

DELEGATE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE

A Series of Interviews Conducted by Susan B. Welsh

Susan B. Welsh is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She served as an advisor to the Kyrgyz delegation at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

On May 11, 1995, history was made as delegates from 175 countries agreed by consensus to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) indefinitely. Meeting in New York to review the first 25 years of the Treaty, the States Parties had to decide how to extend the Treaty based on the options presented in its Article X.2.¹ The following interviews with delegates from some of the key states involved in the Review and Extension Conference examine a number of the critical issues that were raised and suggest how the outcomes will affect the future of the Treaty.

Interviews were conducted with delegates at various times during the final week of the Conference and immediately afterward. The delegates' comments have been edited for clarity and brevity.²

The interviews begin with the comments from the President of the Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala. A South African delegate then discusses how his country developed drafts of the proposals that served as an important bridge between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Interviews with delegates from the states that submitted extension resolutions—Canada, Indonesia, and Mexico—follow this discussion. Other voices from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—Venezuela, Egypt (focusing particularly on the Middle East resolution), and Iran—provide different perspectives on the compromises struck. Additional insights on the negotiations come from the Chairman of the Zangger Committee (on export controls), four nuclear weapon

states (emphasizing disarmament issues), New Zealand (a small but vocal state not involved in the NAM), and Pakistan, (a non-NPT party observing the Conference).

The exclusion or inclusion of a state's perspective in these interviews is not intended to reflect its importance at the Conference. Although some states played more active roles during the Conference, in the end all States Parties present had equal voices in adopting the decisions.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the United States³

What is your perspective on how the package of decisions taken on extension, principles and objectives, and strengthening the review process was reached?

Dhanapala: It was clear from the very beginning that all delegations *did* want to extend the Treaty. There was fundamental support for the Treaty, and there was a desire also to try to reach a common area of agreement on the important decision of extending the Treaty within the framework of the three options that were permitted under Article X.2. At the stage of the general debate, it was quickly evident that a large number of delegations did want to extend the Treaty indefinitely. It was also evident that they were not prepared to extend the Treaty indefinitely, period—there was a desire for an indefinite extension *plus*.

What that plus amounted to was basically a desire

for further commitments toward nuclear disarmament in terms of concrete action. Article VI and the preambular paragraphs to the Treaty, which commit all States to nuclear disarmament, have to lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This was abundantly clear, not only from the general debate, but also from the individual meetings I had with delegations, from the larger delegations to the smaller delegations....

The second most important factor was the fact that South Africa came up with the very imaginative proposal of having a statement of principles and a strengthening of the review process. This enabled us to have the seed of an idea that led to the other two parallel decisions that were taken together with the decision on the extension.⁴

I then conducted a series of individual meetings with delegations who had not committed themselves to either option and with those who had not spoken in the general debate. I established for myself that, irrespective of pieces of paper that were being continuously pushed around by various delegations, there was in fact a majority for indefinite extension. I identified the various elements that had to go into this consensus, which were reflected in my extension decision paper and my suggestion to the members of the President's Consultations⁵ that the other two documents should be given the status of a decision. I was glad that there was a positive response to that.

There were of course negotiations which led to various proposals [based on my original proposal].... I [had] never intended my proposal to be on the table on a take it or leave it basis. We did work cooperatively in a very good atmosphere, in a spirit of give and take, because of the overall importance of the longevity of the Treaty and its universalization....

As far as the crafting of the actual language of the resolution on extension, how did you come up with the idea to extend the Treaty in this manner?

Dhanapala: It was clear to me that not everybody wanted an indefinite extension of the Treaty as...[was] very evident by the fact that we had different proposals [for extension]. If you were going to have a consensus decision or a decision that was accepted without a vote, you had to take into account the people who were going to be left out.

I was convinced very deeply that we should not have a vote because that was going to weaken the Treaty, that was going to make the Treaty less credible, and

that was going to be deeply destabilizing for international security. With that conviction in mind, my delegation [Sri Lanka] supported me, helping to draft a decision where we acknowledged that there was a majority in favor of the indefinite extension of the Treaty and therefore, the Treaty had to be extended [indefinitely, according to] the terms of the Treaty. Some of the statements that were made after adoption [of the resolution reflected views against indefinite extension], but the fact that those delegations were able to go along with the extension of the Treaty without demanding a vote...is a major tribute to their dedication to the Treaty and their commitment to the goals of the Treaty. We must appreciate that fact because there was fundamentally a solidarity for the Treaty, and ultimately it was the Treaty that emerged victorious.

SOUTH AFRICA

The Honorable Peter Goosen, Minister South African Permanent Mission in Geneva⁶

How did South Africa develop the proposal on principles for nonproliferation and disarmament, and what was its aim in introducing it [to the President's Consultations] at the Conference?

Goosen: In developing objectives for the Conference and a position on extension of the NPT, we undertook a process in which we studied the issue, read related documents, and consulted with members of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the NAM and with other countries. Our goal was to understand the perspectives of other countries and to analyze what might happen at the Conference. We began to analyze the possible extension options and what each one entailed, and to examine how we felt about the NPT.... At the fourth PrepCom [Preparatory Committee],⁷ South Africa presented a legal analysis of the different extension options under Article X.2, in response to a request by Nigeria for such an analysis during the third PrepCom.

After that, we held a high-level internal meeting to analyze the extension options—who were the proponents of each one, what each one would mean for South Africa, for other countries, and for the Treaty itself—and the accomplishments of the Treaty. South Africa had given up its nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. We saw that our own security, as well as regional and international security, were being guaranteed by the NPT, not by nuclear weapons,

and that we felt more secure through disarmament. We decided that, in large measure, the NPT had been successful. The number of threshold states had actually fallen, and there had been only two violations over the Treaty's 25 years. Thus, we concluded that the NPT really was in South Africa's national security interests, and that the best way to retain the Treaty would be by supporting indefinite extension in principle.

The question then became how to push for compliance with the NPT without jeopardizing the Treaty itself. An extension with conditions that could lead to the termination of the Treaty if they are not met was not acceptable. Since it is difficult to amend the Treaty, the obligations had to be politically rather than legally-binding. So the idea of principles came up. Principles would have moral strength and could be seen as binding without threatening the existence of the NPT. We then studied the elements of the NPT to identify the various issues which could be addressed in the principles. In formulating these, it was important to stretch the parameters of the debate but yet not to break the envelope of what was possible. The resulting document was circulated in the President's Consultations at the Conference.

And how was the proposal on strengthening the review mechanism developed?

Goosen: Whereas we developed the document on the principles internally in Pretoria, the document on the mechanism for strengthening the review process was also developed out of consultations with countries. Based on these consultations on how the review process works, we decided to propose to strengthen that process. Originally we thought that [it] would not be possible to fully accomplish this at the Conference. However, we began working in Pretoria on the concept of a mechanism for strengthening the review process. We further refined the concept here in New York before presenting the document in order to include more fully the thoughts of other states. Thus, the ideas in the original South African draft on the review mechanism were not those of South Africa alone, as was the case with the draft on principles. It made good sense for us to work with others in developing the draft on the review process, because, after all, this was South Africa's first NPT review conference.

There has been some criticism that the South African proposals were watered down too much during

negotiations in the President's Consultations. Do you agree with this criticism?

Goosen: We saw that we might be able to get a strongly-worded document by a vote, but we felt that this would lack force. Force could only be gained by a consensus that would bind everyone to the decision. In coming to the Conference with this proposal, we did not aim to maximize our national position but to provide the basis for a consensus. During the President's Consultations, some of the language of the text was watered down, while other parts were strengthened. In the negotiating process, you do not get everything you want but what you can live with. In our view, something positive definitely came out of the Conference, and everyone had a part in it. No one was really sure if anything would come out, but everyone bought into the proposals and some words came from each.

In South Africa, recent changes in government and the process of developing a new constitution have led to a consensus-building style within the government. This style also influenced the approach that we took in developing and negotiating the principles. In our view, the proposal adopted at the Conference is not an end to the issue but rather a beginning. The agreed principles and objectives will be brought up at future review conferences as a yardstick for progress.

CANADA

Ambassador Christopher W. Westdal, Ambassador for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade⁸

What were Canada's objectives for the Conference and what tactics did it use to pursue these objectives?

Westdal: We have been working for many months on NPT issues. Our main objective for the Conference was to gain permanence [of the NPT] with accountability, preferably by consensus. We saw that consensus would need to be gained by momentum—in other words, that support for one viewpoint would need to grow to the point of proving that the decision would go that way—rather than by substantive compromise on the extension itself. This was indeed the way consensus was achieved. When it became clear that there was at least a majority in favor of indefinite extension, the cost of staying outside the consensus rose and the point of doing so fell. Countries remaining outside faced the possibility of isolation and had to decide if they were will-

ing to deny the consensus.

In developing our strategy to gain the permanence of the Treaty, we identified both the salient peaks in the NAM which were initially opposed to indefinite extension, and the fertile valleys—countries that might be willing to support permanence. We then attempted to undermine and isolate the critics. I personally worked full-time on the NPT for six months. At the end of the fourth PrepCom, Canada was asked to take a leadership role in promoting indefinite extension. Part of our efforts included systematically targeting 74 undecided countries to try to persuade them—during one-on-one meetings and luncheons hosted by our Ambassador to the United Nations and through repeated demarches through our missions abroad—that from Canada’s perspective as a non-nuclear weapon state, indefinite extension made compelling good sense.

We focused our efforts on building tangible proof that the decision would be made in favor of indefinite extension. We were far from alone in our efforts—we began working with like-minded, principally Western, states and then shifted the base of our efforts to the Mason Group, which is composed of 39 countries from the First Committee of the United Nations (Western, Eastern, and Russia).

How quickly did support for indefinite extension grow?

Westdal: The number of countries publicly supporting indefinite extension grew from 16 at the end of the fourth PrepCom in January to 30 by the end of the first week of the Conference. Signatories for the Canadian resolution for indefinite extension grew to 60 by the end of the second week. After the NAM meeting in Bandung in late April failed to take a decision on extension, we were expecting that a number of NAM countries freed up by this lack of a joint NAM position would co-sponsor the resolution for an indefinite extension. While only a few more countries joined on the first and second of May, 10 to 13 states signed on each day through the end of that week, leading to 103 co-sponsors by the time the resolution was submitted on May 5. The Philippines joined as a co-sponsor from the floor when the resolution was introduced, raising the number to 104.

