraine may retain its SS-24 ICBMs. Kravchuk states that the Lisbon Protocol includes the SS-24s, as well as the SS-19s.204

10/26/93 [RUSSIA AND JAPAN]
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says that Russia would like Japan to buy $100 million worth of uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons each year for 20 years.205

(10/27/93) [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk answers a question regarding Ukraine’s control over the strategic missiles stationed on its territory. Kravchuk answers, “At the moment, we cannot launch the missiles. We could do it if we had set ourselves this task. We have the scientific and technical potential. But we have not set ourselves this task.”206

11/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Eleven of Russia’s top weapons designers warn that “serious infractions” in the storage and safety of Ukraine’s nuclear warheads could cause a disaster on the same scale as Chernobyl.207

11/93 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
The U.S. Congress passes the “Cooperative Threat Reduction Act,” which allocates $400 million more to the Nunn-Lugar program. This Act also includes restoration of the environment on former Soviet military sites and provision housing for former Strategic Rocket Forces personnel.208 The $400 million appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 1994, unlike the previous two years, will be a separate line item in the Department of Defense’s budget and will not come from money already appropriated for defense programs.209
Note: Nunn-Lugar funding for the former Soviet Union has now reached a total of $1.2 billion.

Late-11/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Major General V. Yakovlev, the deputy head of the Russian Ministry’s nuclear weapons department, claims that eight times more nuclear warheads are being stored at Pervomaysk, Ukraine than are allowed by safety regulations. Yakovlev states that “it may prove dangerous to dismantle nuclear warheads” in such a state.210

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11/2/93 [UKRAINE]
Chairman of Ukraine’s National Committee for Questions of Disarmament Boris Tarasyuk states that no missiles, including the warheads from deactivated SS-19 missiles, will be withdrawn to Russia until Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. agree on compensation for Ukraine’s tactical nuclear warheads.211

11/2/93 [RUSSIA]
The Russian Supreme Council and President Boris Yeltsin approve Russia’s new military doctrine. While the doctrine stipulates the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons, it does not include a “no-first-use” policy.212

11/5/93 [BELARUS AND JAPAN]
Belarus and Japan sign an agreement under which Japan will aid Belarus in its efforts to become a non-nuclear state.213 Note: The aid Belarus receives from Japan will be part of the $100 million Japan is splitting between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

11/5/93 [BELARUS AND U.S.]
Belarus Defense Minister Paval Kazlouski states that Belarus should get half of the $400 million U.S. fund for assisting Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan dismantle their nuclear weapons. To date, the U.S. has given Belarus $59 million in assistance to help pay the costs of withdrawing its S-25 ICBMs to Russia.214 Note: Kazlouski is referring to the U.S. Nunn-Lugar legislation. Belarus withdrew its first regiment of nine SS-25s to Russia during the summer of 1993.

11/6/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev states that the Massandra accord includes all 1,600 Ukrainian warheads. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko states that the Massandra accord only applies to some of the older Ukrainian missiles.215 Note: Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko is most likely referring to Ukraine’s older SS-19 ICBMs and not the more modern SS-24s. Russia annulled the Massandra accord on 9/21/93.

11/9/93 [UKRAINE]
Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, the head of Ukraine’s armaments and disarmament department, states that Ukraine has deactivated 20 SS-19 ICBMs and that they will be dismantled in the “near future.” Hryshchenko states that Ukraine’s SS-24s “will be dismantled last of all, whatever the circumstances.”216

(11/16/93) [UKRAINE]
Members of the Ukrainian Rada state that they are determined to retain some of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. The parliament’s draft resolution will favor Ukraine’s ratification of START I, although Ukraine must be given special status as neither a nuclear nor non-nuclear state. According to parliamentary deputy Volodymyr Kolinet, “special status” means that Ukraine can keep some of its nuclear weapons, but will not have operational control over them.217

11/18/93 [UKRAINE — START I]
Ukraine’s Rada conditionally ratifies START I, adding that Ukraine requires security guarantees and $2.8 billion in foreign aid. As a deterrent against Russia, the Ukrainian Rada also renounces Article V of the Lisbon Protocol and refuses to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. The Rada, furthermore, interprets START I to mean that Ukraine must only destroy 36 percent of its ICBMs and 42 percent of its warheads.218 The vote was 254 to 9 in favor of conditionally ratifying START I.219 Note: Ukraine’s Rada ratifies START I without conditions on 2/3/94.

11/18/93 [RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN]
British defense equipment maker GKN Plc announces that it made a $5.9 million deal with the Russian Ministry of Defense to provide 125 armored supercontainers and 20 transport vehicles for use in the dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear arms.220

11/18/93 [LITHUANIA AND IAEA]
Lithuania deposits its instruments of ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA.221

11/19/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
Acting State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly states, “We do not believe Ukraine’s concerns can be met by placing conditions on ratification of the START treaty.”222

11/19/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states, “If we cannot use or fully control these weapons and cannot replace or service them, I said and repeat here that we must get rid of them. This is my viewpoint from which I have not and will not deviate.” Kravchuk also states, “I shall try to bring before a new parliament a proposal concerning START-1 and joining NPT. This I shall do without fail.” It is reported that, to date, the U.S. has promised Ukraine $175 million in aid. President Kravchuk has been trying to get Ukraine $2.8 billion in compensation for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.223 Note: Although the U.S. has promised Ukraine $175 million, Ukraine has not yet received the full amount.

11/19/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov states that the cost of dismantling Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal in “exact fulfillment” with START I, which, according to Ukraine is
36 percent of the launchers, is $1.6 to $1.7 billion. According to Shmarov, total dismantlement would cost about $3.8 billion. Shmarov states that these amounts are based on world costs and prices.\(^{224}\)

11/20/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, reacting to Ukraine’s conditional ratification of START I, states that the ratification made an “alarming impression” and that it was now possible Ukraine might not destroy its nuclear weapons.\(^{225}\)

11/21/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk distances himself from the parliament following the Rada’s conditional ratification of START I. Kravchuk states in a radio address that he unequivocally supports ratification of START I and Ukrainian membership in the NPT.\(^{226}\)

11/22/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev states that Ukraine’s ratification of START I is in violation of the NPT because Ukraine’s Rada, in its ratification of the treaty, declared that Ukraine can retain its nuclear weapons.\(^{227}\)

11/23/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russian Foreign Ministry officials reportedly suggest that Russia could apply economic pressure on Ukraine in order to compel Ukraine to withdraw its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement.\(^{228}\)

11/26/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
The Russian government issues a three-page statement rejecting the Ukrainian parliament’s ratification of START I because of the conditions Ukraine placed on the implementation of the treaty. The Russian government also refuses to service Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. In response to the Russian rejection, Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister states that Russia has control over the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and that Ukraine lacks the ability to service the weapons. The chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s Chernobyl Committee, Volodymyr Yavorivsky, states, “This is dirty nuclear blackmail, and could lead to a nuclear confrontation.”\(^{229}\)

Note: A nuclear confrontation between Russia and Ukraine at this time is impossible. Ukraine, lacking the launch codes, cannot use the nuclear missiles on its territory. Russia continues to maintain control over the weapons.

11/26/93 [UKRAINE AND IAEA]
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry sends a letter to the IAEA stating that Ukraine is prepared to begin negotiations over a full-scope safeguards agreement.\(^{230}\)

11/29/93 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
President Kravchuk tells President Clinton that he will resubmit START I and the Lisbon Protocol to the Ukrainian Rada following the March 1994 elections.\(^{231}\)

Note: The elections are scheduled for 3/27/94.

