

## *Special Section on the September 11, 2001, Attacks*

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# Roundtable on the Implications of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks for Nonproliferation and Arms Control

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### INTRODUCTION

In the weeks since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the proposition that the attacks have “changed the world” has become accepted as conventional wisdom. Not only have the attacks had a profound impact on how the United States views its vulnerability to terrorism, but the ongoing U.S. response to the attacks will inevitably affect a broad range of U.S. policies related to nonproliferation. Equally significant effects on international nonproliferation regimes are possible. To explore these issues, on September 28, 2001, *The Nonproliferation Review* gathered a group of nonproliferation and arms control specialists to examine the implications of the attacks. The group included a range of current and former government officials and nongovernmental analysts. In a 90-minute discussion, the group explored the repercussions of the attacks on a number of topics, including weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) terrorism, the international nonproliferation regime, U.S.-Russian relations, and regions of proliferation concern, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Leonard Spector, Deputy Director (in the Washington, DC office) of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Editor-in-Chief of the Center’s publications, chaired the session.

#### *Participants:*

**Yukiya Amano**, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Robert Einhorn**, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation

**Rebecca Johnson**, Executive Director, Acronym Institute, London, U.K.

**Michael Krepon**, President Emeritus, Stimson Center, Washington, DC

**Jason Pate**, Senior Research Associate, CNS

**William C. Potter**, Director, CNS

**Amy Sands**, Deputy Director, CNS

**Paul Schulte**, U.K. Ministry of Defense, London, U.K.

**Nikolai Sokov**, Senior Research Associate, CNS

**Amin Tarzi**, Senior Research Associate, CNS

**Jonathan B. Tucker**, Director, CBW Nonproliferation Program, CNS

**Leonard S. Spector**, Deputy Director and Editor-in-Chief, CNS

**Christine Wing**, Program Officer, Ford Foundation, New York, NY

**Leonard Spector:** Thank you all for joining us today. Like you, I am still trying to digest the significance of the events of September 11, 2001, for the fields of nonproliferation and arms control, in which we have all worked together for so many years. For this reason, I thought it would be valuable for us to assemble and take a first reading of what we believe the most important impacts of the terrorist attacks are likely to be.

Obviously, events are moving swiftly, and it is impossible to make long-term predictions with any confidence. Nonetheless, I think it will be useful for us and for the readers of *The Nonproliferation Review* to identify the principal areas where the influence of the September 11 terrorist attacks is most likely to be felt in coming months—for example on such issues as WMD terrorism and nuclear relations in South Asia—and to describe the range of the most likely impacts that may emerge. This approach will also help ensure that our remarks today remain timely and relevant to our readers.

I thought Jonathan Tucker might get us started with the implications for WMD terrorism, which has been on everybody's mind.

**Jonathan Tucker:** In the past, we have tended to downplay the threat of WMD terrorism for two reasons. On the motivational side, relatively few terrorist groups seem to be interested in inflicting mass casualties. On the technical side, there are substantial technical hurdles that would have to be overcome for terrorists to use these weapons on a large scale. I think a number of factors since September 11 have changed that perception to some extent.

The first factor is that the group that attacked on September 11 seemed to differ in its characteristics and methodology from other groups that we have seen in the past. They were willing to give their lives in an attack, which indicates a level of dedication and fanaticism that is not characteristic of terrorists, most of whom wish to survive and see the fruits of their labors. They were also extraordinarily methodical in the way they prepared for this attack, getting training for their operatives. They had a fairly good mastery of tradecraft, being able to communicate without being detected. These factors suggest that perhaps they were receiving assistance from some state intelligence agency that has a good understanding of how the United States collects information and can give them good advice on counterintelligence.

Another factor that is troubling is the possibility that the bin Laden network may have, if not state sponsorship, then association with a state that can provide technical assistance. This assistance could perhaps include access to production facilities and know-how—such as biological seed cultures or chemical weapons precursors—that would make the acquisition of these weapons simpler, allowing the group to take some short cuts around the technical hurdles to acquiring a WMD capability. We just don't know, at least from open sources, the extent to which bin Laden does have ties to regimes such as Iraq or Sudan, but there is a clear implication that such connections are possible. These ties could strengthen if there is military action against Iraq. There is also a clear congruence between a number of states that support terrorism and states that have WMD programs. That fact in itself is troubling.

So when we address the terrorism issue, we need to see it in the context of state-level proliferation. Efforts to reinstate weapons inspections in Iraq, as Leonard Spector and I argued in a recent editorial [*Boston Globe*, September 21, 2001], are especially important. Reintroducing the inspectors would both constrain Iraqi WMD programs and also serve the subsidiary goal of preventing the transfer of WMD to terrorists. I think we could discuss the political feasibility or realism of reintroducing weapons inspectors to Iraq at this time. There may be a narrow window of opportunity given the growing sense of unity on the UN Security Council in terms of dealing with the threat of terrorism. The real impediment to reintroducing inspectors in the past has been divisions in the Security Council, and in fact Iraq has been able to divide and conquer and prevent effective pressure from being applied to restore United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and now, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections.

**Jason Pate:** First of all, in regard to terrorist capabilities, I tend to agree almost completely with Jonathan's assessment that WMD proliferation to states is really the critical issue at this point. I differ a little bit on terrorist motivations, for several reasons. Yes, it is true that the attacks on September 11 killed more civilians than any other terrorist attack in history. That ominously speaks of a desire by the terrorists to inflict mass casualties. However, I draw much more reassuring conclusions from an analysis of September 11. First of all, we appear to be almost going

backwards in terms of terrorist tactics, back to hijackings that were seen 30 years ago. This was a very, very low technology incident. The terrorists were able to achieve their goals without even using explosives. I draw the lesson that we are still in the era of truck bombs and hijackings. That said, what is different is that in the past there have been plans to use planes in a multi-pronged terrorist attack, but generally these have been thwarted. So the level of sophistication demonstrated on September 11 is novel, and shows an ability to break through that barrier. And also, Jonathan was talking about the level of sophistication and patience and planning involved in the September 11 attacks, the infiltration of the United States. That's not a new phenomenon in terrorism, although it is a new phenomenon in the United States. Other countries such as Israel, the United Kingdom, and France, have been dealing with this type of well-planned and prepared terrorist attack for many years. So I draw much more reassuring lessons from the September 11 attacks.

**Jonathan Tucker:** Jason, what about the clear evidence that bin Laden is interested in acquiring WMD? He has said that it is his "religious duty" to acquire such weapons. There have also been recent news stories that bin Laden has already acquired a "crude" chemical or biological capability, although what is actually meant by crude is not defined. Wouldn't it be a logical next step in the pattern of escalation for bin Laden to demonstrate some kind of WMD capability? Even if the group were to carry out a relatively small attack with chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons, the psychological impact would be very severe. So I don't see, Jason, that this group has abandoned aspirations of escalating to a new level of violence.

