The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THE NPT EXTENSION DECISION

by Gerald M. Steinberg

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On May 11, 1995, the signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed by acclamation to extend this agreement beyond the initial 25 years specified in the original text. This decision, and the adoption of four accompanying documents, marked the culmination and conclusion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) held in New York and attended by 175 signatories.

The indefinite extension of the NPT was a major achievement for the supporters of the NPT regime. The U.S. government and the Clinton administration had made this a central foreign policy objective and had dedicated extensive resources towards the accomplishment of this outcome. Many other individuals and governments also contributed significantly, including the president of the NPTREC, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, as well as the representatives from Canada, South Africa, and other states.

The favorable outcome of the NPTREC was by no means a foregone conclusion. Numerous conflicts and disputes could, potentially, have led to far different results, ranging from short-term extensions, suspension of the conference, splits among the signatories, or even the collapse of the NPT regime. These contentious issues included: demands by some non-nuclear weapon states that the five nuclear powers agree to specific measures and timetables towards nuclear disarmament; questions over security assurances; political/economic disputes between the non-aligned nations and the developed states; and doubts about the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system (as illustrated by the problems experienced in the cases of Iraq and North Korea). Many of these had come up in past discussions of the NPT, and were responsible for deadlock in the 1990 NPT Review Conference. These issues were also raised in the four preparatory conferences that preceded the NPTREC and, in the case of Main Committee I (dealing with the elimination of nuclear weapons), led to sharp disputes and divisions.

In addition, an extensive Egyptian campaign centered on Israel’s nuclear policy, and NPT status was seen as a significant threat to the desired outcome. Israel was and remains one of three nuclear threshold states which are also NPT “holdouts” (along with India and Pakistan) (Brazil is the other major non-NPT state). In the year preceding the conference, as well as during the conference itself, the Egyptian government, joined by a number of other Arab states and Iran, sought to pressure Israel into changing its policy on the NPT. Egyptian government representatives defined their...
objectives in different language at various times, but the ostensible goal was to force Israel to accept the NPT, place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards within a fixed period of time, and end the long-standing Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel consistently rejected these pressures and resisted basic policy changes, viewing the maintenance of a virtual nuclear deterrent capability as necessary to offset the asymmetries in the size of conventional forces, territorial extent, and demography that it believes threaten the existence of the Jewish state.

This conflict had a significant impact on the NPTREC and on the broader Middle East peace process. The factors involved included Egyptian domestic politics, inter-Arab relations, Israeli policy and interests, regional security perceptions of the major states in the region, and the bilateral and trilateral relations between and among the United States, Israel, and Egypt.

This article describes and assesses the Egyptian campaign against Israel’s nuclear stance, the factors that determined the outcome at the NPTREC (in which both Israel and Egypt can claim diplomatic success), and the likely implications of this outcome on future nuclear negotiations in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the background of the Egyptian campaign, from the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Conference to its development in the final run-up to the opening of the NPTREC in April 1995. It then examines the events at the meeting itself and the factors that led to the eventual rejection of Egypt’s most extreme demands and the adoption of what was seen as a compromise statement on regional nonproliferation in the Middle East. Finally, it considers the long-term impacts of this outcome on the on-going Arab-Israeli peace process, making the argument that Egypt’s leverage among Arab and non-aligned states on this issue has now declined and that the most intense future conflicts over these issues are likely to take place in the context of bilateral and regional negotiations.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS AND THE BUILD-UP TO THE NPTREC

The Middle East peace process that began in October 1991 with the Madrid conference marked a fundamental change in the region and in the relationships between Washington, Jerusalem, and Cairo. After the Madrid Conference, a series of bilateral negotiations led to unprecedented agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (1993) and a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan (1994).

The Madrid Conference also established a number of multilateral working groups, including a group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). The multilateral framework was designed to tackle regional issues that extended beyond the bilateral negotiations, and to establish a basis for discussion and mutual recognition between Israel and the wider Arab world, extending from North Africa to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

The ACRS working group was the most ambitious, and manifested the growing emphasis on arms control and nonproliferation initiatives in the region. Prior to the beginning of the ACRS process, the belated discovery of the scope of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, the establishment of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to search for, monitor, and destroy Saddam Hussein’s efforts to maintain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles to deliver them, and President George Bush’s 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative had already increased the focus on these issues. In 1990, Egypt presented a framework to create a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ), known as the “Mubarak Initiative.” Although the regional conception for ACRS was similar to the Bush Initiative, ACRS emphasized the direct negotiation of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and the step-by-step expansion of regional measures, rather than focusing on long-term objectives, as in the Bush proposal. However, a number of key states, including Syria, Iraq, and Iran were not involved in the multilateral process, and this constituted a major limitation on the negotiation of regional security arrangements.

At an early stage in the ACRS meetings, Egypt began to press Israel to agree to include its nuclear policy on the agenda. The Egyptian representatives stated that progress in the regional peace process was linked to the end of Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Israel rejected the Egyptian demands to discuss the nuclear issue in detail, arguing that the development of regional security must be based first on progress in implementing regional peace agreements, as well as putting a broad network of CBMs into place. Until these conditions were reached, the Israeli policy based on the maintenance of the ambiguous nuclear deterrent would remain. Thus, the detailed negotiations demanded by Egypt that would lead to a change in this policy...
were unacceptable. As a result, by early 1995, the ACRS process had become blocked over this issue.

