
Running in Place: An Institutional Analysis of U.S. Nonproliferation Organization Since the Cold War

AMY B. ZEGART

*Amy B. Zegart is Assistant Professor of Policy Studies at the School of Public Policy and Social Research at the University of California, Los Angeles. She served on the National Security Council staff during 1993, as was a consultant to the presidential campaign of George W. Bush in 2000. She is the author of *Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford University, 1999).*

The September 11 terrorist attacks lend new urgency to halting the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹ Although most experts believe Osama bin Laden has not yet acquired such weapons, evidence strongly suggests that al Qaida and other terrorist organizations have tried and may in the future succeed.² Today there is enough Russian fissile material to build 60,000 nuclear warheads and much of it is poorly secured. Rudimentary instructions for building a nuclear bomb can be found on the internet.³ Biological and chemical agents are even easier to obtain and, as the anthrax mail cases demonstrated, not as difficult to deploy as scientists had previously believed. The threat of a WMD attack on U.S. soil appears to be more serious and more imminent than it has at any time since the height of the Cold War.

Nonproliferation policy challenges are not just more prominent today than they have been in the past. They are more varied. Today's proliferators include regional rivals such as India and Pakistan, rogue states such as North Korea and Iraq, and more than a dozen global terrorist organizations. American policymakers also confront a host of thorny new issues. Chief among them are protecting

the U.S. homeland against catastrophic terrorism, safeguarding Russian fissile material, and managing export controls in an information age that produces technological breakthroughs in weeks rather than years. When Americans are helping Russians dismantle missiles aimed at U.S. cities, it is fair to say that nonproliferation policy is not what it used to be.

This essay argues that the times have changed but U.S. government organization for nonproliferation policy has not. The Cold War's end, the rise of unparalleled American power, the emergence of transnational terrorism, the spread of globalization—these and other profound developments have not catalyzed significant changes in the organizational architecture for nonproliferation policy. Instead, today's policymakers confront pressing new challenges with old structures, processes and problems that date back to the Kennedy administration. The nonproliferation policy system has proven remarkably resistant to reform.

Part One of this essay makes the case for examining organization, explaining why it matters in the first place. Part Two analyzes snapshots of two time periods: John F. Kennedy's efforts to reform how nonproliferation policy

The importance and broad scope of disarmament matters require continuing presidential attention. The complex interrelationships between disarmament activities, foreign affairs, and national security also require that close working-level coordination and cooperation be established between the new agency [I propose] and...other agencies.

... [S]tudies and consultations have inescapably pointed to the conclusion that a new effort...will be necessary....

—John F. Kennedy, June 29, 1961¹

The nation lacks a comprehensive policy and plan to meet the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The President must lead efforts to combat proliferation and direct immediate steps to make those efforts more coherent, consistent, and effective.

— Deutch Commission Report, July 14, 1999²

¹ Letter to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate, June 29, 1961. Reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S. 2180, a Bill to Establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, 87th Congress, 1st session, August 14-16, 1961, p. 9.

² The Deutch Commission, Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter referred to as Deutch Commission Report), July 14, 1999, pp. 9, 13, <<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/deutch/11910book.pdf>>.

was administered in 1960-61 with the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); and a series of government studies examining nonproliferation organization in 1999-2001, ten years after the end of the Cold War. Juxtaposing these pictures reveals something disturbing: in nonproliferation policy, the United States has not gotten the organizational basics right. The point is not that the apparatus of nonproliferation policy has remained entirely static over time. There have been some significant changes in the nonproliferation architecture, most notably the 1997 merger of ACDA into the State Department⁴ and the consolidation of nonproliferation programs in the Department of Defense in 1993 and 1997.⁵ However, these changes mask more significant organizational continuities. For forty years, U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been hampered by the same two types of fundamental organizational problems: poor day-to-day policy coordination and the near total absence of mechanisms to ensure long-term policy coherence. Policymakers have been well aware of these deficiencies but have been unable to rectify them.

Why have these fundamental organizational weaknesses persisted for so long? Part Three offers an explanation that takes issue with conventional wisdom. Typically, organizational problems are thought to arise when presidents do not have the will or power to set clear priorities and knock bureaucratic heads together. According to this view, poor individual leadership leads to poor system performance. By contrast, this essay argues that organizational problems are rooted in four enduring realities that span across presidents: (1) the fragmented structure of American democracy; (2) the self-interest of presidents, legislators, and officials; (3) the dynamics of bureaucratic organization; and (4) the nature of nonproliferation policy. These four factors hinder the design of good organization at the outset and erect high barriers to subsequent organizational reform. Even in the best of circumstances, the federal government's fragmented structure makes major policy change difficult. Legislative reforms in particular require not only inter-branch agreement, but the approval of multiple majorities (and, at times, supermajorities) within the Congress. Rational

self-interest drives legislators to focus on local issues much more than foreign affairs, compels bureaucrats to fight for their own turf, power and autonomy even at the expense of good policymaking, and naturally leads presidents to put their political capital behind easier wins and more obvious successes than overhauling the foreign policy bureaucracy. Organizations, for their part, rarely change on their own, and in fact usually become harder to reform over time, as norms, rules, cultures, and interests become entrenched. As if this were not enough, nonproliferation policy inherently cuts across more agency lines, and involves greater uncertainty between policy choices and outcomes than most other policy areas. In short, these four factors create powerful impediments to effective organizational performance. They help explain why ACDA was hobbled from the start, why the agency never recovered and why the same organizational problems that ACDA was meant to solve still plague nonproliferation policy today.

The essay concludes with a discussion of the implications of this stasis, offering some thoughts about how policymakers can improve nonproliferation policy organization in the future. The news is not altogether encouraging. Given the complex and well entrenched sources of dysfunction in nonproliferation policy, the windows of opportunity for far-reaching organizational reform will be few and fleeting. However, reformers can improve the odds of success by recognizing and seizing such opportunities when they arise, and by concentrating on organizational fundamentals rather than just addressing the immediate problems at hand.

At the outset, it is worth underscoring that this essay paints with a broad brush. Nonproliferation policy refers to the full spectrum of government initiatives related to WMD threats: preventing the further spread of chemical, nuclear, biological and radiological weapons and their means of delivery; rolling back existing programs; deterring and defending against a WMD attack; and managing the consequences of WMD use. Each of these issue areas is extremely complex. For example, it is one thing to discourage existing WMD states from developing and increasing their arsenals (the vertical proliferation problem), and quite another to prevent other states or terrorist groups from acquiring these weapons in the first place (the horizontal proliferation problem). Even much narrower topics such as treaty compliance have spawned substantial literatures.⁶ In such a rich and multi-faceted policy domain, generalization can be difficult.

But it can also be worth the effort. When policy areas are particularly complicated, cutting to core problems and explaining them in generalizable ways become all the more important. The challenge is to identify key leverage points, fundamental policymaking deficiencies and constraints that, if ameliorated, could provide dramatic and widespread improvements across the full range of WMD challenges. Paradoxically, the more complex reality gets, the more potential value a broad-brushed approach can offer.

WHY ORGANIZATION MATTERS

On August 21, 1958 American and Soviet technical negotiators in Geneva agreed on the feasibility of a nuclear test-ban treaty inspection system. It was the first ever agreement on atomic matters between the two superpowers. On the basis of those Geneva talks, President Eisenhower instructed the State Department to begin negotiations for a test-ban treaty. Within just a few months, however, Eisenhower enraged the Soviet leadership by demanding dramatic increases in the number of inspection sites. The Soviet Union refused to even discuss the issue and talks deadlocked.

It turns out that Eisenhower's policy shift had more to do with organization than politics; it was driven more by the internal workings of his own administration rather than by any kind of deliberate political maneuvering toward the Soviets. In August, Eisenhower's technical negotiators in Geneva concluded that an inspection system was workable, and the president believed them. The problem was that negotiators involved did not have the expertise to assess the verification schemes they were negotiating adequately. Few people did. There was, in fact, no regular, centralized or coordinated scientific research program in the U.S. government to support American arms control negotiations. What research support capabilities did exist were ad hoc and housed separately, in the Atomic Energy Commission. (AEC).

Weeks after the negotiators had reached an agreement with their Soviet counterparts, AEC scientists discovered potential ways of evading the verification system. When the scientists reported their findings to the president, Eisenhower became furious. Altering the American negotiating position, he worried, would only feed Soviet fears of an American double cross.⁷ With critical foreign policy issues on the table, including Berlin and the Formosa crisis, Eisenhower now faced the prospect of eroding the already tenuous trust between the superpowers.

But the scientists left little choice. Without quantum increases in the number of inspection sites, verification of treaty compliance would be left in doubt.

Eisenhower's test-ban treaty episode illustrates a central premise of this essay: organization matters. In this case, negotiators were charged with making critical decisions but lacked the personal expertise to determine whether their calls were in fact the best ones. This organizational mismatch between authority and expertise might have been mitigated by better coordination with AEC research. Instead, however, coordination problems between different parts of the nonproliferation bureaucracy only exacerbated the situation, leading to the AEC's last-minute discovery of verification problems. The timing of that discovery led to an 11th-hour policy reversal that ultimately set back U.S.-Soviet test-ban talks, stalled if not impaired superpower relations, and put President Eisenhower in a tough spot.

