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Spring 2002, Volume 9 • Number 1

Articles

The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons, and the Scottish Question
by Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker

Among the states that possess nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom is now regarded as one of the least problematic. Long recognized as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom has a stable democracy, competent administrative system, disciplined military forces, and a cooperative approach to international security. Historically, domestic agreement on nuclear policy has been more difficult to achieve, but an apparently durable consensus in the U.K. government and Parliament exists today around a low-key minimum nuclear force posture combined with support for arms control.

Despite U.K. nuclear policy attaining this stability, a new challenge is emerging from an unexpected source: constitutional changes during the 1990s that established a new legislature and executive in Scotland. In this article, Malcolm Chalmers of the University of Bradford, England, and William Walker of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, outline the implications of Scottish autonomy and possible Scottish independence for the U.K. nuclear force, which is currently based entirely on Scottish territory. The article also discusses what lessons can be drawn from the U.K. experience for the wider international debate about the fragmentation and collapse of nuclear-armed states. Chalmers and Walker do not suggest that there is an imminent crisis in U.K nuclear policy, but rather point out that the stability and continuity of the U.K. nuclear deterrent cannot be taken for granted. Its future depends on developments in Scotland and on its relations with the rest of the United Kingdom as much as on military and economic calculations.
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China's Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes
By Eric Croddy

Owing to political sensitivity, open source research on past and present Chinese chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities has been limited. Much of the literature on the topic is politicized. Many Chinese writings on CBW, for example, are preoccupied with allegations that the United States used CBW during the Korean War. These charges, although unfounded, are still repeated by Chinese officials and analysts. At the same time, the U.S. government suspects that China continues to develop CBW-related technology. However, little is known with any certainty about actual Chinese CBW defensive capabilities, and even less has been discovered about possible Chinese work on offensive CBW.

In an attempt to address the late Gerald Segal's question, "Does China really matter?" Eric Croddy, Senior Research Associate for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, traces the development of Chinese experiences and attitudes toward CBW and its participation in relevant arms control regimes. Through extensive primary source research, Croddy produces a comprehensive analysis of Chinese CBW capabilities. While Croddy concludes that it is not clear that China possesses a meaningful or even extant offensive CBW capability, he argues that its complicity in and potential for the proliferation of dual-use technology make the PRC an important player in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
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Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons
By Mark Wheelis

Biomedical sciences and the pharmaceutical industry are in the midst of a revolution in the science and technology of drug discovery that will significantly complicate the control of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). This revolution may also threaten the current international arms control treaties controlling such weapons. Scientists in fields that are contributing to this revolution may not understand these implications of their work. Likewise, arms control experts might not recognize that there is a profound revolution underway in biology, and that the technical landscape of chemical and biological arms control is rapidly changing.

In this article, Professor Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Davis, seeks to bridge the gap between science and arms control. Wheelis seeks to raise awareness in both fields of the potential ramifications that this scientific and technological revolution may have on CBW proliferation. He reviews the principal technologies involved in this revolution in the drug discovery process, and points out their relevance to the discovery of new CBW agents. These technologies include: combinatorial chemistry, genomics, microarrays, proteomics, toxicogenomics, and database mining. The relevance of these developments to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are then discussed, with particular attention to the potential of non-lethal weapons development to undermine these treaties. Wheelis concludes with an evaluation of what is needed to prevent a renewed biochemical weapons threat.
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Safeguarding This and Verifying That: Fuzzy Concepts, Confusing Terminology, and Their Detrimental Effects on Nuclear Husbandry
by Morten Bremer Maerli and Roger G. Johnston

Words and concepts may have remarkable power, especially in international matters where subtleties and ambiguities in meaning can have major implications for treaty interpretation and compliance. In the diplomatic and political sphere, ambiguity has its benefits, such as for attaining consensus or strategic gain. Fuzzy concepts may thus be embraced purposefully by international players to achieve policy goals. But the imprecise use of terms and concepts can also have significant negative effects, causing misunderstandings and lost opportunities.