**Jason Pate:** Those reports are very troubling, but as you suggest, it's the psychological impact of such an attack that is problematic, not the level of violence itself. It's not obvious that using a chemical agent, as opposed to flying planes into buildings, is an escalation. It may be psychologically, but it would be very difficult to kill 6,800 people [editor's note: casualty estimates have dropped since this discussion was held] in a chemical attack like that. Interest in the weapons does not translate into a capability, nor into motivation to use them, particularly given the track record of extremely high levels of success using explosives, truck bombs, and plane hijackings.

**Nikolai Sokov:** We cannot assume that states supporting terrorism will necessarily share their WMD capabilities with terrorists. At some point the issue of control is bound to arise. I seriously doubt that governments will easily transfer control of WMD into the hands of terrorist groups because they often do not fully control these groups. In fact, governments are more likely to keep control of WMD in their hands and, in this sense, they may become our de facto allies, preventing acquisition of WMD capability by terrorists. Of course, they would only be de facto allies and only to the extent dictated by their own interests.

**Leonard Spector:** That is an optimistic comment. I don't know if I would count on Saddam Hussein.

**Amin Tarzi:** A few quick points. Number one, I certainly disagree with Jonathan's initial point that this is a new type of terrorist attack. You can go back into the history of the Middle East, you don't even have to go back to the time of the Assassins, but just back to 1987 and onwards, and you find terrorists who were willing to die for their cause. I don't think there's been any change in this area. My second point concerns Iraq and Sudan. I think we should make a distinction between these two. The Sudan of 1998 and the Sudan of today are completely different. Sudan has been cooperating with the United States and Egypt. We should not put Sudan in the same category with Iraq. Finally, I somewhat agree with Jason that the terrorists may be using the WMD threat to basically exhaust the United States. People don't realize that in the Middle East there is this notion of exhausting U.S. intelligence and diplomatic efforts by threatening to do one thing, and then doing something totally different to make us look for WMD and then hijack airplanes. So let us take that into account. They always say: "we have a jihad to make the United States pay more for civil services, to have more agencies." Let us not forget that.

**Leonard Spector:** I want to let Robert Einhorn make a comment, and then I'd like to turn to the next topic on our agenda, regarding the seriousness of the terrorist WMD threat as opposed to the threat posed by traditional proliferation.

**Robert Einhorn:** I understand the reasons why terrorists may feel they can get by with relatively low-tech means, with which they often obtain spectacular results. So maybe they do not have strong incentives for going the WMD route. But I think it would be foolish, on the basis of this type of analysis, to feel that we do not have to worry about the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists. What the September 11 attacks demonstrate is that there are no inhibitions on the level of death and destruction that these terrorists are prepared to try to achieve. If they can acquire and figure out how to use more destructive weapons, there will not be many other constraints on their use of these weapons. So I think it would be foolish to count on terrorists deciding not to acquire WMD, and U.S. policy needs to take this into account.

**Leonard Spector:** Are there comments on the larger question of whether WMD terrorism has now become the primary proliferation threat? If you look at the actual threats to the United States or to international stability today, is WMD terrorism looming so large that it is dislodging other anxieties about certain countries acquiring such weapons? Even previous nightmare scenarios like [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein with the bomb or a nuclear-armed North Korea, for example, seem less intimidating than terrorists with these weapons. We know how to address the threat posed by countries with weapons of mass destruction, because we've done it with the Russians and others. Today, we may have a new kind of threat, however. Maybe that's a good lead-in for Michael Krepon, whom I'd asked to address the implications of the September 11 attacks for deterrence and related policies.

**Michael Krepon:** First, I want to associate myself with what Robert Einhorn just said. I don't think there are any silver linings to the September 11 attacks, in terms of proliferation problems. They are all now in stark relief. The Cold War strategic concept of mutual assured destruction also took a big hit on September 11. We are now moving much more forcefully into some kind of mix of deterrence and defense in terms of dealing with a wide array of threats associated with WMD. The situation is obviously very fluid, and people who were on opposing sides of the missile defense debate will feel, in both cases, affirmed in their views. We need to make wise choices. It seems to me that if we look at deterrence and defense, homeland defense clearly needs to assume a very high priority. And

homeland defense consists of many different things. A dollar spent on improving airport safety is, I think, quite evidently a dollar better spent than if it were spent on national missile defenses. It's very important to get our priorities straight. We are now spending two dimes on Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs for every dollar that we spend on missile defenses. Our budget allocations are wildly out of alignment. As another example, we are spending more on national missile defenses than on tactical missile defenses. We've got a lot of work to do in terms of getting the right response in this defense and deterrence mix. But mutual assured destruction has no bearing on people who commit grotesque acts of terror, and we clearly need to affirm a new strategic concept.

**Leonard Spector:** Would anyone like to comment on this point?

**Amy Sands:** I don't disagree with what Michael just said, but I think that the ability of the U.S. government to move in that direction very quickly and smoothly will be challenged by entrenched bureaucratic and ideological interests. I was in Washington last week and was amazed at the concern about deterrence, the traditional concept of deterrence and what kind of systems you would need to support U.S. security requirements in 15 years. Even though concerns about terrorists were there, terrorists are considered undeterrable. Therefore, you need to put funds into defense. As we are all aware, missile defense funding went forward with what was requested by the [Bush] administration, with no cuts. I think it's going to be hard, for this administration especially, given the people they have, to change funding priorities. While I agree with you completely that there needs to be a better balance between defense and deterrence, I just don't see how that is going to be achieved, especially in the short term.

**Christine Wing:** It seems to me that the question of whether or not WMD terrorism is the primary threat is creating an either/or dichotomy that is probably not going to be very useful in our thinking. It is very hard to think about these questions right now, but regarding Leonard Spector's notion that we want to think clearly about what the situation may look like six to eight weeks down the road, it seems to me that we are going to draw a different

picture of the threat, and we are going to draw a different picture of the place of WMD in U.S. foreign and military policy. But I wouldn't do it by trying to say that one has priority over the other. I know this is obvious, but I think it's a false question in a sense.

**Leonard Spector:** What I had in mind, when I raised this question, was the idea of "displacement." In other words, the government can only focus on so many issues at once, and of necessity it must be seized with this new threat, displacing its traditional focus regarding weapons of mass destruction.

**Christine Wing:** So the question is about what will happen, not what should happen?

**Leonard Spector:** That's right. Overall, we have had pretty good success in addressing many nonproliferation challenges. At least the spread of these weapons of mass destruction to new states was relatively slow, and we understood how their spread to additional countries evolved. We knew we could manage the process even if we could not always stop it. With the threat of WMD terrorism, by contrast, we have a shadow world, where phantoms pop up and threaten us, but we do not know how or where they are going to strike next or how and against whom we can strike back. In that sense, the new threat not only looms larger, but may indeed be the more immediate and more serious threat to the United States and international stability because, totally apart from the destruction terrorist use of WMD would cause, it can lead to a loss of confidence in our government. If our allies or our citizenry lose confidence in our government, it would be a very profound impact, indeed.