As the Eisenhower example suggests, choices about organization—about how the government is structured and the process by which decisions get made—can have significant consequences for policy outcomes. Two factors shape these consequences. The first is that choices about government structure create capabilities and jurisdictions, determining who performs which tasks by what authority at what level of competence. The second is that choices about decision-making processes determine how policy options are identified, developed, debated, assessed, decided, and implemented. Taken together, decisions about organizational structure and process unavoidably set priorities, giving greater weight to certain issues, interests, and perspectives than others. They determine who leads, who follows, and who gets left behind. While good organization alone cannot guarantee good policy outcomes, it does significantly affect what gets done, and how well. As Senator Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson put it in 1959, "good organization can help, and poor organization can hurt."⁸

Individuals are not insignificant in the policy process. Personalities, leadership styles, and inter-personal relationships all play vital roles. However, the importance of organizational dynamics tends to be underestimated. Lurking in the background, organizational problems usually are hard to see and disentangle. More than twenty-five years ago, Graham Allison and Peter Szanton illustrated the subtle yet powerful effects of organization by comparing presidential decision-making to eating at a Chinese restaurant. They write, "imagine asking a friend who had just dined at a Chinese restaurant what he had

for dinner and why." His answer would be presented as a matter of personal choice, and nobody would dispute it. He liked one dish more than another. But such an analysis would miss a more powerful, overriding factor: the choice of restaurant profoundly affected his dining options from the outset. As Allison and Szanton note, once the restaurant choice was made, "the question of having hamburger or *coq au vin* simply did not arise." Presidents face a similar situation. They conclude, "the effects of organizational arrangements presented to a President—on the definition of a 'problem'...on the information presented about any such problem, and on the execution of any decision—are equally pervasive, and equally easy to overlook."⁹

In sum, the stakes of organizational design are high. This is true for any policy area, but it may be even more so for issues like nonproliferation that bleed so heavily across traditional agency boundaries. Indeed, it stands to reason that the more players with a stake in the policy, and the more multi-faceted the issue, the more critical organizational choices about structure and process become.¹⁰

THE PERSISTENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESSES: TWO SNAPSHOTS IN TIME

On September 26, 1961, John F. Kennedy signed legislation creating a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was the most extensive reorganization of nonproliferation activities since World War II. For Kennedy, the legislation improving U.S. arms control capabilities capped off six months of intensive work by his administration and delivered on one of his central presidential campaign pledges. Nearly forty years later, as ACDA closed its doors, another reform movement was brewing. It focused more on a broad range of WMD proliferation issues and less on the specifics of U.S.-Soviet arms control and worldwide disarmament. It took shape as a disjointed assortment of studies and proposals—including four blue-ribbon commissions,¹¹ one Senate study,¹² an Energy Department task force,¹³ and fifteen General Accounting Office (GAO) reports¹⁴—rather than a well-organized presidential initiative. It was more bipartisan and yet less overtly successful. However, despite these differences, the reform movement of 1999-2001 bore one eerie similarity to its Kennedy-era predecessor. It faced the same enemy. The critical organizational difficulties it addressed were precisely the same ones Kennedy had tried, and failed, to fix nearly four decades earlier.

FIGURE 1
FUNDAMENTAL ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES AND INDICATORS

	Policy Coordination	Programmatic Coherence
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific policy decision (Should we sanction Iraq?) • Immediate-term decisions (this week-this year) • Primary management of bureaucratic missteps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive approach to policy area (What should U.S. nonproliferation policy be?) • Long-term decisions (5-20 years) • Primary management of bureaucratic rivalry, opposition
Problem Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contradictory policies • Cumbersome policymaking process • Conflicting terminology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy as “hanging threads” • Lack of high-level focal point • Little or no integrated planning and budgeting

These problems can be classified into two distinct categories: policy coordination and programmatic coherence (see Figure 1).¹⁵

Put simply, policy coordination has to do with making sure the proverbial left hand knows what the right hand is doing. It involves managing the day-to-day formulation and execution of specific policies by specific agencies. At its essence, policy coordination involves immediate or near-term decisions that are specific in nature—whether to impose sanctions against Iraq, whether to conduct additional tests for a national missile defense system. Policy coordination guards against inter-agency miscommunication, missteps and some deliberate opposition. It also helps ensure that policies are developed and implemented in a timely manner. In short, getting policy coordination right means ensuring government agencies can follow the medical adage, “do no harm.”

How do we know good policy coordination when we see it? Unfortunately, there is no absolute, objective measure of success.¹⁶ However, there are three indicators that, when taken together, provide a useful gauge of effectiveness. First, when policy coordination falters, agencies become more likely to undermine one another, either

unwittingly or intentionally. In that case, contradictory positions from different parts of the bureaucracy become more prominent. In the most serious cases, these differences can lead to public policy reversals. Second, poor coordination can more likely lead to cumbersome policy development and implementation. Third, terminology provides a good measure of coordination difficulties. When critical words and ideas mean different things to different agencies, it is fair to conclude that coordination is not at its best. An effective organization might be expected to experience some of these problems some of the time, but these problems should be rare and should be confined to relatively minor issues. However, when contradictory policies, cumbersome processes and conflicting terminology appear relatively often, and particularly when they involve relatively important policy issues, it is reasonable to conclude that policy coordination is not what it should be.

The second type of organizational deficiency, programmatic coherence, differs from policy coordination in several respects. It entails developing multi-dimensional, long-term strategies and providing the necessary resources to pursue them. Whereas policy coordination helps answer the question of whether to impose sanctions against

Iraq, programmatic coherence addresses the broader issues of what U.S. sanctions policy should be; how it should relate to other strands of nonproliferation policy such as international treaty regimes and responses to the actual use of WMD; and how to best invest American resources and organizational capabilities to achieve overarching program objectives several years out. By nature, programmatic debates invite greater bureaucratic rivalry. They have higher stakes, involve broader questions and take a longer view. Thus, successful programmatic coherence mutes and manages bureaucratic opposition.

Three critical indicators suggest when programmatic coherence falters. First, there is the absence of a clear overarching strategy. Instead of strands in a woven fabric, individual policies resemble hanging threads. Agency programs appear to operate in isolation or even at cross-purposes rather than in concert. Second, when programmatic coherence is poor, there is no effective focal point—a high level office or person below the president that brings together the various instruments of the departments and agencies concerned. Finally, there is little in the way of integrated planning or budgeting to ensure resources are well matched against priorities. The more prevalent these programmatic coherence problems are, and the more frequently they appear during times of urgency, the less probable the organization will achieve its objectives.

Policy Coordination Problems Then and Now

During the 1950s, it became clear that coordination problems were becoming so widespread that they were beginning to get out of hand. In 1957, the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found that different U.S. agencies were undercutting each others' positions when dealing with foreign powers.¹⁷ As Senator Hubert Humphrey later noted, in one instance the Department of Defense and the Budget Bureau announced unilateral force cuts while the State Department was trying to negotiate force reductions with the Soviets. In another, the Defense Department closed some military bases at the same time the State Department was resisting base closure in a disarmament agreement.¹⁸ These missteps were only likely to get worse. By 1961, nonproliferation policy involved at least nineteen major executive branch agencies and departments.¹⁹

Delay also became a major issue. At the 1960 ten-nation disarmament talks, for example, U.S. representative Frederick Eaton could not initially convey the position to U.S. allies because the Defense and State de-

partments had not yet resolved their differences. Henry Cabot Lodge, who served from 1953 to 1960 as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and who participated in numerous arms control talks during that period, gave direct testimony about the dangers of the cumbersome policymaking process. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1961 ACDA debate, Lodge remarked, “[T]he executive branch of the U.S. Government is not organized as it should be for big, bold strokes in foreign relations.” He went on, “All too frequently, under the present system, it takes too much time to get a U.S. position on any subject involving more than one department. . . .” Although Lodge declined to provide examples in the Committee’s public sessions,²⁰ he did underscore that the Soviet Union had gained advantage by moving much faster than the United States, “with all of the advantages of secrecy and surprise.” Emphatically reiterating his position, Lodge added toward the end of his statement, “As one who has been on the receiving end for almost 8 years, I know that it is indispensable for the U.S. representative to be in a position to make counter-proposals promptly. . . .”²¹

John F. Kennedy was less diplomatic. On the 1960 presidential campaign trail, then-Senator Kennedy told a New Hampshire audience that U.S. arms control negotiators “have been wholly unprepared to either seize the disarmament initiative or promptly respond when the Russians. . . did seize the initiative.” He went on to list examples in rapid fire, noting that the United States had not been prepared to respond Soviet disarmament proposals in 1955 or in 1959, and that U.S. delegates to the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference were “ill staffed, ill prepared and ill advised.”²² Kennedy was not exaggerating. When the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. proposal for the Surprise Attack Conference in September 1958, the United States had no prepared position or even a team in place to develop one. Ad hoc working groups of private citizens and various agency officials were pulled together hastily to draft a technical position. The head of the U.S. delegation, William Foster, was a private lawyer with no experience in disarmament negotiations.²³

Policy coordination weaknesses appear to have gotten worse with time. In large part, this trend can be attributed to the rising salience and complexity of nonproliferation issues. From 1961 to 1999, as the scope of nonproliferation policy expanded and assumed greater prominence, the number of agencies involved in various aspects of safeguarding against WMD ballooned from nineteen to nearly one hundred. In WMD counter-ter-

rorism alone, federal government efforts are currently spread across forty-five agencies that include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, organizations that have never before played a major role in national security policymaking.²⁴ Congress's own fragmentation has also increased, with executive branch nonproliferation organizations now reporting to more than twenty House and Senate oversight committees. More organizations have meant less coordination. As Senator Arlen Specter put it, when it comes to nonproliferation policy, "The federal government is a mess. Nobody's in charge."²⁵