The meetings and other activities in the ACRS working group, as well as similar exchanges between Egypt and Israel in the annual meetings of the IAEA and the U.N. General Assembly were closely intertwined with the preparations for the upcoming NPTREC. This sparring provided a prelude to the intense debate that took place during the conference in New York.

The NPTREC in the Context of Egyptian-Israeli Relations

By the end of 1994, the Arab-Israeli peace process had made substantial progress, with a number of new agreements and treaties. However, Egypt was not a party to any of these agreements, having made its peace with Israel in 1979. Thus, from mid-1994 until May 1995, when the NPTREC ended, Egyptian-Israeli relations were dominated by the nuclear issue.

In late August 1994, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Mousa paid his first official visit to Israel. This was a highly charged and conflictive visit, beginning with Mousa’s initial refusal to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial, which is an important part of official visits for all diplomats and official guests. From the beginning, Mousa clearly stated that this visit was focused solely on Egypt’s demand that Israel sign the NPT. A number of Israeli analysts commented on Mousa’s insensitivity in efforts to avoid Yad Vashem and confrontation with the Holocaust, and the links between this and the Egyptian pressure to “strip Israel of its weapon of last resort.” The issue dominated the press conference held by Peres and Mousa, in which the Egyptian foreign minister sought to gain support from the Israeli public. When Mousa argued that the Israeli capability posed a danger to Egypt, Peres noted that although the United States “has a very large arsenal, ...it has a policy of peace.... I know that our Arab neighbors generally, and clearly Egypt, know that Israel doesn’t have any belligerent intentions.”

Mousa’s meetings in Jerusalem marked the beginning of a new and more intense phase of the conflict. This period included frequent bilateral or multilateral meetings, as well as a series of summits (two-way, four-way, and various other combinations) in Cairo, Washington, New York, Europe, and Jerusalem, focusing primarily on the Egyptian-Israeli conflict with respect to the NPT.

Shortly after Mousa’s visit, Egyptian officials declared that they would seek the support of the Arab League and the non-aligned movement (NAM) in linking NPT extension to changes in Israeli policy. Going further, Egyptian leaders, including Mubarak, indicated that “Egypt would withdraw from the NPT unless the issue of Israeli non-membership is addressed specifically in the NPT Extension Conference.” There was a great deal of confusion in the Egyptian policy, particularly in statements made by Mubarak. At one point, Mubarak stated “the day Israel signs, I will sign” and “Egypt will not renew its signature” on the NPT if Israel refuses to sign. Other sources discussed the possibility that “Egypt is contemplating withdrawing from the Treaty or ‘suspending’ its membership,” while Mousa stated that “All options are open.”

In December 1994, Israeli President Weizman paid an official visit to Egypt. Although the office of the Israeli president is largely symbolic, and he plays no policymaking role, Weizman’s visit had important political significance in the context of Israeli-Egyptian relations, and, in particular, the growing conflict over the nuclear issue. Egyptian government officials and the press (both government and opposition) used Weizman’s visit to emphasize the demands for Israel to join the NPT.

The intensification of the Egyptian campaign led to internal debates within the Israeli government regarding possible responses. Rabin consistently rejected proposals to change the Israeli position, and Israeli foreign ministry and military intelligence officials prepared documents analyzing the long-term implications of the Egyptian policy, as well as on options for exerting counter-pressure. Summaries, including the prospects for “punishing Egypt” and the possibility of war in the next decade, were leaked and published in the Israeli press. However, the Israeli response was limited and indirect since, despite the conflict over the NPT, the Mubarak government was honoring the security aspects of the 1979 treaty, which was viewed as preferable to likely alternatives in Egypt (such as a fundamentalist Islamic regime). Some Israeli officials saw the Egyptian campaign on the NPT as domestically driven. Mubarak was perceived as under internal threat, and the hostility to Israel (known as the “Cold Peace”) and pressures on the NPT issue were partly interpreted in this context.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the conflict escalated, and following the leak of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s assessments regarding the possibility of war, the Egyptians responded in kind. In January 1995, Ruz-El-Yusuf, one of Egypt’s leading weeklies, carried a lead article on the prospects of war with Israel.\(^\text{20}\) Retired General Farik Sa’ad Eldin Shazli, who led the Egyptian military in the 1973 War and is a major member of the opposition, was quoted extensively. He declared: “The combined weaponry possessed by the Arab states today exceeds that of Israel, if all of these weapons were directed against Israel the Arab states would defeat Israel.” Amin Elhawidi, former Egyptian Minister of War and Head of General Intelligence and another opposition figure, stated: “I expect war with a certainty because the agreements which have been signed and are being signed today lead to war.”\(^\text{21}\) This exchange did not contribute to the Middle East peace process or the normalization of relations.

