
Whither the Role of Private Foundations in Support of International Security Policy?

MITCHEL B. WALLERSTEIN¹

Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein is Vice President for the Program on Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy from 1993-1997.

Since the 1970s, a relatively small group of private foundations in the United States have helped to shape the public debate in the international security field through systematic grantmaking around such issues as peace studies, conflict resolution, arms control, non-proliferation and regional security. These organizations include some of the largest and most well known eleemosynary institutions in the world—such as the Ford, MacArthur and W. Alton Jones Foundations; the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and John Merck Fund; and the Carnegie Corporation of New York—as well as a number of smaller but nonetheless influential funders, such as the Compton, Prospect Hill, Samuel Rubin, Scherman and Winston Foundations and the Ploughshares Fund.

Generally speaking, these foundations are considered to have a progressive vision of the current and prospective international security policy agenda.² This vision is characterized, for example, by its support for measures to advance U.S. national security through engagement rather than confrontation; through verifiable arms control initiatives, rather than open-ended military competition; and through effective treaties and international legal norms

rather than military intervention. But how did these funding institutions come to be involved in the arcane and often technical world of security policy, and what is the basis of their legitimacy in making grants on a subject traditionally considered the domain of governments?

In addition to examining these questions, this article will try to characterize the dilemmas that this segment of the philanthropic community³ now must confront as it seeks, along with governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to understand, react to, and anticipate the future direction of international security concerns in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. To be sure, private philanthropies rarely undertake grantmaking in a tightly coordinated, collective fashion. When their agendas overlap, they may concentrate their support on the same (or similar) grantees. But most basic decisions on substantive priorities and program guidelines have been, and continue to be, taken independently. At the same time, however, all funders are struggling with the question of how to move beyond old security paradigms in order to promote new thinking and informed debate in a world that

was searching, even before the terrorist attacks, for a new set of organizing principles in international affairs

THE UNCERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Early foundation support for arms control and other innovative approaches to international security problems arose during the height of the Cold War. At that time, the predominant concern for all parts of the political spectrum was the threat of a nuclear annihilation. The nuclear threat clearly remains very relevant, though curiously most of the public seems oblivious to this fact. But the end of the bipolar world order in the early 1990s unleashed political and economic forces that have created security challenges of far greater complexity and diversity than the (already complex) problems of stable deterrence under the “mutually assured destruction” scenario of the Cold War.

There is a large and growing literature, including in the pages of this journal, about current security threats and policy responses, ranging from weapons of mass destruction to terrorism to cyber-warfare.⁴ From the standpoint of the progressive foundations that remain committed to funding in the area of international security, the “complexification” of the international security agenda over the last decade has created difficult new dilemmas.

First, it is clear that the paramount nuclear threat of the past is far from being eliminated—or even substantially reduced—as had been hoped during the 1990s. The United States and the Russian Federation, though no longer adversaries, continue to maintain a combined total of more than 15,000 deployed nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems, most at high levels of launch readiness, together with thousands of additional warheads in reserves that are maintained at lower readiness levels, and sufficient reserve fissile material stocks for additional thousands of weapons.⁵ While recent progress in the bilateral discussions between U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin on deep cuts in offensive missile systems appears encouraging, the problem remains far from resolved. Indeed, recent Bush administration pronouncements, associated with the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, have indicated that most of the decommissioned warheads associated with future U.S. reductions are to be held *in reserve*, rather than destroyed.⁶ This decision is likely to create further difficulties within the U.S.-Russian security dialogue.