11/29/93 [UKRAINE AND U.N.]
The permanent representative of Ukraine to the U.N., Viktor Batyuk, gives U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali a letter from Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, which requests that the secretary-general encourage the nuclear states to grant Ukraine security guarantees. The security guarantees would ease Ukraine’s attainment of non-nuclear state status.\(^{232}\)

11/30/93 [UKRAINE]
During a parliamentary session, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk states, “We emphasize: following the road of nuclear disarmament, Ukraine expects to receive guarantees of its national security from the United States, Russia and other nuclear states, as well as financial and other assistance adequate to our needs to eliminate nuclear weapons.” Kravchuk also states, “We regard the nuclear weapons not as arms, but as material value and demand compensation. We consider this requirement to be normal.”\(^{233}\)

11/30/93 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s press and information department Grigory Karasin reads an appeal by 11 experts from Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, including academicians Khariton and Avronin. The appeal states that inspections of the warheads deployed in Ukraine have revealed serious violations in the handling of the warheads. The appeal states that “the nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine lack physical protection answering to contemporary requirements.” The appeal also states, “The strict system of handling and servicing nuclear arms, which existed in the USSR for many years and which continues to function in Russia, has been destroyed in Ukraine.” The appeal continues, “A safe dismantling of nuclear warheads is possible only at those Russian plants where they were manufactured.”\(^{234}\)

(11/30/93) [U.S., RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE]
Some U.S. and Russian intelligence analysts reportedly believe that Ukraine could break the codes to its nuclear missiles and gain operational control by spring 1994. The intelligence analysts believe that Ukraine’s behavior toward disarmament until now has been a “stalling tactic” as the country works at breaking the codes.\(^{235}\)
12/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
The U.S. promises Ukraine $135 million in assistance through contracts with private U.S. companies for dismantling its 176 ICBMs. 236

Note: This is most likely the same Nunn-Lugar funds promised by Les Aspin on 7/27/93, even though at that time only a “portion” of the funds were to be released.

(12/93) [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
As of 12/93, the U.S. Department of Defense has proposed giving the four nuclear-armed former Soviet Republics $789.54 million in dismantlement and other nuclear-related aid. Of the $789.54 million, $111.5 million has been proposed for specific programs, particularly programs to improve the safety and security of moving nuclear warheads in Russia. Of the proposed $789.54 million, Russia would receive $441.46 million, Ukraine $177 million, Belarus $76 million, and Kazakhstan $789.54 million. Of the $111.5 million proposed for specific programs, Russia would receive $103.5 million, Belarus $4.5 million, and Kazakhstan $3.5 million. 237

12/93 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore announce that Russia has agreed to end its production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons and that the three Russian reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium in the past at Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7 will be shut down. 238

Note: Chernomyrdin and Gore sign an agreement on 6/23/94 under which Russia will end its plutonium production for weapons purposes.

12/2/93 [UKRAINE AND NATO]
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd hints that Ukraine’s relations with NATO are in jeopardy because of its reluctance to give up the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Hurd states that Ukraine’s admission to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council is based on Ukraine’s status as a non-nuclear state under the provisions of the NPT. 239

12/3/93 [UKRAINE]
The chairman of Ukraine’s Rada Ivan Plyush states that the conditions parliament placed on ratification of START I would not be withdrawn until the West complies with those conditions. Plyush states that Ukraine continues to insist on security guarantees and compensation and that the country does not fear isolation. 240

12/3/93 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher threatens that the U.S. could withhold over $300 million in aid from Ukraine unless Ukraine dismantles its ICBMs. 241

12/4/93 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
Ukraine and the U.S. sign two Nunn-Lugar implementing agreements, from which Ukraine will receive through contracts $135 million in assistance for eliminating its nuclear weapons and $2.26 million to help create export controls. 242

Note: This $135 million is most likely the same money mentioned in the 12/93 entry above and promised by the U.S. on 7/27/93.

12/6/93 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian National Conservative Party (UNKP) announces that Ukraine should become “a full member of the nuclear club” and that the clause dictating Ukraine’s status as non-nuclear should be rescinded. The UNKP also says that President Kravchuk should “set about drawing up a national program of nuclear research, production of nuclear warheads, and antimissile defense space systems.” 243

12/9/93 [UKRAINE]
The Ukrainian government promises to deactivate 50 nuclear missiles by removing their warheads by spring 1994. The pledge pertains to the SS-24s as well as Ukraine’s SS-19 ICBMs. 244

Note: Ukraine promises to deactivate the missiles, not withdraw them to Russia for dismantlement.

12/11/93 [UKRAINE]
Ukraine states that 200 warheads from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs will remain in Ukraine until Russia and Ukraine agree on security measures and the compensation for the weapons. 245

12/13/93 [KAZAKHSTAN — NPT AND U.S.]
Kazakhstan’s parliament votes to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. 246 Kazakhstan’s parliament votes 238 to 1 in favor of the treaty. 247 Washington promises to give Kazakhstan $14.5 million for improvements in the physical safety of Kazakhstan’s warheads, the reporting of nuclear-related information, and improvements in responding to nuclear accidents. 248 Kazakhstan signs an “umbrella” agreement and five implementing agreements with the U.S. in order to receive Nunn-Lugar assistance. 249 The agreement calls for the U.S. to give Kazakhstan $70 million in dismantlement assistance for the dismantlement of Kazakhstan’s SS-18 silos. 250

12/14/93 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
A member of the Ukrainian Rada’s Defense Committee Igor Dirkatck states that Ukraine might ask Russia for the codes to the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine following the electoral success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in Russia. Dirkatck states that Ukraine “must seek to obtain the codes enabling it to control the nuclear missiles stationed on its territory to meet the threat to its security represented by Zhirinovskiy.” 251
12/16/93 [Russia, Ukraine, and U.S.]
Trilateral talks are held among Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. concerning Ukraine’s ratification of START I. Ukrainian delegates stress three issues that Ukraine requires agreement on from Russia and the U.S.: security guarantees, compensation for its nuclear weapons, and financial and technical aid for dismantling its missiles. During the talks, a proposal is made concerning compensation for Ukraine for the material from tactical nuclear weapons. The proposal, which is not accepted, states that Russia will cancel Ukraine’s energy debts as compensation. Ukraine is also offered uranium for its nuclear reactors as compensation for the strategic nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.252

12/17/93 [Russia, Ukraine, and U.S.]
The Ukrainian government announces that it has reached a preliminary agreement with Russia and the U.S. on compensation for the dismantlement of its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. According to Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, part of the compensation includes a five-year supply of uranium for Ukraine’s nuclear reactors. Shmarov states that President Kravchuk has agreed to partially deactivate Ukraine’s SS-24s by removing them from alert and removing the nuclear warheads.253

12/20/93 [Ukraine]
Ukrainian Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov announces that Ukraine removed 17 SS-24 missiles from alert status. According to Shmarov, in 1994, all SS-24 ICBMs will be taken off alert status.254

12/20/93 [Russia and Ukraine]
The Russian Ministry of Defense confirms that warheads have been removed from 17 Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs and that 41 warheads have been removed from SS-19 ICBMs.255

12/21/93 [Ukraine]
Ukrainian Deputy Premier Valeriy Shmarov states that the U.S. has offered a proposal in which Russia will cancel Ukraine’s estimated $2 billion energy debt and the U.S. and Russia will supply Ukraine with five years of free fuel for its nuclear reactors. These offers will be compensation for the withdrawal and disarmament of Ukraine’s strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Shmarov states that Russia has agreed to the plan, although Russian officials have not commented on the deal.256

12/21/93 [Latvia and IAEA]
Latvia signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.259

12/22/93 [Belarus to Russia]
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announces that 27 SS-25 ICBMs have been withdrawn from the Postavi division located in northern Belarus to Russia.260 Note: Nine SS-25s were withdrawn to Russia during the summer of 1993. Since then, 18 SS-25s, two regiments, were also withdrawn to Russia. Russia has adopted the SS-25 as the primary strategic missile in its nuclear arsenal and is redeploying them in Russia. The Postavi division is most likely stationed in Lida, which is the Belarusian missile base located in northern Belarus. Twenty-seven SS-25s are the equivalent of three regiments.

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1/5/94 [Ukraine]
Ukrainian military specialists, during a tour with journalists of the Pervomaysk base, deny allegations that Ukrainian missiles are being kept in unsafe conditions. Pervomaysk’s deputy commander Colonel Viktor Shvets states, “The base strictly observes all safety demands. Staff are trained and all missiles are kept in perfectly safe conditions. Nuclear and ecological safety is observed to the very highest degree.”261

(1/10/94) [Belarus]
The Slavic Union Belaya Rus, within Belarus’s Supreme Soviet, states at a news conference that it opposes the withdrawal of Belarus’ and Ukraine’s nuclear weapons to Russia.262

1/14/94 [U.S., Russia, and Ukraine — Trilateral Statement]
U.S. President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk sign a Trilateral Statement on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery. The Trilateral Statement commits Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and to transfer 200 SS-19 and SS-24 warheads to Russia over the next 10 months. The Trilateral Statement also specifies that Ukraine is to deactivate its SS-24s within the next 10
months. The U.S. and Russia, by signing the Trilateral Statement, agree to guarantee Ukraine’s borders and grant Ukraine security guarantees as long as Ukraine joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. To partially compensate Ukraine for the nuclear weapons on its territory, Russia will deliver within 10 months 100 tons of LEU and the U.S. will give Russia $60 million.  