Specter's remark reflected the consensus of his colleagues at the Deutch Commission. A bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel chaired by former CIA Director John Deutch, the commission spent more than a year performing a comprehensive assessment of U.S. nonproliferation organization and recommending specific changes. Its July 1999 report was unequivocal: the U.S. government was poorly organized for combating the spread of WMD. Specifically, the commission found precisely the kind of policy confusion and delay that hindered policymaking in the 1950s. Echoing Lodge's comments, the commission noted, "When a new problem involves...the development of a coordinated response from several agencies, the process is cumbersome and slow...."²⁶ According to the commission, all too often disputes that should have been resolved quickly at lower levels had to be resolved slowly at higher levels, by deputy secretaries or cabinet-level officials.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program provides perhaps the most telling example of these coordination problems. Launched in early 1992, Nunn-Lugar was a bold plan to provide American assistance in reducing and controlling WMD in the former Soviet republics. By all accounts, the program has been a resounding success. With U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar, more than 5,500 former Soviet nuclear weapons designed to destroy the United States have been dismantled, and three Soviet successor states—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—have given up the nuclear weapons they inherited.²⁷

Even so, the program has faced serious obstacles and encountered significant delay not only from political opponents, but from well-meaning supporters within the executive branch.²⁸ For example, the Deutch Commission was struck by the lengthy planning and difficulties involved in getting the necessary resources for Operation Auburn Endeavor, a 1998 mission that removed five kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Republic of

Georgia.²⁹ Decisionmakers confirmed the commission's findings. In their general account of the Nunn-Lugar program, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter pointedly criticized the organizational problems they encountered:

...it was difficult to shake the grip of the old-style arms control bureaucracy. Officials used to the glacial pace of arms control during the cold war sought endlessly to form "interagency negotiating teams" and send them to foreign capitals, rather than sending the engineers and technical specialists who were essential to action on the ground. These and other well-intentioned "helpers" around Washington's other agencies and the White House needed to be discouraged from impeding the program....³⁰

Another high-level administration official put the situation a bit more colorfully. "If you want to buy some weapons shit from Kazakhstan, it takes two years of NSC interagency meetings before we can do anything."³¹

Little has changed. In March 2003, a joint Harvard University /Nuclear Threat Initiative report found that only 37 percent of vulnerable Russian nuclear materials had been protected by initial security upgrades, and less than one-sixth of the Russian stockpile of highly enriched uranium had been destroyed. As Laura Holgate, Vice President for Russian/NIS Programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative told the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, "we're not moving nearly as fast as we can or we must....I am increasingly concerned that the president's bureaucratic troops [have not displayed] the planning, coordination and degree of urgency that this mission requires."³²

The difficulties of the Nunn-Lugar program and the more general findings of the Deutch commission have been well supported. Since 1999, three other blue-ribbon commissions, a Senate study, an Energy Department task force, fifteen General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, and a score of congressional hearings have examined various aspects of how nonproliferation policy is formulated.³³ All of them have reported major, fundamental coordination problems. One recent GAO report revealed that federal, state, and local governments had no clear chain of command for dealing with a WMD terrorist incident.³⁴ In April 2001 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings revealed that the Department of Health and Human Services was trying to create a national vaccine stockpile that failed to match intelligence estimates about the mostly likely chemical and biological agents that terrorists would

use.³⁵ The Gilmore Panel, an expert commission that was created by Congress to assess American WMD terrorist response capabilities, found in December 1999 that agencies failed to use common definitions in their terrorism response plans. Critical terms such as “weapon of mass destruction,” “terrorism,” and “mass casualties” meant different things—and triggered different responses—in different agencies.³⁶ In January 2001 the Energy Department’s Russia Task Force found that, even within a single department, nonproliferation efforts were not working in concert; according to the task force’s *Report Card on Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*, the Energy Department had no mechanism to ensure that technologies developed in one nuclear waste clean-up program would be shared with others.³⁷

While these examples suggest problems lurking in the wings, press reports have been quick to note more public coordination snafus as well. Perhaps the best known of these occurred in March 2001, when President Bush reversed his own secretary of state on nonproliferation policy toward North Korea. Just one day after Secretary Colin Powell had publicly indicated the administration planned to continue discussions with Pyongyang on ballistic missile limitations, the president put the talks on hold.

In sum, policy coordination problems have been relatively pervasive and fairly serious since the Eisenhower administration. In the 1950s, two of the three problem indicators—contradictory policies and cumbersome policymaking—manifested themselves on several occasions, most critically, with regard to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Foreign policy episodes in the 1990s revealed continuing coordination problems, from unclear chains of command to public policy reversals on North Korea to contradictory definitions of “weapons of mass destruction.” Ironically, the same kinds of difficulties plaguing ill-prepared arms control negotiating teams in the 1950s led to burdensome delays in removing nuclear weapons from Soviet successor states forty years later.

Programmatic Coherence Problems Then and Now

Programmatic coherence problems evident at the height of the Cold War also persisted throughout the century. The first and most obvious of these problems has been the generally disjointed nature of nonproliferation policy – what I term “policy as hanging threads.” In his 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy gave a major speech that

hit on just this theme, though he used a different metaphor. “The most gaping hole in American foreign policy today is our lack of a concrete plan for disarmament,” he declared. Using the speech to propose a new U.S. Arms Control Research Institute (what later became the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Kennedy delivered a blistering attack of the Eisenhower administration, saying that it had failed to develop any clear or comprehensive approach to superpower disarmament issues. “No issue... is of more vital concern to this Nation than disarmament,” Kennedy maintained, “and yet this Nation has no consistent, convincing disarmament policy.” Political rhetoric aside, Kennedy’s speech pinpointed the cross-cutting nature of the policy area and the challenges it presented. “A new agency is not enough,” he plainly admitted. The challenge was to integrate the agency’s recommendations “at the highest levels,” and to manage “the resistance likely to arise” in State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies involved in disarmament policy.³⁸ In short, Kennedy’s speech called for greater programmatic coherence, for a comprehensive, long-term approach to disarmament that could integrate the parochial perspectives and differing outlooks of the various departments and agencies. Nelson Rockefeller, the governor of New York and a dark horse candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, issued a similar call on July 8:

We must establish within our government at the highest level a fully staffed agency to inspire and to coordinate all activities bearing upon arms control and inspection. Such an agency—both pressing research and coordinating departmental actions—should be directly responsible to the President, or to the First Secretary of the government whenever such an office is created.³⁹

In the election, with Vice President Richard Nixon as the likely Republican presidential candidate, both Kennedy and Rockefeller certainly stood to gain by criticizing the Eisenhower administration’s organization for arms control and disarmament. Yet two events suggest that these criticisms were not far off the mark. The first is the incumbent’s response. On September 9, Eisenhower’s secretary of state, Christian Herter, announced the creation of the United States Disarmament Administration (USDA). The agency was housed within the State Department. It was charged with reconciling the divergent views of various agencies involved in disarmament policy and with providing a more substantial research program to support disarmament negotiation efforts. Although the USDA’s creation helped to blunt

campaign criticism, and although the agency soon lapsed in the new administration, evidence suggests that Herter and others acted out of a serious concern for improving government organization in the policy area.

Kennedy's response after the election provides even more compelling evidence of the sincerity of his criticisms. One of the new president's first actions was to appoint John J. McCloy as his special disarmament advisor. McCloy, a well-respected Republican, defense advocate, and advisor to several past presidents, was charged with making specific recommendations to the president about disarmament organization and policy. As Arthur Schlesinger observed, Kennedy's choice of McCloy was a classic and shrewd political maneuver to lay the necessary political groundwork for instituting change.⁴⁰ McCloy, for his part, lost no time. Within six months, he had consulted extensively with relevant cabinet departments and agencies and had drafted a bill for a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that was introduced to Congress. The president, in his June 29, 1961 transmittal letter for that bill, reiterated his campaign themes. In particular, he focused on the need for a nonproliferation system that would bring together all of the relevant policy and agency pieces. "[P]eace cannot be brought about by concentrating solely on measures to eliminate weapons," he wrote. Instead, Kennedy's nonproliferation program sought to be wide-ranging, "tak[ing] into account the national security, our foreign policy, the relationships of this country to international peacekeeping agencies... and our domestic, economic, and other policies."⁴¹ In fact, Kennedy's letter devoted more attention to policy integration than anything else.

The second problem that Kennedy and other reformers sought to address in 1960-61 was closely related to the first: nobody seemed to be in charge. There was no executive branch agency or senior official responsible for developing an overarching nonproliferation strategy or for ensuring that all of the departments and agencies were working in concert. In the 1950s, criticism mounted that Eisenhower was not actively crafting or directing the U.S. disarmament effort, nor did he ever empower another high-level official to do the job in his stead. In 1957, Benjamin Cohen, a former U.S. representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, emphasized the costs of failing to provide sustained high-level programmatic attention. Cohen testified in a congressional hearing:

...since you can't have disarmament without the cooperation of the Defense Department and the State Department...whoever is in charge of disarmament must be in a relationship to the President that he can

bring the matters to the President's attention and get a decision rather than merely taking the lowest common denominator of agreement between the State Department and the Defense Department.⁴²

Former atomic energy commissioner Thomas E. Murray painted an even more vivid picture of what occurs when there is no focal point. "When we come right down to it," he wrote in 1960, "it is not easy to say precisely who makes atomic energy policy in the United States or how it is made." Even on basic policy decisions, he added, government consisted of a "tortuous maze" filled with agencies that tried to dilute or modify proposals.⁴³

Kennedy picked up on this theme. His March 1960 disarmament campaign speech called for a new arms control agency to be "under the immediate direction of the President" in order to "coordinate...and follow through on the research, development, and policy planning needed for a workable disarmament program." Such an agency would act as a "clearinghouse." It would be the "one responsible organization – guided and directed by the White House" on which hopes for peace would be centered.⁴⁴ Rockefeller stressed the same point, insisting that the new agency be "directly responsible to the President" in order to exert the necessary guidance and leverage over the policy process.⁴⁵ Although in the end Kennedy's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency did not have sufficient high-level authority or direct presidential access to play the role he envisioned (more on that later), the 1961 bill transmittal to Congress reiterated his desire to create a "focal point at the highest level of government for the consideration of disarmament matters."⁴⁶

The final issue bedeviling programmatic coherence had to do with resource planning and allocation. In 1961, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its ACDA hearings, there was no coordinated or unified budget for nonproliferation activities in the U.S. government. In fact, there was no list or official record of which agencies performed what functions. Senator Hubert Humphrey succeeded in amassing the organizational information but not the budgetary data. In presenting his findings to the Committee, Humphrey euphemistically remarked, "We are trying to determine the total amount of money involved, but it is somewhat difficult." His frustration soon emerged. "I believe the people of the United States are entitled to know how much the Federal Government is spending—how and where—in this field, subject of course to national security regulations."⁴⁷ Humphrey's request was more than just an accounting issue. It was a matter of determining the appropriate level of resources necessary

for combating a problem and of matching those resources to the right programs. The absence of any budget for proliferation-related activities either within individual cabinet departments or across them made it extraordinarily difficult to do these tasks well.