During this period, meetings between Egyptian and other Arab leaders also focused on the issue of Israel and the NPT. On December 28 and 29, 1994, Mubarak met with Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and Syrian President Hafez el-Assad in Alexandria. In their communique, the leaders called for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a return to the pre-1967 borders, while they endorsed the Mubarak Initiative and the “immediate” negotiation of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (MENWFZ).\(^\text{22}\)

Israeli Foreign Minister Peres was closely identified with the peace process, and he expressed concern that the growing political conflict with Egypt over the nuclear issue would weaken support in Israel for concessions and so-called “security risks.”\(^\text{23}\) If Egypt, which was the first state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, exhibited such hostility, aligned itself with Syria, and placed primary emphasis on “stripping Israel of its deterrent,” Peres noted that many Israelis would question the wisdom of continuing the process.\(^\text{24}\) As a result of this assessment, Peres actively sought an accommodation with Egypt that would remove the issue from the agenda.\(^\text{25}\) He noted that the solution “does not include Israel signing the treaty,” but rather was based on less far-reaching (and undisclosed) policy changes that would satisfy the Egyptians and defuse the conflict. In his annual address before the U.N. General Assembly, Peres explicitly presented Israel’s vision of “A Middle East which will be nuclear-free, missile-free, hunger-free,discrimination-free, tyranny-free.”\(^\text{26}\) His remarks at the Nobel Prize award ceremony a few months later contained similar language.\(^\text{27}\) In the next month, a series of meetings between Israeli and Egyptian officials focused on various compromise proposals to defuse the conflict.\(^\text{28}\) However, Egypt continued to insist on a specific Israeli commitment to sign the NPT, and Israel refused.\(^\text{29}\) The growing conflict between Israel and Egypt began to impede the broader Middle East peace process, particularly with respect to public support for “security risks” and territorial withdrawal in Israel.\(^\text{30}\)

The stage and the leaders shifted to Washington, where the conflict continued, along with efforts by the U.S. government to mediate. The Mubarak government interpreted U.S. policies, such as the Bush Initiative and interest in the fissile material production cut-off, as being supportive of the Egyptian position, and American officials spoke of an Israeli “gesture” to satisfy Egypt.\(^\text{31}\) However, as the conflict over the NPT began to affect the peace process adversely, the United States started to pressure Egypt to alter its position on NPT extension, and the focus shifted from conflict between Israel and Egypt to an Egyptian-American confrontation.

**THE THREAT TO NPT EXTENSION**

In early 1995, some officials in the U.S. government estimated that there were 80 to 100 nations favoring indefinite extension.\(^\text{32}\) Although the extensive American effort had insured that some of the traditional major NPT critics would be supportive (Mexico had just received massive emergency financial aid, and the NAM was divided), the outcome was still in doubt.\(^\text{33}\) Proposals included the establishment of a deadline for nuclear disarmament, universality, demands (particularly from Iran) for greater and “non-discriminatory” access to nuclear technologies, specific and binding security assurances, the unresolved problem of North Korea, and safeguards failures in the case of Iraq.\(^\text{34}\)

Forty non-aligned states were still uncommitted, including many Arab and Islamic states. While the United States sought indefinite and unconditional extension, a group of 14 non-aligned nations, led by Indonesia, called for “rolling extensions” of 25 years, linked to completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and progress towards nuclear disarmament among the five nuclear powers.\(^\text{35}\) Other options included shorter rolling extensions with
In the period preceding the opening of the NPTREC, a number of analysts called for pressure on Israel to “shut down its Dimona reactor,”37 based, in part, on the expectation that Egypt and some other Arab states would attempt to link extension of the NPT to Israeli acceptance of curbs on its program.38 Some policymakers and analysts were concerned that the appearance of a “double standard” in U.S. policy on the NPT and Israel would complicate NPT extension.39 John Simpson noted concerns that “lack of any movement towards a ZFWMD [zone free of WMD] would result in a refusal by Arab governments to accept a long extension of the NPT.”40 Mitchell Reiss warned that the Israeli nuclear program would be a central issue, and that, in the absence of U.S. pressure on Israel to close Dimona, “the concerns of Arab parties may dominate the Review Conference.”41 In addition, some argued that the conference provided an opportunity to “cap the nuclear capabilities” of the three threshold states.42

However, by early 1995, it had become clear that Israel was going to accept neither the Egyptian demand that it sign the NPT nor proposals to close Dimona. Israel rejected the assertion that Dimona was “nearing the end of its operating life,”43 noting that the small reactor is not technically comparable to much larger, power reactors, designed earlier than Dimona. It was also apparent that pressures in this direction in the context of the peace process would reduce political support in Israel for concessions and “security risks.”

As a result, the United States began to pressure Egypt to accept the proposed Israeli gestures and endorse NPT extension. Under-Secretary of State Lynn Davis stated, “we are impressing upon Egypt our desire to have them support an indefinite extension,” while noting that the United States did not realistically expect Israel to sign the NPT or to “take steps inconsistent with how they see their security today.”44 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau went to Egypt in late January and reportedly warned Egypt that some members of Congress had raised the possibility of reviewing American aid to Egypt ($2.2 billion per year) in light of the Egyptian threats to obstruct NPT extension.45 However, Osamah El Baz, special advisor to President Mubarak, dismissed the prospects of a cut in U.S. aid. The Egyptians were aware that both Israel and the United States were loath to do anything that might weaken the Mubarak regime and lead to increased support for radical Islamic groups seeking to overthrow the Egyptian government.