Other nuclear challenges of long-standing concern similarly show no signs of improvement, and indeed may be worsening. China, for example, is known to be in the process of a major modernization of its aging and limited inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and it may well feel compelled to expand its existing ICBM capability by as much as an order of magnitude (i.e., from approximately 20 to between 100-200) if and when the United States proceeds with its plans for even a “thin” national missile defense (in order to avoid the neutralization of its deterrent).⁷ In South Asia, India and Pakistan, with their nuclear tests in 1998, have openly joined the nuclear “club.” As of this writing, their forces are deployed “eyeball to eyeball” at their common frontier. Meanwhile, Israel remains an undeclared nuclear weapons state, North Korea may possess one to two nuclear weapons, and there are significant concerns about the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iraq and Iran.⁸

Under these circumstances, many plausibly argue that private foundations should “stay the course” by continuing to support research, policy analyses and international dialogues to encourage—and, hopefully, to accelerate—additional deep reductions in nuclear arms and improved nuclear safety measures, such as warhead de-alerting or de-mating, plutonium disposition, and re-direction of the work of the nuclear weapons designers. But, despite the recent hopeful signs, overall progress on strategic arms reductions remains painfully slow, and the early momentum of the immediate post-Cold War years has largely been squandered. From the standpoint of the foundations that have championed nuclear reductions, there have been years and years of support—in amounts now totaling in the hundreds of millions of dollars—for studies, conferences, commissions and other initiatives to address problems of arms control and nonproliferation.⁹ Yet, progress has been limited, at best. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, for example, though now ratified (albeit with significant qualifications on both sides), remains unimplemented, the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) late in the Clinton administration, and prospects remain dim for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

At the same time, for the past decade many have considered the threat of poorly secured nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union to be a far more urgent danger to the United States and the world than U.S. and Russian nuclear deployments. This danger appears even more serious in light of the events of September 11,

2001.¹⁰ Given current economic and political circumstances in Russia, the likelihood that plutonium or highly enriched uranium for one or more nuclear weapons might be “lost,” stolen, or sold illegally to a terrorist organization probably represents a far more realistic security threat than a direct nuclear attack by a nation-state—even a state “of proliferation concern,” such as Iraq. But it is unclear whether private foundations have the means, not to mention the will, to address this problem. The costs of addressing the Soviet nuclear legacy—destroying unneeded nuclear weapons and equipment, improving security at the remaining nuclear storage depots, and creating jobs and housing for weapons designers and others in Russia’s nuclear cities—will, in most cases, have to be financed by governments and multilateral aid agencies. The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (along with substantially more modest efforts by a few European governments and Japan) has helped to address some of the most immediate needs, but it has been under-funded and too limited in scope.¹¹

Added to these challenges is the mounting evidence (both before and after the terrorist attacks) that the Bush administration intends to effect a “sea change” in its approach to bilateral and multilateral arms control and nonproliferation policy—shifting to an approach that many have branded as unilateralist. Witness the fact that, in only its first year in office, the administration has:

- announced its intention to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to permit construction and testing of a missile defense system
- raised the possibility of developing an offensive military capability in space as part of future generations of missile defense
- walked away from negotiations on an enhanced Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) protocol
- stated its opposition to bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) back before the U.S. Senate for ratification¹²

A similar approach has been taken by the administration in other multilateral talks, as well.¹²

Moreover, many governments, including some allied with or friendly to the United States, have announced their opposition—or, at least, studied neutrality—to the development of a missile defense system on the grounds that it (a) potentially undermines the stable deterrence on which most existing arms control agreements are based, and (b) creates the real possibility of a progressive unraveling of the entire fabric of arms control and nonproliferation treat-

ties and regimes that have been negotiated over more than three decades.¹⁴ Once again, however, the question arises: how can or should private foundations respond to this major challenge to the existing international security order, particularly in view of the role they played (see below) in helping to facilitate many of the contacts that led to the agreements that are now imperiled?

Finally, there is the obvious question that all of the foundations supporting work in the international security area are now struggling with: how should funding priorities be altered in the wake of the September 11, 2001, tragedy? For example, few of the major funders that have supported arms control and nonproliferation have heretofore made terrorism a major programmatic focus. Moreover, because many funders, including the MacArthur Foundation, have been of the view that there was—and remains—extremely important “unfinished business” related to nuclear arms reductions and the security of existing nuclear weapons, there has been a natural reluctance to abandon or reduce the scope of this work in order to divert resources to other, more contemporary threats, such as biological weapons. This dilemma has only been compounded by the reduced number of funders, which has put significant pressure on the remaining foundations simply to sustain programs already underway. The one good piece of news, in this regard, is the entry into the field of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), funded by Ted Turner, which has more than doubled the resources available for addressing the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.¹⁵ The emergence of NTI may, in fact, make it possible for some of the other major funders to refocus their grantmaking plans and allow greater attention to emerging security concerns, such as biological and chemical weapons proliferation, conflict resolution, and terrorism.