**Christine Wing:** It's also profound in terms of the U.S. public. WMD terrorism is certainly at the top of the list of concerns. All you have to do is walk down the streets of New York to see it.

**Leonard Spector:** For example, if we learn tomorrow that in fact it turned out U.S. intelligence missed a reprocessing [plutonium separation] plant and the North Koreans have four bombs instead of one to two, I think people would say "fine, we know how to meet this challenge,

now on to the next issue." But the possibility that those same new bombs might be in the hands of terrorists would evoke much greater fear and uncertainty.

**Jonathan Tucker:** I do think there is, if not a current, then a potential link between state-level proliferation and terrorist-level proliferation. The reason is simply availability; the more states have these weapons, the more available the necessary technology and know-how. Eventually, I believe there will be some transfer of technology from proliferant states to terrorists. Also, the normative barriers will be eroded. I think even terrorists to some extent can be influenced by moral suasion or at least the existence of a very strong international legal norm. The stronger the norm that exists at the state level, and the stronger the sanctions applied against the few states that retain chemical or biological weapons, the less likely it will be that terrorists will have access to the necessary technologies and will feel emboldened to use these weapons.

**Michael Krepon:** The norm that is most in need of strengthening at this time, in my view, is the norm in Islam against the taking of one's own life, committing suicide, and killing innocents. Islamic norms really need to be refurbished in light of developments in the Middle East, New York, and the Pentagon.

**William Potter:** I think another possible lesson that may be derived from the last several weeks is how easy it may be to inflict massive punishment on nation-states, including nuclear weapon states. I think the vulnerabilities have been exposed in a way that was not appreciated previously. What I fear is that adversaries, not just adversaries of the United States, but also other nation-states that have grievances against the major powers, may turn to sponsoring terrorists as a means to respond to their grievances.

**Rebecca Johnson:** I am a little concerned about some of the questions that are being raised here. To respond to Michael, I do not think in terms of problems with Islam because certainly in Britain and Ireland, we've been dealing with terrorism that's been based on a kind of fundamentalist Protestant and fundamentalist Catholic *political* ethos that has also led groups of people to believe they could not only kill other people but were will-

ing to risk their own lives. So I think the real thing we have to be looking at is how fundamentalism and religious intolerance can be politically manipulated—if combined with certain kind of resources and certain kinds of indoctrination—and how such intolerance can lead groups of people to believe that by committing acts of terrorism and killing other people they can somehow do a good thing in terms of the honor of their community or the honor of their religion or access to paradise.

I also think that one of the lessons for the United States is not to put all its security eggs in one basket and then abruptly pull them out and put them in another basket. One of the key things about terrorism or other forms of asymmetric warfare is that some states, when faced with such a dominant military adversary as the United States or its allies, turn to the unexpected, the surprise. So these attacks resulted from recognizing that hijacked airplanes, a relatively low-tech sort of 1970s phenomenon, can suddenly be transformed and used in a different way as weapons of mass destruction. If the attack then means we turn all our attention to this type of threat, I think that would be a mistake. Because I think one of the problems for future terrorists, or one of the questions they will be looking at, is what do you do to make a major impact for your cause now, after September 11, which stopped the world for a period of time? If you are a group that wants to get major impact, what do you have to do to get that impact? This reasoning leads me to fear that weapons of mass destruction might increasingly become the weapons of choice simply because they cross a different kind of threshold. I think we have to pay attention to that possibility as well as paying attention to the way in which the increased vulnerability to low-tech attacks has also been demonstrated.

But I would actually disagree with Bill Potter's final point that because vulnerability has been vividly demonstrated, that it necessarily will be exploited, perhaps by states. This sort of vulnerability has been demonstrated time and again by terrorist groups in London, Madrid, Bilbao, and in Israel, without necessarily resulting in a significant further escalation in the use of those techniques. So I don't anticipate such an escalation. I think it would be a very high-risk strategy for any state to attempt to use this window of vulnerability now to try to push its own agenda. I think that would very quickly be detected—intelligence is sufficiently high once they clear out the background noise. So I don't actually anticipate that there will be an increase in state-sponsored acts of terrorism.

**Leonard Spector:** Rebecca, let me turn to the next topic if I may and get Bob Einhorn to start our discussion on the implications for arms control measures and nonproliferation regimes. Christine has introduced this topic, and I think it is a good one to follow up on.

**Robert Einhorn:** Let me make some unsystematic points regarding the first of Leonard Spector's bullets here about the U.S.-Russia agenda: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, new strategic framework and so on. I think much will really depend on how Americans and Russians cooperate in managing this incident and this campaign. I think there has opened up in the last couple weeks prospects for cooperation in some rather sensitive areas that could make it easier to cooperate on some of the bigger strategic issues. And if there is to be some sort of compromise between the United States and Russia on whether and how to accommodate missile defense, I think that patterns of cooperation that may be built in the coming weeks could be a decisive factor.

How are traditional arms control and nonproliferation affected by the terrorist attacks? I think it is important to realize that traditional arms control and nonproliferation, and by that I mean before September 11, did not altogether neglect substate actors. There are many aspects of what we did before September 11 that had important implications for constraining terrorists in their acquisition of materials and technologies. You had all of the threat reduction measures and programs with respect to Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS). A very important element of these was preventing the leakage of materials and technologies and equipment to substate actors. Also, simply preventing the proliferation of these capabilities to state actors—Iraq, Iran, Libya, and others—had the motive of preventing Iraq and Iran from having these capabilities because they might be more likely to support the nonstate actors than some of the existing possessors of those capabilities. So a lot that happened before September 11 was relevant. I think those dimensions that have particular applicability to preventing terrorist acquisition of those capabilities will have to be intensified now, clearly. The CTR programs, the programs for physical protection as pursued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other organizations, and similar efforts are very important. So that aspect of the traditional agenda will have to be intensified. I don't think there's a

choice between nonproliferation, or traditional nonproliferation and arms control, on the one hand and anti-terrorism on the other. I think what happened a few weeks ago demonstrates that you've got to work harder on both aspects of the problem. I think, in other words, the anti-terrorism dimension is additive, it doesn't replace the other.

Going back to an earlier point, I think Michael Krepon mentioned it, implied it: what about the weight given to prevention of such attacks versus coping with their effects? There is going to be a lot of civil defense, homeland defense, and other kinds of measures taken to protect against terrible contingencies. That has to go on, but that shouldn't replace prevention. You need both prevention as well as coping with the effects of proliferation, and leakage to nonstate actors. Indeed, you can have a much worse challenge coping with terrorism if you haven't done a good job at prevention. Even with regard to missile defenses, you are going to have a much easier time defending against rogue state missile threats if you have prevented or even contained that capability through traditional nonproliferation measures such as negotiation, in the case of North Korea for example. So I think they go hand in hand. It is not a question of either one or the other.