All of these problems still plague nonproliferation policy. From 1999 to 2001, every single government study and report that dealt with nonproliferation policy found no overarching vision, strategy, or plan. For example, the Hart-Rudman Commission, which conducted the most comprehensive review of U.S. national security organization in the past 50 years, found the “most troublesome” problem to be “a lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation.”⁴⁸ Of particular concern to the commission was the absence of a strategy to defend the U.S. homeland from a conventional or WMD attack:

One of this Commission’s most important conclusions...was that attacks against American citizens on American soil...are likely over the next quarter century.... The United States, however, *is very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland* (emphasis theirs).⁴⁹

The Gilmore Panel on WMD terrorism concurred. Its 2000 report to Congress and the president bluntly stated, “The United States has no coherent, functional national strategy for combating terrorism.” Instead, the panel found that U.S. WMD counter-terrorism strategy amounted to little more than a “loosely coupled” set of executive branch plans, programs, and policy statements joined by ad hoc initiatives created by activist members of Congress.⁵⁰

Examining the full scope of nonproliferation policy, the Deutch Commission also found loose pieces rather than a broad strategy. “We do not have a comprehensive approach to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” its report concluded.⁵¹ The core problem was organizational, not conceptual. The commission noted, “it is not difficult to identify the key elements of an effective government response,” and then proceeded to list them. Critical among them was the ability to develop “coordinated and consistent government-wide strategies,” to integrate agency perspectives and programs, and to delineate clearly responsibilities among the departments and agencies.⁵² Like Kennedy, the Deutch Commission found that the various agencies, when left to their own devices, tended to approach nonproliferation policy with too parochial a perspective.

Today...both diplomatic and military efforts to combat proliferation too narrowly confine the range of tools they employ and the goals they seek. In the case of the Defense Department-led efforts, there is a natural focus on military instruments to respond to the potential threats of weapons of mass destruction. State Department-led efforts, by contrast, naturally focus on formal diplomatic tools....A set of effective strategies reflecting today’s proliferation challenges must go further than this.⁵³

Not even the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon have spurred reorganization for the sake of programmatic coherence. As one General Accounting Office director testified on November 14, 2001, “We agree with the views expressed by the Deutch Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force that a missing element from the current U.S. government implementation of nonproliferation programs is an integrated strategic plan.”⁵⁴ Nearly forty years after Kennedy’s assessment, these panels once again cited the critical need for a new mechanism to harmonize the different voices of the nonproliferation bureaucracy.

The studies and reports also found nobody in charge. Mirroring Kennedy’s criticism of the Eisenhower administration, the Deutch Commission highlighted the need for greater presidential leadership and for the designation of a single, high-level official or agency under the president’s direction to manage nonproliferation policy. Its report concluded:

With no one specifically in charge of all proliferation-related efforts, no one is ultimately accountable to the President and to Congress. Thus, the present system lets agencies protect their perceived institutional interests rather than fully contributing to an overall plan for achieving broader objectives. Blame can be deflected and diffused to other participants in the interagency process. Such diffuse responsibility invites inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and avoids accountability.⁵⁵

In fact, it appears that even within specific areas, nonproliferation policy suffered from the same problem. In U.S.-Russian arms control programs, for example, the Energy Department task force called for a new high-level office to synchronize objectives, programs, and budgets. In the area of WMD counter-terrorism, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Panel, and the GAO all called for establishing a high-level focal point in the interest of effective management.⁵⁶ As the Gilmore Panel put it, “the organization of the Federal Government’s programs for combating [WMD] terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable.”⁵⁷ Since September 11, the Bush administration has attempted to

fill this hole, creating an Office of Homeland Security in the White House and a cabinet department of Homeland Security that brings together twenty-two different agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Although the new department is expected to consolidate and improve U.S. border security operations (the department's border and transportation security division houses 90 percent of its employees and accounts for two-thirds of its budget),⁵⁸ its ability to integrate American counter-terrorism policy more generally remains much in doubt.

As Charles Curtis, President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2003, there still exists a yawning gap between the rhetoric and reality of American efforts to prevent WMD materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and other enemies. "If keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of our enemies is our number one security threat," Curtis remarked dryly, "who is in charge of this important mission? Who's accountable? What's the plan?"⁵⁹

Finally, little, if any progress appears to have been made on Senator Humphrey's demand for a unified executive branch nonproliferation budget, or even for a budget system that tracked nonproliferation-related expenditures within the cabinet departments and agencies. The implications appeared far more serious than even Humphrey had imagined. The Deutch Commission noted:

The success of any campaign depends on the resources available to wage it, and on the ways in which these resources are brought to bear. Currently, however, no one decides what level of resources should be devoted to proliferation-related efforts, there is no overall plan for how those resources should be allocated and no consistent evaluation of the effectiveness of these expenditures.⁶⁰

The commission found that, lacking central administrative guidance, individual agencies and congressional committees and subcommittees had no way to allocate funds in the right places with maximum effect. The result: redundancy in some areas of nonproliferation policy, and critical inattention to others.⁶¹ Nearly four years after the commission's report, and two years after the September 11 terrorist attacks, nonproliferation policy continues to suffer from the absence of a strategic analysis to prioritize funding allocations.⁶²

Although each of these shortcomings raises serious implications for nonproliferation policy, taken together

they create grave gaps in American national security. As the Harvard/ Nuclear Threat Initiative Study concluded:

The U.S. Government has dozens of separate programs, in several cabinet departments, doing important parts of the job of keeping nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials out of terrorist hands—but there is no senior official anywhere in the government with the full-time job of leading and coordinating these efforts. With no single leader, there is also no integrated plan, no overarching strategy that would set goals and priorities, allow these programs to work together efficiently, close the gaps in the response, and eliminate overlap and duplication. Without such a strategy, there is no rational basis for making trade-offs and hard choices among the many programs underway. In this area, the U.S. government has a substantial fleet, but no admiral, and no overall battle plan.⁶³

PERSISTENT ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESS

The snapshots from 1960-61 and 1999-2001 reveal persistent weaknesses in the organization of nonproliferation policy. In both periods, reformers found that bureaucratic agencies inadvertently and sometimes deliberately worked at cross-purposes. In the arms control talks of the 1950s, State Department negotiating teams were undercut by the Department of Defense and other agencies on more than one occasion. Moreover, U.S. arms control efforts were usually ad hoc, poorly supported, and inefficient. Without a comprehensive disarmament strategy or the administrative capabilities to support it, the United States was left scrambling to respond to Soviet proposals. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings of 1961, Kennedy Disarmament Adviser John J. McCloy admitted he was surprised that Washington had fared as well as it had in bilateral talks with Moscow. McCloy made it clear that he believed American success had come despite, not because of, government organization.⁶⁴

Although a great deal has changed since McCloy's testimony, the basic organizational weaknesses he described have not. The same problems of policy confusion and delay still hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. In March 2001 President Bush found himself reversing his own secretary of state on North Korea policy. Even one of the Pentagon's greatest successes, the Nunn-Lugar program, took a tremendous effort on the part of high-ranking officials to get off the ground. Like the arms control talks of the 1950s, the end result proved a success but the process did not. Lingering problems entrenched in the bureaucratic structure made it much tougher and more protracted than it should have been to deal with one of

the gravest threats to American national security since the Cold War.

Even more serious has been the persistence of programmatic coherence problems over the past four decades. When John F. Kennedy campaigned for president in 1960, he saw fundamental deficiencies in the U.S. government's organization for disarmament and arms control. In a policy area where Kennedy described the threat as a "nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads," these problems loomed large.⁶⁵

According to more recent commission reports, studies, and testimony, the U.S. government still lacks a long-term, comprehensive approach to deal with the proliferation of WMD. It still lacks a clear mechanism to, in the Deutch Commission's words, "orchestrate the entire spectrum" of U.S. policy perspectives, programs, and tools.⁶⁶ And it still lacks a planning and budgeting system that would enable policy makers to come up with informed judgments about how best to spend American resources in an area that crosses so many agency lines. The Soviet Union's "nuclear sword of Damocles" may no longer hang precariously overhead, but transnational terrorism has taken its place. In short, it appears that fundamental organizational deficiencies in nonproliferation decisionmaking have had long lives. The unanswered question is why.