Also, although Arab states would not co-sponsor the draft decision—out of respect for Egypt, which had concerns over Israel remaining outside the NPT—some of them favored indefinite extension. Likewise, some

African states were hesitant to co-sponsor the draft decision out of respect for South Africa, which, while supporting indefinite extension in principle, chose not to co-sponsor so as to maintain objectivity in its drive for review reform and principles.

Thus, by May 5, we had an overwhelming majority of states not opposed to, and largely in favor of, indefinite extension. This gave the President of the Conference time to appeal to the critics of indefinite extension to join in supporting it in order to increase the quality of the extension decision.

Once the President’s proposal on indefinite extension by recognition of the majority was adopted, no action was taken on the Canadian draft decision (or the Mexican or Indonesian proposals). Nevertheless, by the end of the Conference, 111 countries had signed on as co-sponsors.

How did Canada pursue its objective of accountability?

Westdal: On the issue of accountability, we worked in both the President’s Consultations and in what we referred to as the “Cosmopolitan Core Group”—an informal, exclusive group of 16 regional representatives—with South Africa and others on the substantive issues of review reform and the principles and objectives. We wanted to show that the argument was wrong that, if the Treaty were made permanent, non-nuclear weapon states would lose their leverage against nuclear weapon states. The principles and objectives, a template, provided a counter-argument, because the measures they contained were steps forward, even though they were not legally-but politically-binding decisions. Canada had earlier discussed the procedural issue of reforming the review process with South Africa, and continued to work with it and others on that issue at the Conference.

Is Canada pleased with the decisions taken at the Conference?

Westdal: Yes, indeed. Until the final week of the Conference, we had anticipated that there might be some protest or tactical voting on the extension decision, so the adoption of the resolutions without a vote exceeded our expectations. Much credit must be given to Ambassador Dhanapala for his skill and foresight in creating the President’s Consultations in addition to the General Committee. These consultations worked on the principles and objectives and the strengthening of the review process. He also deserves credit for seeing that

the documents on principles and objectives and on strengthening the review were essential elements of a package and for his insistence that the extension decision be embodied in nonconditioning text of his own devising after deliberate, wide consultations, so as to create “common property.”

Credit must also be given to those states, such as Egypt, that in spite of legitimate reservations, made “leaps of faith” in not withholding consent on the package of resolutions. Also, states (for example, Singapore and Honduras) that joined as co-sponsors for indefinite extension when this was not an easy decision to make deserve credit. South Africa also played a critical role by declaring itself in favor of indefinite extension (in principle) and for pursuing principles and objectives.

A number of individuals have complained that the extension decision was achieved through the use of unfair pressure tactics. Do you agree?

Westdal: Of course pressure was applied regarding the decision on extension—powerful countries often exert pressure over important issues. To try to persuade countries to adopt a certain position is fair. However, the argument that unfair pressure tactics, threats, or bribes ruled the day does not hold up well. Indeed, such pressure would in many cases have been counterproductive and could not have achieved the goal: permanence with accountability without a vote. In our lobbying, we found much determination to resist both NAM and weapon state pressure. It is simplistic, unduly cynical, and simply wrong to regard the outcome as the result of a massive weapon state power play. The vast majority of states simply wanted to be—and, in the event, were—engaged with respect, to have their opinions heard, their concerns addressed, and to play their part honorably in an historic decision.

Do you think the failure of the Conference to reach agreement on a final review declaration⁹ will have a negative impact on the implementation of the resolution on strengthening the review process?

Westdal: First, Main Committees II and III achieved some very useful language. However, this was not the case in Main Committee I, in part because many of the players on the issues covered by this committee were involved in the President’s Consultations. The lack of a final declaration on review does not undermine the commitment to reform the review process, but rather underlines the need for reform. While it is significant

that we were unsuccessful in achieving a final declaration, in retrospect, two of the past review conferences also failed to reach a final document. The lack of a review declaration at this Conference can be attributed to some extent to the “bruised feelings” of some of the participants, to the fact that the Conference in a sense ran out of steam and energy by the end, and to a lack of willingness to complete the review. Although this is unfortunate, we need to keep in mind that permanence of the NPT was gained. I think there will be improvements under the enhanced review process.

What does the outcome of the Conference mean for the future?

Westdal: It means new global values have been enshrined. It means that permanent values—not temporary, irremediably uncertain provisions that we are going to reconsider every once in a while—have now joined the forces of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and safeguarded peaceful use. The nuclear weapon states need to understand that the non-nuclear weapon states accepted indefinite extension because they want the nuclear weapon states to be permanently held accountable to Article VI on disarmament. Non-nuclear weapon states see indefinite extension as a permanent commitment by the nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament. Thus, the non-nuclear weapon states will now in effect call on the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their commitments under Article VI: to lower the numbers of such weapons, to reduce the risk of use, to delegitimize nuclear weapons, and to get rid of them. That is the message to nuclear weapon states, a message some of them might not welcome. The world has, in effect, proclaimed permanent values and what must be done now is to get on with the hard work of fulfilling them.

INDONESIA

Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations¹⁰

What is the Indonesian perspective on the outcome of the Conference?

Wisnumurti: We look at the results, consisting of the three decisions, as the maximum that all [countries] can get. The United States and other nuclear powers and the Western countries wanted to have a clean indefinite extension decision without any conditions. Now, we have an indefinite extension but with some condi-

tions. Although we do not think the conditions are adequate, this is the maximum that could be reached. So now, what is most important is how the commitments under the other two decisions, namely the decisions on strengthening the review process and on the principles and objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, will be implemented. If the nuclear weapon states and others pushing for indefinite extension are not really ready to implement fully the commitments already put in place in the two decisions, it would be really unfortunate. It will be a betrayal to those that have already accepted indefinite extension in contrast to their original position in favor of a rolling 25-year extension, which is also a legitimate option given by the Treaty itself. So we attach great importance to the two decisions—review and principles and objectives.

We look forward to cooperation that will remedy the bitterness that we had during the effort to reach this final conclusion, even greater bitterness for failing to agree on a final declaration on the implementation of the NPT. The failure to agree on a final declaration hopefully will not constitute a preview of what will happen in the future review process. What led to the failure to reach an agreement on the final declaration was basically the same thing that happened during previous reviews; that is, a confrontation between nuclear powers on one hand and non-nuclear powers on the other hand regarding contentious issues concerned with disarmament measures. This should not happen again in the future review conferences. The United States has made a clear commitment that it will work with us to strengthen the review process and to implement *all* the commitments in the decision on principles and objectives.

What I feel as very disturbing is how they have reached the majority for indefinite extension. It is simply by the use of pressure tactics against smaller countries. Not all of them were being pressured. There are those that already had positions in favor of indefinite extension, but many countries complained to us about pressure with conditionalities and other types of pressures. This might lead to a bad precedent and this should be avoided in the future.

Can you elaborate on what type of pressure was used and who was applying it?

Wisnumurti: The U.S. delegation really worked on this indefinite extension, targeting many members of the NAM, from one and a half years ago until the last

minute. There were other countries—members of the European Union—working in their own sphere of influence, lobbying and in some cases putting pressures on various countries. I even heard complaints from Western countries, “smaller guys” in the Western group, that felt the pressure was too hard. This kind of arm twisting is unacceptable. This is very undemocratic.

The states pushing for indefinite extension opposed the idea of a secret ballot because they were not sure that they would get the same majority if the vote on extension were secret. That’s the reason why they were trying to avoid a vote. We were also trying to avoid a vote because we knew that if we called for a vote it would undermine the Treaty, because there were those who were against the indefinite extension and those who would abstain from indefinite extension. If that were the case, and it would have been sure to be the case if they had pushed for a vote, then that decision would have undermined the Treaty itself. So everybody worked for a consensus. It is not a one sided affair—all sides were trying to get a consensus.

From Indonesia’s perspective, what kind of role did the NAM play at the Conference, and what were they able to achieve?

Wisnumurti: The Indonesian Foreign Minister, who came during the debate on the package of proposals in the President’s Consultations, tried to promote the position of NAM members and the cause of the NPT. His intervention was considered by all sides as very positive, because following his intervention and through consultation, we came to a point where we finally agreed to consensus on three decisions. It was originally not a decision, it was just a statement of principles. Now it has become a decision because we pressed for it. We also pressed for a strengthening of the review process. So, when my minister came he asked that...the text of the President agreed to by the negotiators in the President’s Consultations earlier be reopened. He then made some amendments to it, thereby strengthening the regime of the review process.

We made a very serious effort leading to this consensus. We had over 38 non-aligned countries who until the last minute were against indefinite extension. If we, Indonesia, would have said we have to go to a vote, we would have gone to a vote, which would have resulted in maybe 38 abstentions and negative votes.

MEXICO

Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch,¹¹ former Chair of the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT

What do you think about the way the package solution was crafted?

Marín Bosch: We advocated from the beginning that a shouting match was no good. All throughout the PrepComs we said that we have to sit down from day one in a small group, preferably headed by Mr. Dhanapala, and discuss this thing.... Obviously there is a majority for extension, but obviously there is a bigger majority for extension *plus*. It was that plus that we, and many other countries, [including] many of the co-sponsors of the so-called Canadian resolution, wanted, and I think that we achieved some of it. Our feeling is that since they had a majority it was very difficult to go beyond that.... I was fully aware of the small margin of maneuver of the nuclear weapon states...

We did not decide what we wanted until we put in Rev. 1 [the first revision of a Mexican draft proposal for extension plus] a week ago, ...but obviously we could not put in anything other than indefinite.... It is quite obvious that if you come to New York in the middle of April, and by the end of April there is a palpable, demonstrable majority for an indefinite extension, it would be tantamount to political suicide to oppose it. What would you gain? That is why we...submitted our working paper L.1 without a decision [on the length of extension] and with all those measures [on disarmament and other issues]. When we finally saw that the wind was blowing very strongly [for indefinite extension], we said o.k., indefinite *plus*. We already had the plus [in our L.1 original draft]. Obviously, what is in that *plus* goes much beyond what we agreed to yesterday, but there are certain things in our L.1 which are in the final agreement [on the package of resolutions]....