Egypt intensified its efforts to gain support from the Arab states and called a special meeting of the 22 members of the Arab League to be held on March 23 with the goal of gaining support for linking NPT extension to Israeli accession. On February 6, 1995, a preliminary meeting of the foreign ministers of the eight “Damascus Declaration” states—Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—officially endorsed the Egyptian hard line. In their final statement, they repeated the demanded that “Israel sign this treaty and put its nuclear installations under the system of guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”46

On February 12, 1995, the leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians met in Washington for talks on a number of issues linked to the peace process, particularly on the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian track. However, the Blair House summit was dominated by the Egyptian campaign. In the opening session, Foreign Minister Mousa delivered a vitriolic attack on Israeli policy, demanding to know when Israel would sign the NPT, and tabled a document that included allegations of environmental dangers to Egypt resulting from the Israeli reactor complex. Peres again responded, declaring: “Since Camp David, there has been no change in our position and the distance between Dimona and Egypt has also not changed.”47 In an interview with the London-based paper El Hayat, Mubarak was quoted as saying that “Egypt will sign the NPT when Israel does,” and claimed support from Syria and a number of Persian Gulf states.48 The summit concluded just as the other such efforts had, without an agreement, and the issue remained unresolved. The crisis in the relations between Israel and Egypt intensified, and became personalized, with Rabin referring to “a bad wind blowing from the Egyptian foreign ministry.”49

Egypt’s efforts to gain support in the Arab League for major Israeli policy concessions led the U.S. government to undertake what was described as “a concerted diplomatic counter-offensive” focusing on the Gulf Cooperation Council and other moderate Arab states threatened by
Iraq and Iran. According to reports, American representatives stressed the link between the policies of these states and the continued alliance with the United States, as well as the relation between NPT extension, the security of these states, and the stability of the region. This was similar to the successful American strategy on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, when the Egyptian government sought to forge an Arab block that would remain outside the treaty, and to link the positions of Arab states on the CWC to the Israeli position on the NPT. Despite the Egyptian effort, many other Arab states have signed the CWC. The leaders of the Persian Gulf and North African states reportedly agreed that the primary sources of regional instability and insecurity came from the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs of Iran and Iraq, and that the indefinite extension and strengthening of the NPT regime were in their own national interest.50

The full-scale American campaign to obtain consensus in the NPTREC continued, and in early March, Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited the region. Following the meeting with Christopher, Mubarak softened his position, declaring that he did not expect Israel to “demolish or remove everything now,” but that it was reasonable to expect an announcement of “a timetable or something on any concrete steps.”51 A few days later, Mubarak announced that Egypt would not withdraw from the NPT, even if Israel refused to change its policy. Mubarak indicated that while protesting the Israeli position, Egypt would support extension.52

Throughout this period, Peres had continued his efforts to work out a formula with Egypt before the NPTREC’s opening. According to press reports, in late February, in yet another meeting (this time in Paris), Peres had presented a more specific version of the Israeli policy, pledging to “begin negotiation of a MENWFZ two years after bilateral peace agreements are signed with all states, including Iran.” But Foreign Ministry proposals to agree to discussions of the proposed MEWMDFZ in the ACRS talks were reportedly rejected by Rabin.53

Although Peres presented this as another gesture to end the impasse, it was apparently not understood as such, and the conflict, as well as efforts to resolve it, continued. On March 21, Yosi Beilin, a member of the Israeli cabinet and Peres protege, went to Cairo again, and spoke about the goal of a nuclear-weapon free Middle East—after the achievement of a lasting peace, and that both objectives could be negotiated “in parallel.” (This was a major departure, since Israeli official policy has and continues to be that detailed negotiations can only begin after peace in the region has been fully achieved.) Beilin also noted that the concrete language and commitment to join a MEWMDFZ, included in the Israeli ACRS paper on the goals of the process, marked a major change in policy. Beilin claimed,

It was the first comprehensive Israeli paper about this issue and I believe that the common denominator between Egypt’s view about it and the Israeli one is not a very small one. I think the idea of an agreement on a nuclear-free zone, which is an idea of President Mubarak, is something mutual.54

A few days later, Peres presented a further elaboration of the Israeli position on the MENWFZ, emphasizing the development of a system of mutual inspection and comparing this with the discredited NPT/IAEA verification system.55 However, while the Israelis might have felt that the gap was closing, no such evaluation came from Cairo.

On March 23, 1995, Egypt hosted a special full meeting of the Arab League ministers, which was designed to create a unified position for the NPTREC. This would have served as a nucleus to gain wider support of the members of the NAM. Vice President Al Gore arrived in Cairo at the same time and strongly reiterated the U.S. policies in direct and blunt talks with President Mubarak and the representatives of the other Arab states attending the Arab League meeting. As a result of the American pressure and the interests of some of these states to distance themselves from the Egyptian attempt to dominate the forum, the meeting did not endorse the Egyptian effort, and the Secretary of the Arab League declared that “some Arab countries are leaning toward signing without an Israeli commitment to do so.”56

The extensive discussions between the United States and Egypt continued until the opening of the NPTREC. From April 5 to 9, Mubarak was in Washington, and, once again, the Egyptian policy on the NPT and Israel was a major focus of official discussions and media appearances. The U.S. government, including President Bill Clinton, continued to seek an Egyptian agreement to end the efforts to block indefinite extension or link its policies to explicit condemnation of Israel. In his meetings with Clinton,
Mubarak again pledged that Egypt would not disrupt the conference and “would not be lobbying other governments against extension of the NPT.” In contrast, Mousa, who accompanied Mubarak, declared that Egypt had not modified—and would not modify—its demands, which, he stated, were: 1) Israeli agreement, prior to the NPTREC, to discuss a nuclear-free Middle East in “the next meeting” of the ACRS negotiations; and 2) Israel’s commitment to join the NPT within two years of signing peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. The apparent contradiction between Mubarak and Mousa raised questions regarding Mubarak’s authority and divisions in the Egyptian leadership, or perhaps a division of labor between the leaders.