**Michael Krepon:** I think September 11 clarified the extent to which cooperative threat reduction has displaced mutual assured destruction as the central post-Cold War strategic concept. Cooperative threat reduction requires cooperation, and the cooperation that matters the most in this fight is cooperation with Russia and China. That has ramifications across the board. Treaties are obviously an important aspect here, and the norm-setting that goes on with treaties, and the verification that is mandated by treaties. Prevention measures are going to take an increasingly greater share of our attention and dollars, and then there are the defense measures as well. We have to prioritize these measures. Let me make one last point about the nonproliferation treaties to which most of the people around this table have committed their professional lives. We have followed a model that we need to reconsider. The model has been universality, and the price of universality has been weakened measures for monitoring and for compliance. We all know that the treaty regimes that we have worked hard to put in place have some nations inside of them who are not playing by the rules of the treaty. It is true of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). How do we reassess the impulse towards universality and the price that we pay for universality? I think that we need to think about this important question as we move forward.

**Leonard Spector:** Let me ask Yukiya Amano of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, speaking in his private capacity, to say a few words.

**Yukiya Amano:** Regarding missile defenses, views have been widely divided in this country. Following the debate in the Congress, the immediate impact of the September 11 attacks is working in favor of the [Bush] administration because discussions of issues on which views are widely divided have been postponed. In the long-term future, however, there is no indication that the [Bush administration] policy will be changed. But in the medium-term future, I think missile defense policy will be affected. One way is that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in the next few months is less likely. In another way, sooner or later there will be a competition for funding between missile defenses and the fight against terrorism.

Regarding nonproliferation, in the past nonproliferation meant the prevention of the transfer of technology, equipment, and materials. These aspects should be strengthened. But, in the future, I feel, the concept of nonproliferation will be widened in scope to mean preventing the circulation of money, scientists, engineers, government agents, and terrorists that will cause proliferation of WMD. In the past, of course, we knew that these transfers had implications for nonproliferation. But I feel not enough emphasis has been given to these questions such as finances and the movement of scientists and engineers. But these problems are very serious.

**Leonard Spector:** Thank you. We haven't heard from our colleague in the United Kingdom. Would you care to intervene on any of these points?

**Paul Schulte:** Not to voice any fundamental disagreements. I think it will be conventional wisdom that this event does not make the WMD proliferation agenda any less important in the long run. My concern would be that in the short run some of the attention needed to keep the

[anti-terrorist] coalition together for as long as it takes—nobody is quite sure what that will mean—will mean diverting attention away from WMD proliferation. It will also require a lot of courting of various regimes, particularly in the Middle East, which may be hard to combine with a vigorous pursuit of nonproliferation and compliance issues. So, it is by capturing the short- and medium-term agenda that I think September 11 may be quite destructive with regard to nonproliferation efforts. In the longer term, I think it will certainly increase attention, concern, and prioritization of WMD issues, because people will be afraid. These threats will appear very plausible. You may get not just more electoral opinion mobilized around them but more governments that have been pretty quiet about proliferation issues might be prepared to expend more political capital. But I do not see that happening immediately. Immediately, eyes will be turned on the campaign in Afghanistan and maybe some other places.

**William Potter:** Both Nikolai Sokov and Amin Tarzi are interested in speaking; I think Nikolai will have the opportunity to make his point with regard to the next section. So let me see if Amin wants to come in at this point.

**Amin Tarzi:** Thank you. I would like to make a short point regarding the NPT. I think that for the short term, in order to have a coalition or access to Afghan territory because it is landlocked, the action vis-à-vis Pakistan—specifically the removal of sanctions—will have very negative implications. I think we have already said very loudly that nuclear weapons matter, nuclear weapons are important, having them will change policy. Not using them, but even having one of them, will change the policy of the United States and the rest of the world vis-à-vis that country. So I think that a very wrong message for the longer term success of the NPT has been sent. Unfortunately, most countries in the Middle East, whether they are our friends or not, and even other countries such as Japan and Argentina, may actually think about [acquiring a nuclear capability] because it has utility. The assertions made by the supporters of the NPT that nuclear weapons have no utility in world affairs have been proven wrong now. I think that is a point to underline, not for the short term, but for the long term.

**Amy Sands:** I want to pose a question for the group because I agree with Paul's assessment that in the short- or middle term, arms control and nonproliferation issues will not fall off the U.S. agenda but will be a very low priority. My concern is how do we, make sure that these issues are recaptured in a way that will do what we think needs to happen, which is to enhance some of their aspects, and to use them as a basis for the normative background and foundation. And secondly, a question about what if the United States does something that appears to be overreacting? Would that also undermine its ability in the long term to then go to the international community and develop the rapport and support it needs? There's a certain aspect of what the United States does now that will really have an impact on what we can do down the road.

**Leonard Spector:** We need to move down the agenda but let's have a couple of more comments.

**William Potter:** In part this is informed by discussions I have had recently at the United Nations. One of my concerns, one shared by a number of parties who are anxious to move the nonproliferation agenda forward in the multilateral framework, is that there may be increased reluctance on the part of states (such as the parties to the New Agenda Coalition, to name just one entity) to really try to push the envelope if they believe that the United States or Russia are not supportive. This tendency was present before September 11, but will probably be accentuated further. We are likely to see the first signal of this tendency during the First Committee [of the UN General Assembly (Disarmament and International Security)] when it meets. But I think that there is some reason to be concerned that rather than rocking the boat, or trying to challenge the nuclear weapon states on issues that may be of concern to the vast majority of states, our allies may step back and pause and decide that this is not the time to promote an arms control agenda, even if that agenda includes items that were agreed without a vote during the last NPT review conference.

**Leonard Spector:** I think we saw that with the postponement of the Article 14 conference [the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehen-

sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)]<sup>1</sup>. Jonathan, and then let us go to the next topic.

**Jonathan Tucker:** Just a quick point on possible near-term implications for the BWC and the CWC, which may not be altogether bad. Now that the United States has walked away from the BWC Protocol negotiations, there will be growing international pressure on the United States to come up with a package of alternative measures that will actually do something concrete to reinforce the treaty. I have no idea what those measures will be, but I think there will be a clear expectation that the United States will present some positive proposals at the upcoming BWC review conference in November. With respect to the CWC, I think one possible benefit of this event is that there will be greater emphasis on helping Russia to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile because the weapons at the Russian chemical weapons storage depot at Shchuchye are seen as a proliferation threat.<sup>2</sup> A number of the artillery shells stored at Shchuchye are small enough to be suitable for theft by terrorists, and I think Congress, particularly the Republican-led House of Representatives, will begin to realize that this stockpile is more than just an environmental threat to Russia, it is a security threat to the United States, and only when Russia's chemical stocks are eliminated will they cease to pose a proliferation threat.

**Rebecca Johnson:** I think that from the conversations I have been having, there is a general sense that probably over the next three to six months multilateralism simply isn't going to be on the radar of either the United States or a number of other key countries. Certainly I feel that it is a pity that having postponed the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, they are probably now going to hold it in November so that it is, as planned before, adjacent to the high-level UN [General Assembly] debate, because it will now simply be an exercise in invisibility. But there are two potentially positive things that could emerge.