I personally think that we could have gotten much more. In my view [the inability to gain more was due to] a) the divided non-aligned...and b) the situation that we are living everyday in this building. Just go to the Security Council and you will see what kind of a situation. It is a unipolar 1946 world—there is only one superpower....

Did the United States influence Mexico's position on the NPT, particularly in light of the new circumstances in the economic relationship with the United

States?

Marín Bosch: Ambassador Graham [of the United States] went everywhere, ...[he] had campaigned for a year and a half, ...which is an honest way of approaching it. If you have a point of view, you go and express it.... The minute that they got the president [of the United States] to say in public that he would lead the charge for indefinite extension, a lot more people within the [U.S.] bureaucracy got their marching orders. That...turned what was a calm campaign by Mr. Graham into what I would call a crusade.... It is quite obvious that people interpret [the orders] in different ways and so I am sure that there are some ambassadors of the United States in various capitols who went harder or softer. Ambassador Graham was in Mexico in the middle of January. He personally went once, and we have had other contacts [with the United States]. He did not mention...a link between the so-called [U.S.] aid package [to Mexico and support for indefinite extension] and there is no such thing, ...as far as I know.

There are many ways to skin a cat. If you say for example, "the Treaty's indefinite extension is important because it means that we will forever be committed to nuclear disarmament," that sounds o.k. But if you say, "the Treaty is important because without the Treaty's indefinite extension, we do not know if we are going to be able to live up to our commitments under Article IV," which is the cooperation in the nuclear field, that is another way of skinning the cat. You can link it or not link it, but quite obviously this has an impact on a number of countries who have bilateral relations with the United States and who depend on U.S. technology for medical nuclear research and a number of things. [Ambassador Graham] did not say that [to us, but]...he was making the case for indefinite extension, and he insinuated that it would be better for bilateral nuclear cooperation purposes.

Do you think the strengthened review mechanism and the principles and objectives are actually going to have an effect—that is, will they have enough "teeth" to continue to push the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their NPT obligations?

Marín Bosch: The South African position is that this is a building process, that we have to go slow. My own personal feeling is that if you meet every year, even if its only for two or three days..., unless you get real commitment from 30 to 50 countries to just do something and keep doing it and doing it, this is going

to peter out. And by the year 2003, people are going to say, "What! Another week of this stuff? No, let's skip this year, let's skip next year."

[Progress under the strengthened review] will also have to do with how successful the nuclear weapon states are in shielding it. In the year 2000, with a little luck, we will have the CTBT [comprehensive test ban treaty]...and that will give them five years.... I asked them to please tell us where you want to go from here. Give us your program of action. And they refused.

From a Mexican perspective, what was lacking at the Conference?

Marín Bosch: The major thing that is lacking is that...the nuclear weapon states are not committed to any more nuclear disarmament than they were.... The only possible exception is the question of setting a date for the conclusion of a CTBT, ...maybe the French gave in on that.... [However], since last year the Chinese, the Russians, the Americans, and the British had no problem with setting a date of 1996.... But there is no more commitment than there was 10 years ago to a planned or phased reduction [of nuclear weapons]....

VENEZUELA

Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat (retired), Head of Venezuelan delegation to the NPT Conference [Near the end of the Conference, when Venezuela reversed its position on the extension of the Treaty and decided to co-sponsor the Canadian draft decision for indefinite extension, Ambassador Taylhardat resigned as head of his delegation. He was interviewed two days before the package of proposals on indefinite extension, principles and objectives, and strengthening the review process was adopted.¹²]

How was the initial Venezuelan proposal on extension developed?

Taylhardat: After the decision to convene the Review and Extension Conference, I could see that there were already some very extreme positions shaping up: one was indefinite and unconditional extension, and the other was...a short term or conditional extension. Since I consider the Treaty to be very important and felt that it should not be put to a risk as a result of the extreme positions, I conceived an in-between idea...of a 25-year fixed period or fixed periods rolling [extension]...that I expected could serve as the basis for a consensus agreement that could rally both extreme sectors into a mod-

erate proposal.

What were the major factors behind Venezuela's change in position on extension, from 25 years to indefinite?

Taylhardat: My only answer is that there had been too much pressure...applied in all directions. My view is that if there had been the possibility to express decisions freely during this Conference, indefinite extension would never have been approved, because countries would have preferred a different option. That option in my view would have been the Venezuelan option.

Did the results at the NAM meeting in Bandung in late April have any influence on the change in the Venezuelan position?

Taylhardat: Well, it did in the sense that after Bandung we realized that our proposal was not going to meet the necessary [level of] support, not because it was not a solid enough proposal, but because of the pressure that had been applied. The result of Bandung was a prelude of what was going to happen here, because in Bandung sovereign countries that were being subject to pressures obstructed a consensus around the 25-year rolling extension. If that happened there in a forum of the non-aligned, one could foresee what would happen here. So, from that moment we decided not to insist on our own proposal, because the proposal that was considered in Bandung was directly (in a way) the Venezuelan proposal, to which we had made some minor changes within what is called the "like-minded group" [of the NAM]....

After what happened [in Bandung]...we decided not to insist on our proposal. We did not table it, we did not fight for [it]..., we did not oppose indefinite extension. But I expected that at least we did not have to sign on as co-sponsors to the indefinite extension [draft decision]. In my view, [the decision to co-sponsor the decision] was made because of the pressure. I personally believed that we did not have to go public [for indefinite extension] because we had had a very active position with regard to our own proposal.... To me it was a question of dignity.

What is your view of President Dhanapala's proposal to call for consensus recognizing that there is a majority in favor of indefinite, and therefore that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely?¹³

Taylhardat: ...I personally do not see much sense to these proposals. It is difficult to understand Ambassador Dhanapala's idea of saying that there is a consensus to agree that there is the necessary majority. This is a way of avoiding a vote. There is a majority. What one can do is to turn the majority into a consensus but not to turn consensus into a majority—there is an inconsistency in that....

Do you feel that some of your personal concerns as well as Venezuela's concerns will be addressed if the principles initially put forth by South Africa are adopted?

Taylhardat: When I was participating in the negotiations in the President's Consultations, I constantly insisted that at this stage we don't need principles because the principles are already in the Treaty, ...and our obligations [under] the Treaty have not been fulfilled. So I don't believe that through a document parallel to the Treaty, we may reach the objectives the [Treaty] contains. But nevertheless, I said that instead of speaking of principles, what we should do is try to set up a number of goals and objectives to be attained and to be "overviewed"—and I say "overviewed" because at a certain moment...somebody...said "monitor" and this word was rejected by the nuclear powers—during the review conferences in order to determine whether these objectives are being implemented or not or what can be done to move toward the attainment of these objectives. Nevertheless, my views did not prevail in the consultations....

In the experience of the United Nations, once you define principles, these principles become petrified as if they were inscribed in marble and you cannot touch them, you cannot change them. Everybody would invoke those principles, ...and this is not what we need. We need action, we need movement. This is why we wanted to speak of goals or objectives that could be reviewed and updated gradually in order to move ahead toward the attainment of the objectives...[and] of the obligations of the Treaty.

What do you think the future of the NPT will look like after this Conference?

Taylhardat: In my view, ...the result of this Conference will be a weaker NPT and not what we were all asking for, a stronger NPT.... There was already a lot of unhappiness around the NPT, and now that this decision has been extracted by force, people are more unhappy than before.

What kind of pressure was applied?

Taylhardat: ...There are many ways of exerting pressure, especially when countries are going through difficult times, and most of the developing countries are going through difficult times, including my own. So it is very easy [to exert pressure] by [using a] simple phrase saying basically, "You better think of what we do for you."

Regarding the strengthening of the review process, do you think that it will be an empty gesture or do you think that it will actually allow non-nuclear weapon states to exert pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm?

Taylhardat: My main concern was that the original proposal by South Africa was too weak and we have to strengthen it. The original proposal spoke of enhancing the review process. I said enhancing is a cosmetic thing. You can embellish, you can make things more beautiful by enhancing them, but what we need is to strengthen. Finally, they accepted the notion of strengthening, and we did incorporate in the original South African document some elements which made it more acceptable. But still I consider it a rather weak document....

We should have something more. It is difficult to say what, because I see that the strengthening of the review process...[means] the sacrifice of the [concept of the] extension conference.... I believe extension conferences are important even though this is the first one. If one sees the mobilization that has taken place around this Conference, ...it means that they are meaningful. Now, there will be no more extension conferences.... We should have done something about the review conferences to make them an instrument of demanding accountability from the nuclear weapon states.... I admit that this has been attained partially but not to my complete satisfaction.

Do you feel that the NAM has been fractured at the Conference, and that it could have achieved more if it had been more unified?

Taylhardat: It is not that the NAM *is* fractured. It has *been* fractured.... External factors have fractured the non-aligned.... The non-aligned died at Bandung because one of the few issues where there was some cohesion of the non-aligned was in disarmament and nonproliferation. This does not exist anymore, so it means the death of the non-aligned.

EGYPT

Ambassador Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, Ambassador of Egypt to the United Kingdom¹⁴

What was it that allowed Egypt to feel that it could either support indefinite extension or at least not block it?

Shaker: We were not in favor of an indefinite extension, and many, many other countries were of the same opinion. But, certainly, realizing that the majority of the countries were in favor of indefinite extension was even more reason for us to present a resolution on the Middle East saying, "Here we are. We have a problem. Be aware of it...." We could not accept the indefinite duration, and we thought that because the Conference would go along with the majority, we had to put on record something, ...an expression of the Arab countries' dissatisfaction with the nonadherence of Israel to the NPT and [Israel's failure] to bring all its nuclear facilities under safeguards.

How did Egypt approach the regional issue and concerns about Israel here at the Conference?

Shaker: We came here to this Conference to try to reflect in the work of the Conference...our concern about what is going on in the Middle East and the presence of a country which has not yet adhered to the NPT: Israel.... We wanted to reflect this in the documents of the Conference.... What we did in negotiating the principles and objectives [was to] reference the importance of creating zones free of nuclear weapons in troubled areas of the world such as the Middle East. In Main Committee III [on peaceful use and technical cooperation], we also referenced that Israel had nuclear facilities under no safeguards....