1/14/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]  
Russia and the U.S. sign a 20-year contract worth $12 billion that will provide for the reprocessing of 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium into LEU for use in civilian nuclear power reactors.  

A high-ranking U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) official and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov sign a contract under which the U.S. will buy 500 tons of HEU removed from Russian and Ukrainian nuclear warheads. The HEU will be converted to LEU in Russia and then sent to the U.S. The U.S. will receive 10 tons of HEU (310 tons of LEU) over the next five years and then 30 tons of HEU (930 tons of LEU) per year thereafter. Russia will compensate Ukraine for the uranium in the warheads on Ukrainian territory by providing fuel for Ukraine’s nuclear reactors and eliminating Ukraine’s energy debt, worth about $1 billion.

1/14/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]  
U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin sign the Moscow Declaration in which both countries agree to detarget their strategic nuclear missiles by 5/30/94. Both presidents also “strongly supported completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible time.”

Note: Russia and Great Britain sign a similar agreement on 2/15/94.

1/15/94 [BELARUS]  
Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko states that Belarus would like to receive compensation for the uranium removed from dismantled nuclear weapons and that “in contrast to Ukraine, Belarus does not claim for low enriched uranium which is used as fuel for atomic power stations. We have no nuclear reactors and power plants.”

(1/16/94) [BELARUS AND RUSSIA]  
Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich states that Russia has agreed to compensate Belarus for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn to Russia in 1992 and the warheads currently being removed from strategic nuclear missiles.

1/17/94 [BELARUS]  
Valery Tsepkalo, the top foreign affairs advisor to Belarusian President Stanislav Shushkevich, states that Belarus will attempt to receive some of the profits from the 1/14/94 HEU deal involving Russia and Ukraine. Tsepkalo also states that Belarus wants $500 million in compensation for the tactical weapons it had already withdrawn to Russia. U.S. President Clinton has announced that the U.S. will increase its dismantlement aid to Belarus to $100 million.

1/18/94 [UKRAINE]  
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials state that the Trilateral Statement is only a declaration and, therefore, does not require ratification by the Rada. The head of the Laws and Treaties Department in Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry Oleksander Chaly states, “This is not a treaty, nor an accord, nor an agreement. It is in fact a declaration that Ukraine agrees with Russia and the United States that eventual removal of its nuclear contingent is inevitable.”

1/18/94 [UKRAINE]  
Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, the head of the Directorate of Control over armaments and disarmament of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tells journalists that the nuclear weapons stored in Ukraine are reaching the upper limit of their shelf life and are increasingly becoming a danger for Ukraine. Hryshchenko states that the equipment necessary for the safe storage of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine is produced in Russia, and that Ukraine is not receiving this equipment.

1/20/94 [UKRAINE]  
During the opening of the ninth session of Ukraine’s parliament, one member calls for President Kravchuk’s impeachment for going beyond his constitutional authority. Deputy Valeriy Ivasiuk of Kiev asks, “Are you, the citizens of Ukraine, ready to give up your nuclear weapons to Russia for no money and no security guarantees?” Another parliamentarian calls the Trilateral Statement “Ukraine’s Munich Agreement.”

1/21/94 [WEU AND BELARUS]  
The Western European Union (WEU) reports that Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Sytchev stated that Belarus has transferred 34 strategic missiles and its entire arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles to Russia for destruction. Sytchev, according to the WEU, also requested more Western aid for dismantling Belarus’s conventional weapons.

Note: This report is inaccurate concerning the number of SS-25 ICBMs located in Belarus. Of Belarus’s 81 SS-25s, 27 have been redeployed in Russia, leaving 54 missiles on Belarusian territory. As the Belarusian embassy’s press release indicates in the 1994 entry, Belarus will withdraw to Russia 36 SS-25 ICBMs, 4 regiments, in 1994. All reports indicate that Belarus has been withdrawing its SS-25s to Russia in regiments of nine and not in smaller numbers.

1/21/94 [UKRAINE]  
The commanders of the Russian 43rd Missile Army and the 46th Division are “compelled” to take the Ukrainian oath of allegiance.

Rustam Karimov, the commander of the 19th
Missile Division, refuses the order to take the Ukrainian oath.\textsuperscript{275} Karimov is “unilaterally” replaced by Colonel Volodymyr Shvets.\textsuperscript{276} Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhtyuk, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces in Ukraine, also reportedly takes the Ukrainian oath of allegiance. One-third of the officers of the 43rd Missile Army have stated that they would like to be transferred back to Russia, where they can receive greater pay.\textsuperscript{277}

\textbf{1/26/94 [UZBEKISTAN AND IAEA]}
Uzbekistan deposits its instruments of ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA.\textsuperscript{278}

\textbf{1/26/94 [UKRAINE]}
Bohdan Horyn, the Ukrainian deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, states that the Trilateral Statement is “inadequate” and that its approval should be postponed until after the 3/27/94 parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{279}

\textbf{(1/30/94) [RUSSIA]}
Aleksandr Volkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, states that Russia established two bases, Surovatikha, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, and Pibanshur, near Izhevsk, to dismantle its nuclear weapons. According to the news correspondent, the Surovatikha base can reportedly destroy 40 heavy missiles per year.\textsuperscript{280} Russia’s Pibanshur and Surovatikha bases are reportedly the first to use “resource-saving technologies” for destroying strategic missiles.\textsuperscript{281} Pibanshur was established to destroy SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs, while Surovatikha eliminates SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs.\textsuperscript{282}

\textbf{1/30/94 [KAZAKHSTAN]}
Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev states that Kazakhstan will abide by the nuclear weapons agreements that it has signed and that Kazakhstan does not want to ever be a nuclear power. Nazarbayev states that Kazakhstan has received assurances that it will not be attacked by any of the nuclear states, including China, and that Kazakhstan will be compensated for the HEU in its nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{283}

\textbf{2/94 [UZBEKISTAN AND IAEA]}
The IAEA approves Uzbekistan’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.\textsuperscript{284}

\textbf{Late-2/94 [KAZAKHSTAN TO RUSSIA]}
Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Air Force Colonel General Petr Deinekin states that Russia has received the last of Kazakhstan’s Bear-H long-range bombers.\textsuperscript{285}

\textbf{2/1/94 [RUSSIA]}
Russian officials announce that railway workers in the Siberian town of Kurgan discovered an abandoned train filled with missiles that had been lost in transit to a dismantling plant. The missiles were being shipped without fuel or warheads.\textsuperscript{286}

\textbf{Note:} Another report concerning ICBMs that were lost in transit for dismantlement is in the 2/14/94 entry.

\textbf{2/2/94 [UKRAINE]}
Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Ukrainian Rada, and the chairman of the Rada’s foreign affairs committee Dmitro Pavlichko publicly favor the Trilateral Statement.\textsuperscript{287}

\textbf{2/3/94 [UKRAINE — START I]}
During the debate over the unconditional ratification of START I, Ukrainian legislators demanded that Ukraine be given special status as a temporary nuclear state before signing the NPT. Some parliamentarians fear that by immediately joining the NPT, Ukraine will lose compensation in return for nuclear disarmament. Other legislators want disarmament to be a slow process as protection against Russian expansionism.\textsuperscript{288}

\textbf{Note:} As Russia controls the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, it is questionable whether slow disarmament would deter Russian expansionism.

\textbf{2/3/94 [UKRAINE]}
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk tells parliament that Ukraine must join the NPT and eliminate its nuclear weapons. Kravchuk states, “I cannot understand and people around the world cannot understand why Ukraine does not join the NPT, why we are maintaining such a position. Our future as an independent sovereign state depends not on nuclear weapons but on economic prosperity.”\textsuperscript{289}

\textbf{2/3/94 [UKRAINE — START I]}
The Ukrainian Rada drops its 13 previous conditions and ratifies START I. By unconditionally ratifying START I, the Rada in effect endorses the Trilateral Statement and Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. Out of the 450 members of Ukraine’s parliament, 292 appear to vote; 260 in favor, 3 against, and 29 abstained.\textsuperscript{290} However, Ukraine’s Rada fails to approve Ukraine’s membership in the NPT by about 24 votes.\textsuperscript{291}

\textbf{Note:} Ukraine’s Rada initially ratified START I with 13 conditions on 11/18/93.