One is the feeling that once the United States has tried to run this war against terrorism for a few months, there will be a greater realization among some in the current administration who presently don't see the value of multilateral norms, institutions, treaties, and so on that, although they may not be one hundred percent effective, and may have some weaknesses and flaws, nevertheless they are essen-

tial components that do in fact need to be raised in value and given attention.

What I think may happen is that a new kind of window of possibility for the allies and the wider international community to bring some of those issues back into the U.S. agenda may occur sometime during mid- or late 2002. You'll see a drive on two different things. On the CTBT, I think there will now become a drive—not at this upcoming Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, because this one is not going to do anything at all—but over the next year or so, there will be efforts to look at some kind of possibility for provisional application, provisional entry into force. Most didn't want to consider that before because they thought it was too early, but I think you'll now get some voices looking at that, to try to at least embed a norm under the treaty.

Secondly on the BWC, I think that there is now a renewed desire to, at the very least, to move to keep the process alive. They know that this protocol is dead, but they think there might be a possibility to get some kind of agreement to continue a group, whether it is a new ad hoc group of state parties or however they do it, but a mechanism that allows them to continue to talk about strengthening this treaty. They hope to maybe widen that debate away from just looking at institutionalizing verification through a protocol under the treaty, and actually to incorporate some of the things that the United States is going to be challenged to come up with as alternatives to the protocol. I think some of that is going to be positive.

**Jonathan Tucker:** Right, more than just window dressing. The United States will really have to come up with some concrete proposals.

**Leonard Spector:** Let me ask Robert Einhorn to comment quickly, since he has to leave soon.

**Robert Einhorn:** Let me first say a word on multilateralism. Forgive me, Rebecca, I think this is wishful thinking. If the coalition-building and international cooperation to wage this campaign are successful, that could reinforce the desire of some in this administration to look for multilateral solutions to hard problems. But I don't think there will be any change in this administration's view on the efficacy of certain types of legally binding multilateral agreements to contain proliferation or to limit

arms. There are pretty strong views on the efficacy of these measures—and certainly on the efficacy of the BWC Protocol. As for a norm against nuclear testing, the administration believes there is such a norm but that you don't need a legally binding agreement with deficiencies like those of the BWC Protocol, as this administration sees them, to reinforce that norm. You can agree or disagree, but that seems to be the strong view of the administration. So I wouldn't look for the resurrection of some of the old arrangements.

**Leonard Spector:** Garuav Kampani was going to lead us into the issue of South Asia. Would you like to step in here?

**Gaurav Kampani:** The lifting of the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington Amendment sanctions is the most significant indicator that the Bush administration has quietly accepted the fact that India is a nuclear weapon state.<sup>3</sup> India won't necessarily be recognized as a nuclear weapon state, but it will be treated as one. U.S. policy has shifted to the next level. In other words, the United States will no longer try to persuade India to roll back its weaponization program. But it will try to influence India's nuclear doctrine and the architecture of its emerging minimum deterrent, and try and ensure the safety of its nuclear command and control. During the Cold War years, and during much of the last decade, nonproliferation loomed very large in Washington's South Asia agenda. Now the Bush administration has decided to build on the legacy of the second Clinton administration and establish more broad-based ties with India. Hence, the focus has shifted to global terrorism, security of the sea-lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean region, China, and so forth.

On the negative side, the lifting of the Glenn and other sanctions on India means that the United States will no longer oppose loans from multilateral agencies to India; which means that Indian politicians and bureaucracies will have larger economic surpluses to play with. They will also have greater leverage to deploy these surpluses into the nuclear/military sector. The lifting of dual-use technology sanctions will also strengthen India's domestic nuclear lobbies, especially the "strategic enclave." However, on the positive side, once Indo-U.S. relations become more broad-based, and there is a better understanding of New Delhi's regional security interests and other sensitivities, the Indian policy elite might feel

more reassured. Once the logic of India's nuclear status is internalized in Washington, there might be less pressure in New Delhi to indulge in nuclear flag-waving.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, the lifting of all nuclear sanctions was triggered principally by the practical necessity of cooperating with Pakistan after September 11. I don't think that otherwise all nuclear sanctions would have been lifted. Right now the Bush administration has to court Pakistan, because the United States needs Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan. Of course, there is enormous concern about what is going to happen in Pakistan. If U.S. goals are restricted to Osama bin Laden and the destruction of his terrorist network, this will have a lesser impact on Pakistan. But if U.S. goals expand to include the removal of the Taliban, it could lead to a crisis within Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, and at that point, questions about political instability will arise.

In the medium and long term, the United States is going to be focused on ensuring that Pakistan remains a moderate Islamic state. Washington is likely to try and ensure political stability and the return to democracy in Pakistan. The United States will also exert strong pressure on Islamabad to continue its policy of strategic restraint. Finally, it will press Pakistan to reevaluate its support for the Taliban and to assess seriously the possible blowback from efforts to dislodge the Taliban in Afghanistan, that is, to recognize the danger that Pakistan might itself at some stage become the victim of "Talibanization."

**Robert Einhorn:** I disagree with that. I think the lifting at this time of the [sanctions imposed by the] Glenn Amendment, Pressler Amendment, and Symington Amendment (in the case of Pakistan), should not be taken as a sign that the Bush administration has thrown in the towel on nonproliferation in South Asia and is now going to accept or legitimize the nuclear-weapon state status of these two countries. One factual point: the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 and before the need to get Pakistan to work with us on this campaign. I know this for a fact. It was just a question of when to announce it and how to do it. It is my view the administration was looking for a way to lift the sanctions because it felt the sanctions simply were not working. They were disserving a number of objectives without serving any nonproliferation goals. So they were looking to lift the sanctions but in a way that would not signal what Gaurav was suggesting.

Because of the pressures now of assembling the coalition and so forth, the message has been blurred quite a bit, and it is important for the Bush administration to make clear that it hasn't given up on the nonproliferation agenda. But what is that agenda? The agenda is not to rollback the capabilities of these countries. Presumably the administration would like to do that, but it knows this goal is simply not feasible. So the agenda is restraint, rather than rollback. And I hope before long that the Bush administration will make clear that its agenda is restraint and that India and Pakistan restraining those capabilities will help the United States promote a broader nonproliferation agenda.

**Michael Krepon:** Let me add a couple of thoughts here. Another casualty of September 11 that has yet to be acknowledged is the further postponement of substantive discussions between Indian and Pakistan on nuclear risk reduction. The two countries were close at the Agra Summit in July 2001 to coming up with a structured framework for dialogue on this subject and others.

Now it appears to me that a structured dialogue has been postponed, perhaps for the duration of the military campaign in Afghanistan. Moreover, the government of Pakistan continues to assert that nuclear risk reduction is an item of trade rather than something that is intrinsically necessary and essential for South Asia. I find this stance very, very worrisome, and hope that it will change. We are looking at an extremely fluid period in South Asia. No one can confidently predict what strains will be placed on the army in Pakistan during this campaign against terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The Pakistani army leadership, I think, feels that it has the situation pretty well in hand and believes it has pretty good personnel reliability procedures in place. But Pakistan is a country where people have multiple allegiances. The army reflects the society more than ever before in its history. And the army will be under strain and the society will be under strain in the weeks and months to come.