Explaining Organizational Continuity

Logical reasoning suggests two general explanations for the appearance of similar problems at two points in time. Either the problems were not successfully addressed at the first juncture, or they were successfully addressed but later reappeared for other reasons. In other words, either Kennedy failed outright or he succeeded but his victory unraveled over time.

Both arguments are right. Despite his best efforts, Kennedy failed to overcome the weaknesses he identified on the campaign trail. The president succeeded in passing legislation that established ACDA, but the agency was never able to perform the job it was meant to do; it was hobbled at birth.⁶⁷ In addition, however, the situation worsened as time passed. Existing organizational arrangements proved exceptionally resistant to reform, even as new demands arose. Kennedy's actions ultimately cast a long shadow through history. The choices he made imposed lasting "birth marks" that limited ACDA's effectiveness from the start, led ultimately to its abolition, and

contributed to preventing the nonproliferation machinery from adapting to changing demands over time.

Conventional wisdom holds that presidential leadership—the ability and willingness of various presidents to set policy priorities and to carry out those priorities—should go a long way toward explaining this historical pattern. According to this view, when the president gives an issue low priority, when chief presidential advisers disagree about policy emphases, or when the president himself is weak, bureaucratic rivalries and organizational problems become more pronounced. Indeed, nonproliferation policy priorities are often hard to determine and even harder to maintain as circumstances change. Should India be sanctioned for its nuclear program or supported as the world's largest democracy and a potential counterweight to China? Should Pakistan's nuclear program be forgotten if it continues providing assistance in the war against terrorism? For presidents, answering these kinds of questions means making tough choices and expending political capital, two things most presidents try to avoid. But avoidance only makes organizational problems worse. According to those who stress the primacy of presidential leadership, the more presidents set the agenda, the more they establish clear policy goals and use the power of their office to support them, the better nonproliferation organizations will perform.

Although this explanation captures an important part of reality, it appears better suited to explaining *changes* in organizational effectiveness than the persistence of organizational problems over time. Why? Because of the variability of its independent variable, presidential leadership. As presidential scholars have long argued, different presidents bring different policy preferences and power capabilities to the job.⁶⁸ If presidential leadership really were a major determinant of organizational effectiveness, then these natural differences between presidents should have led to some significant fluctuation in nonproliferation organizational problems over time.

But the two snapshots of nonproliferation organization do not indicate such variation. Indeed, one of the most striking findings is the *similarity* of organizational problems—both in type and magnitude—from the Kennedy to the Bush administrations. While it is certainly possible that some significant variation occurred between these two snapshots, it seems highly unlikely. Changes to bureaucracy are hard to make and even harder to undo.⁶⁹

Even a generous interpretation of the presidential leadership story appears unsatisfying. Let us assume for a moment that nonproliferation organization has suffered

because all presidents since Kennedy failed to exercise the kind of leadership necessary to get the organizational basics right. In that case, presidential leadership appears to be an intervening variable, not an independent one. The real question begging to be answered is: why did so many presidents in such different circumstances behave in similar ways? What underlying forces were so strong as to keep presidents from addressing these fundamental problems during and after the Cold War?

As these questions suggest, identifying the root causes of longstanding organizational problems requires taking a step back, focusing less on the leadership of specific presidents and more on the enduring realities that all presidents face. Four other conditions and developments, taken together, provide a more general explanation for the nagging persistence of organizational problems in nonproliferation policy.

The first of these is the fragmented structure of American democracy. The U.S. political system erects serious obstacles to creating effective bureaucratic organizations at the outset and to reforming them down the road. This is because the framers of the Constitution, who were intent on preventing the kind of oppressive government they faced in Europe, deliberately divided power between the branches. Over time, political norms and informal rules (such as the congressional committee system and the filibuster) have been grafted onto this formal constitutional structure in ways that make any kind of legislative change an uphill battle. For nonproliferation organizations, all of this means that opponents have numerous opportunities to kill or fatally hobble any new agency or arrangement.⁷⁰ Moreover, the worst problems are the least likely to get fixed because fundamental organizational reform usually requires new legislation.

Second, the structure of American democracy shapes the incentives and capabilities of different political players in ways that exacerbate all of these problems. Presidents, as the only nationally elected officials, have good reasons to consider issues like organizational effectiveness that have national impact, but they lack the capabilities to get what they need. As Richard Neustadt pointed out more than thirty years ago, presidents are weak.⁷¹ Presidents must choose their battles with care because they have little time, few formal powers, and limited political capital. In addition, substantive policy issues almost always rank higher on the president's priority list than the more arcane issues of bureaucratic functionality. When the choice is between passing a tax cut or redesigning the

nonproliferation architecture, little wonder presidents choose to put organizational reform on the back burner.

Legislators have very different incentives and interests. If legislators want to win reelection, they must cater to local interests ahead of national ones. Foreign policy in general and foreign policy organizations in particular do not sit high on the congressional agenda. In addition, members of Congress care about maintaining the power of the institution. Generally, this means that senators and representatives prefer executive arrangements with diffuse authority and capabilities. The more different agencies in the executive branch, the more power bases can accrue in the legislature to oversee them. As one former senior official put it, "The Hill will not grant you rationality. Why? Because they have people up there...who have their own power bases that they don't want to give up."⁷²

Bureaucrats, finally, have their own interests and powerful weapons to pursue them. Although presidents rely on their executive agencies to get things done, bureaucrats have other ideas, obligations, aims, and constituencies that conflict with the president's. Nowhere is bureaucratic self-interest more at play than in the design of competing agencies. While most domestic policy areas are fairly discrete, in foreign policy agencies are tightly connected; one agency's work invariably affects what another does.⁷³ In such a complex web, the battle for agency power and autonomy is zero-sum. No agency wants to yield authority or discretion to another.

On the whole, the interests and incentives of politicians and officials suggest that presidents are unlikely to seek thoroughgoing organizational change, and when they do, they are unlikely to succeed. With so many pressing issues, so little time, and so much benefit attached to policy success rather than organizational reform, presidents have little reason to take on the fight. Legislators and bureaucrats are a large part of the equation. The average member of Congress pays no serious attention to foreign policy agency design because he knows it packs no punch at the polls. Even worse, he knows that reorganizing the executive branch means upsetting the applecart of congressional committee jurisdiction. Bureaucrats are even more formidable opponents. They have powerful incentives to care about the design and operation of agencies outside their own and to protect their own autonomy, jurisdiction, and influence, even at the expense of good policymaking.

The third enduring reality that helps explain the continuity of organizational problems is most straightforward: organizational arrangements almost always get harder to

change with time. The longer any single organization lives, the more entrenched its existence, routines, norms, and relationships become. Perhaps even more important, the more interconnected agencies become, the harder it is for the entire system to adapt. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon illustrated the point with a human evolution analogy.

...designing each organ to adapt to changing requirements will be much easier if the design of any one organ has little effect on the efficiency of the others; if the heart can be designed without redesigning the lungs, for instance. With a higher degree of dependence, the continued "favorability" of any change in one organ will depend on what changes occur in the other organs at the same time or in the future.⁷⁴

As Simon suggests, the more organizations there are and the more tightly coupled they become, the more difficult it is for the entire system to change. Adapting to shifting circumstances becomes exponentially more difficult because success requires so many changes in so many places.

Fourth, the nature of nonproliferation policy works against effective organization. As noted earlier, the policy area is highly complex. It spans a wider array of domestic and international issues, requires a more varied kit of policy tools, and involves a larger and more diverse field of government officials than most other foreign policy problems. Although foreign and domestic policies have become increasingly intertwined, nonproliferation policy requires vastly different domestic and international components. Within the nonproliferation rubric, policy problems range from inspecting American cattle at home to inspecting weapons programs abroad, from securing U.S. airports to securing Russian fissile material, from training local health care workers in bioterrorism response to training special operations forces in cave-to-cave combat.

Nonproliferation policy also stretches across more and more disparate agency lines than most other policy areas. While no foreign policy issue is simple, most foreign policy problems—NATO expansion, the North American Free Trade Agreement, Sino-American relations, to name a few—require coordinating diplomatic, military, and economic concerns among a relatively small set of agencies that have a long history of working together. Nonproliferation policy, by contrast, currently involves ninety-six organizations at the federal level alone. These agencies, which range from the Russian Plutonium Disposition Program to the Food and Drug Administration to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, include many that have not traditionally worked together.⁷⁵

Complicating the picture even further, nonproliferation involves a particularly high degree of uncertainty between policies and outcomes. In some foreign policy issues, the relationship is fairly straightforward: in the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, for example, it became clear that U.S. intervention helped restore Mexican financial stability. Similarly, deploying U.S. Navy ships to the Taiwan Straits in 1958 succeeded in easing military hostilities between China and Taiwan. To be sure, most issues involve more murky connections between policies and outcomes. The extent to which U.S. sanctions helped end South African apartheid or containment contributed to the Soviet Union's demise fit in this category. However, two aspects of nonproliferation policy place it at the extreme end of the uncertainty spectrum: proliferators deliberately seek to hide their activities, and nonproliferation success is, by definition, a non-event—the absence of the spread or use of WMD. In these conditions, the challenge is not just to select an appropriate course of action. It is more fundamental: defining and determining the scope of the policy problem itself.