Apparently, the Egyptian effort to forge a unified Arab position prior to the NPTREC was faltering, as was Cairo’s attempt to speak for and represent the Arab world. Egypt still had the support of Syria, and would work closely with the Syrian delegation in the meetings in New York. But without firm backing from the Gulf States and North Africa, the Egyptian position was much weaker than had been sought. This also weakened Egypt’s capability to forge alliances or gain the support of other states in the NAM in the attempt to link NPT extension to a change in the Israeli policy.

**THE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK (APRIL-MAY 1995)**

Despite Mubarak’s pledges to Clinton and declarations in Washington, the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation continued through the NPTREC, which opened in New York on April 19, 1995. By this time, it was apparent that Egypt could not block indefinite extension, but, as Paul Power has noted, “it could hope to gain something on the universality issue, because the United States was dedicated to avoiding a visible split on permanent unqualified extension.” In his opening statement, Mousa declared that the treaty as it stands today and in view of the absence of accession to it by a neighbor with well known nuclear capabilities, is incapable of safeguarding the national security of Egypt. Consequently, Egypt finds itself today in a position where she cannot support the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

He even raised the option of “suspending the Conference for a reasonable period of time.” Other Arab states, particularly Syria, supported the Egyptian position. In his opening statement, the Syrian foreign minister attacked the Israeli policy, and declared that “Syria cannot agree to the extension of the NPT unless Israel accedes to the Treaty and subjects its nuclear installation to international inspection.” He repeated the Egyptian call for suspension of the conference “to correct the loopholes in the Treaty.” As a non-signatory, Israel itself did not participate formally in the conference but did maintain low-level representation based on its permanent U.N. delegation.

The conference began with eight days of general debate, in which 116 speeches were made. After the general debate, the three Main Committees (Disarmament, Safeguards, and Peaceful Uses) as well as other committees, held meetings. There were also numerous informal consultations among the delegates. On May 5, Canada presented a proposal for a consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. (The United States and other supporters of extension sought to avoid a divisive vote and split decision that might have weakened the role of the NPT.) Although this proposal would have gained a majority (it was cosponsored by over 100 states), the Canadian text may not have gained consensus approval.

In contrast, a group of NAM states proposed rolling extensions for 25 years. South Africa then introduced a draft of principles linked to indefinite extension. The language was largely based on U.S. draft proposals, and, because of the South African government’s prestige, also gained the support of the non-aligned movement. This had the effect of severely weakening Egyptian leverage and its potential for gaining the support of the NAM in linking some action specific mention to Israel.

Although officials of the U.S. government reported that Mubarak promised Clinton that Egypt would not disrupt the extension process by seeking to isolate Israel, the American and other delegations expected that to obtain complete consensus, some form of compromise with the Egyptian demands would be necessary. The U.S. delegation had been working with delegates from some moderate Arab states on such a compromise resolution. There was also some hope that the Egyptians would view the language in the other resolutions and reports, cited above, as an acceptable achievement. However, the efforts to devise a compromise failed and the Egyptian delegation demanded that Israel be explicitly singled out. On May 9, just one day before the scheduled adoption of the three main conference extension documents and three days before the end of the conference, Egypt and 13 other members of the Arab League (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen) tabled a draft resolution focusing explicitly on Israel. The text called for Israel’s immediate acceptance of the NPT and IAEA safeguards, and sought to link the consensus on the South African package to endorsement of this draft. Egypt insisted that its resolution be adopted prior to the formal decision on the NPT extension, thereby complicating and delaying the overall conference activities and threatening to block consensus.63

The U.S. government recognized that approval of such a document would have a negative impact on Israeli policy in the peace process, without changing Israeli policy with respect to the NPT or other arms limitation measures. This move, just before the scheduled end of the conference, was a direct violation of the pledges Mubarak had made to Clinton, and according to reports, the U.S. president called Mubarak from Moscow “and warned him against playing such a dangerous game.”64 Members of the U.S. delegation met intensively with the Arab delegations, and during a caucus of the Arab states, many of the co-sponsors declared that they would not vote for this resolution, leaving Egypt and Syria isolated.

At this stage, various other proposals were discussed, including one that would have linked Israel with other non-NPT signatories in the region (Oman and the United Arab Emirates), but the representatives of these states objected, reportedly because they did not want to be included with Israel.65 After another round of intense consultations, and phone calls from Washington to the national capitals, most of the Arab cosponsors indicated that their representatives were prepared to support the consensus for NPT extension, regardless of the response to the Middle East resolution.

Based on these discussions, the U.S. delegation prepared an alternative Middle East resolution, which, in marked contrast to the Egyptian proposal, included a specific endorsement of the peace process and linked the MEWMDFZ to this process. Israel was not mentioned by name (although the report produced by Committee III and attached to the final document named all non-NPT states). The objectives of this decision were not stated explicitly, but were apparently designed to provide Egypt with something to show for its efforts, avoid embarrassment for Mubarak and a deep rift in relations between Cairo and Washington, while also not pushing Israel into a corner.