**Guarav Kampani:** I want to address three issues. First, I would surmise Robert Einhorn is factually right. Apparently, the Bush administration was considering the waiver of some nuclear sanctions on Pakistan. However, statements emanating from administration officials prior to September 11 did appear to suggest that Pakistan would

not be treated exactly like India as far as the lifting of all nuclear sanctions was concerned.

Second, regardless of the rationale for the lifting of Glenn sanctions in Washington, it is important to note how the effects of the latest policy change are perceived in New Delhi and Islamabad. If you follow the Indian media and read commentaries in Indian news media sources, it becomes clear that Indians now believe that the worst is over, and India has at last been tacitly accepted as a nuclear weapon state. At an anecdotal level, there is a smug feeling that the Bush administration is less internationalist than its predecessor; that the Bush team consists of hard-headed realists, unlike the liberals who preceded them; and that these are people with whom New Delhi can do business. Similarly, the appointment of people like Ashley Tellis to the U.S. embassy in New Delhi has been interpreted by Indian commentators as showing that at last there is an individual in an influential position who understands Indian sensibilities and can talk to the Americans in their own language. In other words, there is a smug belief in New Delhi that India has won a critical proliferation battle.

A final aspect, regarding Michael Krepon's comments, I think even though the dialogue between India and Pakistan has been placed on the back burner, and invariably we are focusing on terrorism, I think attention will focus on what the Pakistani government agencies have done in Afghanistan and what is really happening in Kashmir. If the United States were to broaden its focus on terrorism to include Pakistani state sponsorship of militant activities in Kashmir, and were to bring pressure on Pakistan to reduce state-sponsored violence at some level, then there might also be pressure on India to accept some sort of an international mediation effort to address the Kashmir issue.

**Amin Tarzi:** First, I totally agree with Guarav. We unfortunately look at the world from a very Washington-centric perspective. We have to see how the rest of the world perceives events; it is important to understand not only how we see it—that is, whether Bush has thrown in the towel or not, to use Bob Einhorn's words. I don't think Bush has thrown in the towel, but the perception out there is that nuclear weapons matter. Look at Pakistan. We had a UN Security Council resolution [condemning the Taliban]—three of them, in fact—the last one was resolution 1333 of December 2000. We had people like [former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Af-

fairs] Karl Inderfurth calling on Pakistan openly to stop their support of the Taliban. We have concurrent resolutions of the U.S. Congress from October 2000, House resolution 414 and Senate resolution 150, calling on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. All of these declarations were made from 1998 up through 2000. But there was no action. We had all these policies aimed at ending Pakistani support of the Taliban but no implementation.

Now the United States is basically going [in a new direction], and Pakistan has become our main ally. The conclusion that many are drawing is that one reason we are so keen on allying with Pakistan—there are other possible allies like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan—is because they are the ones that have nuclear weapons. At the same time, no one is even raising the issue that Pakistan essentially created the Taliban. So the perception that nuclear weapon capabilities can change U.S. policy is out there. We have to look at that.

**Leonard Spector:** My thought on this is that prior to September 11, the United States had a new relationship unfolding with India, which was based on India being the world's largest democracy and the Indian strategic presence in South Asia. We had nothing specific to link us to Pakistan. Thus, we had an imbalanced relationship with the two South Asian countries. Now for better or worse, we have a special new relationship with Pakistan. Having connections on both sides may allow us, at a certain stage in the game, to bring them together a bit. Maybe that is wishful thinking, but at least now we have the attention of the leadership in both capitals and a certain rapport with both countries.

Let's turn now to the implications of the events of September 11 for U.S.-Russian WMD issues.

**Nikolai Sokov:** The impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S.-Russian relations is likely to be minimal for two reasons. First, the relationship had stabilized prior to the attack, so there was no need for a fundamental turnaround. Cooperation has broadened in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, but this process only reinforces already existing trends. Second, the institutional forms and the depth of current U.S.-Russian cooperation in anti-terrorist operations are not sufficient to fundamentally change the nature of that relationship, at least not in the short term. These events may trigger a new impulse

to institutionalize the U.S.-Russian relationship, although immediate results in this respect are unlikely. The suspicion of the Russian military about U.S. aims in Central Asia, which became apparent after the announcement of the Russian official position, clearly demonstrated that considerable mistrust of the United States remains among Russian elites, and that this mistrust will be difficult to overcome.

On issues related to the ABM and START treaties, I do not anticipate any change whatsoever. The situation now remains about the same as before the terrorist attacks. The United States is likely to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, while Russia will probably respond by withdrawing from START I and other treaties, while refraining from more decisive actions, such as accelerated modernization or deployment of weapons. This pattern was already quite clear before September 11. The situation is similar with regard to enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet again, Russia will make strong statements, but will refrain from tough action in the near future. There will be no impact on CTR activities. These programs will continue without any changes, at least as far as Russia is concerned. We already have several examples of crises during the 1990s, the worst of which was Kosovo, which had no impact on CTR programs.

Regarding India, I want to strongly support what Gaurav said a few minutes ago. The removal of sanctions by the United States against India might be taken by Moscow as a green light, a sign that it is acceptable to develop cooperation with India, including on nuclear and missile technology. The same logic applies to Iran. Consequently, conflicts with the United States over these trade ties will continue. The position Iran has assumed with regard to the anti-terrorist operation might, in fact, help solidify the Russian determination to continue this trade. Moscow may use the Iranian stance to justify its trade with Iran, arguing that in the new political climate, this trade should not cause the United States any concern.

On Iraq, the Russian position will not change or will change only marginally. If U.S. military actions are launched against Iraq without incontrovertible evidence of an Iraqi role in the recent terrorist attacks, the impact on U.S.-Russian relations will be very negative, mostly because of the political fallout inside Russia. The Russian relationship with China will continue to develop as before, although it did slow down a little bit over the summer, partly as a result of successful U.S.-Russian summits. In

the future, concerns about U.S. intentions in Central Asia might reemerge as a central point of the Russian-Chinese agenda. If the United States is not very careful with its policy in the region, we might see a faster rapprochement between Russia and China.

The key factor in future Russian policy remains its integration into the decisionmaking mechanisms of the Western community, first and foremost NATO. I think the recent invitation of [Russian Defense Minister] Sergei Ivanov to the NATO Defense Ministers meeting [in Brussels] was an extremely important and symbolic step, and involvement of Russia in NATO structures should be pursued further. Ultimately, nuclear deterrence can be removed from the U.S.-Russian relationship only through further integration and the development of an institutional framework supporting this integration. It would be a mistake to conceptualize today's U.S.-Russian relationship in terms of whether Russia is "with" or "against" the United States on terrorism. Many problems in the U.S.-Russian relationship predate terrorist attacks and cannot be resolved within the context of the anti-terrorist operation. Instead, the new, higher level of cooperation should be utilized to create a new atmosphere and new institutions that would help to resolve these other problems.