\textbf{2/4/94 [UKRAINE]}
Ukrainian President Kravchuk tells parliament that the missiles deployed in Ukraine threaten Ukraine’s future as an independent state because the missiles are under Russian control and could become grounds for Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs. Kravchuk also warns legislators of the possibility of a nuclear disaster as the warheads grow unstable. Furthermore, Kravchuk reminds parliament that
Ukraine will receive at least $1 billion in U.S. aid and Russian energy credits from the HEU to be reprocessed for use in nuclear power reactors.292

(2/8/94) [RUSSIA]
Russia plans for the SS-25 Topol (RS-12M) to be the future basis of Russia’s land-based ICBM arsenal. The SS-25 can be launched from silos and mobile launchers. According to Led Volkov, an engineer and an architect of Russia’s future nuclear forces, arms control treaties allow Russia to have 1,300 ICBM launchers; however because of Russia’s economic crisis, the number of launchers will most likely be 900.293 Russia will deploy 60 to 70 percent of the SS-25s on road-mobile TELs, while the other 30 to 40 percent will be silo-based.294

2/9/94 [UKRAINE]
People’s Deputy of Ukraine Serhiy Holovaty states at a news conference that members of Ukraine’s leadership falsified on 2/3/94 the Supreme Council resolution ratifying START I.295

(2/9/94) [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
The USEC will reportedly buy an additional 50 tons of HEU, which will be taken from the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. The total amount of HEU to be purchased from Russia is now 550 tons.296
Note: USEC won the contract to purchase HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons on 1/14/94.

2/10/94 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
Ukrainian President Kravchuk’s advisor Anton Buteyko announces that talks between Ukraine and Russia have worked out the details concerning compensation for and the elimination of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons.297
Note: These talks between Russia and Ukraine are a continuation of the 1/14/94 meeting at which the Trilateral Statement was signed.

(2/12/94) [KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA]
According to Kazakh state advisor Tulegen Zhukeyev, Kazakhstan has withdrawn 12 strategic missiles to Russia. Zhukeyev states that the withdrawal of nuclear missiles has been stopped because of disagreements with Russia over Kazakhstan’s compensation for the uranium from the warheads.298
Note: For further information, see the entry on 3/21/94.

2/14/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND U.S.]
President Clinton pledges $396 million in additional economic assistance to Kazakhstan. Clinton also says that he could provide an additional $85 million to Kazakhstan this year and in 1995 for dismantlement. The economic assistance is to help Kazakhstan move toward a market economy and dismantle its nuclear weapons.299 The U.S. promised Kazakhstan $91 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance in 1993.300

2/14/94 [RUSSIA]
Russian journalists discover an abandoned six-car train, near the city of Perm, carrying an RS-22 (SS-24) missile system. Two of the train’s cars carry the command post and an electric power plant. The doors of the other four train-cars are blocked; the journalists believe, however, that they contain the missile and missile fuel. The journalists report their find to the leader of the missile forces, who places the train under guard. A press service worker of the Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence Service Vladimir Murashkin states that the Service knows of the abandoned train containing the missiles; however, it is of no concern because it would not be of interest to foreign intelligence services since the U.S. military had been recently familiarized with the system. The SS-24s were being shipped without their warheads.301
Note: The missile was most likely being shipped for dismantlement to the Pibanshur base located near the city of Izhevsk. Izhevsk is located south of Perm. This is the second report of a missing train containing ICBMs being sent for dismantlement. The first report was on 2/1/94.

2/14/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND IAEA]
Kazakhstan deposits its instruments of ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA.302

2/15/94 [RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and British Prime Minister John Major sign a joint statement under which both countries will detarget their strategic nuclear missiles away from each other.303
Note: The U.S. signed a similar agreement with Russia concerning the detargeting of nuclear weapons on 1/14/94.

2/22/94 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
The commander of Russian long-range nuclear weapons General Igor Sergeyev states that, following the oath of loyalty made by the commanders of the 43rd Missile Army and the 46th Division to Ukraine, Russia is no longer in control of the safety of the nuclear weapons or the missile troops stationed in Ukraine.304
Note: Refer to 1/21/94 for more details.

2/22/94 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
Ukrainian officials deny Russian allegations that Ukraine is trying to interfere with Russia’s control over the operation and safety of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Igor Bizhan states that Ukraine is not interfering with Russian control over the weapons and that the officers of the 43rd Missile Army had voluntarily pledged an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk also denies the Russian allegations and states that factions in Russia are trying to harm the relations between Ukraine and Russia.305
2/22/94 [UKRAINE]
Colonel General Ivan Oliynyk, the Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Armaments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, states that Ukraine is incapable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Oliynyk also stresses that Ukraine continues to want to become a non-nuclear weapon state.  

3/4/94 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. President Clinton pledges that the U.S. will double its aid to Ukraine, providing $350 million in economic aid and an additional $350 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance.

3/4/94 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. President Clinton and Ukrainian President Kravchuk unveil the “Joint Statement On Development Of United States-Ukrainian Friendship And Partnership,” in which the U.S. will grant Ukraine an additional $100 million in 1994 and will request an additional $75 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for 1995.

3/7/94 [GEORGIA — NPT]
Georgia joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

3/9/94 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Safety and Counterproliferation Ashton Carter testifies before Congress that the U.S. is providing Ukraine with gasoline, diesel fuel, tires, jeeps, and batteries for the convoys transporting warheads from Pervomaysk to the trains bound for Russia.

3/9/94 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
According to Dr. Harold P. Smith, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, to date, Congress has been informed that $900 million has been earmarked for a number of Nunn-Lugar projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

3/10/94 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense states that the second shipment of 60 warheads to be transferred to Russia, which was to leave on 3/9/94, will be delayed because the Russian press leaked the shipment’s time and location of departure.
Note: Because the shipment is from Khmel’nytsky, it is most likely composed of SS-19s. SS-24s are only deployed at Pervomaysk. This is most likely the same shipment referred to in the entry on 3/94, although the bases do not correspond. Both shipments are referred to as the “second shipment.” See the entry on 5/4/94 for information on the third shipment of 60 warheads from Ukraine to Russia. Also see 6/29/94 and 9/1/94 for the fourth and fifth shipments.

3/11/94 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
Ukraine announces that it is suspending the transfer of warheads to Russia and accuses Russia of jeopardizing the delivery by releasing secret information pertaining to the shipment. Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Alexander Kluban states, “Ukraine must clarify the schedule and routes for moving the dangerous and secret trains.”

3/11/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND JAPAN]
Japan’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Tuleutai Suleymenov sign an agreement on cooperation toward dismantling Kazakhstan’s nuclear weapons.

3/11/94 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Safety and Counterproliferation Ashton Carter states that the possibility that Russian nuclear material could be obtained by terrorists has increased. Carter states, “There are tactical weapons at hundreds of sites (in Russia). Given the conditions, economic and political, in that country, you can never be sure.” Carter is optimistic about nuclear dismantlement in Ukraine because Ukraine seems to believe that Russia will dismantle the weapons and not keep them for itself.

3/16/94 [KAZAKHSTAN]
Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev states, “The world need not worry because the republic is demonstrating consistency in the matter of liquidating nuclear warheads.”

3/16/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov agree to carry out one inspection of sites in each country where dismantled warhead parts containing plutonium are stored by the end of the year.

Note: Also see the entry on 4/28/94.

3/19/94 [U.S., KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA, AND GREAT BRITAIN]
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that the U.S., Great Britain, Kazakhstan, and Russia are working on a non-aggression treaty, which will include security guarantees. While Kazakhstan has withdrawn 12 10-warhead SS-18 missiles to Russia, further shipments have stalled until Kazakhstan and Russia agree on the amount of compensation

Kazakhstan should receive. Kazakhstan Minister of Defense Sagadat Nurmargambetov states, “I would like to clarify that Kazakhstan keeps to the approach that we need the compensation for the removed warheads.”

3/21/94 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky states that Russia has not shipped fuel to Ukraine in return for the 120 nuclear warheads Ukraine already delivered to Russia. Radetsky states that if Russia does not deliver the fuel, Ukraine “will reconsider the timetable” for sending the remaining 1,600 warheads to Russia for dismantlement.

Note: The 120 strategic nuclear warheads that Defense Minister Radetsky is referring to are those delivered in two shipments to Russia earlier in 3/94 in accordance with the Trilateral Statement.

3/21/94 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
During a meeting in Kiev with Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry signs three agreements that will provide Ukraine $100 million in additional Nunn-Lugar assistance. $50 million is to assist the country in destroying its missile silos, $40 million is to help convert Ukraine’s defense industry over to civilian use, and $10 million is allotted for the physical security of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal.