EXPANDING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOUNDATION INVOLVEMENT

The origins of foundation involvement in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear cataclysm can be traced to the late 1970s, when many of the activists who had remained politically engaged after the end of the Vietnam War became increasingly vocal about the fact that the much-vaunted détente policy of the Nixon/Ford era had failed to reduce the nuclear danger.¹⁶ Indeed, with the decision in the early 1980s to deploy new weapons systems, such as the MX intercontinental ballistic missile and

nuclear-armed cruise missiles, a number of smaller, mostly New York-based, foundations and wealthy individual philanthropists were motivated to underwrite the search for new ways of stimulating the security policy debate in Washington. These efforts primarily took the form of support for educational campaigns to inform the public about the continuing dangers of the superpower nuclear rivalry, campaigns which eventually coalesced into the nuclear freeze movement.¹⁷

The nuclear freeze movement soon became the new rallying point for many of the political activists from the earlier anti-war movement. As John Tirman notes, “the debate within funding circles and the arms-control community about the specific approach to change—thinkers versus doers, or academics versus grassroots activists—was ongoing and at times heated. The chasm between some defense intellectuals and activists often appeared broad and deep.”¹⁸ The dilemma for foundations regarding the most judicious mix of activities to support, ranging from advocacy to dispassionate academic analysis, has continued until the present day. Funders have learned from experience that if they support only academic policy analysis, however well conceived and innovative, without attending to the far more difficult (and “messier”) question of how policy is actually made—or changed—in the real world, there was likely to be little tangible progress, — especially on a subject as complicated (and potentially frightening) as weapons of mass destruction.

There is some debate as to the net effect of the philanthropic community’s efforts, either regarding the modest arms control successes achieved during the 1980s and early 1990s, (*e.g.*, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, START I, etc.) or ultimately, in hastening the end of the Cold War. Many analysts seem inclined to the view that private support probably did not have a major impact in either case.¹⁹ The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were already in the process of social, economic and political implosion, resulting from their own internal contradictions and decades of corruption and mis-management. Others argue that the ideas and policies promoted by transnational networks of activists did have a significant influence on the end of the Cold War.²⁰ Regardless of where one stands on this issue, however, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the formal denouement of the Cold War provided a convenient excuse for a number of foundations to “declare victory” and exit the field.

By the early 1990s, however, it was already evident that the end of more than 40 years of ideological struggle

between the two nuclear superpowers, rather than bringing enduring security, was instead giving way to a new set of security dangers, including “loose nukes” and the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to new states. Nevertheless, a number of foundations apparently felt that there was little prospect for additional progress on arms control and nonproliferation matters in the short-to-medium term. This view gained strength after the successful indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. It is also likely that some foundations were suffering from “donor fatigue” or outright disillusionment.²¹ Whatever the reason, a number of important philanthropies decided to seize upon the historical moment of the end of the Cold War to reorient their funding priorities.