All of these characteristics spell bad news for nonproliferation organization. The multi-faceted nature of the policy area means there are more components to integrate, more varied strands to weave together. The large number and diverse set of agencies involved in nonproliferation policy means there are more moving parts in a bureaucratic machine that has developed no natural way of making them run together. The high degree of uncertainty between policies and outcomes makes it particularly difficult to define policy problems or to evaluate the effectiveness of discrete approaches. With so many policy facets, so many bureaucratic players, and so much uncertainty, nonproliferation policy by its very nature stacks the deck against organizational effectiveness.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES AND THE CREATION OF ACDA

Kennedy's creation of ACDA and the subsequent history of the nonproliferation policymaking process reflect the constraints described above. Three findings stand out. First, major reform of nonproliferation organization has never sat high on the congressional agenda. Although Senator Hubert Humphrey's Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament issued a number of reports in the late 1950s recommending organizational improvements, and although Humphrey and a few others introduced a number of bills calling for the establishment of a National

Peace Agency, these proposals languished in Congress throughout the 1960 presidential campaign. Foreign policy generally, and nonproliferation organization in particular, did not galvanize widespread or serious legislative support in the absence of presidential pressure. As Duncan Clarke concluded, “most legislators had little interest, positive or negative, in the subject [of nonproliferation organization].... Only a small but articulate liberal minority urged action on the matter.”⁷⁶

The same can be said of current reform efforts. Although some legislators have continued to beat the drums for reforming the nonproliferation machinery, they have not been joined by most of their colleagues on Capitol Hill. As Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment put it in the spring of 2003, legislative support for today’s nonproliferation programs is “wide but shallow.” Testifying before the House Subcommittees on Europe and International Terrorism, he noted pointedly, “I would wager that the members here have spent more time today than some members spend in a year thinking about these issues.” Wolfsthal continued, “if I could be bold enough, I’d suggest [you] grab one of your colleagues who doesn’t think about these issues and make him or her think about these issues... because we are constantly trying to find counterweights and constituencies within the Congress to provide our information or suggestion [sic] to and we can only run to the select group that work on this day to day for so long.”⁷⁷

The second finding is that presidents are only slightly more inclined than legislators to tackle organizational reform in nonproliferation policy. President Kennedy, for example, backed away from establishing ACDA even though he held a deep personal interest in the subject and made it one of his central foreign policy campaign issues. In July 1961 the president decided not to place the ACDA legislation on his “must list” of legislative priorities and told his disarmament adviser, John J. McCloy, that the bill would have to be passed without strong administration support.⁷⁸ According to McCloy, the president had become convinced that congressional opposition would kill the bill, a defeat he could not accept so early in his administration.⁷⁹ It took an extensive lobbying effort by McCloy and Senator Humphrey to convince Kennedy to change his mind.⁸⁰

No president after Kennedy has undertaken an extensive reform of nonproliferation policy organization, even though most have been aware of the ongoing problems. Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan all chose to establish informal, temporary, alternative negotiating channels

and interagency processes rather than overhaul the arms control system that Kennedy had established. Even the Clinton administration, which elevated nonproliferation policy to unprecedented importance, declared a national state of emergency concerning WMD, and contributed to the Deutch Commission’s study, did not implement a single one of the commission’s recommendations for thoroughgoing reform. As one official explained, the administration “didn’t want to fight the fight” with Congress, particularly in an election year and particularly when it involved more centralization in the White House, which “Congress always despises.”⁸¹ Other commission recommendations have suffered similar fates. Between 1999 and 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Panel, the National Commission on Terrorism, and a five-year GAO analysis all highlighted the urgent need for organizational reform in the realm of WMD counterterrorism. Before September 11, however, none of the major recommendations from these commissions were adopted. Although some organizational changes, most notably the creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security and the cabinet Department of Homeland Security, have appeared since then, these changes have not yet resolved the fundamental problems with policy coordination and programmatic coherence that Kennedy first identified.

Third, even in the rare instance when a president chose to take on reform, his efforts were thwarted by exactly the forces one would expect. Tracing the ACDA bill’s development from Kennedy’s original formulation to final passage reveals that in each phase of the process, the proposed agency grew weaker and further removed from the president’s original vision.

In the beginning, Kennedy made it clear that he sought a powerful, independent agency that reported directly to him. The “U.S. Arms Control Research Institute” he proposed during the campaign was, as noted above, to be “under the immediate direction of the President.” Although he emphasized that the new agency would not infringe on the prerogatives of any existing agencies, it was designed to do much more than provide technical research to other departments and agencies. The agency was meant to take a vigorous, lead role in policy development and planning.⁸²

But that is not what the president got. Bureaucrats had the first crack at the bill. As Duncan Clarke notes in his history of the agency, “virtually every department had some reason to object to ACDA’s establishment.”⁸³ The State Department felt threatened by the creation of an-

other potential negotiating agency. The Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff did not sit comfortably with the entire idea of disarmament or arms control. ACDA's research focus posed an alternative to the missions of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Even the United States Information Agency stood to lose if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency served a public dissemination function. Kennedy's Disarmament Advisor, John McCloy, had his work cut out for him. From January to June of 1961, McCloy shuttled between the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, and others in an effort to fashion a bill acceptable to all sides. "It was like walking through mud up to the knees," he said later. "No one was too anxious to have this thing."⁸⁴

Congress also diluted the president's bill, for predictable reasons. In particular, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by State Department patron William Fulbright, insisted on placing the arms control agency squarely within the State Department and on downgrading its authority to ensure it would not encroach on existing agencies' functions. As George Bunn, one of the chief architects of the Kennedy draft bill, put it, "We didn't get into trouble until the bill went to Congress."⁸⁵ Chairman Fulbright left the administration few options. After the hearings concluded, he called in Bunn and the rest of the Kennedy team and "told us to redraft it."⁸⁶ They did. In the new version, which passed the Senate, ACDA was subsumed entirely by the State Department. This move left the new agency without the autonomy and broad coordination authority over nonproliferation policy that the president had initially sought, and it left existing power arrangements within congressional committees intact.⁸⁷

The end product demonstrated four noteworthy effects of this executive and congressional wrangling. First, whereas Kennedy's original proposal gave the ACDA director direct presidential access by making him the "principal adviser to the President on disarmament matters,"⁸⁸ the final piece of legislation made the director the principal adviser to *both* the secretary of state and the president.⁸⁹ Second, while Kennedy's bill provided the agency head would work "[u]nder the direction" of the president and the secretary of state,⁹⁰ the actual statute mandated that the director operate under the guidance of the secretary alone.⁹¹ Third, whereas Kennedy's bill charged the director with developing "suitable procedures to assume cooperation, coordination, and a continuing exchange of information among affected Government agencies" sub-

ject to presidential approval and consultation with other agencies,⁹² the legislation vested coordination authority in the president alone.⁹³ Finally, the statute removed entirely a section that insisted all government agencies keep each other fully informed of "policy decisions, activities, statements, studies, research and other matters...which affect disarmament matters."⁹⁴ In its final incarnation, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act succeeded in weakening the most important sources of power for the new agency: its direct relationship to the president and its authority to coordinate the activities of the other agencies.

ACDA never recovered. In 1965, Kennedy Special Counsel Ted Sorensen described the agency with lukewarm praise, calling it "not an unmitigated success" that had "little to do with disarmament steps taken...."⁹⁵ By 1974, Congress was so concerned by ACDA's "eclipse" that the House Foreign Affairs Committee commissioned a major study to determine how best to "enhance the future status and effectiveness" of the agency.⁹⁶ Every administration that dealt with strategic arms negotiations during the Cold War circumvented the agency's primary role, choosing instead to establish alternative interagency coordination mechanisms dominated by other players. As Barry Blechman and Janne Nolan observed in 1983:

There can be no doubt that the present system does not work well; the evidence is persuasive in the memoirs and testimony of individuals who have been involved, as well as in the continuing disarray of our policies. In itself, the fact that every new administration feels compelled to revise extensively the approach pursued by its predecessor suggests that U.S. arms control policies are not built on a solid enough foundation to assure continuity and bipartisan support.⁹⁷

Organizational Deficiencies and the Abolition of ACDA

In the perfect storm of 1995, the Clinton administration floated the idea to eliminate ACDA as part of the reinventing government initiative just when Senator Jesse Helms assumed chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Helms, an ardent opponent of the State Department bureaucracy and ACDA in particular, saw his chance. In March 1995, Helms released a reorganization plan that called for consolidating three agencies, including ACDA, into the State Department. When Clinton refused, Helms played hardball, using his chairmanship to freeze 400 State Department promotions, hold up more than a dozen ambassadorial nominees, including posts to Bosnia and China, and block ratification of the critically

important Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). When the dust settled, Helms agreed to allow ratification of the CWC to come to a vote in exchange for ACDA's abolition.

Although ACDA officially closed its doors in 1999, its abolition was merely the final move in a game whose outcome had been determined in 1961. From the beginning, Kennedy faced an uphill battle to get an effective centralized nonproliferation agency. His proposal generated opposition from nearly all elements of the foreign policy bureaucracy. It aroused fierce opposition in Congress, threatening the power of State Department patrons in the Senate and drawing the ire of conservatives who mistrusted the entire idea of arms control and disarmament. At one point, Kennedy himself nearly gave up, preferring to use his political capital on issues where he stood a better chance of winning. Little wonder the final result was not the strong, independent agency that Kennedy wanted. The structure of the American political system and the self-interest of the political players made it nearly impossible.

Reforming the nonproliferation architecture appears to have gotten only more difficult over time. The proliferation of agencies and congressional committees involved with nonproliferation policy has created more parts to coordinate, more voices to harmonize, and more roadblocks to success. With so many more stakeholders in the current system, reform must cover more ground in order to be successful. It must redraw more bureaucratic and congressional boundaries, and it must redistribute power from a wider range of places to reap results.