Over and above all this, we thought that it is important to have a resolution on the Middle East which would single out Israel as a country which has to become party to the NPT.... Some delegations, such as the United States, were not very keen to single out one country. They said, "we would accept doing that if you would also call upon countries of the region who have not yet ratified the NPT," [notably] the three Arab countries: Djibouti, Oman, and the [United Arab] Emirates. Those countries...have no nuclear facilities at all and no plans of having any nuclear facilities in the future...and did not want their names to appear in such a document. So that explains why the new document adopted does not mention Israel by name but by cross reference to Com-

mittee III [draft report] and by referring to the principles and objectives, where we have reference to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Someone who knows the subject would understand that this revision is in fact addressed to Israel....

We thought it was about time to raise this matter because it is very serious, it affects our security in the region. We have to work on that as quickly as possible because the presence of unsafeguarded nuclear capability in Israel would encourage other countries in the area to match the Israeli experience. We have seen what Iraq has tried to do. Others would try to match this....

How was the final resolution on the Middle East reached and what were some of your last-minute concerns about it?

Shaker: [Negotiating this resolution] was a complicated process. We had been meeting with the Americans and some members of the Western group. Egypt and Algeria [were the main countries involved from the Middle East] and at a second phase other Arab countries' representatives came in. We had tabled a text on this, L.7, [which] expressed the will...of the Arab countries.... We had a President's proposal on how to...make it more agreeable to others. The Americans had their own preambular and operative paragraphs. We stressed our wish only to work on the President's text, but then we also negotiated, discussed, and considered the American text.... The informal consultation with the Americans and Western [Group members] and the President...was a very useful meeting and we went with the proposal that we reached in this meeting to the Arab Group....

[However], in the Arab Group...there was no unanimity on the suggestions we came away with from the informal consultations.... So we went back to the President and said we could not reach [agreement on] this. We started a new formulation. We [had] already eliminated mention of Israel. We eliminated security assurances.... So, the final draft was watered down. This was one reason why it was no longer the Arab text. That is why the Arabs did not sponsor it fully and said to the depository states [of the NPT], "Please sponsor it. You give it some meat, you pursue the matter." What is good about this resolution that was adopted on the Middle East, ...[is] that the three depository governments are the sponsors of this resolution. This is good because it gives them...responsibility to pursue this matter forcefully in the future.

We intend to take the matter to the Security Council. Now [that] the three depositories have put their names on this resolution, [they] should follow it up in the Security Council and elsewhere. This resolution—in conjunction with the package of resolutions on extension, principles and objectives, and strengthening the review process—all form one unit. The resolution should be read in this context.... It is not [the] perfect text that we would have liked to have, ...[but] this is not the end of the road.... We will keep hammering and we will not give up on this issue.

Looking at the resolution adopted on strengthening the review process and the way the review process has gone here, does Egypt have any views on how the process could be improved?

Shaker: [In] the new document on strengthening the review, you have 10 working days for each session of the PrepCom, and you may have four sessions of the PrepCom, [thus a total of] 40 days to prepare for the [review] conference. And then we come here and end up like we are ending up today, without a final [review] declaration. This augurs badly for the future. It is very difficult to say how we are going to proceed with this review [process], but the important thing is to go to these conferences and try to accommodate each other....

After the experience of today and the experience of [the] 1990 [Review Conference], maybe countries will give up the idea of a final declaration. We meet, converse, present documents, and disperse. [But] it would be very unfortunate because we need some guiding documents for the five years to follow. I think we will have to learn from this experience. Also, in the course of the next two years or so, we will have to think about how to proceed with the review and to be sure that we go to the conference well-prepared with a text and not leave it to the hazards of the conference. Now we will have a chance to discuss substance in the PrepCom.... Maybe because we are going to discuss substance early enough (two or three years before the review conference), we will come to the conference well-prepared, and the conference will be just the theater where we approve all the documents that we have been working on during the [preceding] three-year period.

IRAN

Mr. Behrouz Moradi, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York¹⁵

Do you feel that the results of the Conference met Iran's objectives?

Moradi: Our main objective was a decision by the Conference that would strengthen the NPT. For this reason, we preferred a conditional extension of the Treaty, which in our view, would provide a higher degree of accountability. We believed that a conditional extension would serve the Treaty better, and we tried with some other like-minded states to promote a kind of extension, namely rolling 25-year fixed periods, which would contribute to early realization of the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty. In our endeavors towards this goal, however, we were guided by the realities that existed in the Conference, including the fact that a majority supported, for some reasons, an indefinite extension in terms of Article X.2 of the Treaty.

In such a circumstance, there was no point in insisting on our proposal because the Treaty in Article X.2 provides for an extension decision by majority, and we were not in a position to rewrite the Treaty.... [If] the majority of the parties believe that indefinite extension would serve the objectives of the Treaty, then we could go along with it provided that we have some clear understandings that the nuclear weapon states shall fulfill their obligations under the Treaty at a very early date. In our view, such understandings were reached in the package that was adopted which, *inter alia*, provided for a conditional indefinite extension. We think that the package provides a check on nuclear weapon states to fulfill their obligations under the NPT.

I think that pressures exerted on some States Parties to agree to indefinite extension would backfire unless the nuclear weapon states do something concrete in the field of nuclear disarmament. Now the ball is in the court of the nuclear weapon states. Now, they do not have any excuse that the NPT is not in a stable situation...[nor] any excuse whatsoever not to fulfill their obligations under the NPT, in particular Articles IV, VI, and I. I think that if they really implement the NPT itself, and remain faithful to the spirit and letter of the Treaty as well as the package that was adopted, [then] we can believe the Treaty would be strengthened. The future will prove who was right.

In light of the agreement on strengthening the review process, do you think that the lack of a final review declaration is a bad sign as far as the future of the review process is concerned?

Moradi: The absence of a final review document

shows two or three realities. First, [it shows] the weakness of the existing review mechanism provided for in the Treaty itself in Article VIII.3. After almost a month of deliberation and negotiation, we did not get a document. That was also the case in 1990 and in 1980. Secondly, it shows that there are disagreements among the States Parties with respect to implementation of the Treaty. The non-aligned countries argued that, for example, Article VI had not been realized fully. The nuclear weapon states did not share our assessment and instead argued that progress has been made in fulfillment of Article VI, that the cessation of the nuclear arms race has manifested itself in many ways. But they really did not provide us with concrete and substantiated proof and evidence to support their argument. We have only START I and II, and we know that START II has not been ratified and implemented.... There are some facts that indicate that they are even improving the quality of their nuclear weapons and their delivery systems....

The absence of the final review document also shows that the objectives of the Treaty have not been realized and that the nuclear weapon states have not fulfilled their obligations under [the] NPT.... This simple fact reminds us of the validity of the argument of those who maintained that the Treaty should not be extended indefinitely. One might rightly ask why, if this Treaty has not been implemented fully and its objectives have not been realized, the parties decided to extend it indefinitely. I think we are not the ones who could answer this question. Those who strived for indefinite extension of the Treaty should answer [it].... That is why the nuclear weapon states wanted to get a final [review] document. But, they wanted a final document that would serve their own purpose, and they were not able [to get such a document]. They did not want to commit themselves to complete disarmament measures that we and some other non-aligned countries proposed. They simply wanted the final [review] document to “welcome” things they had not [yet] done. We wonder what purpose such a document serves.

Therefore, I think the absence of the final review document indicates that we should strengthen the review mechanism. We should make it more meaningful, more objective oriented.... It also proves the validity of Iran’s argument...that the extension should take place in light of the results derived from the review process.... We had a hard time convincing everyone that this conference should be the *Review* and Extension Conference

[rather than Extension and Review or simply Extension]. We believe that only based on the results achieved from the review of the Treaty and of different provisions of the Treaty, one could make an important and wise decision about the extension of the Treaty....

With respect to ways to enhance the review process, in addition to what I have already said, I really think that if States Parties comply with their obligations effectively and in a timely manner, as provided for in the Treaty, we would have fewer problems in the review conferences and the review mechanism would be enhanced by itself. As part of the package [of proposals adopted], we got the document on the strengthening of the review process, which we believe will enhance the review conference mechanism if it would be underpinned by political will and a real commitment to the Treaty. The first PrepCom will begin in 1997 and we look forward to seeing how it will operate.

Do you think that there was any way that the NAM could have been more unified, resulting in a different extension option?

Moradi: Basically, we believe that the NAM is not a coherent movement.... On some general principles, all of us have something in common, but when it comes to less general things, then division begins. Secondly, some factors, including the end of the bipolarity in international relations, weakened to some extent the *raison d’etre* of the NAM. Moreover, some members of the NAM have traditionally had a political alliance, if not a military one, with big powers. This is why they are unable to coordinate their positions on important international issues, such as the extension of a security treaty, with the rest of the movement.

I think we would have been able to have a common position if we had had better coordination, I mean collective coordination by a group of key non-aligned countries that should have played an active role. But, I think there was a limit for members of the NAM that they could not go beyond in coordination of their positions on the NPT. I already mentioned some reasons, I would add that each member of the NAM has its own national interests, and for many of them, especially the small countries who are not willing or do not have the economic base to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the NPT is a secondary issue. The political and economic vulnerability of such states also played a role in their muted participation in the Conference.

Were you aware of pressure being applied to different states, and, if so, what was the nature of that pressure?

Moradi: A lot of pressures, ...promises and sometimes threats, ...were put on non-aligned countries...by certain nuclear weapon states, in particular, the United States, as well as certain Western countries.... Some of the diplomats said very explicitly that pressure had been put on their governments. Again, this might call into question the method by which the indefinite extension was reached, namely the fact that the decision was neither taken in a healthy atmosphere, nor in a democratic way as such. Had members of the non-aligned had the opportunity to express themselves freely on the issue of extension, they would have decided otherwise, I am sure.

On the issue of export controls, there were some differing opinions expressed here at the Conference, particularly in the working group on that issue. How do you feel about the way the issue was addressed?

Moradi: Export controls are not a new phenomenon. The Western countries began to develop export controls in the 1970s in the form of the Zangger Committee and the London Suppliers Group [also known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG].... Those groups...make decisions in secrecy. They do not allow new membership. Their meetings are not transparent and the regulations upon which they operate export controls are not negotiated, are not universal, are not legal.