The statistics tell the tale: from more than 75 foundations making grants in the international security field in 1984, the number dropped to 55 foundations in 1988 and to 25 by 1994.²² Among the foundations in this “first wave” of departures from the field were the George Gund Foundation and the Rockefeller Family Fund. Many donors at the time chose to turn their attention instead to environmental problems, where the prospects for progress looked considerably better.²³ As John Redick, formerly of the W. Alton Jones Foundation, has observed: “I think foundations floundered at the end of the Cold War. They did not seize the opportunity to make a major change away from high military spending, did not try to strengthen the UN or regional organizations, or educate the public about international engagement. Instead, I saw trustees walk away and look for a new fad. The end of the Cold War was the end of excitement. It was a time for maturity from foundations, and that did not happen.”²⁴

One should not suggest, however, that the efforts of the foundation community were without any significant impact during the early post-Cold War period. On the contrary, aside from the political activism and grassroots advocacy mentioned earlier, foundations provided support for a number of important policy studies and broader educational efforts, many of which were highly influential.²⁵ Also, with the end of the Cold War, the range of subjects of interest to the security-minded foundations began to expand. Problems such as pre-conflict resolution and post-conflict peacekeeping, stemming the flows of legal and illegal small arms transfers, and issue-specific initiatives, such as the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, all received support.²⁶ When these accomplishments are taken together, it is clear that the efforts of the philan-

thropic community helped to create and sustain a community of scholars and policy analysts interested in promoting restraint, engagement, arms control and nonproliferation.

As the decade of the 1990s progressed, with power in Washington divided between the political parties (resulting in ever more fractious and partisan in-fighting), and with President Clinton distracted by a scandal that ultimately resulted in his impeachment, progress on significant arms control or nonproliferation issues slowed dramatically. The first Clinton term produced a number of accomplishments. These included: the indefinite extension of the NPT; the denuclearization of three of the four post-Soviet nuclear states (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan); the U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the signing of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program; and the dismantling of much of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability through the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Both the NPT extension and CWC ratification were facilitated, in part, by major foundation support and aggressive NGO involvement. The negotiations leading to the Agreed Framework were catalyzed by a visit to Pyongyang by former President Jimmy Carter, which was underwritten by the Rockefeller Foundation. In contrast, the second Clinton term was marked by major setbacks, such as the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and failures, such as the inability to complete negotiations on a strengthened Biological Weapons Convention protocol or to make progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

For some foundations, frustration with the lack of additional progress may have led to disillusionment and "donor fatigue." For others, impatience that many years of support for university research and NGO activism had failed to produce a new security paradigm may have caused them to rethink their priorities. Whatever the reason, near the end of the 1990s a number of the major funders had become sufficiently alarmed about the deteriorating state of the field and the reduced support available—despite the appearance of NTI—that they joined together to establish a new affinity group, known as the Peace and Security Funders Group (PSFG). The purpose of the PSFG is, in part, to attract new foundations, large and small, as well as individual philanthropists to support strategies of engagement and restraint in the international security field.

Nevertheless, the field absorbed yet another serious blow in 2001 when the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the John Merck Fund both announced that they would cease grantmaking in the international security area by the end of 2002.²⁷ (In the case of W. Alton Jones, it was revealed that the family-controlled foundation had decided to dissolve). Thus, it is fair to say that even before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks totally changed the focus and saliency of international security policy, the field was already in a considerable state of flux.

THE CONCERNS OF THE FOUNDATION COMMUNITY PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Before the international security agenda was dramatically changed by the terrorist attacks on the United States, the grantmaking activities of the major funders had been focused largely (though not exclusively) around four major foci:

- (1) Encouraging new thinking to replace the Cold War paradigm. This task included identifying new security parameters in a globalizing world, such as conflict resolution, public health (e.g. HIV/AIDS), water and other natural resource constraints, economic and political migration, civil conflicts, etc. It also encouraged the development of new models of security that focused on the security and well-being of the individual (usually referred to as "human security").
- (2) Helping to stabilize, if not reverse, the deterioration in U.S.-Russian (and US-Chinese) relations that appeared to block progress on further reductions in strategic and tactical weapons
- (3) Dealing with the perceived rise of U.S. unilateralism, including the development of national missile defenses (NMD), the abrogation of or failure to ratify international treaties, and lack of active support for certain international regimes.
- (4) Finding ways to re-populate the international security field, replacing the "best and brightest" of the Cold War generation.

The following section briefly describes the major concerns of the foundation community in these areas prior to September 11, 2001.