3/21/94 [BELARUS TO RUSSIA]
Two Belarusian RS-12M “Topol” (SS-25) ICBM regiments located in Mozyr and Lida have begun transferring their weapons and equipment to Russia. The Mozyr and Lida Divisions will be completely disbanded by mid-1996.

3/21/94 [KAZAKHSTAN TO RUSSIA]
To date, Kazakhstan has withdrawn 12 ICBMs to Russia for dismantlement. The warheads may not have been withdrawn with the missiles, but could remain in Kazakhstan. According to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan and Russia could reach an agreement concerning compensation for the warhead’s HEU within the next month. The warheads would then be withdrawn to Russia.

Note: These 12 missiles would be SS-18 “Satan” ICBMs, which are armed with 10 warheads each. Thus, 120 warheads may have been withdrawn to Russia, if Kazakhstan withdrew them with the missiles. Other reports also indicate that 12 missiles were withdrawn, but made no mention of the status of the warheads. These reports state that this would be the last withdrawal of missiles from Kazakhstan to Russia until the issue of compensation is resolved. See the entry on 2/12/94.

3/22/94 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian servicemen at the Pervomaysk missile base in Ukraine tell U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry that 30 SS-24 ICBMs and 11 SS-19 ICBMs were deactivated by hav-
ing their warheads removed.330

3/22/94 [RUSSIA]
The Russian business manager of the Atomic Energy Ministry Valery Bogdan says that Russia could stop producing weapons-grade plutonium for use in nuclear weapons by the end of the year.331

3/22/94 [UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND U.S.]
During a joint news conference with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Vitaliy Radetsky announces that Ukraine is re-examining the timetable for transferring warheads to Russia for dismantlement because Russia has not delivered any fuel for Ukraine’s reactors. Radetsky states, “I said that if the timetable of deliveries was not respected—and that goes for both sides—we of course will re-examine that timetable. And that is what we are doing now.”332 Additionally, The Chairman of Ukraine’s Atomic Energy Committee Mikhail Umanets states that Russia will supply Ukraine with nuclear fuel once the U.S. pays Russia the $60 million that had previously been promised in the Trilateral Statement.333

3/23/94 [RUSSIA]
The chief of the main center for the testing and application of space technologies at the Svobodniy cosmodrome in the Russian Far East states that the Svobodniy-18 SS-11 missile base has enough missile silos and the necessary infrastructure to convert it into a space launch center. In 2/94, the last of the troops stationed at Svobodniy-18 were released from duty following reductions in the missile division in accordance with START II.334

(3/25/94) [RUSSIA]
Maslakov, the director of the “Zvezda” plant located in Bolshoy-Kamen Bay, Russia, says that the plant has dismantled five nuclear submarines and that four more are at the plant to be dismantled. According to Maslakov, of these four submarines, two are as yet untouched.335

3/28/94 [RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN]
During a summit in Moscow, Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev sign an agreement placing Kazakhstan’s strategic nuclear forces under Russian jurisdiction and establish a timetable for transferring the warheads to Russia within 14 months. All strategic missiles and launchers in Kazakhstan are to be destroyed within three years.336

(4/94) [RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN]
Great Britain will reportedly deliver 250 nuclear weapon containers and 20 vehicles, worth about 35 million pounds, to Russia “in the near future.”337

4/1/94 [UKRAINE AND CANADA]
Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet announces that Canada will offer Ukraine $15 million in assistance toward disarmament and nuclear safety.338

4/5/94 [RUSSIA TO UKRAINE]
Ukraine announces that it has received fuel rods from Russia for its nuclear reactors in accordance with the Trilateral Statement. Kiev also announces that it plans to resume transfer of another 60 warheads to Russia.339

4/6/94 [UKRAINE AND ITALY]
Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk announces that Italy has offered Ukraine aid for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. The details of the assistance will be discussed during Ukrainian President Kravchuk’s forthcoming official visit to Italy.340

4/7/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND JAPAN]
During a meeting with Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev, Japanese Prime Minister Moihiro Hosokawa announces that Japan will allocate $11 million to Kazakhstan to assist in the dismantlement of Kazakhstan’s nuclear weapons. This $11 million will be part of Japan’s $100 million fund that is to be divided among Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.341

4/7/94 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Russia’s Chief Air Force Commander Petr Deinekin states that Russia and Ukraine have not yet reached an agreement over the withdrawal of 42 strategic aircraft from Ukraine to Russia. The 42 bombers include 19 Tu-160s and 23 Tu-95 MCs. In return for the aircraft, Ukraine wants Russia to write off 700 billion rubles of its debt. Russia, however, will only agree to write off less than one-third of the amount.342 An informed source in the Russian Ministry of Defense confirms that talks between Russia and Ukraine are underway for withdrawing strategic bombers from Ukraine to Russia. Ukraine is reportedly prepared to withdraw the bombers because of the defection of combat crews to Russia and the great difficulty of maintaining the bombers’ combat readiness. The strategic bombers are located at Ukrainian air bases in Priluki and Uzin.343

4/7/94 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
Vladimir Rozhkov, the deputy director of the Novosibirsk chemical plant that produces fuel for Ukraine’s reactors as compensation for warheads, states, “A disruption of nuclear fuel shipments to Ukraine is not ruled out because the state, which is acting as a contractor, does not fulfill its commitments in time.” The chemical plant, facing difficult financial circumstances, is the only Russian plant producing the fuel to be shipped to Ukraine for its water-moderated, water-cooled reactors.344
4/12/94 [UKRAINE—MTCR]
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov is confident that Ukraine will abide by the MTCR and will also be a founding member of a new COCOM regime. Shmarov confirms that talks concerning the MTCR are underway with the U.S. Ukraine, however, is not a formal member of the regime.

Note: Ukraine signs a memorandum with the U.S. on 5/13/94, agreeing to abide by the MTCR.

4/13-15/94 [RUSSIA]
Nikolai Ermakov, the head of the nuclear power department of Russia’s Minatom, states at a conference in Japan that dismantlement of nuclear weapons costs $100,000 per weapon and that Russia is spending up to 1 trillion rubles per year on nuclear weapons disarmament.

4/14/94 [RUSSIA TO UKRAINE]
Grigory Karasin, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, states that the Trilateral Statement signed on 1/14/94 is working. Karasin is referring to a Russian delivery of LEU to Ukraine’s Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. The delivery of LEU, as stipulated in the Trilateral Statement, is compensation for the HEU from the nuclear warheads transferred from Ukraine.

(4/14/94) [BELARUS AND RUSSIA]
Belarussian Minister of Defense Pavel Kozlovskiy states that the nuclear weapons in Belarus belong to Russia and that the weapons are being withdrawn to Russia according to schedule. According to Kozlovskiy, all of the weapons could be withdrawn to Russia by 1999, if not earlier.

(4/25/94) [RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND GERMANY]
Germany is reportedly spending DM20 million in 1993-1994 for the dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in Russia and Ukraine.

4/28/94 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Harold Smith tells the House Armed Services Committee that Russia has deactivated 378 ballistic missile launchers and has removed 510 warheads from missiles since 9/90. Although not required by the START treaties, Russia reportedly told the U.S. that it has been dismantling 2,000 to 3,000 warheads per year.

4/28/94 [RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN]
Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, announces that the strategic missiles located in Kazakhstan belong to Russia.

Mid-5/94 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Russia has extracted 614 warheads from 389 ICBMs since 9/90, including 326 SS-11s, 20 SS-13s, 27 SS-17s, and 16 SS-18s. Russia still has 20 SS-13s, 20 SS-17s, 188 SS-18s, 170 SS-19s, 46 SS-24s, and about 350 SS-25s in its arsenal. The U.S. Navy states that as of 1/94, Russia has deactivated nine out of 12 Yankee-I- and three out of 18 Delta-I-class submarines.

5/3/94 [RUSSIA]
Russia is reportedly planning to build a storage facility for the plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons at Mayak instead of the previously selected site at Tomsk.

5/4/94 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
A Ukrainian report states that a third shipment of 60 warheads left Ukraine for Russia earlier in the week. Colonel Igor Sergeyev, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in Ukraine, states that, to date, Ukraine has shipped 180 strategic nuclear missiles to Russia for dismantlement. Sergeyev emphasizes that Russia has already destroyed more than 350 missiles and about 300 missile launchers.

Note: The first two shipments of 60 warheads each were delivered to Russia in 3/94. Also see 6/29/94, 9/1/94, and 10/4/94 for the fourth, fifth, and sixth withdrawals.