At this point, a sponsor (or sponsors) had to be found, and the three NPT depository states (the United States, Britain, and Russia) agreed to play this role. Although some analysts later called this “an inspired political maneuver” by Egypt and the Arab states,66 the role of the depository states was the result of a proposal from a member of the American delegation, and the political implications were apparently not recognized at the time. (Israel, as a non-NPT signatory, is not bound by any of the resolutions, although U.S. officials contacted Israeli policymakers in Israel and sought their response to some of the events and resolutions.)

Regarding the extension itself, the South African draft led to the negotiation of a declaration adopted by acclamation (explicitly endorsed by 111 of the participating 178 nations) that extended the NPT indefinitely.67 The conference also adopted documents on “Strengthening the Review Process” and on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” They addressed general issues, but had specific importance with respect to Israel and the Middle East. These resolutions emphasized the goal of universality and provisions for a strengthened review process, consisting of an annual 10-day preparatory committee meeting in each of the three years preceding a review conference every five years. Among the stated objectives of this process were the consideration of “principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality,” thereby insuring that the Israeli exceptionality would continue to receive attention. In addition, the resolutions specified the goal of reaching agreement on a CTBT and a fissile material production cut-off agreement.68 Israel was active in negotiations for the CTBT, and backed this treaty. However, cut-off proposals are problematic for Israel, as they are viewed as “back-doors” to the NPT and external inspection on the activities at the Dimona facility. As noted, the Israeli government has not taken an official position on the cut-off, but Rabin termed these proposals “unworkable.”69

At the same time, these resolutions were also seen as providing support for the Israeli position, particularly with respect to the direct negotiation of a regional NWFZ among the countries. Section five of the set of principles calls for the “establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on
The basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region.” Section six mentions the Middle East specifically in this context, noting that the “specific characteristics of each region” should be considered.

The conclusion of the NPTREC marked the end of a major phase in the conflict over Israel’s NPT status and its ambiguous nuclear deterrent. The conference ended with a unanimous decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, without a change in Israeli policy or status. However, the provisions in the formal decisions and in the Middle East Resolution left the opportunity for continuing the conflict in future review conferences and other meetings. Indeed, immediately after the end of the conference, the Egyptian government indicated that the issue was far from resolved, and that the conflict would continue. In a meeting of the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in June, Egypt’s Ambassador Mounir Zahran urged implementation of the Middle East Resolution, and called for “concrete actions” in its implementation with respect to Israel.10 The process and conflict between Israel and Egypt disrupted and set back the Arab-Israeli peace process and would continue to do so.

Shortly after the assassination of Rabin in November 1995, Shimon Peres, who became the prime minister, met with Mubarak and Mousa in Egypt. Peres sought to strengthen support for the peace process in Israel by demonstrating improved relations with Egypt. In the wake of this meeting, Peres is reported to have stated that he had received a pledge from Mubarak for a year’s “cease fire” on the nuclear issue, and resumption of cooperation in the ACRS process.11 However, there was no official confirmation from either government. Shortly thereafter, Mousa and other Egyptian officials resumed their campaign, and continued to block efforts to resume the ACRS with discussions on non-nuclear weapons limitations and CBMs. In addition, public pressure on Israel continued. In November 1995, after an earthquake in the Red Sea, Mousa said that “Egypt was following up” reports that this might be related to Israeli nuclear tests, and this theme has been repeated frequently by Egyptian officials.12 Thus, the conflict between Egypt and Israel over the status of the Israeli nuclear deterrent continued after the NPTREC, much as it had before.

AN ISRAELI VIEW OF LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

For both Washington and Jerusalem, the outcome of the NPTREC was a major diplomatic achievement. The United States succeeded in obtaining an indefinite extension without causing divisions or dissen-

sion among the signatories (although not quite the consensus or unanimous support the administration had initially sought) and without a negative impact on other foreign policy objectives, most notably the Arab-Israeli peace process. Israel was able to maintain its nuclear deterrent posture while avoiding conflict with the United States. (Indeed, their close coordination had the effect of enhancing bilateral ties and increasing the understanding of each other’s interests and objectives.)

The conflict also forced the Israeli government to provide a rationale for the policy of nuclear ambiguity, and the underlying logic of this op-

tion was articulated to the public at both the domestic and international levels. This is a major change from past policy, when Israel’s leaders generally avoided any public discussion of its nuclear or deterrent policies and sought refuge behind standard phrases that provided no explanation or justification. Rabin, Peres, and other Israeli leaders clearly articulated the links between the maintenance of the nuclear capability and the continued threats to national survival, combined with the military, geographic, and demographic asymmetries in the region. Perhaps the clearest example of this new formulation, developed in the course of the conflict with Egypt, was presented by Ehud Barak, shortly after he became foreign minister in January 1996. In the absence of proven and reliable regional peace agreements, Barak declared, “Israel’s nuclear policy, as it is perceived in the eyes of the Arabs, has not changed, will not change and cannot change, because it is a fundamental stand on a matter of survival which impacts all the generations to come.”13

The process that accompanied the NPT extension, and the concomitant increase in the active role of Israel in international organizations and fora dealing with arms control and non-proliferation—such as the CD and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—enabled the government to consolidate and strengthen the domestic political commitment to these policies. Despite its unconventional policies, Israel avoided the political and diplomatic isolation that they had feared and that had apparently been sought by Egypt.