The Need for New Thinking

From the standpoint of many funders, including the majority of experts who follow international security issues, the latter part of the 1990s involved a series of

missed or squandered opportunities to “think anew” on such matters as how to expedite deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and how to find a way beyond the deadly stalemate of “mutually assured destruction.” But other crises (e.g., the war in the Balkans) and political exigencies (e.g., NATO expansion) intervened to destroy the positive momentum that had been built up in the period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.²⁸ At the same time, questions were beginning to be raised in the philanthropic community about whether some of the NGOs (i.e., think tanks, advocacy groups, etc.) that focused explicitly on international security issues—many of which were created during the Cold War specifically to deal with the issues of that era—were appropriately staffed and intellectually equipped to cope with the dramatically altered security agenda after September 11, 2001. A key question in this regard is whether there is a need for a process of consolidation and innovation.

The State of U.S.-Russian Relations

As noted above, during the second Clinton term, especially after NATO expansion and NATO action in the Balkans, U.S.-Russian relations in the security domain fell back into a state of suspicion and mistrust. There appeared little prospect for forward progress on any front, ranging from negotiation of new arms control agreements to cooperation on restricting exports of sensitive technologies to states of proliferation concern, such as Iran. Since September 11, 2001, the campaign against terrorism may have changed the basis of the relationship and created a genuine opportunity for enhanced cooperation. Nevertheless, many difficulties still must be surmounted, including: continued (though now muted) Russian opposition to U.S. development of a missile defense system and the abrogation of the ABM Treaty; likely Russian resistance to further NATO expansion; and possible disagreement over the course to be followed in dealing with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, to name only a few. On the whole, however, the prospects definitely appear brighter for an improved bilateral relationship—to the point where it would seem unlikely that the state of the U.S.-Russian security relationship will continue to be a *separate* focus of attention, except in those situations where it potentially impedes progress on larger arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

The Rise of U.S. Unilateralism

It can be argued that the unilateralist strain in the Bush administration’s foreign policy stems in part from the mal-

aise in international arms control and nonproliferation negotiations during the late 1990s. The demise of Russia as a superpower, combined with the loss of momentum in critical arms control and nonproliferation negotiations or the outright failure of some regimes—contributed to the view that the United States might be better off pursuing its own national interest unilaterally, rather than being constrained by treaties that were largely negotiated and signed in a different era, in most cases with a political entity (the USSR) that no longer exists. Many senior Bush administration policymakers came into office with a deep skepticism of both bilateral and multilateral understandings and agreements constraining WMD. This skepticism often bordered on outright antipathy towards such instruments. Still, there had also been bilateral and multilateral security policy *successes* during the 1990s, including the ratification of START II, the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the successful negotiation and ratification of the CWC. Many of the funders discussed here played an important role behind the scenes in these achievements through their support of NGOs working on these issues. Moreover, new thinking that emerged in the 1990s about cooperative security—a concept developed through scholarship and professional exchanges underwritten by private foundations—led directly to the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative embodied in the 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation. The new unilateralists in Washington, however, appeared to question even these accomplishments, as the Bush administration reviewed U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union and promoted non-treaty-based approaches to strategic arms reduction.

Funders are consequently questioning whether the successes of the 1980s and 1990s were an aberration, or whether more progress is possible in the near term. They are also asking how foundations can encourage grantees to articulate the fundamental importance of sustaining a policy of engagement and the negative implications of pursuing a unilateral approach to international security policy. The need to forge a new coalition to conduct and legitimize the post-September 2001 war on terrorism—including the invocation for the first time of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—has made these points in a powerful and poignant manner. But even after cobbling together an anti-terrorist coalition and initiating hostilities in Afghanistan, the United States publicly announced its intention to proceed with the abrogation of the ABM Treaty²⁹ and walked away from the negotiations for a BWC monitoring protocol.³⁰ Thus, despite some rhetoric to the contrary, little evidence suggests that the Bush

administration has abandoned its unilateralist outlook. This situation reinforces the need for the foundation community oriented towards engagement and international restraint regimes to “stay the course.”