The NPT has not provided for export controls as a way of ensuring compliance with the Treaty. To begin with, it is illegal based on the letter of the NPT. The NPT has provided for safeguards agreements, and we think these are the most appropriate means to ensure compliance with the Treaty.... We do not think that export controls are the best means to ensure compliance with the NPT. In most cases they are applied in a discriminatory way. [Supplier states] export some materials to some friendly states, and they do not export those materials to states that are in full compliance with the NPT, such as Iran....

[Supplier states] should allow the non-aligned countries to participate in their meetings and contribute to formulation of export control policies and gradually transform them into legal instruments.... Generally, we have no problem with regulating transfer of materials and technology, ...but we think the best way...is through universal, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, multilaterally-negotiated legal instruments. Pending this, we be-

lieve the Nuclear Suppliers Group in terms of export controls and regulations should treat equally all states that are in full compliance with their obligations under the NPT.

CHAIRMAN OF THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE
Dr. Fritz W. Schmidt of Austria, Director, Division for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Federal Chancellery¹⁶

What will the outcome of the Conference mean for the export control groups?

Schmidt: Overall, the Conference was a success. We got indefinite extension, but at the same time provided “perspectives” for the future implementation of the Treaty—perspectives that enhance predictability and reliability. In particular, the Zangger Committee came out of the Conference in good shape, but at the same time this means a lot of work for the future.

As the Conference did not agree on a final declaration, it is necessary to take stock of all those parts in the draft texts where compromise was achieved. We need a foundation for the future review process agreed upon at the Conference in the decisions on enhanced review and on principles and objectives.

Export controls were a contentious issue in this Conference. The NAM countries demanded more transparency. I think that we should use the time until 1997, when the first session of the PrepCom for the sixth NPT Review Conference will be held, to open up a dialogue between major suppliers—members of the Zangger Committee—and other countries in an informative and educational manner to widen the understanding of Article III.2 as a common obligation of all States Parties to the NPT. Information should be provided to all states about how export controls...are [required] in order to fulfill the obligations of the NPT, and, in particular, what legal and administrative steps on a national level are necessary.

What are the major issues that came up in discussions on export controls?

Schmidt: The most prominent issue was the reluctance of the NAM countries to understand the reasons for the existence of suppliers groups like the Zangger Committee or the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]. These fora were accused of being “secretive” and intending to deprive developing countries of their right to develop. Thus, for the NAM it seemed rather logical to do away with such groups. This idea originated to a

certain extent from a lack of information. Since the background documentation on export controls [NPT Conf. docs. 95/7, Part II and /21] were published very late in the Conference, there was no real opportunity to study these papers. This may have been the reason why Main Committee II discussions ran out of time before we could finish the draft text on export controls. Better and earlier preparation would have helped.

Talks at the margins of the Conference helped to provide such basic information. The...Zangger Committee was [described] as an informal group, where NPT members...who were regularly confronted with the question of what items fall under the general description of Article III.2, came together to learn from each other about how to interpret that article and to harmonize their understandings.

It was finally understood that Article III.2 is above all an obligation of each individual state—regardless of whether it is a major supplier or not—to make sure that whenever such items are transferred across national borders, they would not contribute to proliferation.

A second major issue in the discussions was the fact that NAM countries were concerned about the lack of distinction...between parties to the NPT and non-parties. They claimed that this difference should be made more explicit, in particular where draft texts referred to “stopping cooperation and support for countries, which could become proliferation risks.”

It was important to make clear that Article III.2 applies to *any* export to *any* non-nuclear weapon state and does not make a distinction between parties and non-parties to the Treaty. But a distinction is inherent in so far as the requirement of “full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply” is already met by parties through their commitment under Article III.1.

In this regard, it was important to remind members of the principle inherent in Article III as a whole: the “universality of full-scope safeguards.” While non-nuclear weapon states adhering to the NPT accept such safeguards when they join the Treaty, non-parties have to be brought into such safeguards as a condition of supply, whenever exports from NPT countries are under consideration. In the past, a great number of supplier states followed the policy that less comprehensive safeguards, the old “facility-based safeguards,” would be sufficient. We have to be clear that this policy was based on political considerations but was in fact not in line with the wording of the NPT.

In reviewing the process of export controls and how they were applied in the past, was there any discussion about the failure to stop Iraq’s nuclear weapons program?

Schmidt: Of course! As this Conference was the first after the revelations in 1991 about Iraq’s clandestine program, this question was in all our minds in the discussions on Articles III and IV. In fact, it was the origin of the continuing process on “strengthening of IAEA safeguards” since 1992, but also of our efforts in the past years to improve export controls, e.g., by revitalizing the NSG in 1992. We have to see these two areas as complementary to each other and interdependent.

The efforts in the IAEA in Vienna to strengthen safeguards have met reluctance, particularly from NAM countries. At the same time, NAM countries complain about export control policies adopted by the NSG countries. So, we have to make clear that additional measures adopted by the NSG countries were necessary, as long as the IAEA’s safeguards system was not able to meet the expectations of Article III.2 of the Treaty, which, as Iraq demonstrated, includes the capability of the Agency for “clandestine activity search and (detection).” For this additional task, the IAEA needs additional information from several sources, which could be integrated with its existing verification tasks. This is the new and additional element that we are looking for in the so-called “93+2 programme.” Once the IAEA has acquired this capability through an “integrated safeguards system,” I am convinced that supplier states will be able to refrain from additional measures applied [within] recipient states.

Today, this may appear like a vision, but there is much realism in it. I envision that in the future, technical groups like the Zangger Committee will enjoy full recognition by all member states as a forum, assisting NPT members in interpreting Article III.2, and giving guidance to governments on how to fulfill their tasks in authorizing exports. Through the “universal reporting system,” countries inform the Agency about the export of “trigger list” items. But once exported items have gone across the border, all further verification activities shall be the responsibility of the IAEA, according to its new safeguards system.

Revitalization of the NSG (1992) and, in particular, its dual-use regime, met strong criticism from NAM countries. Some of them even objected to any reference to the NSG in a draft final declaration of the Confer-

ence. They failed to see or accept that the Iraqi clandestine nuclear program was to a great extent based on the acquisition of dual-use goods.

Whatever the source of the strong animosity from NAM countries to NSG activities, I believe that we have to provide a great deal of information and education. The call for transparency in export controls cannot be ignored. This also applies to a certain extent to the Zangger Committee, even though it is limited to faithfully interpreting Article III.2 of the NPT. The new enhanced review mechanism, decided upon by this Conference, requires us to open up the dialogue between suppliers and recipients. We have a chance to make clear that nuclear export controls are an obligation of all NPT members, as unlikely as it may be for many of them to ever be confronted with a need to decide upon an export license. But, even in such a rare case, a member country will need minimum legal requirements for export controls. The Zangger Committee understandings, as published in the IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended, shall provide guidance for developing such national policies.

UNITED STATES

The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹⁷

How does the United States feel about the package of agreements that resulted in the indefinite extension of the Treaty?

Scheinman: We felt comfortable with all three elements of the package that was put forward by the President.... We thought the principles were good, sound, pointed in the right direction, and will stand to the benefit of all of us over the long haul.... The principles represent the principles that any country interested in nonproliferation and international stability and security should be able to identify with....

[It is not the case that the United States won.] We all won. This is a Treaty for everybody.... The indefinite extension of this Treaty has really enhanced international security, regional security, and the security of states in various localities.... So, from that point of view, we were absolutely delighted with the outcome.... Charles Wilson, when he was president of General Motors once said, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country." In a sense, what's good for the nuclear weapon states happens to be good for the world in the case of the NPT. We all gain and we all gain in

equal and reciprocal ways. That is something that I think really needs to be understood and absorbed and internalized by a lot of countries. This is not a we-they proposition.

With respect to the review process itself, we will need time to catch our breath and to take the temperature of what has happened here over the course of the last four weeks. But one thing is very clear...we took this whole process very seriously and we are very intent on seeing to it that the Treaty is implemented in a manner in which the parties intended for it to be implemented. We will take very seriously the objective of reviewing this Treaty on a periodic basis.... More likely than not this will be almost like a continuous review. [Although] according to the enhanced review process, there will be three years over which the PrepCom meetings will take place, my guess is that we are not going to have a two-year hiatus and then sit down and talk. There will be a lot of informal...dialogue going on to try to identify what it is we are going to seek to achieve in the year 2000....

What we have done here [in strengthening the review process] essentially is to institutionalize that process [of holding a review conference every five years], but in a way that did not constitute in any shape or form an amendment to the Treaty.... [It was] simply an understanding among the parties that this is what has been done over the years and it is good for us, we should continue to do it. The PrepComs spread over three years prior to the conference [should address] substantive issues as well as procedural issues....

On the regional issues that came up, particularly the concerns of the Middle Eastern states regarding Israel, what role did the United States play in discussions and how much is it going to be trying to do now to push Israel to join the NPT?

Scheinman: We believe in the universalization of the Treaty. We think this Treaty will be all the more enhanced if every state in the world is party to the Treaty. That will bring all of their nuclear activities under international safeguards and verification. The safeguards system has been substantially improved over the past number of years and especially in the wake of the Gulf War.... Now [that] the Treaty is indefinitely extended, international safeguards are indefinitely extended, because in many cases safeguards were dependent upon the tenure of the Treaty.... As everyone knows, the United States certainly has been pressing South Asian

states to take steps to join the Treaty....

We recognize that there are situations in which countries find that their local or regional security situation prevents them from taking the step that we want them to take. So we are trying to build in the direction of creating the conditions that would enable states in such regions to be able to take that final step.

I think you have to look at the Israeli situation in the context of the peace process that has been going on in the Middle East. But, we have never failed to recall to the Israeli government our strong interest in the Treaty, and I believe that everybody's interests, including Israel's, will be enhanced by a total globalization of this Treaty and of the regime that it sustains. It is going to take time....

The fact that we got the fourth document, the resolution on the Middle East, that was packaged together with the first three, indicates that there is a clear understanding of the problem, a clear focus on the issue, and a clear call to countries in the region not yet party to the Treaty (of which there are four, not just one) to join the Treaty. We will continue to pursue that objective, and I think that that objective will be achieved in the context of a Middle East peace process that is brought to fruition.