**William Potter:** I tend to agree with most of what Nikolai said, particularly the importance of engaging Russia as a real partner in the decisionmaking process. That is really the key. The extent to which the United States is prepared to include Russia in this manner is likely to determine the future direction of the U.S.-Russian relationship. It is also worthwhile to note what I see as a significant change in Russian public sentiment towards the United States, which I should give Putin more leeway than was the case previously.

To the extent that there were any prospects for movement on a Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, I fear that not only will the Russians be less flexible on this issue, but the United States may also revisit the question of the potential utility of nuclear weapons in Central Asia and therefore may not be as supportive of the zone as it was previously.

An interesting test both of the substantive commitment of the U.S. administration to nonproliferation and the new relationship with the countries of South Asia will come in the meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It will be interesting to see whether the Russians continue to push

for a separate regime for South Asia and whether the United States reiterates its opposition to that position in light of the new potential strategic partnership with certain countries in South Asia.

**Leonard Spector:** It seems to me that we have something of a disagreement within the group over whether or not the Bush administration is going to soften up a bit on Russia. Here we are with Russia endorsing the idea of U.S. military forces operating out of Central Asia...

**Nikolai Sokov:** Russia had no choice. The United States presented the choice in terms that are very familiar from Soviet history: "those who are not with us are against us." Russia had to go along. But those in Russia who wanted cooperation with the West hoped for more, especially in terms of institutionalizing the relationship. It became clear early on that they hoped that Russia would become an integral part of the coalition, complete with a place in the war councils, and a role in military decisionmaking. There are also very strong forces inside Russia that are unhappy with the very limited role Russia is assigned at the moment and that remain very concerned about the implications of an expanded U.S. presence in Central Asia.

**Leonard Spector:** To continue with the point I was trying to make, the Russians have done enormous favors for us in facilitating, or not objecting, to our putting some kind of military forces right in their backyard. That is pretty extraordinary. Clearly it is a favor of enormous value to us. It is hard to imagine that next week or next month, in the context of all of these actions, we are going to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Perhaps others disagree with me that recent events are changing the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The ABM Treaty was the leading issue of concern to Moscow for the past six months—even more prominent than NATO expansion. I can't believe that we going to go and poke a finger in their eye after they have been so helpful to us in the war against terrorism.

**Michael Krepon:** The need for cooperation from both Russia and China could clearly affect decisions of timing, but it is not clear to me yet that it affects the policy preferences of the Bush administration.

Let me go back to something important that Nikolai Sokov said that is worth reinforcing. When we talk about cooperative threat reduction, we can talk about it at varying levels. One level is cooperation together against terrorist groups. A second level is cooperation against states that have very, very murky relations with terrorist groups, and states that might well be pursuing WMD in their own right. Nikolai was saying that he did not anticipate much change in Russian relations with Iran as a result of this new world that we are living in.

I do not anticipate much change in China's relationship to Pakistan, either. We can get help from Russia and China against substate groups that we are all very worried about. But the impulses that have led Russia to relate to Iran in a certain way or that have led China to relate to Pakistan in a certain way, those factors have not changed after September 11, even though, for example, the Chinese leadership is very well aware of the ties between the army leadership and the Inter-Service Intelligence leadership in Pakistan with *jihadi* groups that are very active in Kashmir and that are Osama bin Laden's biggest fans in Pakistan.

I have to throw a little bit of cold water on Leonard Spector's hopeful guess that perhaps better relations between the United States and both Islamabad and New Delhi could lead to a constructive role on Kashmir. Unless and until the army leadership in Pakistan changes its Kashmir policy, it is hard to see how the situation in Kashmir gets any better. The army leadership has basically said they are going to cooperate with the United States and are even ready, very reluctantly, to see what might come after the Taliban. But they are doing this to protect their Kashmir policy and to protect their strategic assets. That does not lead to a solution to the Kashmir problem. A reevaluation by the Pakistani army leadership of the wisdom of its Kashmir policy would open the door to a useful U.S. role, and indeed, an entirely new U.S. relationship with Pakistan.

**Leonard Spector:** A thoughtful point, Michael. Let's turn to our final agenda topic, the Middle East.

**Amin Tarzi:** I would like to go back to Iraq, and the point made by Jonathan Tucker about the need to reintroduce weapons inspectors from UNMOVIC into Iraq. I also agree that these inspectors could then monitor not only Iraqi

weapons, but also potential transfers of Iraqi special weapons technology to terrorists. I absolutely agree with this point. The only question is: how do we achieve the reintroduction of the inspectors?

Iraq is a very important issue, but when looking at the Arab street, there are many things we should consider. We have to look at both military and intelligence issues, but we also have to look at our foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East. What has happened in the past is the voice of the Arab street has never been heard. It has basically been dismissed. Since Arab countries are not democratic, the tendency has been to say, "Who cares? We basically support the government."

What has that to do with Iraq? U.S. policy on Iraq has unfortunately been a contradictory policy. On one hand, we have a UN policy calling for new inspections, while on the other we have a U.S. policy calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. That is one reason we are losing the support of some of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (P-5). Because the P-5 are asking, "What is U.S. policy? Do you really want inspectors? Or do you want Saddam Hussein to be removed?" And there are also concerns among other countries with the issue of state sovereignty. We must look at this policy a little closer within the Bush administration. Early in the Bush administration there was an attempt to review U.S. policy on Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell went to Congress and said that our Iraq policy was in disarray, but Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz actually contradicted Powell openly. So we saw a conflict between the State Department and Department of Defense on how to proceed with Iraq. There was also an effort, mostly by the Department of Defense, to push the removal of Saddam Hussein by the INC [Iraqi National Congress]. That didn't work because the United States does not even really understand the capabilities or motivations of the INC.

The U.S. should conduct a very thorough review of its policy toward Iraq, because the way that we have been maneuvering for the past 11 years will not work. The Saudi government, the Arab street, and even our own allies are very tired of the bombing campaign [against Iraq]. The Arab street thinks we are killing Iraqi children in order to keep Saddam Hussein in check. Some in the region even argue that the United States prefers to have Saddam Hussein in power, because the threat he creates legitimizes the use of military force and generates tension.

So that is how many in the Middle East perceive U.S. policy on Iraq, and we have lost the propaganda war. In spite of this, I think we need to resume inspections in Iraq, and we may even have an opportunity to get rid of Saddam Hussein. If there is any evidence that he was involved with the September 11 events, there will be a chance to finally accomplish what we should have done in 1991. Of course, that would not solve the problem of what to do after he is gone.