The Need to Repopulate the International Security Field

One of the sad realities of the present time is that we are in the midst of a generational change. Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the field of international security. Most of the key figures in both the United States and Russia who provided technical advice on nuclear weapons development and policy, as well as on other critical defense matters, during World War II and through much of the Cold War have now retired and are passing from the scene. Many of these individuals were leading figures in the fields of physics, chemistry, and engineering who served as long-time, trusted advisors to government. To further complicate matters, with the end of the Cold War, universities and think tanks—and even the U.S. Government—have moved to eliminate programs or scale-back the number of full-time positions dealing with security issues. These cuts have had the dual effect of constricting the pipeline for new talent, as fewer students (especially those with backgrounds in the physical sciences) choose to go into the field, while also severely reducing the career opportunities for those who have completed their training. As these effects become more pronounced with each passing year, many in the foundation community have begun to worry about where “the best and brightest” of the next generation of experts will be trained and employed—particularly those capable of engaging in the highly technical and often arcane details of arms control and nonproliferation matters.

In the case of the MacArthur Foundation, concern about sustaining the field through the development of the next generation of security experts has been a consistent theme from the outset. Most readers are probably familiar with the Foundation’s signature program, the MacArthur Fellows (sometimes known as the “genius awards”), which provides five years of “no strings attached” support to outstanding, creative individuals from a wide range of professional backgrounds. Over the course of the program, ten outstanding individuals in the international security field have been named MacArthur Fellows,³¹ recognition that conveys prestige, increased visibility, and financial security to these grantees. The MacArthur Foundation also has contributed in a number of other ways to strengthen-

ing the field through its support of fellowship and training programs, such as the Minnesota-Wisconsin-Stanford Consortium and the Global Security fellowship program of the Social Science Research Council. In addition, it has made grants to selected universities and NGOs that provide employment opportunities for outstanding individuals who emerge from these training programs. Many of these experts have gone on to leadership positions in U.S. government, in the nongovernmental research community, and in a number of multilateral institutions. In view of the concern about the current need to re-populate the field, a number of major foundations are currently exploring a new initiative to create *additional* post-doctoral training and professional opportunities in “science and security.”

NEW CHALLENGES

Most major philanthropic organizations in the United States responded quickly to the September 11, 2001, tragedy with an outpouring of charitable contributions, intended in the first instance to aid those whose lives had been directly affected by the attacks. Some, including the MacArthur Foundation, have sought to focus their grantmaking on the specific substantive issues, both domestic and international, raised by the events and their aftermath.³² Beyond the short-term response, it is likely that most funders will now step back and re-examine their priorities, seeking to determine whether they need to modify their grantmaking strategies. At this writing, it is too soon to know how or even whether the events of September 11, 2001 will permanently alter the programs of foundations supporting the international security field. It is also too early to judge whether this terrible tragedy and the hatreds that it revealed will cause other foundations and individual philanthropists to engage—or, in some cases, to re-engage—in the field.

Certainly, the question most widely encountered in the media—“why do they hate us?”—must be examined and understood. It should also be addressed in both its cultural and socio-economic dimensions, which extend well beyond the current scope and grantmaking guidelines of most of the existing foundation international security programs. There is also, however, a profusion of new (or altered) questions and concerns needing analysis. These relate more directly to international security, including:

- the means and methods of terrorism in the 21st century—including the reality of bio-terrorism and the older

concern about possible terrorist access to nuclear weapons;

- the relationships between state sponsors of terrorism and non-state actors, particularly in view of what is already known about the scope and extent of al-Qaeda's global network of terror cells;
- the human rights implications of the new "war on terrorism;" and
- the vulnerabilities of advanced industrialized societies to "asymmetrical" attacks on buildings, infrastructure, and civilian populations.

Here, as well, the appropriate role that private foundations can play in the search for answers to these difficult problems remains to be explored.