Where is the United States prepared to go next as far as START II and a possible START III are concerned?

Scheinman: We hope the Senate will ratify START II so that we can implement it as quickly as possible, although we are already taking measures that are going to be covered by START II because we want to get this process going promptly.

Is the United States prepared to go further in the area of security assurances?

Scheinman: In adopting the resolution [984] in the Security Council, ...we made it very clear to all non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty that we are prepared to provide the kind of security assurances that make good sense.... We have been reluctant to get into a discussion on legally-binding security assurances.... I know it is hard for some states to accept the proposition that our word is our bond, but we have tried to wrap these commitments in a context and a framework and a set of statements, with the Security Council resolution as an over-arching umbrella, ...in a way that makes it very clear that we are [guaranteeing]...negative security assurances and have taken very seriously and re-

committed ourselves on positive security assurances.... That does not mean that we might not find ways in which to further strengthen security assurances, but it is very difficult to say at this time of what those enhanced elements might consist....

One institutional arrangement through which security assurances might be enlarged is nuclear-weapon-free zones [NWFZ], most of which have some type of protocols associated with them. The United States evaluates all of these nuclear-weapon-free zones according to a set of criteria...which relate to existing security arrangements, international law, transit rights, freedom of the seas, and also to whether or not the parties to the potential zone have voluntarily come together to establish such a zone and that all the relevant parties are in fact party to the zone....

We have signed on to the protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty [establishing a Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ], and it is perfectly plausible to think that, as things evolve, we will be looking at other security arrangements in the nuclear-weapon-free zone context in a similar manner....

In other words, we are trying to suggest that we are not adverse to strong and reliable security assurances. We cannot at this time engage in the kind of arrangement that would satisfy everybody on an equal basis, ...[since] not all the nuclear weapon states look upon the security assurance issue in the same way.... We need to evaluate these things in terms of the evolution of the security environment [and] the political environment. I am sure that over time, we will see adjustments and new dimensions to many aspects of the non-proliferation regime. Security assurances could well be among them.

How do you respond to the criticism of some states that indefinite extension of the Treaty is just a very weakened formula that will allow nuclear weapon states to keep their weapons instead of facing pressure to disarm?

Scheinman: I visited a number of countries...in the months before the Extension Conference [and] I often ran into that argument...but I think that people in saying that were overlooking something which is very important. This is the only Treaty which exists that has a legally-binding commitment on the part of the parties to seek in good faith to negotiate nuclear arms control and disarmament and general arms control and disarmament under international inspections.... It was re-

ally critically important to have this Treaty in order to keep that process going.... Without this Treaty, the chance for continued progress in the direction of progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and arsenal would be lost....

[The argument has been made that] there are more nuclear weapons around today than there were in 1968. That is true. We went through a period of initially uncontrolled arms racing at the height of the Cold War. But my answer to that argument has been: let us look at where we were at the height of the Cold War, and let us look at where we are at today. It is a very steep trajectory down and the [continuation of the NPT is the] only way to keep that process going down toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons....

We really do not believe that it is prudent to try to develop a process of timetable disarmament because we do not think that creating expectations that might not be met is really advantageous to anybody and in fact can cause a loss of confidence. Disarmament on demand is not really very feasible. Disarmament is dependent very much on what is happening in the international environment, on how states perceive their security.... The process will go on very clearly, but it will go on according to a timetable that is dictated by the realities of the situation in which we find ourselves.

RUSSIA

Ambassador Grigory V. Berdennikov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Head of the Russian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament¹⁸

What are your impressions from the Conference and on the extension decision?

Berdennikov: We are satisfied with the decision. It was our [position that the Treaty should be] extended in an unlimited way without conditions and that is exactly what happened. On top of that, we are very satisfied that the decision was taken by consensus. Of course, we had votes for that decision—the L.2 proposal [for indefinite extension submitted by Canada] had 111 co-sponsors—but it was very good that the other delegations, who were either not sponsoring any proposal or sponsoring different proposals, were able to come together with us for this unlimited extension of the Treaty. This is a very significant achievement and contribution both to stability and to further progress in arms control.

Do you think that the lack of a final review document will hamper efforts to strengthen the review process in the future?

Berdennikov: It seems that at least some, but not all, elements of the review process were covered in the decisions on principles and on [strengthening the review]. We are witnessing now the failure to come to an agreement on the review declaration not for the first time actually. It has happened before. But this time, though we would like to have had an agreed result on the review, it is much better than, for example, in 1990, because we at least have something to show that was agreed upon.... So there is some progress, though maybe not to the fullest extent....

What are your views on the resolution on the Middle East?

Berdennikov: We worked on [the resolution] very arduously, especially during the last days. It turned out that for some countries, especially from the Middle East, that it was—I would not use the word “a condition,” but very desirable—that such a resolution would be adopted so that they would be able to go along with the rest of the package. So we tried our best and succeeded, and that was very gratifying.

Now that the NPT has been extended indefinitely, how would you characterize the prospects for a CTBT?

Berdennikov: We agreed in the principles paper about the time frame for [CTBT] negotiations, and that was done for the first time.... Russia, in the last session of the General Assembly, proposed that the treaty would be concluded this year, 1995, by the time of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. But we could display some flexibility, and we agreed on a year later [1996]. So, in this situation I think the result of this Conference is significant.

Do you think that having an indefinite extension will help lead to the ratification of START II and the beginning of talks on a START III?

Berdennikov: That is exactly my hope. I think that this outcome should have very beneficial consequences in all areas actually, not just arms control. It provides for long-term stability, at least from the point of view of nuclear nonproliferation, and that is very important.

Many countries at the Conference have called for legally-binding security assurances. What further steps is Russia prepared to take on this issue?

Berdennikov: ...We are for the immediate establishment of a committee in the Conference on Disarmament.... We are for working with the aim of having a legally-binding instrument or instruments as the result. That is our long-standing position. The West has a little bit different position, but I hope that after these discussions and after what is written in the principles, there would be a resumption of negotiations.

What is Russia's position on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and the idea of banning them under a CTBT?

Berdennikov: Our official position is that if there is a consensus on banning them, we will not be an obstacle to that.... We have experience with those experiments and we have a lot of scientists in Russia who argue sometimes very convincingly the economic benefits of such experiments, especially in a country like Russia which has vast uninhabited areas.... One of our concerns [is] that it is really very difficult to distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions. For example, the Chinese...have officially proposed in the negotiations [to] allow PNEs, and as a hedge against using those explosions for non-peaceful purposes, say that only one parameter will be monitored, that of explosion yield.... [However], I can tell you from conversations with our scientists that...this is the one parameter that is crucial for military purposes.

CHINA

Ambassador Sha Zhukang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva¹⁹

What were China's objectives for the Conference?

Sha: We participated in all four PrepComs. From the very outset, we clearly stated our preference for a "smooth extension." We knew that opposite views on extension were being developed, with some states calling for an indefinite and unconditional extension and others not accepting that. We were concerned that if states spoke to extreme views, the atmosphere of the Conference would be spoiled. Thus, we said we want a "smooth extension." We recognized that the review process would be very important, and should provide for understanding and reconciliation between parties.

At the Plenary session of the Conference, we spelled out what we meant by a "smooth extension." We said that first of all, we did not object to indefinite extension, as long as it did not imply that nuclear weapon states should have the prerogative to keep nuclear weapons for all time to come. We stand for elimination [of nuclear weapons]. Secondly, we could agree to a rolling extension if each period were not less than 25 years in duration. We see that the NPT is in the interest of all States Parties and that our differences are not fundamental, and so we wanted to have a consensus.

Are you satisfied with the results of the Conference?

Sha: We are happy with the results, the three decisions taken without a vote. We are also pleased that the principles and objectives include as an ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear weapons.

What is your view on the review process and the lack of a final review declaration?

Sha: We have to be realistic. There has never been agreement on all the nuclear issues. This is not the first review conference that has not reached an agreement—this was also the case in the 1980 and 1990 conferences. In 1985, we did reach an agreement, but it was an agreement to disagree. Although that was in the Cold War, and we are now in the post-Cold War, it is regrettable but not surprising that we also did not agree on a review document at this Conference. However, the decision on principles and objectives, along with two other decisions, were the maximum possible we could achieve and are not insignificant. Under the enhanced review process, we will need to see what other programs can be achieved.

What is China's perspective on the disarmament-related issues that came up at the Conference?

Sha: One issue of great concern is a CTBT, and we agreed in the decision on principles and objectives to speed up the negotiations in order to conclude by 1996. We are hopeful that negotiations for a cut-off of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes will soon be started.

Another important issue is that of negative security assurances. China's position has been to grant such assurances unconditionally to all non-nuclear weapon states. Other nuclear weapon states do not agree with this, although the non-nuclear states do. In my view, it is high time for a treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear

weapons. China's position is that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and I believe the conditions are now ripe for such a treaty. With the Conventional Weapons Treaty in Europe and the end of the Cold War, the imbalance is no longer there, and the international situation is generally improved. As allies or partners, the other nuclear weapon states are not expected to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, while China has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. And it is simply not fair to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Why should they keep the right of first use?

Security Council resolution 984 is a step in the right direction. This issue of security assurances is one area that, in the future review process, we hope the other nuclear weapon states will change their minds about.

After the Conference, I spoke to some people who conveyed to me their concerns that the nuclear weapon states might not honor all their commitments made at the Conference. We will have to see what happens. China, for its part, will honor the commitments it has undertaken.

What is your position on export controls?

Sha: In joining the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states undertake the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, so they are entitled to free access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many states are not happy with the NSG and domestic regulations, which they feel are discriminatory and not helpful to gaining free access. In some cases, such as Iran, they feel a double standard is being applied. This is also an area in which we will need to work hard in the future review process to see if we can make improvements.

There has been considerable criticism of China's continued nuclear testing. Can you explain China's policy?

Sha: We are aware of the criticism of our testing. Although we understand these sentiments, we believe that China, being the smallest nuclear country in terms of size of arsenal and having conducted the least number of tests by far, has adopted a restrained attitude. We are working hard now in the Conference on Disarmament for a CTBT and are hoping for an early conclusion, not later than 1996....