5/4/94 [UKRAINE AND JAPAN]
The Japanese embassy in Ukraine tells a Ukrainian correspondent that Ukraine will receive $16 million out of the $100 million allotted by Japan for nuclear dismantlement in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

(5/6/94) [RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND KAZAKHSTAN]
According to Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, the Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, all SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine have been removed from alert status, with their warheads and targeting codes removed. In addition, 20 SS-19 missiles, whose service lives have ended, were also deactivated.

(5/8/94) [UKRAINE; UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Anatoliy Murakhovsky states that Ukraine has removed almost all of its 46 SS-24 ICBMs from alert status. Murakhovsky states, “The process of deactivation is nearly complete. The nuclear warheads have been removed and the flight patterns have been depogrammed.” Ukrainian military officials also state that nearly one-third of Ukraine’s 130 SS-19 ICBMs have been dismantled and that Ukraine has transferred a third shipment of 60 nuclear warheads to Russia.

Note: The shipment of 60 warheads transferred to Russia mentioned here is the same shipment Sergeyev announced on 5/4/94.
5/12/94 [U.S. and Ukraine—Nunn-Lugar]
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that the U.S. will grant Ukraine $5 million from Nunn-Lugar funding to start a “defense conversion” project in which Westinghouse and the Khartron Production Association of Ukraine will jointly create modern systems for civilian power plants. The Khartron Production Association formerly produced guidance systems for Soviet nuclear missiles.359

5/13/94 [Ukraine—MTCR]
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov and U.S. Vice President Al Gore sign a memorandum in which Ukraine pledges to abide by the MTCR.360

Note: See the entry on 4/12/94 concerning Ukraine and the MTCR.

5/16/94 [Russia]
Herbert A. Yefremov, the director general/general designer of Russia’s NPO Mashinostroenia, states that the SS-19 ICBM is being modified by the design bureau into the “Roket” low-orbit space launch vehicle.361

5/16/94 [Ukraine and Russia]
Rukh Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Ukrainian nationalist opposition leader, urges the Ukrainian parliament to discontinue the country’s disarmament program because of Russia’s “shameless interference” in the Crimea.362

5/16/94 [Ukraine to Russia]
Ukrainian Minister of Defense Vitaliy Radetsky states that Ukraine’s nuclear weapons will be withdrawn to Russia in three to four years. Radetsky confirms that a timetable for withdrawing about 60 warheads each month will be maintained.363

(5/16/94) [Russia]
Russian military experts believe that the Russian defense budget for 1993 and the first quarter of 1994, which covers only 10 percent of the Strategic Rocket Forces’ needs, will leave the SRF with only 90 launch facilities by the year 2000. The Russian legislature has tentatively approved the budget.364

5/17/94 [Ukraine]
A senior Ukrainian official calls the European Union’s decision to implement a partnership accord with Ukraine only if Ukraine accedes to the NPT, “unconstructive and illogical.” The official states, “Any attempt to pressure Ukraine will result in the opposite of what is expected. It is only a matter of time before the new parliament joins the NPT.”365

5/18/94 [Russia and U.S.]
Following a meeting between the U.S. and Russia from May 9 to May 14, 1994, U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary states that the two sides have agreed to allow visits to the Tomsk-7 nuclear weapon materials facility in Russia and the Pantex facility in the U.S.366

Note: The rocky Flats facility, and not Pantex, was the site of a Russian visit during the summer of 1994.

(5/19/94) [Russia and Ukraine]
In a protocol signed “this week” by Ukrainian acting-Prime Minister Yefim Zvyagilsky and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia and Ukraine agree to accelerate the timetable for disarming Ukraine from seven years to three years. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov is quoted as saying, “Ukraine’s last nuclear warhead will be transferred to Russia no later than 1997. If Ukraine’s economy allows it, this could happen even sooner.” In the protocol, Russia agrees to provide Ukraine $500 million in compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons already removed to Russia.367

(5/21/94) [Russia]
By the end of the 1990s, reports indicated that Russia is expected to start producing a new SSBN, which will be a follow-on model to the Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon-class SSBNs.368

6/94 [U.S. and Russia]
The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) releases the 1994 DNI posture statement. The statement reveals that Russia has 48 SSBNs and will most likely maintain about 24 SSBNs within the provisions of START II. In late 1990, the Soviet Union declared 62 SSBNs in the “START I Memorandum of Understanding.” The statement indicates that Russia has retired one SSBN since 1/94 and a total of 14 SSBNs since the “Memorandum of Understanding” was submitted on 9/1/90.370

6/94 [U.S. and Ukraine—Nunn-Lugar]
By 6/94, the U.S. has promised Ukraine $277 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance. $185 million out of the $277 million has been allocated for the elimination of the 176 ICBM silos in Ukraine.371

6/94 [Ukraine]
By mid-6/94, Ukraine has reportedly deactivated all 46 SS-24 ICBMs and up to 30 SS-19 ICBMs. Ukraine has also withdrawn “at least” 180 nuclear warheads to Russia.372
Since 9/90, Russia has “deactivated” 378 Russian ballistic missile launchers and has removed 510 warheads from its missiles.373

**6/1/94 [U.S., GREAT BRITAIN, AND CIS]**
The U.S. and Great Britain announce that neither country is targeting land- or sea-based strategic nuclear missiles at the former Soviet Union.374

*Note:* The detargeting of nuclear missiles by the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia is largely symbolic. If necessary, the missiles can be retargeted in a short period of time. Russia announced that it was no longer targeting the U.S. with its nuclear missiles on 5/30/94.

**6/6/94 [RUSSIA]**
According to the Minister of Minatom Viktor Mikhailov Russia spends 1,000 billion rubles each year to dismantle nuclear weapons.375

**6/7/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]**
The Russian Academy of Sciences, the Urals electro-chemical plant, the Serbian chemical plant, and the U.S. Allied Fuel Energy Service Company have established the Matech joint-stock company that will process the HEU removed from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads.376

**6/10/94 [RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN]**
Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Yakovlev states that 50 percent of the tactical nuclear warheads that had been withdrawn to Russia from the other CIS nations have been dismantled.377

**6/21-22/94 [RUSSIA]**
Russia conducts a military exercise, witnessed by President Boris Yeltsin, during which an SS-25 is launched from Plesetsk, an SLBM is launched from the Barents Sea, and an AS-15 ALCM is launched from a Tu-160 Blackjack, targeting the Kura testing facility on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The exercise was reportedly “necessary to check operational procedures for the use of strategic nuclear weapons once ‘zerotargeting’ of all strategic missiles is implemented.”378

**6/23/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]**
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vice President Al Gore sign an agreement under which the reactors at the Russian facilities of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk will be shut down by the year 2000.379

*Note:* Chernomyrdin and Gore had initially agreed that Russia would end its production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons in 12/93. By the end of 1994, the agreement had not entered into force. According to Russia, the U.S. must first identify alternative financing for alternative energy sources in the regions to replace the energy that is provided by the reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.

**6/28/94 [UKRAINE]**
Ukraine’s Rada votes in favor of an ultra-nationalist proposal to debate whether Ukraine should suspend shipments of nuclear warheads to Russia because of uncertainty over the Crimean peninsula. A time for the debate is not set. Oleh Vitovych, a member of the extremist Ukrainian National Assembly, calls the Trilateral Statement “the worst possible strategic error.” Ivan Zayets, a member of the moderate nationalist Rukh party, supports “a pause in the transfer of warheads so that we can deal with problems that have emerged with disarmament.”380

**6/29/94 [UKRAINE AND IAEA]**
The IAEA announces that Ukraine has agreed “in principle” to use its nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and to allow regular IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.381

**6/29/94 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]**
Ukraine has reportedly transferred 240 of its warheads to Russia.382

*Note:* This report indicates that a forth shipment of 60 warheads was withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia in 6/94. The first two shipments were announced in 3/94, and the third shipment was announced on 5/4/94. By 9/94, a fifth shipment of 60 warheads is sent from Ukraine to Russia. On 10/4/94, a sixth withdrawal is reported.