It is likely that there will be "niche" opportunities—particularly on those issues or problems that governments are unable or unwilling to address—where the philanthropic community can and should engage, ideally through a coordinated approach that exploits their collective resources. Among these niche opportunities are likely to be initiatives addressing possible restrictions of civil liberties and/or other human right violations, both in the U.S. and abroad arising from the reactions to the events of September 11, 2001. Foundation leaders will proceed with caution in some of these emerging issue areas. They are well aware that Americans are feeling vulnerable and insecure since the attack and are demanding further measures to ensure domestic safety and security. They also understand that the U.S. public demands, as a first order priority, that al-Qaeda terrorists be found and brought to justice for the terrible evil they have perpetrated.

In some respects, this discussion brings us back full circle to the question raised at the outset of this article: What is the source of legitimacy for private foundations, which are not directly accountable to the public through the political process, to become involved in a set of issues previously relegated almost exclusively to the domain of governments?³³ This point has been a sensitive one ever since the earliest days of foundation involvement. Indeed, the lack of direct public accountability—and resulting funding constraints—has been seen as creating both an opportunity and a special responsibility for the philanthropic community to support the exploration of difficult and/or politically charged issues and problems that governments may be constrained from addressing (or may choose for political reasons to avoid). Unfettered by historical foreign policy positions or military "theology," foundations are in an ideal position to facilitate new and creative thinking

about a range of subjects that sometimes have been considered "beyond debate." At the same time, most foundation leaders take very seriously their roles as managers of a public trust, and they adhere scrupulously to the rules imposed on such institutions.³⁴

It is also the case, however, that laws and regulations governing the tax requirements on eleemosynary institutions are intended to *encourage* these institutions to engage in such activities as public education, support for theoretical and applied research, and funding organizations engaged in issue advocacy (excluding lobbying activities). Certainly, in the international security policy arena, just as in the court of U.S. public opinion, there is a long history of encouraging public debate from all parts of the political spectrum. Foundations remain vital to this process through their role in providing the resources that facilitate this debate.

Moreover, foundations operating in the field of public policy do not do so in a vacuum. Through their boards of directors and the contacts of their professional staffs, they learn about and are attentive to issues of national and international concern. Through their interactions with grantees they are exposed to and influenced by a wide range of ideas and approaches. In the realm of international security, philanthropic organizations from all points on the political spectrum collectively represent a broad reflection of society's views and concerns.

There can be little question that our public discourse has been—and continues to be—strengthened by this contribution, which will be all the more important as we struggle to address the profound new challenges to global peace and security in the 21st century.

¹ This article was written prior to the terrible events of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, significant portions have been modified and new sections added to take account of the profound alteration of priorities in the international security field that has resulted from the tragedy. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions received from Kennette Benedict, Jonathan Fanton, Wayne Jaquith, Renee de Nevers, Leonard Spector, David Speedie, and Christine Wing during the development of the draft. The views expressed here, however, are *solely* those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the policy or position of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

² There are, of course, other eleemosynary institutions, that support a more traditional and more conservative agenda, working with grantees to promote larger defense budgets, national missile defenses, and robust nuclear forces, while opposing multilateral nonproliferation regimes and arms control agreements. Foundations with this focus include the Scaife, Olin, Smith-Richardson, and Bradley Foundations. Occasionally, both groups of funders may find common ground, each supporting, for example, efforts to improve security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union or tougher enforcement of export control laws.

³ Despite using collective terms such as the “philanthropic community” or the “foundation community” in this article, I wish to make clear that I do not purport to speak on behalf of other foundations making grants in this substantive area, but rather as someone involved in the field of international security for many years, who has seen it from the perspective of grantee, senior government official, and private philanthropy.

⁴ Michael Krepon, “Prisms and Paradigms” *Nonproliferation Review* 9 (Spring 2002), pp. 122-131.

⁵ “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 57 (March/April 2001), pp. 77-79, <<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ma01nukenote.html>>; “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 57 (May/June 2001), pp. 78-79, <<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/mj01nukenote.html>>.