We will stop testing when a CTBT enters into force. We have our own security concerns. There are some countries with large nuclear weapon stockpiles that

maintain the right to first-use, leading to our security concerns. So, we are doing a bit of testing.

What is China's position on PNEs?

Sha: This is an issue which has become controversial, but it really should not be so controversial. Russia has conducted a number of PNEs, and we are aware that there are differing views within Russia on this issue. We have been told by their scientists that PNEs have been very successful and can be useful for oil extraction etc., especially in a country like theirs where there are huge unpopulated areas. I believe the United States has also carried out a number of PNEs, and their scientists may not be unified in their views.

The NPT clearly stipulates that PNEs are legal. It is true that so far, there have been no requests by non-nuclear weapon states for them. Since there are divergent views on PNEs, I sincerely believe that we should not completely close this option. Of course, if mishandled, PNEs could be a proliferation concern. Yet, I believe this can be managed and should be discussed in the context of a CTBT. Since a CTBT will be indefinite in duration, and science and technology are continuing to develop, we should keep the option of PNEs open while ensuring that it is not misused. Misuse can be avoided by appropriate procedures of applications for PNEs and on-site verification. We must be sure not to "close the door too early," so as to avoid cutting off any possible benefits to mankind.

FRANCE

Ms. Thérèse Delpech, Deputy Director of International Relations, Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l'énergie atomique)²⁰

What were France's objectives for the Conference, and were they met?

Delpech: Our objective was undoubtedly to achieve indefinite extension with wide support. To achieve it without a vote was even better of course, because it is a victory for all the NPT parties and not only for those who had declared in advance that such was their choice. This was done thanks to the hard work of all the delegations. A special thanks is nonetheless due to the President because he was the first to make it clear that he wanted to avoid a divided house. He also found the ways and means to actually achieve his goal.

Is France satisfied with the package of resolutions proposed by the president and adopted by the Conference?

Delpech: The answer is a clear yes. We participated actively in the negotiations of these texts. We thought it was a wise initiative from the South African delegation to propose this solution in order to broaden the support of the Conference for the extension decision. We constantly supported the presidential attempt to negotiate two additional decisions on principles and objectives and on strengthening the review process. Finally, these two resolutions give the parties a better chance to follow the implementation of the Treaty. This goal is ours as well.

Several individuals at the Conference indicated that they were aware that a number of smaller states were subject to pressure to support indefinite extension, and felt that in the absence of such pressure, the outcome of the Conference might have been different. As a member of the French delegation, what is your view on this?

Delpech: This was indeed said on different occasions during the Conference on an informal basis. I cannot follow this line, whatever the country or countries concerned, for the following reasons:

First, the NPT parties are sovereign states. I do not find it very respectful of this sovereignty to assume or to declare that they were not in a position to decide freely what their choice was in such an important occasion. I can tell you, as far as my country is concerned, that, being particularly touchy regarding external pressures, we did not apply any on other countries ourselves. But we spent time in explaining why a permanent NPT was to us an important goal.

Secondly, the President of the Conference himself conducted consultations and came to the conclusion that an overwhelming majority existed in favor of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Lastly, I do not believe that it would have been possible to achieve the outcome of the Conference without a vote if there were not a genuine and very broad support for indefinite extension.

What is your perspective on the lack of a final review declaration?

Delpech: My own view on the subject of the review is that everybody was exhausted at the end of the Conference. The genuine effort, conducted by the Presi-

dent, to achieve consensus on Friday, May 12, also on the final document was a courageous try, but it failed on important issues where the discussions in the Committees have been most difficult, notably in Main Committee I. We regret it. We would have preferred to have a final review document as well, but we do not overemphasize the lack of agreement. The review process will give us all occasions for further debates!

What role did the NAM play in the Conference?

Delpech: The non-aligned countries were the most numerous group. They played therefore a major role. This does not mean that they were united on the different issues at stake, including the extension decision. Such was not the case.

Key non-aligned countries were very active members of the [President's Consultations] and they showed there a genuine wish to achieve consensus on the two texts. Indonesia in particular was one of the major partners of the last negotiation on the text concerning the review process. Arab countries also played an eminent role, since the adoption of a resolution on the Middle East allowed them not to oppose the decision.

Let me recall that South Africa, which played such a central role in the Conference, is a non-aligned country. Last, but not least, the President belongs to a non-aligned country. His wish to avoid a vote, and to take the decision by consensus was very much shared by the NAM. It proved to be the right solution.

What role did the European Union, and France in particular, play in the Conference?

Delpech: The European Union is composed of 15 countries with different positions regarding nuclear weapons and even nuclear energy. During the Conference, this peculiarity was more of a strength than a weakness, since it contributed to underline the common choice of all these countries in favor of a permanent Treaty. A number of European countries had a specific responsibility to fulfill during the Conference: the United Kingdom was chairing the WEOG (Western European and Others Group), the Netherlands chaired Main Committee III on peaceful uses and succeeded to achieve consensus on the report, and Finland played a very important role in the discussion concerning the rules of procedure. The two European nuclear weapon states participated very actively in the debates taking place in the different committees, notably Main Committee I. Four countries of the European Union were members

of the group working with [the President's Consultations] on the texts about the strengthening of the review process and the principles and objectives: the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Their participation was active and constructive.

The countries of the European Union have also been very active in explaining around the world, before and during the Conference, the reasons for their choice in favor of indefinite extension of the NPT, and the role they all recognized this Treaty played in international stability and peace. France, which acceded to the NPT in 1992, thought it was her responsibility to explain this position as widely as she could, notably in Africa.

There was considerable criticism at the Conference of the lack of progress made by nuclear weapon states in meeting their obligations under Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty. What next steps will France take toward fulfilling these obligations?

Delpech: The truth is, since the last Review Conference in 1990, a lot has been done in improving the implementation of Article VI. This should first be recognized. If the deep cuts in the American and Russian arsenals are found negligible, the incentive for the other nuclear powers to disarm would be very low indeed. As far as we are concerned, since our accession to the NPT, we have a rather good record to present, and we presented it at the Conference:

On July 4, 1993, France confirmed its engagement in the negotiation of a CTBT. This engagement was followed through, as France is participating actively in this negotiation.

We decided to halt the production of plutonium for weapons purposes in 1992 and agreed in December 1993 to negotiate a convention handling the production of fissile materials for these purposes.

France limited its latest generation strategic nuclear submarines to four (instead of six). It limited production of Hades missiles by 75 percent and decided on their non-deployment. It withdrew and dismantled the gravitation weapons (AN 52) that equipped its air force and also retired the Pluton missiles. In so doing, France achieved a 15 percent reduction in four years of the number of nuclear weapons deployed. Finally, a complete and detailed description of the French nuclear forces was presented by the President of the Republic on May 5, 1994.

With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, France

signed and ratified Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty in August 1992 and is ready to sign and ratify the protocols of the future treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

As far as future actions are concerned, the decisions taken at the Conference will be implemented.

A large number of countries at the Conference have called for legally-binding security assurances. Is France prepared to take further steps on this issue?

Delpech: Concerning security assurances, France recently gave positive security assurances to countries signatory to the NPT. At the same time, it reaffirmed its negative security assurances. We are pleased that Security Council resolution 984 on security assurances was unanimously adopted by the 15 members of the Council. It goes without saying that France is also fully committed to the text adopted on this issue in the declaration of principles and objectives.

NEW ZEALAND

Ambassador Alan H. Cook, Resident Representative for New Zealand to the IAEA, and **Ms. Caroline Forsyth**, Director of International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade²¹

What were New Zealand's objectives for the Conference, and have they been met?

Cook & Forsyth: A number, although not all of our goals were met. One of our objectives was to get a firm date for a CTBT, and this was achieved, although we would have preferred to call for the conclusion of negotiations in 1995. Another goal was to give a boost to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off, and this too was accomplished at the Conference. We also sought a reaffirmation of the disarmament goal, but no recognition was made of another step to move closer to complete disarmament. During the Conference, we had put forth the idea of a ban on the production of nuclear weapons, in order to get the idea out on the table and begin to look ahead further than the immediate agenda. The idea met with some sympathetic hearing, but was not agreed upon.

In terms of regional objectives, we raised concerns regarding the South Pacific NWFZ and the issue of nuclear transport. As a member of the G-10, we sought to promote support for requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses and for plutonium management.

What role did New Zealand play in the Conference?

Cook & Forsyth: Overall, we came to the Conference prepared to raise questions about where do we go from here. With the like-minded of the G-10, our delegation worked on issues that were not “headline catching,” many pertaining to the role of the IAEA. In the Main Committees, the G-10 often provided language, crafted to gain consensus, that was fairly close to language that was eventually agreed by consensus in the committees.

Although we were not in the President’s Consultations (Australia represented our region), we met with our South Pacific neighbors, with the Western group, with the Canadians, with ASEAN, and with the Vienna Group, composed of diplomats based in Vienna. Mainly we tried to talk across groups to hear the concerns of many.

What is New Zealand’s view on the package of resolutions adopted by the Conference?

Cook & Forsyth: We supported indefinite extension as the necessary outcome, but did not see it as enough on its own. Thus, we view the package as a better approach. The decisions adopted give the regime the certainty that it needs while also strengthening the [review] mechanism and putting forth guidelines, as well as providing a mechanism for the establishment of additional guidelines in the future.

The package therefore has benefits for all...and shows the importance all states attach to the NPT. Credit must be given to the roles that the President and the South Africans played in moving toward the goal. One problem that arose was that some small countries arrived at the Conference unprepared; however, once they thought about the issues here, they saw the value of indefinite extension as well as that of taking the decision by consensus.

What is New Zealand’s perspective on the review process, especially on the lack of a final review declaration?

Cook & Forsyth: It will be disappointing to have no final review document, because although the text that was agreed upon can still be used, it will not have the same status as a final review document. A number of key issues, such as calling for full-scope safeguards agreements and some text on NWFZs, are included in the principles, so not all is lost and more was achieved than in 1990. It will be necessary to look at how the

review process can be made more functional—we lose agreed text items because other areas are contentious. We need to see how we can capitalize on common ground.

Will the decisions reached in the Conference promote further disarmament?