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Many critics argue that U.S. foreign policy agencies are poorly equipped to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War world. They are only half right. The truth is that most foreign policy agencies were never well designed to handle the old challenges of the Cold War. In the nonproliferation field, policymakers have found serious organizational weaknesses for more than four decades. From Kennedy to Bush, policymaking has suffered from poor coordination and weak programmatic coherence. Departments and agencies have undercut or contradicted one another. Responses to changing developments and needs have been slow and cumbersome. Policies to handle proliferation have lacked an overarching strategy or plan. There has been no high-level office or person in charge to weave the threads of all the departments and agencies

engaged in combating WMD into a single fabric. No budgetary mechanism has existed to help prioritize, track, or evaluate program effectiveness.

These organizational problems have been so enduring because their causes are so deeply embedded in the structure of American democracy, in human nature, in the design of bureaucratic organizations, and in the nature of nonproliferation policy. In the United States, the political system makes any kind of reform difficult to achieve and ensures that even successful change will include crippling compromises. Self-interest guarantees that almost all presidents will avoid tackling systematic reorganization because bureaucrats and Congress will resist it. Instead, presidents will do what they can under the radar screen, creating new capabilities and organizations informally. In the end, this may only make matters worse. As the nonproliferation policy apparatus grows larger and more complex, reform will have to be all the more sweeping to produce results.

Although this analysis does not offer cause for celebration, it does suggest two cautionary observations about how to maximize the prospects for successful organizational reform. First, given the complex and well entrenched sources of dysfunction in nonproliferation policy, the windows of opportunity for organizational reform will always be few and fleeting.

From the Cold War until September 11, in fact, prospects for reform appeared slim. Despite the importance of nonproliferation, not a single president after Kennedy opted to push for bold changes.

Initially, the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the sudden menace of anthrax sent through the mail growing public awareness of al Qaida's interest in WMD, raised the possibility of organizational reform in nonproliferation policy. Indeed, for many Americans today there is no danger more frightening than the specter of terrorists armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Only such a high level of public awareness and concern can provide the necessary political impetus for the president to advance reform proposals. Even then, public awareness and concern usually will not be enough, because the reform stars align only briefly, because organizational reforms are inherently difficult to achieve, and because there are always numerous areas in need of reform that compete for the president's attention and support. This tendency emerged clearly after 9/11, when President Bush chose to use the considerable political support generated by the terrorist attacks to create a new Department of Homeland Security and to conduct the war in Iraq rather than to address

serious and well-known deficiencies in areas such as nonproliferation policy or intelligence coordination. Despite the president's record high approval ratings, his two priority initiatives did not come quickly, easily or cheaply. Had Republicans not gained Congressional seats in the 2002 mid-term election, the Homeland Security Department bill might well have remained deadlocked in Congress. And the war in Iraq has exacted a substantial political price in terms of American relationships abroad.

To improve the chances of success in such an environment, reformers need to be able to recognize windows of opportunity for organizational reform when they arise and be prepared to seize them quickly, before competing priorities dilute the president's newfound stock of political capital. In practical terms, this "hurry up and wait" approach means working to develop serious, detailed reform plans and enlist the support of key political officials *before crises erupt* and maintaining the capability to deploy a rapid reaction reform team that can work with administration officials and legislators once the opportunity arises. The window of opportunity generated by 9/11 may now be closed. However, the unfortunate likelihood of future terrorist attacks against Americans and the continuing spread of WMD suggest that reformers will have more windows of opportunity to tackle critical organizational problems in U.S. nonproliferation organization in the not too distant future. The key to future success is to start planning reform now.

The second cautionary observation is that organizational reformers should resist the temptation to focus narrowly on the immediate problems at hand; instead, they should concentrate on the fundamentals. The history of nonproliferation suggests that organizational basics—ensuring day-to-day coordination and long-term programmatic coherence—are the hardest problems to remedy but may have the greatest potential to provide leverage across a range of complex and unforeseen policy challenges. If nonproliferation organizations are managed to coordinate their daily work, if they are working in concert to support an overarching national strategy, and if their programs are evaluated and measured against a common standard, then *any* WMD strategy can be better executed. Any future WMD problem can be better addressed. When all of the parts in a car engine are running together, the car can move in any direction.

In particular, organizational reform should start by dealing with programmatic coherence: developing an integrated national nonproliferation strategy, creating a high-level focal point to coordinate efforts throughout the

bureaucracy, and establishing a cross-agency budgeting process to match resources against priorities. A government-wide strategic plan need not be created out of whole cloth. Essential elements of it already exist within individual agencies. What is lacking, however, is an overarching perspective that considers the best mix of policy programs and how that mix can be sustained or changed over time.

Establishing effective leadership is more challenging but equally important. The core problem here is not that the U.S. government lacks the necessary capabilities, ideas, or manpower for nonproliferation policy. It is that the bureaucracy has grown unwieldy and has no central coordinating mechanism. It has become a body without a brain. To be sure, experts will continue to disagree about the best organizational solution to this problem—whether, for example, to locate a hub within the existing National Security Council staff structure or whether to devise a new cabinet agency. In the end, what matters most is that some new office or position be created, that it be elevated to the highest level of government—with direct access to the Oval Office—and that it be clearly vested with the personal trust and authority of the president. Kennedy's best intentions for ACDA went awry because he failed to endow the organization with the direct access and presidential authority it needed to keep other bureaucratic players in line.

Finally, as the old saying goes, you cannot manage what you cannot measure. Establishing a cross-agency nonproliferation budget will enable the new central coordinator to determine priorities, more clearly evaluate costs and benefits of competing programs, and send clear marching orders to the rest of the bureaucracy.

The task is difficult, but the stakes are high. Presidents cannot manage nonproliferation policy by themselves. They have too many obligations and too little time. Even the best-intentioned president does not have the resources to personally ensure that vaccine stockpiles match intelligence estimates, that policy innovations get off the ground, or that programs are well integrated in support of a comprehensive strategy. These tasks require organizational capabilities. In nonproliferation policy, organizational reform may not be a panacea, but it is the right place to start.

¹ The term "weapons of mass destruction" includes nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons as well as their means of delivery.

² A March 2003 Kennedy School of Government report commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that al Qaida has been attempting to acquire nuclear materials and the expertise to build a bomb for at least a decade and

concluded that “detailed analysis of the nuclear documents recovered in Afghanistan, and of other evidence, suggests that, had al Qaida not been deprived of their Afghanistan sanctuary, their quest for a nuclear weapon might have succeeded....” Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, John P. Holdren, *Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan*, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, March 2003, p. xii, < <http://www.nti.org/cnwm> >. See also U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Public Statements on Potential Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Agents since July 1997,” updated April 12, 2002, < http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/pub_statements_cbrn.html >; Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, rev. ed., November 20, 2001, < <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm> >.

³ Sam Nunn, “Moving Away from Doomsday and Other Dangers: The Need to Think Anew,” speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, March 29, 2001, < http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/related/govt/testimony/final_npc_speech.html >.

⁴ ACDA was an independent agency charged with developing, advocating, and implementing arms control agreements. Before the merger, the State Department’s nonproliferation efforts were scattered and underemphasized, a product of the department’s strong regional orientation. The merger consolidated all nonproliferation efforts of both organizations into three State department bureaus—the Bureau of Nonproliferation, the Bureau of Arms Control, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs—and placed them under the direction of the under secretary for arms control and international security.

⁵ In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin launched the Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) to elevate the importance of WMD issues within the military and to establish the Pentagon’s bureaucratic primacy in nonproliferation policy across the U.S. government. Aspin called for a review of WMD defense technologies, established a new assistant secretary position for nuclear security and counterproliferation, and charged the services with identifying specific research and acquisition programs to be funded. The CPI did not get far. The services, facing overall budget cuts, resisted shifting budgets and priorities to new WMD programs; the new assistant secretary position was soon abolished; and the program encountered opposition from the State Department and other agencies outside the Pentagon who feared Pentagon primacy would downgrade non-military aspects of nonproliferation policy. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative brought together five different agencies that dealt with proliferation-related technology acquisition programs into a single defense threat reduction agency; it consolidated a number of policy areas in the office of the secretary under a single assistant secretary for strategy and threat reduction; and it cut support business costs. Again, however, these reform efforts fell short of expectations. In 1999, the Deutch Commission found that even after the Defense Reform Initiative, the Pentagon still lacked the managerial direction to set broad programmatic goals and to integrate all of the department’s programs in pursuit of those goals. The commission concluded that responsibility for proliferation-related issues was “so diffused as to make it impossible to determine who—below the Deputy Secretary—has the authority and the responsibility to integrate plans, policy requirements, and programs” *Deutch Commission Report*, p. 53.

⁶ For an overview of this debate, see Michael Moodie and Amy Sands, “New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements,” *Nonproliferation Review* 8, (Spring 2001), pp. 1-9.

⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, Volume II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 477-78; 492.

⁸ Henry M. Jackson, “How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival?” Address before the National War College, Washington, DC, April 16, 1959; in Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988), pp. 78-81.

⁹ Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 18.

¹⁰ For more on the importance of organizational structure and process, see Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington,

DC: Brookings, 1974); Patrick J. Haney, *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Terry M. Moe, “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1989), pp. 267-329; Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

¹¹ The commissions are: The Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Deutch Commission); The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission); The National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission); and the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Panel).

¹² U.S. Senate, *Report to Accompany H.R. 4690 on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill 2001*, 106th Congress, 2nd session, S. Rpt. 106-404, September 8, 2000.

¹³ Russia Task Force (Cutler-Baker Task Force), *A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, U.S. Department of Energy, January 10, 2001, < <http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf> >.