Saddam Hussein has two Islamic groups fighting—the Soldiers of Islam (Jund Islam) and the Movement of Islamic Unity (Harakat al-Wahdat al-Islamiyyah)—in Northern Iraq, most likely with Osama bin Laden’s help. He is trying to attack the Kurds and, just yesterday, the two Kurdish factions united against the new threat. We need to look both at our Iraq policy, not only regarding inspections, but maybe regarding attempts to change the regime in Iraq. How feasible that is, of course, is something that will be seen in the future. I do not see inspectors going back, however, unless there are major shifts. I don’t think Russia or France will change their policies in this respect.

On Iran, the response of Tehran shows the divide between the Iranian government and the people. What we have is unlike most other countries in the region: the Iranian public likes us [the United States], while [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah] Khamenei—at least at this point—does not. The Iranian public held candlelight vigils, which were not fake, but genuine. The participants actually risked their own personal security to do that. You don’t see that in any place in the Middle East but Tehran. In the Arab public mind, we are supporting very undemocratic and very forceful regimes, so Arab sentiment is not so much with us. Whereas in Iran, because the United States is not supporting an authoritarian system, but is instead in conflict with it, the public likes us.

Can we use that? Yes. But if we overuse it, we are going to jeopardize [President Mohammad] Khatami’s own government. It is a very fine line. At the same time, we should not throw away Khamenei, as he controls the military and the intelligence [services]. Khamenei may come with us if we go through him. So I think that, even if there is not yet an open dialogue with Iran, I hope we keep this possibility open. I don’t think the media should be involved, because if it is, then nothing will happen. Track II or clandestine discussions can produce results.

Regarding Russia and Iran, I agree with Nikolai Sokov. Iran and Russia have a relationship, and if you read Khamenei’s speech of September 26, he says, “First evi-

dence shows that the American government attempts to repeat what they did in the Persian Gulf and this region, that is in Central Asia. They attempt to come and establish themselves in the region under the pretext of the lack of security here. Evidence shows that they are doing so in Pakistan, on the Subcontinent, in Central Asia, and Afghanistan.” Basically the fear is that this situation will mean that the United States, having established itself in the Persian Gulf, will establish itself in Central Asia in the same manner. Iranian and Russian officials are hand in hand on this issue and will oppose expanded U.S. influence, especially in the Caspian, as will China. So we may want to give and take and allow the Iranians and the Russians to deal with the Caspian on their terms so as to reduce these concerns.

As far as nuclear weapons and whether anti-terrorism cooperation with Iran will reduce proliferation, my view is pessimistic: Iranian proliferation has nothing to do with who rules there. If we had the return of the Shah’s son, who lives in the United States, I still think Iran would still want to go nuclear. And what happened in Pakistan is just more evidence that nuclear weapons are important. Furthermore, Iran resides in a region where they remain useful. So in my view, Iran will eventually try for a nuclear capability. In that case, it would be better if the Iranian regime were more friendly to U.S. interests, but would that in itself stop proliferation? No. In fact, if anything, I think recent developments place emphasis on nuclear weapons even more.

**Paul Schulte:** I don’t see any immediate implications for UNMOVIC’s chances of gaining access to Iraq. Some developments could make the situation worse, such as military action against Iraq short of removing Saddam Hussein, which would seal Iraqi defiance. A lot will depend on what goes on in Afghanistan. If Russia is violently antagonized by a long clumsy campaign, which looks unlikely at the moment, then I think it could play an even less helpful role over Iraq. But the situation looks stalemated and unpromising. And I don’t see it getting unlocked by post-September 11 events, and I can see ways in which it could get even worse.

**Leonard Spector:** My sense was that we seemed to be embarked on a more cooperative relationship with Russia, and what Russia has at stake in Iraq is hard to understand. Russia sometimes seems to be motivated by a neur-

ingrained response to our desire to be present and influential in the Persian Gulf region. If they could be brought along to endorse a Security Council effort to get the inspectors back into Iraq, Saddam would have to be fearful that we—meaning the United States and our British allies—would back that up with force very emphatically. So I thought the dynamics here have shifted a bit especially because of the connection between Saddam and some terrorist groups and because of the increased anxiety in Washington about Iraqi biological weapons falling into the wrong hands. So I think there are opportunities here. I recognize, however, that it may be that it is impossible to move this issue to the forefront of the agenda of the United States because we have a bigger challenge right at the moment.

**Paul Schulte:** The only response I would make to that is that a successful campaign in Afghanistan is going to show America's global reach is even greater. It will be a further symbol of U.S. abilities around the world, including in Russia's backyard. If that happens, even though the Russians may welcome it in many ways, because they don't like Islamic terrorists either, are they going to be anxious to see another U.S. success in Iraq?

**Leonard Spector:** I can't answer that, but perhaps this is a good point to leave this matter and permit our readers to ponder the issue for themselves.

**Amin Tarzi:** I wanted to respond to Rebecca Johnson's point on Islam. I think she made a very good point. And

Prime Minister Blair has done a good job in engaging the Islamic community in the United Kingdom. That said, we have a lack of knowledge of Islam. Most of us think *jihad* means holy war, according to Islamic law, and that *fatah* means death threat, but both of these translations are wrong. I think we need to engage and even persuade the 99 percent of Muslims in this country who are peaceful American citizens to become more involved. We need to persuade the Saudis to have conferences condemning terrorism from the perspective of Islamic law. I think that this is something that should be used eventually.

**Leonard Spector:** I see we have run out of time. This has been an extremely valuable discussion, and I want to thank all of you for participating.

<sup>1</sup> The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which was scheduled to be held on September 25-27, 2001, at the United Nations in New York, was postponed following the September 11, 2001 attacks. For more information, see <[http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/ctbt/article\\_iv/index.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/ctbt/article_iv/index.html)>.

<sup>2</sup> The Shchuchye chemical weapons depot, located in Kurgan Oblast, Russia, stores over 5,450 metric tons of nerve agent, weaponized in nearly two million artillery projectiles, 718 bulk-filled FROG and Scud missile warheads, and 42 bomblet-filled SS-21 warheads. See Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, "Preventing the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons and Know-How," *Nonproliferation Review* 7 (Spring 2000), p. 92.

<sup>3</sup> The 1994 Glenn Amendment imposes a wide range of economic sanctions on states defined as non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT (including India and Pakistan) that detonate nuclear explosive devices. These sanctions were triggered against both countries in 1998 following their nuclear tests. The Pressler Amendment prohibits U.S. military assistance to Pakistan unless the president certifies that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. Sanctions under this provision were imposed against Pakistan in 1990, when President George H.W. Bush declined to make this certification. The Symington amendment prohibits economic and military assistance to NPT non-nuclear weapon states that import uranium enrichment equipment unless they place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection. This sanction was imposed against Pakistan in 1995 following its importation from China of specialized magnets for its uranium enrichment plant, one of several Pakistani nuclear installations not subject to IAEA inspection. Sanctions under all three provisions that applied to India and Pakistan were lifted by President George W. Bush shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. In a 1999 provision known as the Brownback Amendment II, Congress had previously provided the president discretionary authority to waive these penalties. President Clinton had previously used this authority to waive most elements of the Glenn Amendment sanctions for India and several elements for Pakistan.