In addition, the U.S. government accepted the Israeli position that
nuclear arms control and the status of the Israeli deterrent were inextricably linked to the Middle East peace process, and discussions of the former are dependent on substantial progress in the latter. This link can be seen in the language adopted by the NPTREC in the resolution on the Middle East and in formal statements issued by the U.S. State Department. The United States and Israel also established a formal forum for bilateral consultations on nonproliferation and arms control issues in order to increase coordination and prevent misunderstanding and conflict.

In a broader sense, the American policies adopted during this process reflect a shift from an exclusive emphasis on the universal nature of the NPT regime to a regional approach to arms control. For many years, the United States had consistently placed primary or exclusive emphasis on the combined NPT/IAEA framework. The policies adopted by the United States in the context of the NPT extension process seem to demonstrate tacit acceptance of the Israeli position that its nuclear policies are linked to the regional security environment, which is beyond the scope of global regimes such as the NPT. The first steps in this process of change in the American approach to nonproliferation can be seen following the Gulf War, and the realization that the effectiveness of the application of the NPT on a global basis was flawed in regions such as the Middle East. These changes were expressed in the 1991 Bush Initiative, but then, the regional framework was still closely coupled to the NPT and IAEA. By 1995, this link was much looser.

From the Egyptian perspective, the results were mixed, at best. The Mubarak government did not succeed in its stated objective of forcing Israel to accede to the NPT or pledge future acceptance, and to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards. As in the case of the CWC, Egypt was unable to gain sustained support from the Arab states or recognition as the leader of the Arab world, even on this issue. In various meetings of the Arab League prior to the NPTREC, as well as during the conference itself, representatives of these states distanced themselves from the Egyptian position. During the conference, South Africa, and not Egypt, emerged as the central broker between the advanced industrial states and the NAM.

In addition, as a result of the continued and single-minded campaign, the Egyptian government is seen by many, both in the region and outside, as responsible for disrupting the peace process, although this may be changing more recently under the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The hostility from Egypt and the conflict generated over this issue had a negative impact on Israeli public opinion and reduced support for risk taking. Critics of the Labor government’s policies argued the high level of hostility from Egypt and attempts to isolate Israel, 16 years after the peace treaty, were negative precedents for proceeding with withdrawal from the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria. Mousa’s August 1994 visit to Israel, which focused on the nuclear issue, was particularly important in this sense.

This does not mean that the outcome was a total defeat for Egyptian diplomacy. The Middle East Resolution and the frequent review conferences provide mechanisms for maintaining pressure on Israel, for seeking to isolate Jerusalem, and for giving the Egyptian government a cause around which to build domestic legitimacy and claim inter-Arab leadership. Despite the outcome, Egypt is able to claim a pivotal diplomatic role in the region and gain the attention of the United States. Domestically, the role that Egypt played in confronting both Israel and the United States on this issue was very popular, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the regime. In this sense, the NPT conflict should be seen as only one issue, albeit the most visible, in a series of Egyptian efforts to assert dominance and slow the acceptance of Israel in the region. The Egyptian government has also urged the Arab states to suspend regional economic cooperation with Israel in the context of the Casablanca and Amman Economic Summits and the Barcelona Conference (sponsored by the European Union). Cairo has blocked progress in all of the multilateral working groups, accused Israel of planting mines in the Sinai (this accusation was later retracted), and strongly protested Israeli-Turkish military cooperation agreements. From the Israeli perspective, the multiplicity of conflicts, and the stated Egyptian objective of “reducing Israel to its natural size,” indicate that Cairo’s campaign on the NPT was not fundamentally motivated by threat perceptions, but rather is a means of slowing the process of normalization between Israel and other Arab states, in the effort to enhance Egypt’s own power in the region. For Egypt, the NPTREC, the ACRS process, and the bilateral discussions with Israel were not seen as the ba-
sis for stability that would serve the interests of all states in the region, but rather an arena of political conflict in a broader zero-sum game.

There were other global and regional factors that shaped Egyptian policy: Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the end of the Cold War, a decline in Egyptian influence in the Middle East and the Arab world due to the wider Middle East peace process, and a waning of domestic political support for efforts to weaken Israeli military capabilities and end the nuclear monopoly. Expectations of support, particularly from the U.S. government, appear to have influenced the Egyptian perceptions. The available evidence indicates that until late 1994 or early 1995, the United States did not convey the message that it would not press Israeli security doctrine, and is widely supported by the national security bureaucracy, the political leadership, and the press. In the absence of fundamental political changes in the region going far beyond the small steps towards conflict resolution taken to far, this is not likely to change.

Similarly, Egyptian policy and emphasis on this issue are likely to continue, and indeed, have continued following the NPT extension decision. The ACRS process is still frozen, and Egypt and Israel maintain opposing positions in the United Nations, IAEA, CD, and other international fora. The events leading up to and during the NPTREC reinforced the positions of the major actors, and the pattern of Egyptian demands, Israeli resistance, and U.S. efforts to contain the tensions and limit damage to the political relationships in the region is likely to be repeated in the 1997 PrepCom and in other fora for many years.

At the same time, the experience from the 1995 NPTREC indicates that Egyptian efforts to isolate Israel on this issue—and the attempts to link an end to the Israeli nuclear deterrent capability to the continuation of the NPT regime—do not have strong support from many Arab and non-aligned states. Although these conflicts will continue in the PrepComs, NPT review conferences, and in the annual meetings of the IAEA, their intensity will be reduced. Thus, they are unlikely to disrupt the continuity of the global nonproliferation regime.