¹⁴ General Accounting Office (GAO) publications include both reports and testimony officially submitted to Congress: “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction,” testimony of Gary L. Jones, director, Natural Resources and Environment, GAO, before U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services (GAO-02-180T), November 14, 2001, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02180.pdf> >; “Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response,” testimony of Raymond J. Decker, director, Defense Capabilities and Management, GAO, before U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, and Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (GAO-01-660T), April 24, 2001, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01660t.pdf> >; “Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy,” testimony of Raymond J. Decker, director, Defense Capabilities and Management, GAO, before U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (GAO-01-556T), March 27, 2001, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01556t.pdf> >; *Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response* (GAO-01-15), March 2001, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0115.pdf> >; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination* (GAO-0114), November 2000, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0114.pdf> >; “Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources,” testimony of Norman J. Rabkin, director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO, before US House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218), July 26, 2000, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00218t.pdf> >; “Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs,” testimony of Norman J. Rabkin, director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO, before U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172), May 4, 2000, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00172t.pdf> >; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism* (GAO/NSIAD-00-85), April 2000, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00085.pdf> >; “Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs,” testimony of Norman J. Rabkin, director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO, before U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145), April 6, 2000, < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00064.pdf> >; U.S. GAO, *Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 Experiences* (GAO/AIMD-00-1), October 1999, < <http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ai00001.pdf> >; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack* (GAO/NSIAD-99-163), September 7,

1999; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs* (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181), June 9, 1999; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations* (GAO/NSIAD-99-135), May 13, 1999; U.S. GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism* (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107), March 11, 1999.

¹⁵ I am grateful to Ashton Carter for originally suggesting this distinction.

¹⁶ Organization theory offers no ideal-type organizational design. Incomplete information, imperfect monitoring, and the uncertainties of human interaction make all organizational arrangements prone to problems. See Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, *Economics, Organization and Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992).

¹⁷ John McLaughry, "The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: A Legislative History," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1963, p.52.

¹⁸ Hubert Humphrey, speech in U.S. Senate, March 8, 1960, reprinted in 106 *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2d session, p.4915.

¹⁹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on S. 2180*, August 14-16, 1961, pp. 62, 112.

²⁰ When asked to elaborate about the difficulties and delays he experienced in getting his negotiating instructions, Lodge replied that he would go into the details at the Committee's executive session. See U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p. 120.

²¹ U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, pp. 116-17.

²² Senator John F. Kennedy, remarks at the University of New Hampshire, March 7, 1960, reprinted in 106 *Congressional Record*, 86th Congress, 2nd session, March 7, 1960, pp. 4707-9.

²³ McLaughry, "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," p. 44.

²⁴ Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, *Hearings on the Hart-Rudman Report*, 107th Congress, 1st session, April 3, 2001; Sam Nunn, former U.S. senator, testimony before U.S. House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, *Hearing on Terrorism Prevention*, 107th Congress, 1st session, July 23, 2001.

²⁵ A. Stone, "United States is Open to Attacks by Terrorists, Report Warns," *USA Today*, July 9, 1999, p. 11A.

²⁶ *Deutch Commission Report*, p.9.

²⁷ U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Testimony of Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, United States Air Force, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 107th Congress., 1st session, July 12, 2001.

²⁸ It is worth noting that in 2002, the program stalled for nearly an entire fiscal year when Congressional Republican opponents attached criteria requiring the administration "certify" Russian compliance on a number of issues, including human rights and arms control pledges.

²⁹ Suzanne E. Spaulding, "The Deutch Commission Report: An Overview," *Nonproliferation Review* 6 (Fall 1999), pp. 170-1.

³⁰ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 75-6.

³¹ Senior U.S. official (name withheld by request), telephone interview with author, March 21, 2001.

³² U.S. House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, *Hearings on U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: How Far Have We Come? Where are We Heading? Part II*, 108th Congress., 1st session, May 14, 2003.

³³ See in particular: U.S. Senate, *Hearings on the Hart-Rudman Report*, April 3, 2001; U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, *Hearings*, 107th Congress, 1st session, July 12, 2001; U.S. House, *Hearing on Terrorism Prevention*, July 23, 2001; U.S. Senate Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Service, *Hearing on Handling Bioterrorist Attacks*, 107th Congress., 1st session, July 23, 2001; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Hearing on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*, 107th Congress., 1st session, July 24, 2001.

³⁴ US General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorist Leadership*.

³⁵ *Hearings on the Hart-Rudman Report*, April 3, 2001.

³⁶ *First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, December 15, 1999, p.59, <<http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.terror.pdf>> .

³⁷ Russia Task Force, *Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*.

³⁸ Kennedy, remarks at the University of New Hampshire, March 7, 1960.

³⁹ Trevor Gardner, "Organizing for Peace," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 16 (September 1960), p. 299.

⁴⁰ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 472.

⁴¹ U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, August 14-16, 1961, pp. 8-9.

⁴² U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control, and Reduction of Arms, *Hearings*, Part II, 85th Congress, 1st session, January 9-10, 1957, p. 1085.

⁴³ Thomas E. Murray, *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1960), p. 202.

⁴⁴ Kennedy, remarks at the University of New Hampshire, March 7, 1960.

⁴⁵ Gardner, "Organizing for Peace," p. 299.

⁴⁶ U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p.9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴⁸ Hart-Rudman Commission, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. x, <<http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>> .

⁴⁹ Hart-Rudman Commission, *Road Map for National Security*, p. 10.

⁵⁰ Gilmore Panel, *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, December 15, 2000, p.iii, <<http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf>> .

⁵¹ *Deutch Commission Report*, p. 5.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Gary L. Jones, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services (GAO-02-180T), November 14, 2001, p. 7, <<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02180.pdf>> .

⁵⁵ *Deutch Commission Report*, p.9.

⁵⁶ For a side-by-side analysis of proposals in this area, see Raymond J. Decker, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response," testimony before U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, and Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (GAO-01-660T), April 24, 2001, <<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01660t.pdf>> .

⁵⁷ Gilmore Panel, *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, p. v.

⁵⁸ Jason Peckenpaugh, "Building a Behemoth," *Government Executive*, September 1, 2002, <<http://www.govexec.com/features/0902/0902mag.htm>> .

⁵⁹ U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Hearing on Proliferation Threats Facing the United States*, 108th Congress, 1st session, March 19, 2003.

⁶⁰ *Deutch Commission Report*, p. 19.

⁶¹ Spaulding, "Deutch Commission Report," p. 171.

⁶² For more, see U.S. House, *Hearing on Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs, Part II*, May 14, 2003.

⁶³ Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, *Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials*, p. xvi.

⁶⁴ US Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁵ John F. Kennedy, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 15, 1961, reprinted in *Disarmament Document Series* no. 29, mimeograph (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962), p.1.

⁶⁶ *Deutch Commission Report*, p. 4.

⁶⁷ For a good analysis of ACDA's troubled history, see Barry M. Blechman and Janne E. Nolan, "Reorganizing for More Effective Arms Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Summer 1983), pp. 1157-82; Duncan A. Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency* (New York: Free Press, 1979).

⁶⁸ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics*

of *Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, revised edition (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 128-51.

⁶⁹ Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," pp. 267-329; James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books 2000), pp.257-76.

⁷⁰ As Terry Moe concludes, "in the political system, public bureaucracies are designed in no small measure by participants who explicitly want them to fail." Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 127.

⁷¹ Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, p. ix.

⁷² Senior U.S. official (name withheld by request), interview by author, March 20, 2001.

⁷³ Zegart, *Flawed by Design*, pp. 37-8.

⁷⁴ Herbert A. Simon, "Public Administration in Today's World of Organizations and Markets," John Gaus Lecture, American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC, September 1, 2000, reprinted in *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33 (December 2000), p. 753, < <http://www.apsanet.org/PS/dec00/simon.cfm> > .

⁷⁵ In July 2001, Sam Nunn provided a vivid description of the problem. Testifying before Congress, he noted that a few years ago, when the Clinton administration held a meeting to discuss supplemental funding legislation for defense against biological weapons, the presiding White House Official greeted officials from the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Council staff and the Defense Department. But when he saw the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services, he did a double take and asked, "What are you doing here?" As Nunn concluded, "Health officials should not need to be given directions to the White House Situation Room." Nunn, testimony before U.S. House, Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, *Hearing on Terrorism Prevention*, 107th Congress, 1st session, July 23, 2001.

⁷⁶ Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control*, pp. 14-15.

⁷⁷ U.S. House, *Hearing on Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs, Part II*, May 14, 2003.

⁷⁸ Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control*, p. 19.

⁷⁹ U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Hearings*, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., September 24, 1974, p. 3.

⁸⁰ McClaughry, "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," pp. 177-81.

⁸¹ Former U.S. government official (name withheld by request), telephone interview by author, March 21, 2001.

⁸² Kennedy, Remarks at the University of New Hampshire, March 7, 1960.

⁸³ Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control*, p. 19.

⁸⁴ McClaughry, "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," p. 147.

⁸⁵ George Bunn, telephone interview by author, January 26, 2001.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Report on S. 2180," 87th Cong., 1st sess., Report No.882, September 6, 1961, in *Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961).

⁸⁸ Text of S. 2180, U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. 75 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p.632.

⁹⁰ Text of S. 2180, U.S. Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p.2.

⁹¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. 75, p. 632.

⁹² Text of S. 2180, US Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p.4.

⁹³ *United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. 75, p.635.

⁹⁴ Text of S. 2180, US Senate, *Hearings on S. 2180*, p. 4.

⁹⁵ Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 518.

⁹⁶ Statement by Chairman Clement J. Zablocki, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Hearings*, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, September 24, 1974, p.v.

⁹⁷ Blechman and Nolan, "Reorganizing for More Effective Arms Negotiations," p. 1180.