Cook & Forsyth: Even though the Conference agreed to a mechanism that will allow for clear reviews of implementation of Article VI, sovereign states cannot be compelled to do anything. Since the NPT is only part of the global security system, other factors will also play a role in how the Treaty is implemented.

PAKISTAN

Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York²²

How does Pakistan—as a non-State Party—view the way that the NPT Conference went?

Kamal: It was quite clear to us that there was a large number of countries and probably a majority [even] before the Conference started which were in favor of indefinite extension. The question was really not about the extension of the Treaty, but about the review of the existing performance of the Treaty.

What has happened at this Conference is that an extension has been agreed [to], but...the review has not resulted in any consensus formulation. The reason for that is that the performance of this Treaty in some of its essential articles, that is to say Article IV, which is exchange of technology for peaceful uses, and Article VI, which is negotiations in good faith towards disarmament, do not have enough evidence to substantiate that nuclear weapon states have really performed in the manner to which non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the NPT are legitimately entitled. The performance...is also weak on negative security assurances.... We have always argued that if you ask people to give up an option, then you must provide them with a degree of security....

On the transfer of technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, by and large the developing countries felt that they had not gained anything by becoming signatories....

Under Article VI, disarmament in good faith was never done. In fact, many nuclear weapon states used

the NPT as a license for proliferation.... They proliferated so much so that in [numbers of] nuclear weapons it went up hundreds fold, in fissile material it went up thousands fold. So there was no evidence for the greater part of the life of this Treaty of any desire on the part of nuclear weapon states to nonproliferate themselves. Nonproliferation was for others, not for themselves. There was no move towards disarmament in good faith. Even after START I and START II and the moves which have come as a result of the end of the Cold War, not as a result of the NPT, the total number of weapons and fissile material stocks still outnumber where they were in 1968. So there is much in the unhappiness of signatories of the NPT in so far as Article VI is concerned, and that was in fact where the whole debate lay during the review process.

A third element [of contention] was with negative security assurances, where the effort was made to come forward with half-baked reiteration of principles in the Security Council. A number of countries made statements in the Security Council firmly rejecting those statements when measured against the aspirations—the aspirations being a legally-binding instrument to be negotiated and which must be unconditional....

So, on all three accounts there were shortcomings in the performance of the NPT and that is why the review process created the type of divisions which it did and did not result in a final document....

[But] we are very happy with the indefinite extension and we are glad that at least on that half of the review and extension exercise the results were as positive as they were.

Will Pakistan's views of the Conference and its results affect the Pakistani position on the NPT?

Kamal: Pakistan was on the sidelines of the Conference. We are not a signatory, but we were there because we believe that the NPT is an important instrument and because we have consistently said that, despite the discriminatory nature of the NPT, we are willing to sign it—provided India signs it...

Pakistan has a position on the NPT that is reasonably clear and reasonably consistent. The Pakistani position is that the NPT is a discriminatory Treaty, ...because it draws distinctions between “haves” and “have nots” and perpetuates the haves. We also believe that it is a Treaty that has not succeeded in addressing adequately all the different aspects of nonproliferation because proliferation is both horizontal and vertical,

and this Treaty never quite succeeded in either of these two objectives.... We also have expressed very clearly the point of view that the Treaty does not under existing circumstances respond to the security interests of Pakistan, because we are located in a region which is a zone of tension [where] the neighboring country, which demonstrated nuclear potential, has not signed the NPT. Therefore, Pakistan is not in a position to sign the NPT because it does not respond to our security perceptions.

Having said that, we recognize that the Treaty is an important legal instrument with very wide membership and therefore that it is a factor in global stability. Because it is a factor in global stability...we came out...several months ago with the point of view that we were in favor of the extension of the Treaty, in fact, even in favor of its indefinite extension....

Will Pakistan and India face more pressure to join the Treaty now that it has been extended indefinitely?

Kamal: Well, I hope so, because our position has always been that India should sign the NPT. We want to sign it but we cannot.... In fact, all our proposals for nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia are geared to the idea of getting India to agree to nuclear nonproliferation. That is why we have said let us both sign the NPT simultaneously; and if you cannot sign the NPT, let us jointly renounce nuclear weapons. If you cannot do that, let us jointly inspect each other or let us jointly accept IAEA safeguards within or outside the NPT. If we cannot, let us have a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. And if we cannot do that let us at least get together and discuss.

¹ Article X.2 calls for a decision to be made on extending the Treaty after an initial 25-year period, based on one of the following three options: 1) extension for a fixed period; 2) extension for fixed periods (also referred to as “rolling extension”); or 3) indefinite extension.

² The interviewer would like to thank all the individuals who so graciously agreed to take time out of their busy schedules to share their views. The interviewer accepts responsibility for any errors in transcription.

³ Ambassador Dhanapala was interviewed around 4:00 p.m. on May 11, after the package of decisions on extending the Treaty indefinitely, on principles and objectives for nonproliferation and disarmament, and on strengthening the review process had been adopted without a vote.

⁴ In the final week of the Conference held from April 17 to May 12, 1995, the States Parties adopted without a vote a cleverly crafted package of three decisions proposed by Conference President Ambassador Dhanapala. Both the first decision, on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4), and the second, on the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5), grew out of discussions of draft documents submitted by South Africa. In

the third decision (NPT/CONF.1995/L.6), the Conference recognized that a majority did indeed exist in favor of indefinite extension, and decided that therefore, under the terms of the Treaty, it would be extended indefinitely.

⁵ The "President's Consultations" was an informal group consisting of individuals ("friends of the President") from about 25 key countries, with at least one country representing each region of the world. The group negotiated and accepted the package of proposals before they were presented to all the States Parties at the Conference for adoption.

⁶ The South African delegation played a key role in the Conference by submitting for discussion the draft documents that became the basis for the decisions on principles and objectives and on strengthening the review process. This interview was conducted in person on May 12.

⁷ The Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference held four meetings, during which it discussed procedural matters for the Conference: 1) May 10-14, 1993, in New York; 2) January 17-21, 1994, in New York; 3) September 12-16, 1994, in Geneva; and 4) January 23-27, 1995, in New York.

⁸ Canada took the lead in pushing for indefinite extension, and submitted a draft decision (NPT/CONF.1995/L.2) for such an extension on behalf of a large group of co-sponsors. Ambassador Westdal was interviewed by phone on May 26.

⁹ During arduous and often contentious sessions, the Conference worked in three Main Committees and later in a Drafting Committee to try to reach consensus language for a Final Declaration on the review of the implementation of the Treaty. Although much language was agreed upon in Main Committees II and III on safeguards and technical cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, respectively, great differences, mainly over interpretation of progress on disarmament-related measures (Main Committee I), remained in the last hours and no Final Declaration was reached.

¹⁰ At the time of the Conference, Indonesia was chair of the NAM, and submitted a draft decision (NPT/CONF.1995/L.3), calling for a 25-year rolling extension on behalf of a group of 14 co-sponsors. Ambassador Wisnumurti was interviewed in person on May 16.

¹¹ Ambassador Marín Bosch led the negotiations on a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament in 1994. He has currently been assigned an ambassadorial post in Barcelona. At the NPT Conference, Mexico submitted a draft resolution calling for indefinite extension with conditions (NPT/CONF.1995/L.1 and Rev.1). Ambassador Marín Bosch was interviewed in person around 6:00 p.m. on May 12.

¹² Ambassador Taylhardat is a retired diplomat who formerly represented Venezuela at the Conference on Disarmament and has also been at Venezuela's mission to the United Nations in New York. The Venezuelan government had asked him to lead the country's delegation to the NPT Conference. The Ambassador made the following comments during an interview in person on May 9 (after he had resigned and just before he left New York).

¹³ The word "consensus," as referred to in this question, can be found in early versions of the proposal on extension, but was dropped by the President's Consultations from the draft proposal, which was then submitted to the Conference as a whole for "adoption without a vote."

¹⁴ Ambassador Shaker chaired the third NPT Review Conference in 1985. He is the chair of the Advisory Board of the U.N. Secretary-General on Disarmament Matters. The Ambassador was interviewed in person on May 12, (around 10 p.m.) after it was clear no agreement would be reached on a final declaration involving the review process.

One of the main concerns of the Arabic countries at the Conference was addressing Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear program. The Arabic countries submitted a draft resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/L.7). However, during negotiations over the text, a new draft was formulated and submitted by the three NPT depository states—Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This new draft (NPT/CONF.1995/L.8) was adopted without a vote right after the decision on extension, principles and objectives, and strengthening the review process. This Middle East resolution was essential for allowing the extension decision to be made without objection by the Arab states.

¹⁵ Mr. Moradi was interviewed in person on May 15. Among other things, he participated in the debate on disarmament and other issues in Main Committee I and in the Drafting Committee. His views are not necessarily

those of his government

¹⁶ Dr. Schmidt was interviewed in person on May 9, 1995, after the draft review text adopted by the Main Committees had been passed on to the Drafting Committee, where discussion continued on unresolved, bracketed items. He subsequently provided written additions and clarifications to his remarks.

¹⁷ The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman was interviewed late on May 12, after the Conference adopted a final document without a final review declaration.

¹⁸ The interviewer would also like to thank Vagram Gabrielian, adviser of the Armenian delegation (and recent graduate of the Monterey Institute of International Studies) for his assistance in interviewing Ambassador Berdennikov. Ambassador Berdennikov was interviewed in person on the evening of May 12, before the final Plenary session as the negotiations on a final review declaration were breaking up without reaching agreement.

¹⁹ Ambassador Sha was interviewed by telephone on June 2. He stressed that his comments were made in a personal capacity.

²⁰ Ms. Delphech responded to the interview questions by facsimile on May 22, 1995. These quotes are taken directly from her response.

²¹ The two members of the New Zealand delegation were interviewed in person on the afternoon of May 12.

²² Pakistan, as a non-party to the NPT, participated in the Conference as an observer. Ambassador Kamal was interviewed in person on May 16. Please note that the Indian perspective is not included in these interviews, which cover views of official government delegations only, since India did not participate in the Conference as an official observer. However, as has been stated by Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, one should note the significance of an Indian presence at the Conference in the form of non-governmental representatives, including analysts from the government-sponsored think tank, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (Roland Timerbaev, in a speech delivered to the World Affairs Council of the Monterey Bay Area, Monterey, California, May 18, 1995.)