In this article, Morten Bremer Maerli of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Roger G. Johnston of Los Alamos National Laboratory take a critical look at some of the existing nomenclature and concepts in the field of arms control. Maerli and Johnston argue that many current arms control terms are imprecisely defined and often used inaccurately. They contend that this imprecision may hamper the negotiation and implementation of current and prospective international arms control agreements. As an alternative to the current "fuzzy" terminology, Maerli and Johnston identify seven distinct "nuclear husbandry functions," which have less overlap, clearer definitions, and thus can help avoid technical and political pitfalls. The authors conclude that the use of improved terminology can strengthen both domestic and international efforts to improve nuclear security, while continued confusion over basic terms may block further progress.
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Whither the Role of Private Foundations in Support of International Security Policy?
by Mitchel B. Wallerstein

Security policy has traditionally been viewed as the province of governments, even in democracies. However, during the latter part of the Cold War, private Western foundations entered the security arena by providing funds to enable think tanks, advocacy organizations and individual researchers to conduct programs seeking to address the threat to international security posed by weapons of mass destruction. By stimulating discussion and public awareness of these issues, foundations filled a role played by neither governments nor universities.

In this article, Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Vice President for the Program on Global Security and Sustainability for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, traces the history of grant-making in international policy from its roots in the post-Vietnam era peace movement to its current efforts to address the emerging security environment after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He reflects on the successes and setbacks of the U.S. eleemosynary community in promoting the goals of international security, citing the contributions made by foundations to the debates in the United States over the Chemical Weapons Convention, the START I and II treaties, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. From there, the article discusses whether foundations must reorder their priorities to combat contemporary threats posed by bioterrorism and other types of asymmetrical warfare. Wallerstein concludes by examining the legitimacy of foundation involvement in the international security policy process, given that they lack direct political accountability.
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Viewpoints

Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals
By Robert E. Rehbein

The 1998 nuclear tests in Pakistan and India removed any hope that the nuclear weapons of these two countries would remain "in the closet." Since then India and Pakistan have gradually developed their respective nuclear systems and plans, and little real progress has been made to reduce the dangers. Fears that the two newest declared nuclear weapon states could unleash their arsenals over the Kashmir issue were joined after September 11, 2001, by deep concerns that Pakistani nuclear weapons, materials, and technology could be seized by rogue fundamentalists in the Pakistani military. These new dangers have suddenly shifted the U.S. national interest from its previous focus on preventing nuclear war in South Asia to efforts to halt possible attacks on its own shores.

Given recent changes in the strategic environment, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Rehbein, United States Air Force, argues that the United States must explore new policies that make the most of a bad situation. Rehbein contends that in order to reduce the chances of an inadvertent nuclear exchange occurring in South Asia, or of elements of the South Asian arsenals being used against others, U.S. policymakers should adopt a novel solution to help "manage" proliferation in this case. This proposal includes transferring selected U.S. nuclear weapons command and control (C2) systems to India and Pakistan, with the objective of securing the stability of their nuclear arsenals. Despite treaty constraints on such support, Rehbein maintains, the long-term necessity of preventing unauthorized weapons and material transfer or a nuclear exchange via "managed" proliferation outweighs the benefits of protecting a principled "zero-proliferation" stand.
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In the Shadow of Anthrax: Strengthening the Biological Disarmament Regime
By Jonathan B. Tucker

The lethal anthrax spores sent through the U.S. mail in the fall of 2001 have aroused new concern over the threat of bioterrorism. The anthrax incidents have again demonstrated that existing legal prohibitions on biological weapons are flawed or incomplete. The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of bacteriological agents in warfare but not their possession, and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, possession, stockpiling, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons but lacks adequate verification and compliance measures. With the December 2001 suspension of the Fifth BWC Review Conference, many countries and non-governmental organizations are wondering how best to bolster the regime.

Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, examines three complementary approaches to reinforcing the biological disarmament regime: (1) measures within the framework of the BWC; (2) national measures to strengthen the regime; and (3) external measures to strengthen the regime. Tucker argues that these approaches are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued in a coordinated manner. If nothing is done to strengthen the BWC and the international regime continues to unravel, he maintains, the consequences could be grim. Widespread proliferation of the specialized know-how needed to develop and deliver designer pathogens would make mass destruction capabilities accessible to small groups of terrorists and even to mentally deranged individuals. To prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, Tucker contends that the international community should take concrete steps to reinforce the ethical and legal norm against biological warfare and to regulate hazardous research.
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Prisms and Paradigms
by Michael Krepon

The Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, where weak states or terrorist groups strike at U.S. vulnerabilities while skirting U.S. military strength. Cold War security dilemmas, such as a massive "bolt from the blue" missile attack and the rumble of Soviet tank armies across the German plain, have given way to very different surprise attack scenarios. Americans now dread hijackers who fly planes into buildings, trucks carrying "fertilizer bombs," and letters without return addresses that could be carrying strange, powdery substances. Although the Cold War ended symbolically many times, the transition from Cold War to asymmetric warfare occurred rather precisely on September 11, 2001.

In this viewpoint, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argues that in the era of asymmetric warfare, the United States must develop a new central organizing principle for its national security policy. Krepon contends that the time is ripe for a new wave of creative thinking about the legacy of the Cold War in U.S. security policy. He proposes cooperative threat reduction as a new strategic concept, urging that it be included with deterrence, diplomacy, and superior military capabilities as a central instrument of U.S. national security policy. The potential of cooperative threat reduction is far greater than is commonly understood, concludes Krepon, and can make a major contribution to addressing the dangerous world of asymmetric threats.
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A Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament
by Yukiya Amano

As the only country to suffer a nuclear attack, Japan plays a unique role in international discussions regarding nuclear disarmament. In the years since 1945, Japan has emerged as a "middle ground voice," supporting practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the Japanese position and way of thinking on this subject are not always well understood in the international community.

In this viewpoint, Yukiya Amano of the Japanese Foreign Ministry analyzes the factors that Japan considers in formulating its position on disarmament issues, including both humanitarian and security considerations. He then outlines in detail the Japanese view on three major issues related to nuclear disarmament: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, deep cuts in nuclear arsenals (including the elimination of nuclear weapons), and ballistic missile defenses. He concludes that Japanese views on these issues reflect a balance between idealism and realism, an approach that may not grab headlines, but whose influence should not be underestimated.
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Reports

The German Plutonium Balance, 1968-1999
by Martin B. Kalinowski, Wolfgang Liebert, and Silke Aumann

Growing stockpiles of civilian separated plutonium pose a serious nonproliferation challenge. The international community and individual states with civilian nuclear programs face the question of how this material can be safely processed or stored for the long term. A number of countries, including Germany, Japan, Russia, and Great Britain confront significant plutonium surpluses and currently lack assured plans for its disposal.

In this article, Martin B. Kalinowsky of the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and Wolfgang Liebert and Silke Aumann of the Darmstadt University of Technology trace the development of the German plutonium stockpiles since 1968. The authors provide a comprehensive estimate of German plutonium stocks, analyzing the results of foreign and domestic reprocessing of spent nuclear power reactor fuel as well as the production and use of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. The report concludes that because the German MOX program will have difficulty absorbing existing German stocks of this material, the future of the German reprocessing program has been placed in doubt, and new initiatives are urgently needed to develop a comprehensive long-term strategy for addressing the German plutonium surplus.
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Technical and Proliferation-Related Aspects of the Dismantlement of Russian Alfa-Class Nuclear Submarines
by Mohini Rawool-Sullivan, Paul D. Moskowitz, and Ludmila N. Shelenkova

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union built 245 nuclear submarines. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited these submarines, and faced the challenge of dismantling them and finding safe and secure storage for the associated radioactive waste. A unique aspect of this problem has been the dismantling of the Russian Alfa-class nuclear submarines, which were built with liquid metal-cooled (LMC) reactors whose dismantling raises unique technical and nonproliferation challenges.

In this report, Mohini Rawool-Sullivan of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Paul D. Moskowitz and Ludmila N. Shelenkova of Brookhaven National Laboratory analyze open source information on the Russian Alfa-class nuclear submarines. The seven submarines of this class were each fitted with an LMC reactor fueled by weapons-grade uranium. Built for speeds above 40 knots, in several instances, these submarines suffered reactor meltdowns and other serious accidents. All of the Alfa-class submarines are decommissioned and awaiting dismantlement. The report describes the LMC reactors used aboard these submarines, the fuel used in them, and analyzes the spent fuel issues associated with their decommissioning.
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