**7/5/94 [KIRGHIZSTAN — NPT]**
Kyrgyzstan accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.385

**7/16/94 [UKRAINE]**
Ukrainian President-elect Leonid Kuchma states in an interview that Ukraine will abide by an agreement to transfer its nuclear warheads to Russia for compensation. Kuchma states, “We have to fulfill the agreement signed in Moscow...I see no other way out of this. It’s one thing to remove the nuclear warheads and another to keep all these rockets which are all long past their shelf life. The quicker Ukraine gets rid of these rockets, the better.”386

*Note:* Leonid Kuchma was elected president on 7/10/94.
7/18/94 [UKRAINE]
Yuriy Alekseyev, the general director of the Pivdeniy machine building plant in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine, states that the plant’s highest priority production items are aerospace equipment and tractors. The plant previously manufactured strategic nuclear missiles, including the SS-18 ICBMs, and it continues to build the Kosmos, Tsylkon, and Zenith space-launch vehicles.\

(7/23/94) [RUSSIA]
Eight Yankee-class (Navaga) strategic nuclear submarines await destruction at the “Zvezdochoka” ship repair yard at Severodvinsk, Russia. Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev states that Russia lacks the funds necessary for “recycling” the submarines.

7/26/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND IAEA]
Kazakhstan and the IAEA sign a nuclear safeguards agreement in Almaty.

Mid-8/94 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
The U.S. ships equipment for destroying Russian silos to Uzhur, where the Soviet Union had declared 64 SS-18s in the START I MOU.

8/1/94 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
U.S. Vice-President Al Gore visits Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in Kiev. Gore and Kuchma discuss Ukraine’s progress in transferring its nuclear weapons and the progress of Ukraine’s economic reforms. Kuchma informs Gore that the U.S. has only given Ukraine about $6 million out of the $350 million that had been promised for disarmament, even though Ukraine has “practically disarmed itself.” In an attempt to convince Ukraine to join the NPT, the U.S. government offers Ukraine high-technology cooperation, particularly in the field of aerospace technology.

8/2/94 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma tells the 43rd Missile Strategic Troops in Pervomaysk that the disarmament process in Ukraine must be controlled so that Ukraine can defend its interests and be respected. Kuchma also states that “erroneous” policies made by the previous leadership have isolated Ukraine from Russia and the other CIS nations. Kuchma states that he must overcome this isolation. According to Kuchma, although he did not favor the Trilateral Statement when it was signed, Ukraine will abide by its commitments.

8/3/94 [UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND U.S.]
Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis states in a speech that Ukraine has withdrawn 300 nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantling. Davis also states that more than half of Ukraine’s SS-24 ICBMs have been “deactivated.” According to Davis, Russia has sent two shipments of reactor fuel to Ukraine, and the U.S. has given Russia the agreed upon $60 million. Davis also states that the U.S. has obligated $277 million of the promised $350 million in Nunn-Lugar disarmament assistance to projects in Ukraine.

8/10/94 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
A U.S. House-Senate conference committee authorizes $400 million dollars in Nunn-Lugar aid toward dismantlement in the CIS for Fiscal Year 1995. President Clinton had previously requested this amount.

8/11/94 [U.S. AND UKRAINE]
Ambassador James Collins states at a briefing in Kiev that full cooperation between the U.S. and Ukraine will begin once Ukraine accedes to the NPT.

8/19/94 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma pledges in an interview to convince the Ukrainian parliament to agree to join the NPT. Kuchma says he will present the issue to the parliament in 10/94. Kuchma states that the Rada will support him. Note: When Ukraine’s Rada dropped its conditions from its 1/18/93 ratification of START I on 2/3/94, it refused at the time to join the NPT. Kuchma submits the NPT to the Rada for ratification on 10/5/94.

8/20/94 [RUSSIA]
In 1993, Russia destroyed a total of 32 RS-20 (SS-18) and RS-16 (SS-17) ICBMs at Surovatikha. So far this year, Russia has destroyed a total of 22 RS-20s and RS-16s, although originally 44 were to be destroyed. Following negotiations with Kazakhstan, Russia is to receive 30 more RS-20 ICBMs for dismantlement at Surovatikha. Russia will be able to destroy 14 more RS-20 ICBMs at Surovatikha before the end of the year. It takes 10 days to destroy one missile.

8/21/94 [UKRAINE]
Oleksandr Moroz, Ukrainian Supreme Council chairman and chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission, states that Ukraine is not prepared to sign the NPT. According to Moroz, Ukraine’s parliament must first determine the usefulness of the NPT.

8/22/94 [UKRAINE AND RUSSIA]
A senior source in the Russian Ministry of Defense states that Ukraine and Russia could possibly agree on the withdrawal of strategic bombers from Ukraine to Russia now that new leaders are in charge in Kiev. Ukraine has demanded that Russia pay $3 billion in compensation for the 18 Tu-160 and 23 Tu-95 MS bombers. Russian experts believe the amount of compensation should be 217 billion rubles. The Russian Defense Ministry source also states that compensa-
tion will take the form of writing off Ukraine’s energy debts to Russia.402

9/94 [RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN]
A CIA report states that as of this month, Russia has deacti-
vated 326 SS-11s, 10 SS-13s, 22 SS-17s, and 16 SS-18s. In
addition, Russia has deactivated 260 SLBMs and 25 Bear
bombers armed with gravity bombs. Russia’s nuclear arsenal
still has an estimated 30 SS-13s, 25 SS-17s, 188 SS-18s, 170
SS-19s, 10 silo-based SS-24s, 36 rail-based SS-24s, 369 SS-
25s, 16 SS-N-6 SLBMs, 208 SS-N-8s, 224 SS-N-18s, 120
SS-N-20s, 112 SS-N-23s, 36 older Bear-G bombers and 63
Bear-H and Blackjack bombers which carry ALCMs. Ukraine
has deactivated 37 SS-24s and 40 SS-19s, leaving 9 SS-24s,
90 SS-19s, 19 Blackjack bombers, and 23 Bear Bombers.
Kazakhstan has deactivated 44 SS-18 ICBMs, leaving 60 on
alert status. Belarus has transferred 45 SS-25 ICBMs to Rus-
sia, leaving 36 in Belarus.403

9/94 [U.S. — NUNN-LUGAR]
As of this month, the U.S. has obligated $385 million to
signed contracts for dismantlement projects in the FSU.404

9/94 [BELARUS AND IAEA]
The IAEA approves a safeguards agreement with Belarus.405

Mid-9/94 [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
A U.S. shipment of equipment to assist in destroying Russian
silos, including three Caterpillar bulldozers, arrives in
Sechuga, Pibanshur, and Yedrovo, where the Soviet Union
had declared 47 SS-17 ICBMs in the START I MOU. The
U.S. also ships equipment for destroying Russian ballistic
missile submarines to Bolshoi Kamen, Murmansk, and
Severodvinsk.406

(9/1/94) [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
By 9/4, Ukraine has withdrawn 300 of its warheads to Rus-
sia.407

Note: This is the fifth shipment of 60 warheads from Ukraine to
on the four previous Ukrainian warhead shipments to Russia.
Also see 10/4/94 for information on the sixth shipment.

9/1/94 [UKRAINE]
Boris Olinyk, chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s For-
gien Affairs Commission, states that Ukraine will join the
NPT “when we are ready.”408

9/3/94 [RUSSIA AND CHINA]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang
Zemin sign a declaration in which both countries agree not to
target their nuclear missiles at each other.409

Note: The U.S. and Russia agreed to detarget their missiles on 1/
14/94. Russia and Great Britain agreed to do the same on 2/15/
94.

9/8/94 [UKRAINE]
Oleksandr Moroz, Ukraine’s Supreme Council chairman, says
that he believes that Ukraine will ratify the NPT. Moroz also
says that the conditions under which Ukraine signs the NPT
must be “taken into consideration.”410

(9/11/94) [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
According to U.S. Ambassador James Collins, Ukraine wants
to store the missile fuel extracted from dismantled SS-19
ICBMs in Ukraine. The U.S. will help fund the construction
of storage facilities to store the fuel through the Nunn-Lugar
assistance program.411

9/17/94 [UKRAINE AND U.S.]
The chairman of Ukraine’s parliament Oleksander Moroz states
that Ukraine will not vote to join the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapon state until 1/95. Ukrainian leaders dislike the fact
that the U.S. has provided Ukraine only $10 million of the
$350 million that had been promised in Nunn-Lugar assis-
tance.412

9/20/94 [RUSSIA AND ITALY]
Russia and Italy sign an agreement under which Italy will
allocate 10 billion lire to Russia until 1995 for nuclear weap-
ons dismantlement.413