⁶ Natural Resources Defense Council, “Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration’s Secret Plan for Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces,” February 13, 2002, <<http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/020213a.asp>>.

⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015* (Washington, DC, December 2001), <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.htm>.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, these foundations sponsored extensive research and public education efforts on these issues. Among the outstanding examples were: the nuclear weapon data books published by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Carnegie Endowment’s catalog of proliferation threats; the nuclear data bases and training efforts of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, and such publications as the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and *Arms Control Today*, to name only a few.

¹⁰ See, for example, Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Sam Nunn, “Towards a New Security Framework,” Remarks delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 3, 2001, <<http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/speeches/nunn.htm>>. Since the onset of hostilities in Afghanistan, and the recent rise in tensions between India and Pakistan caused by the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament, there has also been growing concern about the possibility of a nuclear exchange between these two states, as well as the possibility that some of Pakistan’s estimated 30 nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists if radical Islamic elements within Pakistan were to overthrow the current government of General Pervez Musharraf.

¹¹ In December 2001, the Bush administration announced that, based on the results of an internal review of U.S. government threat reduction efforts, it had decided to restore most of the funding that it had planned to cut and to accelerate these efforts. This is a major victory for the arms control and non-proliferation community, which had pushed hard for the full-scale continuation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (also known as the Nunn-Lugar Program).

¹² U.S. Department of State Press Release, “Bolton Says U.S. Will not Resume Nuclear Testing,” January 24, 2002, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02012400.htm>>.

¹³ Among the other, ongoing multilateral negotiations, treaties and regimes that the Administration has abandoned or rejected are the Kyoto Protocols on Global Warming and the treaty to establish an International Criminal Court.

¹⁴ And, of course, a substantial number of security experts in the United States also have argued against missile defense largely on the same basis.

¹⁵ For a brief description of NTI and its mission, see its web site, <<http://www.nti.org>>.

¹⁶ The exception is the Ford Foundation, which began funding in the area of international security during the 1950s.

¹⁷ See, John Tirman, *Making the Money Sing: Private Wealth and Public Power in the Search for Peace* (New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 3 and 15; and Jeffrey Knopf, *Domestic Security and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 63

²⁰ Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Effort to End the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

²¹ Tirman, *Making the Money Sing*, p. 65

²² *Ibid.*, p. 93

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 87

²⁴ Quoted in Tirman, *op. cit.*, p. 90

²⁵ See, for example, Spurgeon M. Keeny, ed., *Nuclear Power Issues and Choices* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976); Allison, *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy*; Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *The New Nuclear Nations*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994).

²⁶ See, for example, the work of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, <http://www.ccpdc.org/>

²⁷ These two foundations together accounted for approximately \$13 million in annual funding in this area.

²⁸ In fact, it can be argued that both the Balkan crisis and the NATO expansion decision were explicitly responsible for *derailing* efforts to improve US-Russian relations, which is clearly a necessary pre-condition to further progress on a broad array of security issues and negotiations.

²⁹ “Remarks of President George W. Bush Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, December 13, 2001, pp. 1771-1798.

³⁰ “Bolton Says BWC Draft Protocol Is Dead and Won’t Be Resurrected,” U.S. Department of State Press Release, November 19, 2001, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01112001.htm>>

³¹ Internal communication, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

³² Shortly after September 11, 2001, the MacArthur Foundation’s board of directors approved the establishment of special, \$5 million fund that was to be used to make one-time grants to organizations both in the United States and abroad who were addressing various substantive issues (e.g., refugees, civil liberties, etc.) arising from the terrorist attack and the U.S. response to it.

³³ Though not answerable to the public in the political sense, it should be pointed out that most private philanthropies, as Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-approved 501(c)(3) institutions, are operated as public trusts, and their grantmaking is a matter of public record.

³⁴ Under IRS regulations governing the behavior of private philanthropic organizations, there are specific purposes and applications towards which the resources may be employed (e.g., education, research, information dissemination), as well as certain uses that are not permitted (e.g., most lobbying activities).