Following the indefinite extension of the NPT, Egypt’s leverage on this issue declined. As a result, in the context of the NPT, the conflict between Israel and Egypt on the status of the Israeli nuclear program peaked in 1995, and in the future, the primary settings for this conflict are likely to return to the bilateral and regional levels.

1 The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Ihel Foundation; Yona Cymerman and Lea Rappaport provided research assistance.
2 Article X.2 of the NPT, which entered into force in 1970, specifies that “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed or fixed periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.”
8 Mohamed Nabil Fahmy, “Egypt’s disarmament initiative,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1990), pp. 9–10. In 1978, President Sadat had sought to include agreement on the Israeli nuclear capability in the context of the Camp David Agreements that led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, but this was rejected by the Israelis, and the issue was dropped for many years. See William

Some of the other Arab participants also sought to include discussion of the Israeli nuclear policy in the context of CBMs, but with less fervor than in the case of Egypt. See Jenkins, “The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS).”

Mousa had come to Israel before short periods in the context of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.


Ibid.

Under the terms of the NPT, Egypt had two options: it could vote against extension, but still be bound by the majority, or it could withdraw in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. See *Davar*, January 31, 1995, p. 3; Fawaz A. Gerges, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May/June 1995); “Egypt ties NPT and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS).”


Gerges, pp. 71-72.


Ibid.


Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” *International Security* 19 (Fall 1994) argues that domestic political and ideological differences between Israel’s major parties have led to conflicts over nuclear policy. While some individuals, such as Shimon Peres and some of his proteges, are reportedly more “willing to embrace a regime,” as Solingen claims, the evidence for the broader claim regarding parties and ideologies is not supported by the evidence. While Peres made some isolated statements indicating greater enthusiasm for the concept of a Middle East NWFZ following implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, including Iran, this was far from the Egyptian demands for immediate Israeli accession to the NPT. More importantly, with the possible exception of Peres, between 1977 (when Likud first formed a government) and 1995, there was no discernible difference between the nuclear policies of Labor (particularly during the government of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin) and Likud-led governments. Many of the key policymakers in the Ministry of Defense (such as Director General David Ivri) and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission served under both governments.


Address by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the 49th session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 29, 1994 (Israel Information Service, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem).

Remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, Oslo, December 10, 1994 (Israel Information Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem).


Epstein, p. 27.

Simpson and Howlett.


Simpson and Howlett, p. 59.

Reiss, p. 11.


Reiss, p. 11.

*Nuclear Proliferation News*, No. 18 (February 17, 1995).

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The American pro-Israel lobby, as its name suggests, was an American lobby. It had no influence in Egypt, not even on the government, let alone on the people. As a member of the Egyptian delegation in the United Nations in the 1980s, Mousa developed a reputation for deep antipathy towards the United States and American requests and a recognition of the importance to Egyptian interests and regional stability of fostering better relations with Israel. As a member of the Egyptian delegation, Mousa and Fahmy were the primary forces in this anti-Israel campaign, while Mubarak acted to limit this tension, in response to American requests and a recognition of the importance to Egyptian interests and regional stability of fostering better relations with Israel.

Although Jordan formally tended to follow the Egyptian position, the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty calls for a Middle East free from WMD, “both conventional and non-conventional,” without specific reference to nuclear weapons or the NPT and IAEA.

Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 20 (March 21, 1995).

Ibid.

Aluf Benn, “Israel will agree to Nuclear Free Zone to Begin Two Years after Signing of Regional Peace Agreement” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, February 21, 1995, p. 1.

Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 21 (April 4, 1995).

Ibid.


Statement by Farouk Al-Shara, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arabic Republic, to the Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), April 19, 1996, New York.

Rauf and Johnson.


Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (February 17, 1995); Power, p. 204; and Epstein, p. 28.

Shmuel Segev, “Egypt Moving Toward Anti-US Anti-Israel Policy,” Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1995, p. 5. There are also reports that Vice President Gore’s foreign policy aide Leonard Firth called Osamah El-Baz (Gore was the formal head of the American delegation to the NPT Extension Conference), and both reports may be correct.

Power, p. 204; and Segev, p. 5.


Continued dissension and dissatisfaction by some states, including the Arab states, blocked adoption of a formal Final Declaration and assessment of the status of the NPT and its operations. This also occurred in the 1980 and 1990 NPT Review Conferences (see Epstein, p. 29).


Salamah Ahmad Salamah, “Closeup: Nuclear Tests in al-Aqaba?” Al Ahram, November 28, 1995, p. 10; in FBIS-NEQ-95-233 (5 December 1995), p. 10. In contrast, the Egyptian Ministry of Science announced that the seismic evidence showed that the movement was the result of an earthquake.


United States Information Agency Near East/South Asia English Washington File, Tuesday, June 25, 1996; Transcript: State Department Briefing, Briefing from Acting State Department Spokesman Glyn Davies, Tuesday, June 25, 1996.

Gerald M. Steinberg, “Non-Proliferation: Time for Regional Approaches?” Orbis 38 (Summer 1994).

For a discussion of the role of Egyptian domestic factors in this process, see Gerges, pp.69-78, and Guy Bechor, “The Egyptian Campaign on the NPT Increased the Popularity of Mubarak and Mousa on Cairo’s Streets” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, April 19, 1995, p. 2.

Arieh O’Sullivan, “Turkey Denies Letting IAF Train There,” Jerusalem Post, April 8, 1996.