9/20/94 [U.S. AND CIS]
Secretary of Defense William Perry discusses the U.S. Nuclear
Posture Review, which concerns U.S. nuclear policy, nuclear
force structure, operations, and arms control. According to
Perry, the U.S., armed with 25,000 nuclear weapons, must
retain a nuclear hedge against Russia in case reform in Russia
fails. Russia also continues to maintain about 25,000 nuclear
weapons. The U.S. also must be concerned that Russia’s
“drawdown” of its nuclear arsenal is proceeding at a slower
pace than the U.S. Perry also states that the U.S. must be
concerned with the security of nuclear components in the
FSU. According to Perry, 40 SS-19s and 37 SS-24s have
been deactivated in Ukraine and missiles are being withdrawn
from Belarus and Kazakhstan.414

9/23/94 [UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND U.S.]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Valery Shmarov states that
Ukraine could suspend its withdrawal of nuclear warheads to
Russia because the U.S. has not provided the disarmament
aid promised Ukraine to help cover the high costs. Shmarov
states, “Russia is also interested in this, because it is holding
back the disarmament process, which could lead to the pro-
cess slowing down or being suspended. I think neither Rus-
 sia nor the United States are interested in this.” Shmarov also states, “This assistance is totally unsatisfactory—it practically has not started. Ukraine is paying for the process almost entirely out of its own budget and obviously, this does not create a good foundation.” Following talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Shmarov says that Ukraine might not join the NPT because the nuclear states have not provided Ukraine with security guarantees.415

9/26/94 [RUSSIA]
Russian President Boris Yeltsin states at the U.N. General Assembly that Russia, the U.S., China, France, and Britain should agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals, ban nuclear testing, and end the production and reuse of fissile materials.416

9/28/94 [RUSSIA AND U.S.]
During their fifth summit meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton agree to seek early ratification of START II once START I enters into force. They would like to exchange START II instruments of ratification at their next summit meeting. Both presidents also agree that upon ratification of START II, they will immediately deactivate all strategic nuclear weapons that are to be destroyed under the treaty. Additionally, Clinton and Yeltsin agree to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the continued moratorium on their nuclear weapon testing, and the achievement of a global ban on the production of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons. Both presidents also ordered their experts to increase their dialogue on the further reduction and limitation of the nuclear arsenals following the ratification of the START II Treaty. Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the possibility for confidence building and transparency measures in the area of future reductions to improve relations between the two countries.417

9/28/94 [UKRAINE AND IAEA]
Nicolai Steinberg, the chairman of Ukraine’s State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, and IAEA Director General Hans Blix sign a nuclear safeguards agreement in Vienna.418

9/29/94 [TURKMENISTAN — NPT]
Turkmenistan joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.419

(10/1/94) [U.S. AND RUSSIA]
Twenty-two SS-18 missiles have reportedly been destroyed at the Surovatikha destruction site near Nizhny Novgorod.420

10/4/94 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA]
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter tells Congress that Ukraine has transferred 360 warheads to Russia. Ukraine now has 880 strategic warheads and 494 ALCM warheads.421

Note: This is a reference to the sixth withdrawal of warheads from Ukraine to Russia.

10/5/94 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma submits the NPT to the Rada for ratification. Presidential spokesman Mykhailo Doroshenko states, “The President has made good on his promise to the international community. He presented the NPT to the Ukrainian parliament. In this way, he displayed his will that Ukraine should join the NPT before its term ends in 1995.” Doroshenko also states that Kuchma has sent letters to the leaders of Russia, the U.S., Britain, and France asking for security guarantees. Kuchma’s chief of staff Dmytro Tabachnyk states that Ukraine has only received six percent of the promised $350 million in disarmament assistance from the U.S.422

10/5/94 [U.S. — NUNS-LUGAR]
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch reports to Congress that the amount the Pentagon has spent on dismantlement programs is “in excess of $100 million.” The Pentagon’s proposed obligations by 10/94 total $969 million, and $434 million has been obligated to signed contracts. Of the $185 million (increased from $135 million in Fiscal Year 1994) that had been promised for ICBM dismantlement in Ukraine, only $75 million has been obligated. Although Kazakhstan has been promised $70 million in dismantlement aid, none of this amount has been obligated by the Department of Defense.423

10/6/94 [UKRAINE]
The chairman of Ukraine’s parliament Olexander Moroz does not foresee the parliament quickly joining the NPT. Moroz states, “The issue is not about speed but about international agreements which would guarantee non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and decrease nuclear potential in the whole world.”424

10/11/94 [MOLDOVA — NPT]
Moldova deposits its letters of accession and joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.425

10/13/94 [UKRAINE AND GERMANY]
Ukraine and Germany sign an agreement under which Germany will grant Ukraine DM1 million ($650,000) to assist in the destruction of Ukraine’s missile silos.426

10/21/94 [UKRAINE]
Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk states that Ukraine was isolated by the West due to its delays last year in ratifying START.427
10/24/94 [UKRAINE AND CANADA]
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma asks Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien for Canadian assistance in obtaining security guarantees from the nuclear powers.428

(11/94) [UKRAINE]
Ukraine has started to construct a SS-19 dismantlement plant at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk. The facility is expected to begin operation in October 1995, destroying three SS-19 missiles per month. The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program is helping fund this project; an agreement worth $185 million was signed in 1993. The U.S. Morrison-Knudsen construction firm was awarded a $2.5 million contract for the project.429

Mid-11/94 [UKRAINE]
By mid-November, Ukraine has deactivated all of its SS-24 ICBMs.430

Late-11/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA]
According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Kasimzhomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan and Russia continue to negotiate compensation for the fissile materials in the warheads located in Kazakhstan. Tokayev predicts that the ICBMs remaining in Kazakhstan will be transferred to Russia by the end of 1995.431

11/15/94 [UKRAINE]
Fourteen countries and the European Union promise to give Ukraine an additional $234 million in disarmament aid.432

11/16/94 [UKRAINE — NPT]
Ukraine’s Rada votes 301 to 8 with 13 abstentions to ratify the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Ukraine’s ratification of the NPT is contingent upon receiving written security guarantees from the five nuclear weapons states. President Kuchma states, “Ukraine today has no choice between being nuclear or non-nuclear. The choice is made. The process of world disarmament depends on our decision today.” Kuchma also states that Ukraine does not have the capability or the money to use its nuclear weapons or establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle. A small group of nationalist deputies do not support Ukraine’s ratification of the NPT, and Oleh Vytovych of the Ukrainian National Assembly states, “Ukraine has become the hostage of the policies of other countries. I know which country is applying pressure. I therefore say ‘Yankee go home’.”433 Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Hennady Ukovenko states that Ukraine received from the U.S., Russia, and Great Britain a document that included security guarantees.434

Note: Ukraine’s ratification of START I and the NPT will allow START I to enter into force once the instruments of ratification have been exchanged.

11/16/94 [UKRAINE TO RUSSIA; U.S.]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov states that about 400 warheads have been withdrawn to Russia. Shmarov also states that Ukraine would like the U.S. to redirect about $50 million of disarmament aid to “social security” projects, including new housing for the 2,500 soldiers who formerly worked at missile bases. According to Shmarov, Ukraine has only received equipment worth about $4 to $5 million from the U.S.435

11/24/94 [KAZAKHSTAN AND U.S.]
After months of negotiations, the U.S. undertakes Operation Sapphire, during which it airlifts 600 kilograms of weapon-grade HEU out of the Kazakh facility at Ust-Kamenogorsk to the U.S. The operation follows an official request by Kazakh officials concerned that the material was not securely stored.436 The uranium was sold to the U.S. for “some tens of millions of dollars” and humanitarian and technical assistance.437 The U.S. will blend the HEU into LEU and sell it for use in commercial power reactors. Some of the profits will go to Kazakhstan in payment for the HEU.438

12/94 [RUSSIA]
Russia tests what the West believes to be a new missile, a modified version of the SS-25 ICBM.439

12/94 [RUSSIA]
During a Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting, the Russian delegation announces that Russia stopped producing plutonium for weapons purposes as of 10/1/94. According to the Russians, the reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk currently produce only plutonium oxide.440

12/5/94 [UKRAINE AND NPT; START I]
Ukraine formally accedes to the NPT at the CSCE summit in Budapest, Hungary. The presidents of the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan exchange instruments of ratification for START I, so that the treaty is now officially in force. The five nuclear weapons states also provide Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with security guarantees.441

12/15/94 [RUSSIA AND UKRAINE]
According to Viktor Mikhailov, the head of Minatom, Russia has delivered 102 tons of nuclear fuel to Ukrainian nuclear power plants as per the Trilateral Statement and has withdrawn more than 300 nuclear warheads from Ukraine.442

Note: Ukraine’s ratification of START I and the NPT will allow START I to enter into force once the instruments of ratification have been exchanged.
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